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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with tracking and theorizing the co-production of an emergent
technoscientific regime - that of biotechnology in the context of drug development - with an
emergent political economic regime that sees the increased prevalence of such research in
corporate locales, with corporate agendas and practices. Hence biocapital, which asks questions
of the implications for life sciences when performed in corporations, and for capitalism, when
biotechnology becomes a key source of market value.
The methodology followed in this dissertation is multi-sited ethnography. I study a range
of actors - including academic and industrial scientists, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and
policy makers - in two distinct national environments, the United States and India, as they shape
and come to terms with these emergent technologies and emergent political economies.
I attempt, through such a study, to theorize biocapital, drawing primarily upon Marxian
and Foucauldian understandings of life, labor and value, and upon literature in Science and
Technology Studies, that has constantly drawn attention to the constructed, contingent and
politically consequent nature of technoscientific activity. In the process, this thesis intervenes in
social theoretical debates not simply around the nature and production of knowledge and value,
but also around the place of larger belief-systems - relating to religion, nation and ethics - in
such productive enterprises. It simultaneously intervenes in conceptual debates within cultural
anthropology regarding methodological questions that surround the undertaking of comparative
ethnographic projects of powerful sites of knowledge production and value generation in a
globalized world.
Thesis supervisor: Michael M.J. Fischer
Title: Professor of Anthropology and Science, Technology and Society
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PROLOGUE: DISCOVERY AND REVOLUTION
Deciphering the code of existence requires a special set of tools.
Affymetrix. Discover more.'
I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;
And on the pedestal these word. appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.2
Affymetrix, a Santa Clara, CA based biotechnology company, is the inventor and
manufacturer of DNA chips, what they call GeneChip® arrays. A DNA chip is a 1 cm x 1 cm
silicon wafer substrate, that has genes tagged to it, on which hybridizations can be performed to
compare two sets, and "states", of genetic samples, to see which genes are selectively up- or
down-regulated in response to certain events, or predispositions to events (these events usually
'From an advertisement for Affymetrix, Inc., a Santa Clara, CA based biotechnology company.
2 Shelley (1818).
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being diseases). It is an actant in the sense that Bruno Latour uses the term (Latour 1987).
Essentially a machine, DNA chips are also an experimental site, an entire laboratory on a single
silicon wafer,3 and a bearer of scientific fact, as it is a tool in providing not just a profile of gene
expression across whole clusters of genes (conceivably across whole genomes), but also therefore
enables us to know our predispositions to various traits, once those gene expression profiles are
adequately correlated with those different traits.
The DNA chip epitomizes both many of the features of biocapital that I see as its
distinctive markers (just as the chip itself shows distinctive markers of traits, even as it disavows
cause-effect relationships between those markers and their corresponding traits). In the ad in
Figure 1, the DNA chip is also shown to embody and reflect some of the contradictory discourses
and tensions that I want to show as constitutive of biocapital.
Firstly, the DNA chip, both as it is represented in this ad and in its everyday existence as
a key material-semiotic object of the genomics revolution, embodies a promise, the promise of
understanding as leading to discovery. It is a promise that is couched in the secular terms of
cryptography and computer code. Yet that much more emphatically Christian premise, of the
human genome as the Book of Life (Kay 2000) and the Holy Grail, is barely hidden. The DNA
chip is the first of many salvationary objects provided to us by the biotechnology - genomics
revolution. It offers us the first step on the route to knowledge that will ultimately, in this
narrative, lead to the generation of new therapies for diseases without adequate cures.4
But secondly, the DNA chip is also a signifier that we are both always already
predisposed to a whole range of diseases and, therefore, just one of many variable living entities,
not "pathological" (see Canguilhem 1989 [1966]) in our multiple disease predispositions.
3 Indeed, another company that makes chips for biomedical applications, Caliper Technologies (based in
Mountain View, CA) explicitly calls their products labs-un-a-chip (or LabChip®).
4 It is already clear that the greatest promises of genomics lie in cancer research.
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Therefore, the DNA chip hastens to tell us of our (potential) imperfections even as it tells us that
it is the fact of having these imperfections in the first place that makes us "normal".
Figure 1: Affymetrix advertisement for DNA Chip
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What is immediately promised, by the ad and by the chip, is not a therapeutic, but a
diagnostic; not a drug, but knowledge. At once modest, yet extremely profound, the DNA chip is
a tool to decipher code, where deciphering code itself is a tool for profoundly revolutionary and
scale-making practices of getting better through an understanding of "life itself'.5 The chip is at
once salvationary and secular-utopian, the salvation mediated by the rational accrual and use of
the "ultimate" knowledge of human existence.6 One's "agreeing" or "disagreeing" with the type
of knowledge doesn't preclude this knowledge from functioning in all the ways mentioned above,
as supremely authoritative, as fact, but also as fact that is somehow fundamental and originary, as
fact about existence, fact that will lead us to discover more. About what, or to what end, is not a
part of this script.
Thirdly, the DNA chip is a commodity, but only a commodity that is also already an
experimental system and knowledge, all in one. It interpellates us, as both patients- and
consumers-in-waiting, as subjects of a knowledge-producing enterprise that is one of the most
capital intensive and profitable enterprises there is.
The DNA chip is quite literally a hybridization of informatics and life, as DNA samples
are hybridized onto a silicon chip in order to create the DNA chip. Both a commodity and an
object of knowledge production, it has within it the mysticism and authority associated with each.
What it does is standardize, providing a neutral (as in scientific) playing-field for such vexed
analyses as comparisons of populations for predispositions to disease or drug response - the
5 For an extremely insightful use of Michel Foucault's term "life itself' as it pertains to the revolutionary
imaginaries of contemporary biotechnology, see Franklin (2000).
6 I think here of Douglas Adams (1995) on "life, the universe and everything", in which he shows through
deftly excessive humor how the answers to profoundly revolutionary questions are often apparently banal
and unintelligible, but nonetheless lead, in their very quest, to scale-making projects that are both extremely
productive and extremely dangerous, violent and potentially destructive. Also central to Adams' implicit
philosophy is that such questions also lead, in the attempted elucidation of their answers, to extremely
interesting stories, biographies and enactments, whose narration is of as much importance as the "ultimate"
diagnosis of outcomes.
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latter, pharmacogenomics, being one of the most immediately realizable outcomes of the
genomics revolution.
The DNA chip also has tied into it histories that point directly to the strategic terrains of
ownership through intellectual property protection that serve as yet another diagnostic marker of
the biocapitalist era that the chip signifies. Patent disputes around DNA chip technology are
bewilderingly numerous as well as complex, because it is very difficult to determine exactly what
a particular patent covers, and what specific licensing agreements have covered. Patents are taken
out not just on the DNA chip, but on the hardware and software associated with the chip, the
applications of the chip for different research / therapeutic / diagnostic purposes, the fundamental
principles on which the chip operates, and so on. Patent disputes over research tools can span
different "components" of the tool (underlying principle versus method of manufacture versus
specific application), previous licensing agreements and different national legal regimes, and are
further complicated by the fact that the companies involved themselves often postdate the initial
fundamental patents that get argued about. Some patent disputes are between competitors, such as
the case between Affymetrix and Hyseq Inc.7 Others are between "collaborators", for example the
dispute between Incyte and Affymetrix. These two companies had entered into an alliance in
1996 to develop and commercialize novel and disease-specific gene expression databases and
services,8 a partnership that combined Affymetrix's GeneChip® technology with Incyte's
LifeSeqTM genomic database. Affymetrix's suit was against chip developer Synteni, which had
just been bought by Incyte.9 Incyte wasn't averse to taking their own adversaries to court over
such technologies (which can generically be referred to as microarray technology), taking Gene
See http://www.affymetrix.com/press/pr980818.html for Affymetrix's press release on this matter.
8 http://www.recap.com/alliance.nsf/la23c592bl 03546f88256480005a7e33.
9 See http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/657bO6742b5748e888256570005cbaOl/.
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Logic to court alleging infringement of three of its patents which all cover microarray and gene
expression technologies.'°
Meanwhile, the fact that hybridization was developed as a technology in the first place by
Edward Southern led to another series of patent disputes. In 1995, Southern founded a company
co-owned by Oxford University called Oxford Gene Technology Ltd. (OGT) in order to develop
and commercialize services using microarray technology. On 13 December 1999, they signed a
licensing agreement with Incyte covering each other's microarray and gene expression technology
portfolios, under which OGT provided Incyte with access to the basic array technology, and in
turn got access to the downstream technologies associated with the production and use of the
microarrays.
While OGT was building bonds with Incyte, they were taking Incyte's ex-buddy
Affymetrix to court to revoke two of their UK patents relating to microarrays. Justifying this,
Southern said, "Affymetrix did not invent the array. Yet they appear to be attempting to patent all
arrays and achieve a monopoly over all arrays. This conduct may hinder the emergence of
competitive array technologies, such as the computer-controlled printing techniques disclosed in
our original filing. If not checked this could ultimately drive people away from arrays altogether.
It would be a catastrophe not to make full use of such a powerful analytical tool.""
Therefore, on the one hand, there are intellectual property disputes over what is uniquely
coverable by patents relating to the chip. On the other hand, there have been disputes that have
stemmed from the fact that less sophisticated versions of the chip are easy to "homes
manufacture". Affymetrix, after spending lots of money in aggressively (and not always
successfully) protecting its intellectual property on the chip, is now "open-sourcing" it: a dramatic
10 For Incyte's press release on this, see http://www.incyte.com/news/1999/genelogic.html.
I Quoted in OGT's press release, http://www.ogt.co.uk/ogt02.html. Earlier, OGT had brought proceedings
against Affymetrix to US and UK courts for infringements. In defence, Affymetrix resorted to stating
licensing agreements made previously between other corporations / incarnations of the two parties, pointing
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example of the ways in which contradictions built into the supra-commodification of biological
objects leads to tensions that force decommodification; but also an example of the ways in which
forced decommodifications get articulated as magnanimous acts of "gifting" naturally ownable
property to the public domain.'2 "Open-sourcing" is through what is called the NetAffxM
Analysis Center, which enables researchers to correlate their GeneChip® array results with array
design and annotation information.
Both the DNA chip itself, and the advertisement for it that I show at the start of this work,
provide windows onto each of the five sets of theoretical issues I explore in the dissertation:
speed and information, ownership and ethics, vision and hype, nation and salvation, and risk and
subjectivity. In order to understand a little bit more about why I think this tool, and the way this
ad represents this tool, are such useful segues into my larger arguments regarding biocapital, it is
perhaps useful to start by explaining exactly what sort of tool the DNA chip might be in drug
development.
The ad, interestingly, does not make explicit at any point that this tool is about, or for,
drug development at all. The message here is about deciphering, almost as an end in itself rather
than necessarily as a prelude to therapeutic development. Before the genomics "revolution" (and I
purposely for the time being put this in quotes), the end point of what might broadly be called a
"pharmaceutical" enterprise was precisely the development of therapeutics. One of the many
things genomics promises us - and I explore this in detail in Chapter 8 - is the possibility of
diagnostic development without the concomitant development of therapeutics. In itself, the DNA
to a license granted by Isis Innovation, Oxford University's technology transfer company to Beckman
Instruments (now Beckman Coulter, plc) in 1991.
12 1 asked one of the division managers at Affymetrix where the company would realize value if they
"open-sourced" the chip. Her response was that the quality of Affymetrix chips is so high that people will
still buy the chip rather than reverse-engineer their own based on the information Affymetrix has open-
sourced. In other words, by early 2002, Affymetrix has moved to a situation where it relies on brand loyalty
rather than intellectual property protection to retain market monopoly. While branding can never provide
the type of complete monopoly that IP can, the belief in the company is that what is lost in terms of
absolute protection is compensated for by the symbolic capital that can accrue from releasing chip
information into the public domain.
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chip is a decoding device, one that will allow association between gene expression and disease
predisposition and therefore one that will be a useful prelude to the development of diagnostic
tests, and some of its most promising, and potentially profitable, uses stem from that fact.
But the importance of having tools to "decipher the code of human existence" also
underlies what has been an attempted paradigm shift in therapeutic development over the past
number of years, towards what is called "rational" drug design. Traditionally, drug development
occurred through medicinal chemistry by trying to determine the therapeutic properties of
candidate natural products and seeing if those therapeutic properties exceeded the toxicity of the
products concerned sufficiently to enable it be used as a drug. The two problems that became
manifest with what was for decades a very successful strategy of natural product chemistry for
drug development were, firstly, that this strategy involved a completely random screening of
possible leads, with all the attendant risk and uncertainty that comes from an inability to
predictably prioritize promising lead compounds; and secondly, that it has recently come to be
suspected that most of the "low-hanging fruit" in terms of therapeutic natural products have
already been picked.
There are two broad approaches possible to rational drug design. The first is to
"rationalize" the chemistry, by creating combinatorial libraries of chemical compounds from
which therapeutic molecules can be derived. I do not talk specifically about this in this
dissertation (though see Barry Werth's fascinating book The Billion Dollar Molecule for a history
of Vertex Pharmaceuticals, one of the first biotech companies to aggressively move into rational
drug design in the early 990s), though in terms of the scientific-corporate implosion into venture
science, in terms of hype, vision, promise and a certain contingent, unpredictable and far from
complete fulfillment of that promise, combinatorial chemistry prefigures many of the current
happenings in genomics.
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The second approach is to rationalize drug development by identifying molecular targets
within the cell by elucidating biological mechanisms at the molecular level. This really is the
outcome of the recombinant DNA revolution. Genomics - by "deciphering code" - becomes one
means to such realization.
The Affymetrix DNA chip is precisely a tool that enables the earliest stages of such a
rationalization, by helping to look for gene candidates that might be therapeutic targets (though as
argued in Chapter 8, the sorts of information provided by the chip are a very very early stage in
the possible development of any therapeutic actually based on such information), and by looking
for gene markers that could be used in the development of diagnostic tests (a much easier
proposition). Further, the DNA chip allows not just rationalization, but high-throughput
rationalization: massively parallel analysis of whole genomes or parts of genomes that can
increase the speed of analysis manifold.'3 These - information and speed - really are the defining
facets of genomics.
The story of the DNA chip is one about speed, but also one, as outlined above, about
commodification, and therefore about speedbumps inherent to a system that makes such speed
possible (this is the theme I elaborate while talking about speed and information in Chapter 4).
The story of the chip is also a story full of promise, it is a tool of the future. And yet the ad shows
the chip embedded, quite literally, in the past, not just in post-Christ-ian history, but in pre-
history; the code of human existence as depicted in this ad is not computer code, but a hieroglyph;
not the Book of Life, but before the Book.
It is these sets of complex symbolisms in the ad that go beyond and undo the normal
teleological frontier assumptions of unbounded and inescapable progress that typifies much
corporate technoscientific discourse. The "pre"-historical embeddedness, quite literally, of the
chip as depicted in the ad signifies a denial of the ahistoricity that pervades much corporate
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biotechnology discourse, while reinstantiating it in a different form, by conveying a sense of
timelessness, of eternity. One is forced to think of Ozymandias - Shelley's Egyptian king, whose
grandeur, eventually, is eroded into unmemorable rubble - to remember how, even in the absence
of specific historical memory, it is possible to superimpose civilizational scale-making projects in
ways that deny history not by ignoring it, but by encompassing it. The DNA chip is hardly
figured in this ad as emanating in any progressive manner from the glories of Egyptian
civilization; it does, rather, suggest that the chip co-habits the same sort of civilizational
imaginary that the great ancient civilizations conjure up for us.14
Therefore, the ad in Figure 1 also asks the question of revolution. While the ad might
invoke history in an originary sense, rather than as flowing out of a progressive linear narrative of
technoscientific progress, there is no question that the ad does suggest that an invention like the
DNA chip is world-historical, a defining moment in civilization and humankind. This ad indicates
not the endless frontier that epitomizes the myth of much American technoscientific progress
(where the frontier signifies geography without end, but also therefore denies historical
antecedents, the concern with the frontier myth being what exists at the crest of the wave and
beyond rather than what has come before it), but origin in a Biblical sense, revolution in a
Marxian sense, discontinuity in the sense of Foucault and Canguilhem. It therefore asks the
fundamental question that must be asked: what kind of a history is a history of genomics? It is
13 At the time of writing, May 2002, Affymetrix has managed to put the entire human genome on two chips.
14 This difference is of some significance in sites, such as India, where understanding the role of "pre"-
history in figuring contemporary greatness is a matter of extremely vexed political debate, with very high
stakes. This is because the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its ideological wing, the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), are extremely invested precisely in the sort of history - distinct from that
suggested by the Affymetrix ad - that suggests that contemporary Western technoscience was perfectly
anticipated by (even if it did not emanate from) the glories of Vedic science (especially mathematics). The
glory of "India", through moves that take recourse to "history" while remaining perversely ahistorical, then
gets figured as originating, in a deeply civilizational sense, from mathematicians such as Aryabhatta. It is
equally of note that the complicated city-building projects of the Indus Valley Civilization, which pre-dated
the suspected Aryan "invasion" that led to the Vedic period and eventually pre-figured Hinduism as it is
now understood, are not accorded a similarly glorious place in such civilizational history. I make this point
both to suggest that the figuration of historical imaginaries is hugely consequential, and also as a prelude to
sections of the dissertation that deal with genomics, drug development and biocapitalism in India, which
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precisely the difficulty that one encounters in parsing out these various suggestions, that
genomics is originary / revolutionary / an epistemic shift, when encountering genomic
imaginaries such as they are conveyed through ads like Affymetrix's that pushes me not to
attempt either a Foucauldian history / archaeology of genomics, or a classic science studies
constructivist account, but rather a more Marxian political economic analysis of biocapital, in
which genonlics serves as a central diagnostic marker rather than as the subject itself of historical
analysis.
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are emerging in the context of a BJP-run coalition government, a context that is of some importance in
understanding the sorts of technoscientific emergences occurring in India today.
CHAPTER 1: THEORY AND CRITIQUE
1.1. Overview of thesis and significance
The title of this dissertation is "Biocapital: The Constitution of Post-Genomic Life". I use
biocapital here as an explanatory framework for contemporary capitalism in its emergent and
shifting topological manifestations and conundrums of value generation and market logic that
come out of the bio-informatic (disciplinary and corporate) mergers of the genome sequencing
revolution. As new disciplines such as bioinformatics, functional genomics and structural
genomics emerge within the life sciences, so too does the practice of life science research move
towards corporate locales, with corporate agendas and practices. I am interested in the features
and consequences of this corporatization of the life sciences, and well as in asking what it means
for specifically the life sciences to undergo such corporatization.
In this project, I use "constitution" in all its meanings. Firstly, as a noun, constitution
refers to a set of institutionalized codes, both legal and normative, that get sacralized and held up
as defining prescribed codes of action and governance. The working draft sequence of the human
genome, announced in June 2000, is a revolutionary moment not just for biology, but for society
and its perspectival vantage points writ large. The sequence itself was during its generation
referred to as the "Holy Grail" of life itself, and within the life sciences, it is seen as constitutional
of the way in which research agendas will be structured, both conceptually and institutionally. In
other words, genomic information is becoming a reference point against which the intellectual
quality of life science research gets constantly validated, and genomics is emerging as the
attractive area of research in order to grab institutional attention and get money, whether from
public sources or private investors. Genomics as research agenda is further being co-produced in
a larger technoscientific environment that Joseph Dumit calls "venture science", in which the
corporatization of the life sciences is deemed not just desirable but natural.
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Secondly, constitution as verb refers to the act of constituting, of putting in place. Work
in Science and Technology Studies (STS) has for years insisted upon the constructed and
contingent nature of production of scientific fact. Recent literature on co-production has further
emphasized how scientific fact is neither produced in isolation, nor does it precede or follow
institutional (legal / corporate / governmental) productions in any causal manner (see for example
Jasanoff 1995, 1996). Rather, emergent science and technology gets constituted along with
emergent institutional structures and emergent individual and collective identities. This
constitution requires active work by various actors, whose goals are by no means identical or
even co-terminous. Tracing the acts of constitution that create post-genomic life across multiple
locales and in multiple institutional settings is an integral part of any larger project that seeks to
make sense of and historically situate emergent life-worlds.'
Thirdly, constitution refers to health, to the body and its overall well being. And indeed,
genomics is about health, the body, life and hope, as it shapes and gets shaped by a society that is
increasingly a therapeutic one. This therapeutic society, like any other, has a political economy
embedded within it. And yet, theorists of the information economy, such as David Harvey (1990)
with his sector economy approach, have tended to emphasize how such emergent economies
intersect Work (the classical Marxian formulation) without enough attentiveness as to how they
intersect Life. The co-production of new political economies with and as biopower (Foucault
1990 [1976]), biosociality (Rabinow 1992) and new "forms of life" (Fischer 1999) is the third
broad organizing theoretical problematic of my work.
Using multi-sited ethnography as my methodology, I have studied the constitution of
genomics and / as biocapital from a series of situated vantage points in the United States and
India. The actors I have followed include corporate biotech entrepreneurs, venture capitalists,
15 In this regard, I see STS as what Michael Fischer calls a "canary discipline", as in "the canaries that
miners take into the mines to sniff out deadly gases, thereby showing where the mines need to be vented or
reworked" (Fischer 2000).
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public researchers, policy makers and founders of patient advocacy groups. Rather than simply
write about each of these sets of actors, as an anthropologist conventionally might, I have rather
writtenfrom the locales that each of them inhabit as they engage and come to terms with an
evolving global scientific-corporate-legal regime that biocapital co-produces. Further, multi-sited
ethnography is necessarilyfragmentary rather than comparative in any complete sense, and this
fragmentary nature is inherent to a politics of partial perspective that acts against and resists the
fetishistic maneuver of passing off any necessarily fragmentary piece of knowledge as somehow
"whole".
I have thus explored the importance of speed and information as the organizing material -
rhetorical principles that make genomics a constitutional moment; analyzed the debates and
politics around ownership and intellectual property in the United States and India that get thrown
up because of the possibilities of obtaining patent rights on biological material; traced the
importance of hype and other forms of strategic visionary articulation in creating a biocapitalist
political economy; and argued for the need to create new theories about the operation of risk and
risk discourse in order to understand how biocapital and genomic information operating as
scientific fact create new individual subjectivities and social identities.
The sequencing of the human genome is revolutionizing the life sciences and creating
new sorts of knowledge about life, which is increasingly viewed as information that can be
obtained, analyzed and decoded. The commodification of the information that produces these
ways of understanding is increasingly perceived as legally justifiable and strategically natural.
This project partakes in the contemporary intellectual endeavors to identify, name, and explore
the implications of these new developments in science and the concomitant new epistemology. It
undertakes an extensive mapping of the global terrain of post-genomic biotechnology, generates a
methodological apparatus for the study of this new phenomenon, and develops the outlines of a
theory.
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Theorizing global phenomena leads to questions about the boundaries of one's research.
As I will elaborate while describing my field sites, the strictly "ethnographic" component of this
research has been undertaken at a number of sites in the United States and India, from periods
ranging from a day to a few months. Therefore, what this work offers at the outset is a
comparative view of genomics research and the politics surrounding it in two distinct national
environments, each with its own institutional, political and cultural contexts, but both always
already over-determined by a globalizing market rationale. And yet, as again I will elaborate upon
subsequently, ethnography is itself undergoing what Marcus and Fischer (1986) call an
"experimental moment", and field sites and the narrative structures emanating from writing
"about" them need to be retheorized (see also Gupta and Ferguson 1997). While I write "about"
genomics in certain specific sites in the US and India, I also writefrom these sites, sites that are to
varying degrees invested in one another, but also in other locations and the unlocatable "global".
This means that this project is both bounded and not. My attempt is not to create a theory as
totalizing as the processes of globalization I set out to critique appear to be, but it is impossible to
artificially circumscribe one's pronouncements to a specific set of locations, because they
themselves are crossing boundaries of many sorts while trying simultaneously to instantiate some
of those very boundaries.
It is hoped that this project will have an impact in a number of areas. It aims to contribute
specific knowledge about science and technology changes in the US and India; to extend the
methodological frameworks in STS and anthropology; and to feed into broader interdisciplinary
debates over the nature of globalization and the impact of biotechnology. A propos the last: much
of the public response to biotechnology has been of a reactive anti-science variety, as seen in the
Seattle (and subsequent) demonstrations against the World Trade Organization, or the Boston
demonstrations against the Biotechnology Industry Organization. Such tendentious responses
have marked much academic writing about biotech as well, especially in India (see for instance
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Visvanathan 1997). This project offers instead a strategic and reflexive critique with a view to
facilitating a genuinely dialogic understanding of the issues and the compulsions at stake for the
various actors involved.
1.2. Theory
Emergent Forms of Life
This thesis is concerned with tracking and making sense of emergent forms of life, in an
era in which there is "a pervasive claim asserted by practitioners in many contemporary arenas
such as law, the sciences and political economy that life is outrunning the pedagogies in which
we were trained" (Fischer 1999). In other words, I am concerned with a thick description of what
Michael Fischer refers to as an ethnographic datum.
"Emergent forms of life" as a heuristic is particularly resonant in understanding what I
shall outline as biocapital, precisely because of the multiple meanings that can be attributed to
both "forms" and "life". Fischer, drawing upon Raymond Williams, Ludwig Wittgenstein and
Emmanuel Levinas, uses forms of life to refer to socialities of action. Biotechnology, however,
brings with it the possibilities not just of new forms of life as in modes of living, but equally
forms of life as in, quite literally, living beings. Genetically modified organisms and cloned
animals are only the most colourful and controversial of such forms of life. "Forms of life" could
also refer to a combination of the above two definitions, especially as it applies to humans. As
Donna Haraway and Sherry Turkle have both shown in different ways, "forms of life" could be
forms that life -- as both object and instrument -- takes as humans relate to emergent technologies
in ways that question the form of life that the human is, and the forms of lives that humans lead
(see, for instance, Haraway 1991, 1997; Turkle 1984, 1995).
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In Haraway's articulation, this form of life is cyborg, a conceptualization that has
spawned a whole generation of what is often referred to as "cyborg anthropology" (for a
representative collection of such "cyborg anthropology", see Downey and Dumit 1998).
According to Haraway, there are three boundary breakdowns in the late 20th century that make
cyborg imaginings possible (Haraway 1991: 149-181). The first is that between human and
animal; the second between the (animal-human) organism and machine; and the third between the
physical and the non-physical. A tracing of emergent forms of life, then, is very much an exercise
in cyborg politics, as it tracks these (intensely productive) breakdowns in order to track the
possibilities: utopian, dystopian, liberatory, repressive, necessary and contingent: that flow from
them. This thesis, from the outset, adheres to the politics that Haraway argues for in her "Cyborg
Manifesto", politics that stem from the reality and the realization of emergent cyborg worlds:
first, that "universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake that misses most of reality, probably
always, but certainly now" (181); and second, that an anti-science demonization of these
emergences is not a viable strategic response to dealing with their very realities.
If life can refer to both object and instrument, then, equally,form functions as both noun
and verb. As noun, it refers both to external structure and to the essential nature of a thing. But
further, "form" carries within itself notions of normativity, of established methods of proceeding:
a form of life could refer to ungrounded socialities of action (as Fischer argues), but equally could
imply emergent prescriptions for action, formulae, customs, etiquette. Form then refers both to
substance (outer / morphological and inner / essential) and to style. Fourthly, a form is a
document that classifies, that makes sense of and puts order into the world by parsing it in ways
that have consequences, for life and for lives (see, for example, Bowker and Star 1998). Indeed,
forms refer to orderly methods of arrangement, to patterns. As verb, form is a process of shaping
or molding, of modeling by instruction and discipline, a process of normalizing unruly and
chaotic -- indeed emergent -- material-semiotic actants. It is an act of fashioning and constructing.
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Understanding emergent forms of life, therefore, involves tracking objects and subjectivities, both
as things and as processes, and requires an attentiveness to tactics and strategies. Both actors and
actions have to be simultaneously traced and located.
Understanding biocapital obviously requires as a starting point an understanding of what
has variously been referred to as contemporary / late / postmodem capitalism, whose features
have been most comprehensively outlined by Harvey (1990) and Jameson (1991). There is much
understanding to be gained of the ways biocapital functions from the understanding of the
information economy that these authors, Harvey in particular, provide. But such theorizing still
locates forms of life primarily (merely?) as socialities of action. The question that biocapital begs
is how these socialities of action can be understood in a context of a technology that literally
creates new forms of life-as-objects. In other words, how does the creation of new forms of
beings (including but not just human) affect new forms of being? How do productive (and re-
productive) biotechnologies interdigitate with socialities of action?
These are not new questions, and have been asked most forcefully in science studies by
scholars such as Paul Rabinow (1992) in his articulation of biosociality. The question Rabinow
fails to ask however is how biosocial articulations get manifested in a social framework that is
always-already overdetermined by capitalist relations of production.
This thesis offers a number of theoretical propositions about the life sciences and the
institutional contexts within which scientific knowledge is produced, and traces the consequences
following from them. These relate to the generation of new forms of ownership, new
conceptualizations of property, and new forms of subjectivity, which at various levels or registers
are themselves constantly relating to each other. There is a need to explore the relationships
between ideology and state or corporate activity and between information and materiality, since at
each of these levels one sees a back-and-forth between abstraction / conceptualization on the one
hand and the site where it might be materialized on the other. Outlined below are some of the
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major bodies of work that will be drawn upon here, in order to make theoretical sense of these
relationships.
There are three strands of social theory that are relevant o engage with in such a project.
The attempt to understand the political economy of an innovative technoscientific marketplace,
especially when placed in global contexts, is primarily an engagement with Marxian theorizations
of political economy, labor, value, the meaning and magic associated with the commodity-form
and an industrial economy that depended upon colonialism. This project engages these key
Marxian concepts in a context in which many of them demand retheorization. For instance, value
is increasingly being realized in the realm of symbolic capital, the biological emerges as (more
than just) a form of commodity and global relationships are llore complicated and mutually
implicated than they were during the phase of industrial colonial expropriation.
This thesis argues that we are in the midst of an inaugural moment brought about by the
life sciences' constructing and articulating different forms of meaning and value, by looking both
at commodification and subjectivity, when knowledge about living beings - selves - becomes
increasingly naturalized as marketable. Patenting DNA sequences and other biologicals has
become increasingly commonplace, governments encourage industrial bioscience research with
payoffs and there is a tighter integration of biological research with biotech companies and
pharmaceutical results. There is an ease and persistence with which biotechnology,
bioinformatics and bioscience have entered our vocabulary, testifying to a profound shift in the
nature of "nature" and also therefore of labor and value. This creates a need to understand the
politics Gi, production, circulation and consumption of both knowledge and the market
frameworks in which it is embedded.
The second strand of social theory that this project predominantly engages relates to the
notion of biopower (Foucault 1990 [19761), which articulates how modernity has put knowledge
about life into the realm of explicit political calculation. This in turn owes much to Georges
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Canguilhem's explanations of how knowledge in-forms subjectivity by producing certain
legitimized forms of normativity (Canguilhem 1989 [1966]). Subsequently Foucault's analyses of
the intimate relationships between knowledge about life and power over it have been forcefully
developed by such theorists as Paul Rabinow, who has developed the notion of biosociality as a
conceptual framework with which to understand how biological knowledge co-produces social
relationships (Rabinow 1992). There is now a body of work that focuses on this relationship
between technology, governmentality and affect (see for examples Petryna 1999, Sunder Rajan
2001, Biehl 2001, Biehl et al 2001, Fischer 2001).
My attempt, to begin with, is to bring together these two complementary strands of social
theory. In their respective evolutions into "schools of thought", they have by virtue of excessive
faithfulness to their progenitors carried with them analytic lacunae that get further reified as the
objects of study emerge in ways that outrun the theoretical formulations proposed to make sense
of them. If one were to locate biocapital as simply as "case" of Marxian political economy, then
what would most glaringly get left out, as mentioned earlier, is that economies intersect Life just
as they intersect Work. Marxian political economists, while insisting on the value of human labor
against the reifying efforts of the capitalist machinery to value human labor merely as a relatively
expensive, dispensable, and interchangeable input, have paid little attention to the Foucauldian
emphasis on the production of life as a calculable unit of political policy. Similarly, imagining
biocapital to be the next theoretical step in a genealogy starting with Foucault's notion of
biopower (Foucault 1990), and its extension and incorporation as Rabinow's biosociality, misses
the number of points at which Foucault's theory diverges markedly from a Marxian theoretical
understanding. In other words, biocapital as a theoretical notion doesn't simply complement or
"fill in" biopower and biosocial theorization by including corporate ethnography or explicitly
situating these notions in capitalist (theoretical and empirical) frameworks. Rather, it
acknowledges the need to understand the modes of abstraction that give a certain constitutional
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moment (which also happens to be constitutive of a global regime) its meaning and magic
through theoretical categories such as ideology and fetishism that Foucault explicitly rejected.
The challenge in tracing biocapital is to place theoretical reflections such as these along
with thick ethnographic observations into the emergent and hardly stable frameworks of political
economy. An ethnographic tracing of forms of life would initially encounter them as ways of life,
and describe and interrogate the different cultural formations that emerge in a world of scientific
practice that is increasingly corporatized. It would then encounter "inner lives", the biographies of
the various individual actors involved. Incorporated, quite literally, into these forms of life are
emergent forms of ethics, both as individual commitments (and the lack thereof) and as collective
normative practices. Therefore, the purpose of ethnography here is to map the various registers of
meaning - articulated as everyday social and institutional practices, discursive strategies and
inner belief-systems - that constitute a larger life-world that demands theorization.
The third strand of social theory draws upon various notions of what Ulrich Beck calls
"Risk Society" (Beck 1986). Beck is attentive to the central place that the politics of science and
technology, centering around health and environment, has in defining emergent social and
institutional orders and political economies. While Beck views risk society within a Habermasian
sphere of rational communication (Habermas 1985), other theorists of risk adopt more Marxian or
Foucauldian approaches. Francois Ewald, for example, sees risk as a form of capital in his
analysis of the insurance industry, an understanding that is extremely pertinent to theorizing the
high-risk environment of speculative capital and intensive R & D investment that marks the start-
up world and big pharmaceutical business models respectively. Robert Castel theorizes risk in a
more Canguilhemian mode as he discusses how calculations of risk of disease lead to the creation
of certain types of subjectivities that are molded by risk profiling.'6 Amongst STS authors, Sheila
Jasanoff and Brian Wynne have extensively documented the ways in which risk assessment is
16 See Burchell et al 1991: 281-298, for both Ewald's and Castel's arguments.
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used in environmental controversies by various expert bodies in political and legal arenas, thereby
showing how risk analysis as "science" is co-produced with risk analysis as a regime of expertise
and a set of legal and institutional codes (Smith and Wynne 1989, Jasanoff 1994, 1995, Lash et al
1996, Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
The challenge theoretically, then, is to weave from / with these three normally distinct
strands a whole political economy and a whole system of knowledge about life that both embeds
within and shapes such a political economy. Therefore, the overarching co-production that this
project is trying to map is that of an epistemic regime as / with an economic one. This isn't just
choreography within an immutable theoretical framework (such as political economy or
biopower) that is already given. A political economic analysis of biotechnology cannot simply
slot biotechnology into a pre-existing political economic framework. Rather, it must be an
exercise in coming to terms with an entire epistemic framework that attempts to explain how
money, capital and knowledge together mediate and in-form the way people live the lives they do
in an emergent and inaugural moment. The project will try to conclude what is at stake - in lives
as well as in political economies - in a biocapitalist society.
The sociological or ethnographic mapping of technoscientific processes in the work of
the early STS mappers such as Latour (1986, 1987) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) or schools such as
the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), were primarily concerned with the construction
of scientific knowledge and technological artifacts. But there are aspects and implications to
genomics that call for further theoretical understandings. Firstly, there are cultural
transformations that accompany and co-produce the redefinition of "life itself', making such
maps extremely complicated to generate, with very few fixed points of reference. Secondly, a
complete commodification of "science itself' leads to a very quick internalization and acceptance
of these processes as natural. Thirdly, the global integration of these processes requires an
attention not just to the co-production of science, politics and culture, but to such co-productions
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across multiple relational locales, adding a further level of complexity to the analysis. Put simply,
the object of bioscience, the practice of bioscience and the locations of bioscience have all
chapged. These changes call for an STS / anthropology of science approach that will combine
political economic, business and bioscience analysis and ethnography. Some recent pioneering
works in STS (Haraway 1997, M. Fortun 1999, Kelty 1999, Fischer 2000, K. Fortun 2001, Dumit
forthcoming) and in the related field of medical anthropology (Farmer 1993, Rabinow 1997,
1999, Petryna 909, Cohen 2000, Biehl 2001) have begun to chart such a terrain. Also of
relevance are models of other ethnographic work sensitive to the relationship between global
political economic processes and local practices, knowledges and value systems provided by
authors such as Taussig (1980, 1987), Appadurai (1996), Gupta (1998) and Scott (1987, 1999).
New theorization is always a form of critique, and critique, of course, is a political
exercise. It would therefore be worthwhile to elaborate upon the politics of an intervention such
as this dissertation. At its most simplistic, mine is a politics that is similar in inspiration to that
which underlies much of the enterprise of STS scholarship, in its attempts to mix up extant
boundaries. It stems from my formative and ethnographic experiences, and comes from a political
engagement as an Indian who is deeply concerned about global scientific inequity, about
articulations of nationalism and the preservation of a secular, anti-imperialist nationalist ethic and
about democratic participation in and access to decisions about and developments in technologies
that deeply affect our lives: that indeed, as Michael Fischer (1999) poignantly points out, have
consequences for who lives, and who dies. I believe there are four broad political "themes" that
underlie this dissertation.
The first has to do with situatedness. Biotechnology and genomics are not just about
science or business, but are about life itself. This is not just because they are "life sciences", but
because they structure to a great extent the ideological and institutional terrain and imaginary of
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the emergent new millennium. This is a banal point, but one that is overlooked with surprising
ease even by those works on biotech that serve as public relations manuals for the enterprise: they
claim to talk about how biotechnology is changing the way we live, but end up often talking
about scientific developments or business models as if they can indeed be talked of in isolation
from ethics, politics or subjectivity (see for a representative example Robbins-Roth 2000).
This is part of a purificatory impulse, rejected by STS authors such as Donna Haraway.
Sheila Jasanoff and Bruno Latour, that often forms a basis for an oppositional politics towards
biotechnology as well. I argue that such purifying moves are not just politically fiaught, but are
also epistemologically unfounded. Not only does it assume a transcendental view-from-nowhere
space from which critique can be itiade (and it is precisely the impossibility of making such an
assumption that I imply in the point above, that biotechnology does impact all of our lives: every
critic of biotechnology is always already a situated observer, not because the politics of situated
perspectives is in any way "better" or more strategic than one that pretends to be "outside" the
murkiness of the objects of one's critique, but because everyone is situated in worlds that have
the life sciences as a central organizing regime), it also plays into precisely such ahistorical and
racially motivated discourses of the "pure" that those broadly on the left generally (ought to)
oppose. There might be many reasons to oppose regimes that produce transgenics, and to feel
uncomfortable about the thus produced transgenic objects themselves, but their emergence as
novel and therefore "unnatural" entities is not one of them. It is not just critics on the far right or
left of the ideological spectrum who take up cudgels against the "unnatural" products of the
biotech revolution: such critiques are often the basis of institutionalized bioethical critiques, that
operate not from the fringe (with the attendant skepticism accorded to what gets perceived as a
fringe critique), but as normative expert discourses that legitimately mediate in and adjudicate
upon biotechnologies and their consequences. Without ever explicitly exploring institutionalized
bioethics with an ethnographic gaze (that is undeniably an important project, and one that is being
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attempted in interesting ways by a host of people in anthropology, science studies and the history
of science),'7 I do critique it at various points in the dissertation.
The second political "theme", related to the first, is that a situated perspective necessarily
involves being suspicious of both unreflexively realist and exuberantly relativist positions. On the
one hand, I am suspicious, based again on the strength of ethnographic observations, of the type
of linear accounts of biotechnical (and therefore necessarily societal) progress that biotech
enthusiasts like Robbins-Roth propound (while knowing, surely, that such accounts are simply
not born out by historical fact). I am also aware of the erasures that get effected through such
frontier discourses of technoscientific progress, that at the end of the day, even when they are
"true", do end up targeting diseases selectively (those that have huge Western markets), do cater
selectively to those patient populations that can afford to pay for expensive high-end therapeutics,
do take resources and attention away from basic primary health problems and approaches to
solving them, and do involve more exploitative labor practices than one fathoms from reading
accounts (including this disseration) that invariably focus on the excitement of managing
biotechnological workplaces. On the other hand, I also see the hopes that get pinned on
biotechnology, not just as a means of making lots of money, but as a means of saving lives that
otherwise would not be saved - and these are not hopes that can simply be dismissed by cynical
attributions of"hype". Yes, biotechnology operates on hype - and yes, hype is not reality, but
hype is also not the binary opposite of reality. Biotechnology has many complex affective
dimensions to it for those who are invested in it in many different ways. Further, technoscience,
17 I have co-organized two conference panels at the Society for the Social Studies of Science (4S) meetings
that explore and critique the role of institutionalized bioethics, sometimes in head-on ethnographic and
political engagement, sometimes more obliquely through related objects and subjects of critique, in 2000
and 2001. Participants in these panels are all engaging with the challenges that get thrown up in critical
engagement with biotechnologies in a discursive field that is powerfully configured by the "expert"
meditations of institutionalized bioethicists. The participants on these panels are therefore all in their own
work and their own ways concerned precisely with the political implications of formal "ethical"
interventions in biotechnologies. Many thanks to all of them: Stefan Beck, Joao Biehl, Joseph Dumit,
Michael Fischer, Kim Fortun, Michael Fortun, Linda Hogle, Kristin Peterson, Adriana Petryna, Jenny
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even when high tech, virtual and not addressed to more primary needs, is an important vehicle for
development in Third World countries, both for the tangible material benefits it promises (and
sometimes provides), and for the epistemic interventions it makes in polities such as India where
anti-scientism is not just the privilege of vanguard intellectuals who expose the violence of
technoscience (see for instance Visvanathan 1997), but is also the preferred position of many on
the Hindu Right who are at present in the position of formulating science policy. Their choices
have serious implications for what gets learnt as "scientific", "true" and "rational", from the
school level onwards.
At the level of epistemological critique, while I am surprised by the reification of science
as something whose authority solely derives from the "truths" it propounds, I do hold on to a
residual Marxian belief that scientific facts do matter: the job of the critic is not to undermine
science as much as it is to make it better. I am not willing to admit that a belief in technoscientific
progress is merely false consciousness. At the level of material practices, this means that I do
think India should invest in genomics, and I myself am invested in seeing such investment bear
fruit, even if I am uncomfortable at priorities that pit such expensive technoscience against
primary health concerns, and am uncomfortable at priorities within Indian genome agendas that
might end up reifying genetically determinist notions of race, caste and ethnicity while setting up
the (manipulated and studied) genetic material of the Indian people as "naturally" the intellectual
property of the Indian state.
The third political "theme" involves rethinking corporatization and property. I believe
that one of the central structural - and strategic - issues in biotechnology has to do with
intellectual property, and I recognize the huge amount of ambivalence that must go into
structuring one's political positions vis-A-vis intellectual property regimes. On the one hand, I am
firmly in agreement with a host of actors ranging from many public scientists in the US to critical
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Reardon, Chloe Silverman, Jeanette Simmonds, Jenny Smith, Stefan Sperling, Karen-Sue Taussig and
legal theorists like James Boyle (see, for instance, Boyle 1997) regarding the importance of
preserving the intellectual commons, and not barricading it completely through what are often
ludicrous intellectual property claims that still nonetheless get granted (and I think the argument
that obtaining patents on gene sequences is one such ludicrous claim has considerable merit). On
the other hand, I feel uncomfortable that an overly pre-meditated opposition to intellectual
property on simply logical grounds might serve to effect strategic erasures, since intellectual
property protection does get used by otherwise disenfranchised groups to stake claims not just to
monetary rewards but also to control over research agendas. The debate on the desirability of
gene patents often looks very different, and much more complicated, than an unreflexive politics
for the preservation of the public domain might anticipate. We are forced to reflect again when
the major proponents of an IP regime are members of a patient advocacy group (for example,
PXE International) who are struggling to get just enough control over biotech research agendas so
as to push biotech companies into researching a rare disease that would otherwise get no
attention, and its major opponents are big multinational pharmaceutical companies, for whom
gene sequence information isn't the primary locus of value, and whose desire to do away with
gene patents has no impact whatsoever on their position regarding drug patents. These latter
ultimately are the form of intellectual property that most directly translates into unaffordable drug
prices for a majority of the world's population.
A major institutional feature that deserves political response - and that arguably defines
venture science - is the issue of the increased cohabitation of academic and industrial
technoscience worlds. On the one hand, again, I feel extremely uncomfortable about the easy
naturalization of the corporatization of academic research, that is especially marked in a place
like MIT, which sometimes seems to me to frame itself as existing solely in order to provide the
space for enabling discoveries that then get transferred to private companies rather than
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Charles Weiner: for helping me think through issues relating to bioethics.
remaining accessible through the public domain. I also believe that it is important for academic
centers to do science that doesn't have a corporate agenda, if only because that is the only way
such enabling discoveries for subsequent market development can keep happening. On the other
hand, I am also suspicious of an ivory tower academic mentality that disdains industrial science
as somehow corrupting and necessarily corrupt, not just because such an attitude smacks of
arrogance and ignorance, but because it is also reflective of a discomfort with inter-disciplinarity
and boundary crossing, fostering both of which are central to the epistemological and political
agenda of inter-disciplines like STS, and both of which have, it must be admitted, been attempted
with much greater imagination by industry than by academe.
The fourth political "theme" has to do with reinventing democracy and notions of
accountability through role models. What politically ought to be the task of broadly "left"
oriented critical thinkers is not just to make science better, but to make it more democratic and
publicly accountable. As suggested above, this is one of the scariest and most tangible potential
dangers of over-corporatization: not just a loss of material or information or property from the
public domain, but the loss of certain forms of discourse, of the sorts of dialogic polyphony that
shouldn't always have to translate into consensus for it to be productive of better science and
better civic society. Excessive corporatization of the academic environment does, as Sheldon
Krimsky says, lead to a loss of capacity for social criticism.
There are role models to look for, who might provide alternative ways of doing and
thinking science, and finding such role models could be an exciting consequence of ethnographic
investigation. Such role models, when they are found, are necessarily imperfect, agenda driven
people who might have politics or values that the ethnographer feels deeply uncomfortable with,
or ambivalent about. Certainly, I ascribe no perfection, in any sense, to the two actors in my
dissertation, Sunil Maulik and S.K. Brahmachari, who I do think provide certain types of role
models in my eyes. I think they are important because they think venture science in alternative
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ways. They are both invested in the corporate world, invested in money and fame, and, to varying
degrees subscribe to genetically determinist views of the world, they are also powerful and by no
means subaltern voices. But by contributing to the dialogic polyphony that I yearn for, they do
open up the possibilities for new forms of representation, for new inter-disciplinary spaces that
involve crossing boundaries, for the denaturalization of venture science as something that is
always already a given. People like these two open up new political terrains as they open up new
scientific possibilities, and I think my last political theme in essence is also reflective of a
question of ethnographic ethics: namely, that it is impossible to generate truly sustained and
meaningful critique through ethnography without being genuinely (though not blindly or
unreflexively) respectful of the subjects of one's study, even if they do occupy what might
politically seem adversarial positions to the ethnographer's own.
1.3. Outline of dissertation
As Marx always implied, understanding capitalism involves understanding its science
(political economy / information economy), its religion (a Weberian Protestant ethic, but also the
modes by which a certain scientific-economic formulation becomes legitimately authoritative)
and its magic (surplus value / the generation of emergent forms of life). As already noted, I
contend in this dissertation, through each of my chapters, with five key sets of theoretical issues:
speed and information; ownership and ethics; vision and hype; nation and salvation; and risk and
subjectivity.
The first question to ask when tracing any emergent phenomenon is: what's really new
here? The first thing that is rnew is that life-as-information is transformed through genomics into
commodifiable, material reality. The second is the speed at which the science is being done and
information produced. Indeed, many of the changes that genomics brings about are not new
conceptually. However, their realization is made possible because of technological advancements.
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The key here is automation and high-throughputness, as biology becomes an industrialized,
process-driven science.
Speed is of both material and rhetorical value. A blockbuster drug can generate revenues
for a pharmaceutical company of $3-4 billion a year. Therefore, goes the rhetoric, a delay in
bringing a possible blockbuster drug to market (and of course, any drug that is being brought to
market, it is hoped, will be a blockbuster drug) costs the pharmaceutical company potential
revenues of about a million dollars a day. This is the material justification made for constant
speed within the industry, where daily delays are calculated as huge possible losses in an
endeavor that usually takes up to 15 years from initial R & D to market launch. But speed is also
a rhetorical fulcrum, integral to the operation of hype and the making secondary of ethical issues
and considerations, to lever the government, venture capitalists and the public to further invest
themselves in biotech.
Therefore, speed is dictated by "market logic". However, market logic also propounds
ownership as desirable, legitimate and logical. My argument is Chapter 4 traces the speed bumps
predictably encountered in biocapitalism because of the speedy trajectories of genomics being
tempered by a market system that allows things to be owned. There are contradictions in the
capitalist system that lead to a frictioned process, a friction which isn't just obstructive but
intensely Productive, of new ways of doing things, strategic ways to deal with ownership and so
on. In other words, the very constituents of capitalist dynamics, such as market logic, operate to
some degree in countervalence to one another.
Chapter 5 on ownership goes more deeply into the host of intellectual property issues that
arise all the way through genomic drug development, but focuses most specifically on the
ownership of genomic material and information, and the relationship between these two sets of
genomic "things" that have related but distinct social lives and ownership politics. I specifically
talk about the contested commodity status of these various genomic things as they undertake
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travels that are invariably global, and outline some of the strategic and policy initiatives that the
Indian government, in particular, is considering in regulating the flow of genetic material from its
territory. In the process, questions come up not just around property, but also around the nation-
state: its jurisdiction, its bomundaries and its assumption of being the representative of its peoples'
genetic material. This is, of course, set in a larger context of globalization and economic
liberalization, which sees the Indian state framing itself in ways very different from the way the
anti-imperialist Indian nation-state framed itself in relation to the West for much of India's post-
Independence history until the 1990s.
Chapter 6 theorizes vision and hype. Genomics, as I have mentioned, is venture science,
through which a certain form of corporatization is not just effected, but also very quickly
naturalized and legitimated. My argument in this chapter is that biotechnology is a game which is
constantly played in the future in order to generate a present that enables one to go into that
future. It is not dissimilar, in this regard, from the dot com economy, but this dynamic has marked
the biotech industry since its inception in the late 1970s. By definition, biotech companies can
only operate on promise, becau,. of the time scales of drug development and the capital
intensivity of the process.
But vision is also a part of the symbolic capital of biotech, which is in the business of, to
quote Monsanto's logo, Food, Health and Hope (M"). I argue in Chapter 7 that the promises of
biocapital are intensely messianic. What interests me here is to trace how vision gets articulated
through different underlying belief-systems in the US and India that drive the vision in different
ways. In the US, as mentioned above, this vision is theological and messianic, and is the subject
of my section titled "The Born-Again Ethic and the Spirit of Venture Capitalism?".
On the one hand, the performnativity of futuristic discourse around biotech in the US takes
on messianic overtones. On the other, there are embodied perspectives on biotech as visionary
practice, that I explore in particular through my story of Patrick Terry and the patient advocacy
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group that he has founded, PXE International. For people like Terry, who is himself a devout
Christian, the promises of biotech are not utopian in some general sense of being the route to the
realization of health, wealth and happiness; biotech contains salvationary hopes that are intensely
subjective, and that have everything to do with his own family, his own children. Indeed, Terry's
trust in Randy Scott, with whom he has co-founded a biotech company, stems from Scott's own
devout Christian values, which again are embodied in the suffering of people Scott himself knows
rather than in some abstract notion that therapeutic development is a good thing and a virtuous
business.
In India, on the other hand, nationalism is the predominant underlying visionary belief-
system, in the context of a larger transformation of nationalist consciousness away from
Nehruvian secular nationalism towards the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s Hindu cultural
nationalism. Once again, nationalist technoscientific vision gets articulated in a number of ways.
The first is at a policy level, where a major Hindutva ideologue, Murli Manohar Joshi, is India's
Minister for Science and Technology. He is in the process of drafting India's first science policy
document since 1958, which was written by Nehru himself with the famous atomic physicist
Homi Bhabha. Much of the genesis of the present policy document is taking place at the Centre
for Biochemical Technology (CBT), Delhi, India's flagship public sector genome laboratory, and
I will draw upon my fieldwork there to talk about it. It is not coincidental, of course, that the 1958
document was largely authored by an atomic physicist, while the 2002 document is largely
authored by a genome scientist. 8
Secondly, this nationalist vision nicely articulates the tension between a New World
Order definition of "national" prowess as being indicated by global competetiveness (the
successful mimesis of the West as being the ultimate signifier of the "Third World" country's
18 One is reminded here of Donna Haraway's diagnostic epigraph "Transuranic elements: Transgenic
organisms :: Cold War: New World Order" (Haraway 1997: 52-63), which dutifully plays out in India as
well.
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national worth) and an anti-imperialist rendering of "national" interests as being the protection of
"Indian" genetic material from Western expropriation. This tension perfectly mirrors that within
the Hindu Right, which wants to be an aggressive global free market player while protecting what
is "essentially" Indian.
Thirdly, this vision portrays personal nationalism and patriotism among scientists, for
whom such sentiments are a part of a personal and scientific identity that is marked by a decision
to either stay back in India or return after doing research in the West. It is very much more
common for the best biological scientists to move to and settle down in the West after initial
training in India (usually at the expense of the state).
In my final chapter, I talk about personalized medicine, which in many ways is the
"ultimate" aim of genomics. Personalized medicine is the ability to make therapeutics that are
ideally tailored to each individual. The hype that surrounds personalized medicine suggests that
one can find genes responsible for diseases, find molecules that can target the gene when
diseased, and fix it. This is not just a popular perception: this is the view of companies with a
certain type of business model that is based on genetic target identification. Therefore, this
articulation of genomics fits well for them, because they are in the business of finding targets to
tinker with and "fix".
I trace the construction of the promise of personalized medicine through the hype
surrounding it, and through its co-production with a variety of upstream business models to show
how in reality what "personalized medicine" is becoming, as a consequence of genomics being
venture science, is a combination of pharmacogenomics (tailoring drugs that already exist for
optimal response in different patients) and predictive diagnostic testing, rather than a novel means
of individually targeted de novo therapeutic development. I finally suggest how, in a post-
genomic world with many diagnostic capabilities and many fewer corresponding therapeutic
availabilities, genomic information translates into scientific fact to constitute the subjectivity of
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consumers - as patients-in-waiting, and patients as consumers-in-waiting. In the process, I
theorize the emergence of risk as the defining heuristic around which biocapital as a value-
generating enterprise interpellates individuals as polymorphic subjects (themselves always
already at risk of future illness) along with the fetishization of genomic information as scientific
fact. This is, ultimately, an attempt to theorize the modes of abstraction of biocapital, and to
understand how the magic of biocapital operates.
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CHAPTER 2: ETHNOGRAPHY AND PRAXIS
The challenge of understanding political economic structures through ethnographic
methods is one that has been highlighted by George Marcus and Michael Fischer as being central
to anthropology's current "experimental moment" (Marcus and Fischer 1986). I explore some of
these challenges as encountered in this project by considering multi-sited ethnography as a
conceptual topology for exploring stratified political economic emergences, and explaining my
choice of field-sites through such a conceptual lens. I do so, initially, through multiple re-readings
of Clifford Geertz's Interpretation of Cultures (Geertz 1973), a necessary starting point because
of his call for thick description as the method through which to realize a program of interpretive
anthropology, but equally a productive starting point because he has not himself dealt with some
of the contradictions flowing from following through his own program.
Some of the issues that I highlight through a critique of Geertz that become central to my
own ethnographic and narrative practice are as follows. Firstly, there is Geertz's positivism with
respect to science in his reading of religion that STS as a discipline has taken avoided as
fundamental to its practice of knowledge production. Secondly, there is the importance, in
projects such as mine, of polyphony, which is subsumed in Geertz's "thickness", which
ultimately seems to represent a synoptic cultural view. Thirdly, there are questions of
ethnographic complicity and heterogenous collaborations, leading to vexed politics of access.
These transactional relationships with the subjects of one's research are never adequately
problematized in Geertz. Fourthly, for Geertz, the question of critique doesn't arise in the way it
does for me, because his synoptic view presented through thick description is a re-presentation
(as in portrait of the culture under study). In projects such as mine, the politics of representation is
very much more in the sense of representation as proxy (for the necessity of staying attentive to
the distinction between these two forms of re(-)presentation, vertreten versus darstellen in Marx,
for any form of critique that claims to "speak for" others, see Spivak 1988). This latter sense of
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representation is necessarily an intervention, and it is representation that is necessarily
incomplete. The challenge of such representation is to retain the ability to be judgemental without
falling prey to the tendency to pre-judge.
It therefore becomes difficult to talk about methodology in ethnography without blurring
the boundaries between theory and method. To the extent that I talk about the sets of
methodologies that I have employed in this project, I attempt to do so as theoretical interventions.
2.1. Thick Description
Thick description was a mode of ethnography famously articulated by Clifford Geertz
(1973). Particularly useful to an analysis of biocapital is the way Geertz applies it to an analysis
of religion as a cultural system. I use Geertz's analysis of religion as a cultural system as a
methodological guide with the help of which one can interpret other belief structures, like science
(and indeed also as a narrative guide when one is confronted with the task of writing about these
structures). These are belief structures that function in the world as common-sense, and that
engage both authority and ritual. Geertz's reification of the scientific as a somehow distinct and
unquestioningly Baconian form of common-sense in opposition to the religious may be
challenged: we could productively argue instead that religious common-sense and scientific
common-sense operate in the same objective or social spaces. This is not to equate science and
religion, but rather to say, firstly, that both science and religion depend upon certain ritualized
performances (which in the case of the former, gets operationalized and reified as "scientific
method") and ideological conceptions of legitimacy in order to be authoritative. Belief systems of
all kinds have this in common: they are neither seamlessly self-confirming, nor are they
totalizing, and they require careful mapping if they are to be made sense of in situated fashion.
This is where Geertz's methodological lessons become even more important rather than less.
What a thick description of biocapital is called upon to be, if it is to follow these lessons, is a
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careful tracing of the multiplicities of rituals and reliances upon authorities and institutional
structures (which include markets, legal regimes such as those codified in intellectual property
law, the state, conventions of scientific bodies, and so on).
Geertz's own definition of religion is: "(1) A system of symbols which acts to (2) establish
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3)formulating
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura
offactuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (Geertz 1973: 90,
emphasis in original). The methodological utility of such a mode of description is that it manages
to be descriptive without being definitive or exclusionary.
The question that comes out of this definition is that of religious belief. Belief, which is
fundamentally a question of the modes of transformation of consciousness, remains as
fundamental to a contemporary globalizing knowledge regime as it was for an understanding of
class formation in the nineteenth century. Geertz's answer is that "it is best to begin any approach
to this issue with frank recognition that religious belief involves not a Baconian induction from
everyday experience -- for then we should all be agnostics -- but rather a prior acceptance of
authority which transforms that experience" (Geertz 1973: 109). The first step then is tracing
belief to a pre-existing authority. But the question that remains is how that authority became
authoritative. In trying to understand what is widely called "the religious perspective", one comes
up against two questions:
1. What is the religious perspective, as distinct from other perspectives (common-sense,
scientific, aesthetic)?
2. How do human beings come to adopt it?
As we shall see, this is a form of questioning that can be of great relevance in
understanding the formation of subjectivities by and through scientific fact.
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The essence of religion is complex symbolism combined with authority that is generated
in ritual. It is in ritual that "the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the agency
of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out to be the same world, producing thus that idiosyncratic
transformation in one's sense of reality" (Geertz 1973: 112). The most important and effective
rituals operate as full-blown cultural performances.
Geertz himself tends to reify and make static the "scientific perspective", which marks an
interesting blind-spot in an interpreter of cultures. Nonetheless, methodologically, Geertz calls
into focus the importance of understanding any form of production, including (indeed,
necessarily) scientific production, not just in institutionalized and demarcated laboratory spaces
and settings (though understanding the functioning of authority that emanates from such
demarcation is undoubtedly vital), but as a part of the totality of everyday social experience, and
also as something that is produced through ritualized modes of performance. (In my investigation
of biocapital, such performances will be enacted at sites like journal articles, conferences,
investor presentations and press releases). Says Geertz: "The acceptance of authority that
underlies the religious perspective that the ritual embodies thus flows from the enactment of the
ritual itself' (Geertz 1973: 118).
Geertz thus talks about the becoming of religious common-sense: "this placing of
proximate acts in ultimate contexts...makes religion, frequently at least, socially so powerful. It
alters, often radically, the whole landscape presented to common sense, alters it in such a way
that the moods and motivations induced by religious practice seem themselves supremely
practical, the only sensible ones to adopt given the way things 'really' are" (Geertz 1973: 122).
What Geertz achieves is a location of religion as simultaneously a common-sensical
knowledge of social life and as a set of practices that mark this knowledge as supremely
authoritative. It is an imbrication of the inherent and essential force of a form of life with a set of
ritualized or strategic (but always dynamic) practices that leads to the creation of subjectivities, if
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subjectivities can be explained as expressions of consciousness of selves. Subjectivities are
created by the internalization that certain knowledge - belief systems are authoritative / true /
legitimate / natural / desirable. In addition, capitalism requires the internalization of the
authoritative / true / legitimate / natural / desirable nature of commodification. Biocapital emerges
at the articulations of the knowledge - belief systems of biology (operating as a scientific, and
therefore legitimate, knowledge - belief system) and capitalism, each in turn being affected in its
own emergence by the contingencies imposed by the other. The mechanisms of internalization of
both knowledge - belief systems involve both ritualized performance and tactical improvization,
acts in the world that constantly destabilize each other's authority / truth / legitimacy / naturality /
desirability as much as they instantiate and reify them. It is this tension, marked by contingency
though certainly not by indeterminacy, that marks an emergent moment as distinct from the
bounded and fixed culture that serves as the subject of anthropological enquiry even, ultimately,
for Geertz.
There is a second reason, beyond the methodological, why I refer to the particular essay
of religion as a cultural system. I will flag this second reason here, and return to it in detail in
Chapter 7. This is that science and capitalism, especially their co-production of venture science,
partake significantly of a Christian, or broadly theological, discourse. We see this in two aspects
of their formation. First, there is Weber's description of Protestantism as one of the causes for
early industrial capitalist investment, and for the work ethic of the labor force at particular points
in the stratification system (Weber 2001 [1930]); this is the understanding to which I quite
obviously owe the title of section 6. 1, "The Born-Again Ethic and the Spirit of Venture
Capitalism?". And second, there is the similarity of the belief-systems constituted by science,
religion and capitalism. While these may be at odds in the content of the belief they impart, they
are eerily similar in the form of belief they depend upon and bring about.
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Of course, there is a difficulty in reducing religion to either Weberian or Geertzian
formulations, because religion isn't one thing, and has many definitions and manifestations. The
visionary nature of venture science, which I talk about in Chapter 6, is, especially as it applies to
biotech, entirely messianic. For instance, strong resonances may be found between my work on
biotech entrepreneurs, especially in the United States, and Susan Harding's on born-again
Christians (Harding 2000). I will therefore return in the body of my thesis to "Religion as a
Cultural System" in more ways than the simply methodological.
S***** * *
2.2. Multi-sited ethnography
The immediate assumption that many contemporary "experimental" ethnographies
challenge is the assumption of locality. George Marcus and Michael Fischer have argued for the
necessity of multi-sited ethnography as a conceptual topology through which to track an
increasingly mobile and inter-connected globalized emergent world (Marcus and Fischer 1986).
A common misreading of multi-sited ethnography is the literalist one of assuming that it is simply
a quantitative multiple of single-sited ethnography, now performed at many places. Such an
understanding assumes that multi-sited ethnography perforce asks the same questions of the
known and demarcated locality that traditional ethnography disciplinarily based itself on. Multi-
sited ethnography can certainly ask the same questions, but it cannot ask them in the same way, a
way that assumes an exact correspondence between the place being described and the sets of
"objects" issuing therefrom that are being written about.
The issue, in other words, is that the questions "where am I writing about?" and "what am
I writing about?" have ceased to remain the same question. This is not simply the consequence of
a fashionably "postmodernm" or "experimental" ethnographic style: it is a necessary consequence
of tracking processes of globalization, of which after all biotechnology is one example.
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To talk about the politics of using multi-sited ethnography to study a globalizing
phenomenon, let me turn to Michael Fischer's analyses of religion, that remain faithful to Geertz
while moving Geertzian parameters, conceptually, methodologically and politically.
Debating Muslims (Fischer and Abedi 1990) explicitly embodies some of the key features
of Anthropology as Cultural Critique: firstly, an attentiveness to different genres of storytelling
and the relationship between them; and secondly, the use made of cultural idioms, concepts,
tropes and discourse, not just as objects to be studied but as epistemological guides. This is where
Fischer expounds the term critical hermeneutics, which is not just a hermeneutics of suspicion,
but is, importantly, dialogic.
There is, again, a politics to emphasize in an endeavor that seeks to understand religion in
a dialogic fashion rather than through monolog(ic writing). This politics is not just a Derridean
politics of suspicion of the violence of writing, but is equally a Bakhtinian politics of polyphony
rather than a single authoritative voice. This is a politics that opens up spaces for articulation and
transgression rather than closing them down: therefore, the particular salience of the word
debating, in the title and to the project.
What lessons, then, do multi-sited works such as Debating Muslims have, for devising
methodology and for intervening in politically reflexive and strategic ways as anthropologists?
Firstly, these works teach us that "multi-sitedness", as mentioned earlier, is a topology
and not a literalist dictum. This means that the multiplicity of sites could be temporal as much as
spatial, and there is a decentering of the authenticity of the physically present source during the
anthropologist's encounter with the culture under study. Storytelling and different narrative forms
become crucial informants, but it is always important to stay attentive to the genres that these
narratives inhabit and the way they relate to each other in order to understand the stories they tell.
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Secondly, Fischer inverts Geertz's problematic understanding of cultures as texts
awaiting interpretation by using texts as particular symbols of cultural expression.
Thirdly, the anthropologist's own presence is much more uncertain, fragmented and
unstable - and therefore demanding of reflexive theorization - than for Geertz, who successfully
"penetrates" Balinese culture in his famous flight from the police when they raid a cockfight
(Geertz 1973: 412-417). Fischer's locational politics are poignantly highlighted by post-
revolution Iran, where physical travel itself gets authoritatively circumscribed in ways beyond the
anthropologist's control.
Fourthly, religion for Fischer ultimately is a polyphony, whereas in Geertz, it crystallizes
into the moment of the ritual, as described in his colorful portrayal of the Rangda-Barong ritual
(Geertz 1973: 114-118).
This dissertation reflects challenges analogous to the ones Fischer faces and highlights.
Doing ethnographies in corporate environments quite literally involves negotiating a minefield of
access issues, and an anthropologist's travels are seriously and constantly circumscribed by her
informants (or their lawyers). Physical presence is always already further decentered in online
ethnographic contexts, where conversations often occur much beyond the "ethnographic
encounter", and where informants themselves are hugely mobile - which means that it might
actually be easier to meet with the CEO of a San Francisco based company in Boston than in San
Francisco. Written sources are a terrific source of information, especially regarding sites where
physical access if difficult or impossible, but constant attention needs to be paid to the "origin
stories" of these sources, that are often significantly crafted or influenced by corporate public
relations apparati (whether they be annual reports, press releases or even "objective" journalistic
accounts). Finally, while technoscience, like religion, operates in supremely authoritative and
legitimate ways, one of the values of ethnography is to highlight its polyphony: corporate
technoscience is neither the seamless embodiment of progress that its official discourse would
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suggest, but nor is it a supremely cynical, money-grubbing exercise at the expense of "higher"
norms or values, as many academics and activists on what might broadly be termed the left are
quite ready to believe. (En)countering corporate technoscience requires respect for the multiple,
often contradictory, voices that go into its creation and sustenance.
I have visited a number of sites in the course of this thesis, and I document and talk about them in
a subsequent section. I use one, however, as an emblematic ethnographic site through which to locate the
broader sets of theoretical issues concerning biocapital that I talk about in this thesis. This might be a
controversial choice, and certainly there are perhaps other sites that could have served this function just as
well; maybe even better, or more "authentically", for the start-up I write about is not even a biotech start-up.
Certainly the perspective that I provide from this company is very much a situated perspective, and is only
one situated perspective of many that I have in this thesis. I think, however, that it might be the most
important.
Situated perspectives serve a political function, as Donna Haraway has forcefully argued (Haraway
1989). In anthropology, even more so, and the importance of reflexively situating the perspective that one is
writing from and about (which may or may not be the same thing) is increasingly obvious. This is
accentuated by the fact that in this thesis I choose to investigate the systems of techno-capitalism from the
inside: trying to get into the belly of the corporate beast that I have politically often thought about
adversarially. The ethnographic challenge here is to be able to narrate my multiple (usually corporate)
subjects' perspectives with respect and understanding without abandoning the right, or the ability, to be
critical. It's hard.
GeneEd, one of the sites I chose for a slightly longer-term, targeted period of participant
observation, provides situated perspectives on the drug development marketplace, on Silicon Valley, on
entrepreneurship and on Indian diasporic trajectories. My stories of these can be read as a supplement to
the main "body" of the thesis, independent of it, or not at all. It is meant to be one running commentary on
the worlds that I explore in this work, but is not intended as a distraction.
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GeneEd is an e-leaming start-up that provides online genomics and biology courses to biotech and
pharmceutical companies. A start-up is an emergent form of life in both senses of the term as I have
outlined above: it is both an emergent entity, and an emergent sociality of action. The question of corporate
identity - what, or who, or who all, constitute(s) a corporation - troubles me throughout this thesis. A start-
up allows some insights into a definition. Start-ups, literally, are emergent entities: every day that they
survive is a triumph, often against odds; their days are numbered, quite literally, by the amount of cash they
have left in the bank.
GeneEd was conceived in the early 1990s, to the extent that its co-founder Sunil Maulik conceived,
even before the existence of the world wide web, of the possibilities of using the computer to teach science.
Born in Bombay, Maulik grew up in England, where he studied biology before moving to Brandeis University
for a PhD. After his degree, he moved in the late 1980s to Silicon Valley to join a company called
Intelligenetics. Intelligenetics was a "bioinformatics company before bioinformatics existed. His
contemporaries at Brandeis thought he was crazy. It was still relatively unusual to leave academics to do
research in a company at that time; but more than that, who would ever do biology in a company that only
had computers? From Intelligenetics, Maulik moved through a series of other companies, before ending up
at Pangea Systems (later Doubletwist).
It was during this time that Mauilk met Salil Patel. Of Indian descent, Patel spent his early
childhood in Uganda, before his family became one of the many Ugandan Indian refugee families who
moved to England because of their persecution at the hands of Idi Amin. In England, Patel grew up with
many other refugee families in Greenham Common, the site of a United States Air Force base made famous
by anti-nuclear demonstrators through the 1980s. Patel did a Ph.D. at Stanford and a post-doc at Caltech,
before joining a biotech firm to do research on angiogenesis in order to develop gene therapy.
In his spare time, Maulik used to teach seminars on bioinformatics, often at evening colleges and
University extension schools, and once they became friends Patel would occasionally stand in for him. They
both shared and developed together a love for teaching, that blossomed into Maulik's mind as a corporate
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opportunity. Bioinformatics was just becoming big; it would be the future. Why not start a company to teach
bioinformatics? And why not teach it on the web, in order to reach a really wide audience?
It was easy for Maulik to think of leaving a job to start his own company. He typified the Silicon
Valley entrepreneur. Divorced, he did have a child to support, but not a traditional nuclear family structure to
seriously disrupt by the manic commitment and insane risk that any entrepreneurial activity entails. In any
case, Maulik, again fitting the Silicon Valley stereotype made famous by Jim Clark (the founder of
Netscape), was someone who dared to think differently. A friend and G3neEd investor, when asked why he
invested in GeneEd, was very clear that it was Maulik's personality - epitomized for him by his memorable
(and invariably bare-chested) presence at parties - that gave him the confidence that his money was being
soundly wagered. Maulik is extroverted and fun-loving, and he loves talking about his ideas for a company -
precisely the sort of person financial communities in any other place and at any other time in history would
have most immediately run away from. In Silicon Valley, he was perfect CEO material.
It was a lot harder for Patel to leave his job and jump into the world of entrepreneurial unknowns. In
addition to the commitments of marriage, he had grown up being a scientist: relatively shy, passionately
committed to his research, and not, in his own mind, at all an entrepreneur. Only his friendship with Maulik
and his love of teaching made him even seriously consider jumping ship. GeneEd, therefore, was founded
and incorporated as far back as 1997, but really remained in a state of purgatory for the next couple of
years, as Maulik and Patel balanced their new company with their existing jobs. During this time, in Maulik's
terms, GeneEd lacked the "activation energy" to function as a real company doing real business on its own.
Starting a company is such an insane business that it usually requires some form of crisis to make
the risk worthwhile. For Patel, it was a progressive disenchantment with his current employer, a
disenchantment that really stemmed from the type of scientist that he was. Patel has a firm belief in science
-- in the truths it provides, and in the ways it must be performed - that harkens back to an era of positivism
and Mertonian normativity, an ethos that seems strangely out of place in today's postmodem venture
science environment that thrives on the ability to be cynical. Patel's almost myopic principle that science is'
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about the quest for truth encountered considerable friction from the everyday activities of an aggressive
biotech company. The difference in value-systems between Mertonian academic science (such as it exists)
and corporate venture science, as I will assert again later in the thesis, is that the onus shifts away from
truth and towards credibility in the latter: corporate biotechnology research becomes almost inseparably
intertwined with corporate PR.
Patel in any case was not terribly happy with the way his company was managed, an unhappiness
that clearly proved to be a leaming experience as he moved to become a manager of a company himself.
He was involved in gene therapy work that was constructed as the flagship project of the company, and yet
he was given meager resources and only four researchers under him. After a year of working on his project,
his team reported generally negative results, which he took to the management, advising them to drop the
project altogether. The next day, the company put out a press release announcing the stunning advances
they had made towards gene therapy, using as examples the sorts of seriously troubled projects such as
Patel's that the company was actually pursuing (or considering to not pursue further). Their public relations
stunt got them the desired publicity and allowed their stock prices to shoot through the roof at a time when
stock markets were highly responsive to the slightest hint of promise. In Patel's belief system, however, this
piece of what in many circles might be admired as clever marketing was nothing other than scientific fraud.
His disenchantment, increasingly, was not just with the way the company was being managed, it was with
the form of life that the company stood for. Maulik's entreaties to join him were looking more and more
attractive. What finally gave him the courage to make the jump was the support of his wife Tejal, who
insisted that he should do what gave him satisfaction, rather than simply what brought home the proverbial
bacon.
Maulik, meanwhile, was running GeneEd by John Couch, the CEO of Pangea, where he was now
in charge of business development, and was generally getting Couch's blessings. As far as Couch was
concemed, anyone who could go out and educate other biotech / pharmaceutical executives about
bioinformatics was in effect creating informed customers for companies like Pangea. By December 22,
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1999, the company incorporated two years previously had slowly gathered enough momentum to appear
ready to go on the road, Maulik had been promised money by venture capitalists, and had made eight job
offers. On this day, he threw a party for the new employees, to celebrate the "beginning" of GeneEd.
The real beginning, according to both Maulik and Patel, happened neither when GeneEd was
incorporated, nor when they made these initial hires, but on the day after that party, on December 23, when
Maulik, in the midst of a hangover, was informed by the venture capitalists who had promised him funding
that they had decided, after all, not to give it to him. This was the crisis that provided Maulik with the
activation energy to really get GeneEd started, as he was faced with no money and eight employees as a
single parent who had maxed out four credit cards. The option remained to return to Pangea and resume his
job there; but the withdrawal of the VCs' commitment, more than ever, made Maulik determined to convert
what he was by now convinced was a very good idea into reality.
Over the next few weeks, Maulik went into money raising frenzy. He called up a couple of his
friends who had struck gold in the dot com boom and who were toying with the idea of doing some angel
investing (this being a particular form of "benevolent" investing that is contrasted to venture capitalism in the
generally smaller amounts invested, with the generally lower expectations on the part of the investors of
incredibly high returns on their investments. Venture capitalists, ideally, like a 60-70% return on their
investment, and usually take over a significant chunk of the company from the founders in return for their
largesse). His friends asked him if he needed money in the next few months. No, said Maulik, he needed it
in the next few days. Meanwhile, Maulik was on the road trying to sell what GeneEd had to offer in terms of
products, and was receiving expressions of interest from biotech companies like Celera Genomics. Maulik
also approached Celera's Silicon Valley rival Incyte, not just as a customer but as an investor. Like John
Couch at Pangea, the management at Incyte was enamored of the idea of a company that would effectively
be educating the industry about products it made and services it offered, and agreed to invest $500,000 in
GeneEd.
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2.3. Field sites and reflections on field work
The field sites that I have chosen are a reflection of the "objects" that I have followed
around. These objects include information, drugs and health. Each of these objects has distinct
notions of temporality associated with them. Information, particularly as it pertains to DNA
sequences, is, among many things, the enabler of "rational" drug development (this does not
mean that sequence information will necessarily enable the successful development of new
therapeutics; what it does mean is that it will enable a rational process of drug development,
whose outcomes, nonetheless, will remain uncertain). In other words, sequence information is
drug in-formation, information here assuming a transitory space towards future possibilities rather
in the way Alberto Melucci describes information in his formulation of new social movement
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One Saturday morning, when Maulik was spending time with his mother, he received a call from a
friend saying that he should make a pitch to Ernest Mario, CEO of Alza Corporation, a Silicon Valley biotech
company (since bought by Johnson and Johnson) that makes improved drug delivery systems. Getting an
appointment from Mario for that very aftemoon, Maulik drove unshaven to Alza's headquarters. He strolled
through Alza's spacious, fountain-bedecked grounds into Mario's huge executive suite and talked him into
investing another $500,000 into GeneEd. Within the next few weeks, Maulik, who was really looking for
about $500,000 in total to get his company going, had two and a quarter million dollars, and not a cent of it
venture capital money. His failure to obtain venture capital funding has had serious long-term consequences
for GeneEd's corporate culture, allowing it to be molded by the personalities of the management and
employees, but also making it acutely dependent on constant sales in order to stay afloat: the sort of
desperate fiscal discipline and pressure to produce, innovate and sell that most dot corns, flush with millions
of dollars of venture capital money, never had to deal with.
I will talk about some if these pressures, and the culture they have given birth to, at subsequent
points through this thesis. For the time being, however, GeneEd had emerged.
theory (Melucci 1996). Drugs are temporally oriented towards the present (and indeed, ethically
oriented towards the present as in gift, drugs being discursively articulated through corporate
public relations instruments as the "gift" of the genius and industry of pharmaceutical companies
that undergo high-risk, decade-long drug development ventures in the cause of Food, Health and
Hope). Health meanwhile is salvationary, and is oriented almost by definition towards a utopian
future.
Each of these three objects also has different symbolisms associated with them.
Information is science: it is, indeed what the science of biology has become, an information
science; or so, again, goes the discourse. Drugs are magic: they are the colorful black-boxed pills
that we can all pop and get better on. The salvationary utopia that constitutes Health is messianic
and religious. In following the set of "objects" that get constituted by information, drugs and
health, I am in effect tracing the complex imbrication of science, magic and religion in
contemporary capitalism.
Igor Kopytoff has forcefully argued for the social life of things (Kopytoff 1986). This
thesis is not the social life of a drug in a post-genomic world, and those are not the circulations
that this project traces through its choice of field-sites. Rather, this thesis is about the imaginary
life of a drug, as it morphs between information, pill and Health. Tnese transformations reflect the
epistemic shift that genomics marks in the first place, as it shifts the primary site of articulation of
bioscience from drugs to information. They also reflect the institutional shifts that genomics
partakes in, shifts that portray the corporatization of life sciences as natural.
So what are all these people who I am studying constructing? Are they constructing one
object? Reading this as tracing a social life of a drug might imply that they are; understanding
this as tracing the imaginary life of a drug makes it clear that they can't possibly be, even though,
in some sense, they're all involved in the same enterprise, however they might approach it and
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whatever their politics towards it might be. What is biotechnology? Is biotechnology a boundary
object (Star and Griesemer 1989)? Is biotechnology capital?
These are not questions that I arrive at answers to; they are questions, however, that I
constantly ask throughout this thesis. What is clear, however, is that materials, people, money and
information are all flowing, at and through each of the sites I study. I am not interested, therefore,
in tracing the culture of particular sites, even though what might be read as "cultural" stories of
them are variously embedded through the thesis. What I am interested in tracing are the multiple
exchange relations between these sites. The sites that I outline, therefore, are not studied in and of
themselves as reified, static or solitary entities, but are rather studied for their place, and
articulations, as nodes of multiple sorts of exchange. I believe that it is by enabling such studies
about a system through a set of interacting locales that multi-sited ethnography, as a conceptual
topology, is not simply about going to many different sites and comparing them to one another.
In my fieldwork, I have adopted a six-pronged approach: intensive, medium-length
participant-observation (1-2 months per site); short targeted "probes" (1-2 day site visits); on-
going monitoring of written products of the drug development marketplace; semi-structured,
multiple, life history and career development interviewing; use of scientific conferences and trade
shows as ritual spaces for seeing many of the promotional, competitive and status constituents
enacted and renegotiated; and seminars that I gave at one of my sites, GeneEd, which emerged as
an ethnographer's variant of a focus group technology. In the process, I have physically covered a
number of sites in the US (mainly around Boston and the Bay Area) and in India. The list of sites
at which I have undertaken field work is outlined in Appendix i.
Alongside the "body" of my thesis, then, runs the stories of two major field sites at which
I undertook targeted participant observation of a few weeks to a few months, GeneEd (a San
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Francisco based e-learning start-up) and the Centre for Biochemical Technology (India's flagship
public sector genome lab).
A standard question that the choice of these sites would generate would be how they are
in any way representative of genomics, and how indeed I could write a "real" history of an
emergent present from what are at best peripheral sites. My response would be that these are both
fascinating ethnographic sites in and of themselves, and fascinating vantage points onto the
processes I'm studying. While they may be "peripheral", they are sites that are deeply invested in
the marketplace I'm studying, and certainly start-ups and "Third World" countries significantly
impact and shape drug development marketplace agendas. These sites are not just interesting, but
reflective of the fact that place matters, as they highlight the insights that ethnography can
provide onto political economic systems.
The first of these sites is GeneEd, a San Francisco based e-learning start-up that provides
web-based multi-media courses for biotech executives. There are a number of reasons why I
believe GeneEd, more than almost any other place I have studied, provides a complex set of
embodied perspectives on the systems and phenomena that I am trying to study.
GeneEd sells its courses both to small biotech and large pharmaceutical companies. It is,
therefore, extremely invested in the drug development marketplace, which, at the end of the day,
is the "space" that I am trying to elucidate myself. Of course, GeneEd is by no means a "neutral"
or "impartial" observer: no situated observer can be, and I am trying to capture neither an
"objective" view of the marketplace nor one that mirrors my own. By selling to both small and
large, biotech and pharma, upstream and downstream companies, however, GeneEd's worldview
is less self-refractory than those of biotech / pharma companies themselves, who tend to view
marketplaces and market logics very much through a situated perspective that discursively
constructs terrains and logics as only capable of being the way they see it. One of my arguments
throughout this thesis is that capitalism draws its sustenance, and encounters its resistance, from
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the multiple contradictions of the marketplace; for biocapital, a lot of those contradictions play
out between biotech and pharmaceutical companies. GeneEd is able to "see" those contradictions
in a more complete, though by no means less self-interested, manner than many companies that
are actually in the business of making drugs.
The location of a start-up is itself an interesting and important one to identify.
Biotechnology is a form of venture science. Genomics in particular, taking place as it is in the
midst and immediate aftermath of the dot corn boom, has as central to its calculus entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists. GeneEd itself is not a venture capital funded company, though not for
want of effort. It is nonetheless very much a company that is at the heart of venture science.
The particular location of this company in geographical terms adds to its interest. Being
in San Francisco, it is a Silicon Valley company, and yet not a Silicon Valley company. Location
does count for start-ups, and being in places like, especially, Silicon Valley, enables the creation
of networks and contacts that are of prime importance in hiring the best workers and managers,
being in corridors of conversation with investors, and being able to easily access customers and
collaborators. It's a lot harder to be a start-up in Kalamazoo, Michigan. GeneEd is very much a
product both of its times and its place. And yet that place is not alongside a freeway in Palo Alto,
Fremont, Santa Clara or San Jose, but in a run-down part of San Francisco south of Mission
Street. Within two blocks' walk one can reach a rather trendy part of San Francisco's shopping
district; an extremely ornate Hispanic church; a community kitchen where homeless people get
fed; a caf - cum- laundromat where one can have lunch while washing one's clothes; a bakery
that sells x-rated cakes; and a transvestite nightclub. Until the latter moved out, GeneEd shared its
office building with a company that manufactured jeans. Many of GeneEd's employees, including
their co-founder and CEO Sunil Maulik, live in the Mission district, and share in the general
community concerns over the progressive corporatization of their locality. That they themselves
are a part of that corporatization is an irony that is acutely felt within the company. GeneEd's
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Silicon Valley is not the Silicon Valley of strip malls and suburban villas that most Northern
Californian biotech companies inhabit, nor even that other sought after biotech locality made
famous by Genentech, South San Francisco (which calls itself "The Industrial City").
GeneEd's founders, Sunil Maulik and Salil Patel, are both of Indian descent, both grew up
in Britain and have both lived in the Silicon Valley for over a decade. There are stories of
friendship and hybridity in their biographies. As is the case with many start-ups, the founders'
biographies leave a significant mark on the culture, identity, even (perhaps unwittingly) corporate
strategy of the company they create. The Indian entrepreneurial community in Silicon Valley is
one of the central links in this thesis between the drug development worlds of India and the US.
Maulik and Patel both belong to, and yet by virtue of their British upbringing are distinct from,
that community.
In terms of being a site of knowledge production, GeneEd is an interdisciplinary space
that reflects the centrality of interdisciplinarity in the scientific - corporate worlds that I am
studying. GeneEd's courses are physically designed by a team of graphic designers (most of
whom have no advanced training in the life sciences, and so are picking up their biology on the
job), their computers are maintained by programrs while content is provided by Maulik and
(mainly) Patel, who are both biologists. Indeed, my own function in exchange for the access I was
given was to give a weekly seminar on the history of biology to the entire company, in order to
get the employees aware and talking about issues in the life sciences. Needless to say, these
seminars were fascinating ethnographic moments.
The Centre for Biochemical Technology (CBT) is one of the forty or so labs of the Indian
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). Founded in the 1960s, it has for most of its
life been a dilapidated, musty center that has sold biochemical reagents. In 1995, the Indian
government realized that it was missing out on the global genomics bandwagon, having decided
not to be a part of the Human Genome Project (HGP) at its inception in the late 80s. India didn't
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really have very many "genome scientists" at the time, and the best known was S.K.
Brahmachari, who had worked with initiators of the HGP such as Charles Cantor, and who had
been clamoring for India to do genomics for much of the previous five to six years. Brahmachari
was at this point ensconced at Bangalore's Indian Institute of Science (IISc), India's premier
scientific research institution, and without a doubt the best place in India (and possibly among the
best in the world) to do unfettered basic life sciences research. The Indian government persuaded
Brahmachari to move from IISc to head a new center that would do genome research. The
government's idea was to build an entirely new genome center, which Brahmachari rejected. He
felt that India was already behind the genomics curve, and building a new center would mean that
his (and the country's) energies would be spent just getting a building up and labs functional for
the next four to five years. In other words, by the time a new genome center was ready to go,
Brahmachari felt, the genome would already be sequenced or nearly so, putting the Indian effort
at a virtually insurmountable competitive disadvantage. He felt it would be a far better idea to
retool an existing lab into a genome center, and so was given the Directorship of CBT in order to
convert it into India's flagship public sector genome lab.
In addition to reinventing the agenda of a public laboratory (which in itself would have
made CBT an interesting ethnographic site to study), Brahmachari has, along with the Indian
pharmaceutical company Nicholas Piramal (NPIL), seeded a genomics start-up called Genomed
on its premises. There is, in parallel, another Genomed that is located in Bombay, in the very
different setting of a hospital owned by the Piramals. A comparison of Genomed Delhi (housed in
an academic research center) and Bombay (housed in a private hospital) again highlights the
importance of place in the production of "global" knowledge.
Brahamachari has also become a major policy player, as India very actively tries to come
up with laws regulating the circulation of human genetic material out of India. This is an area of
some concern as human (and other) genetic material becomes important "raw" material in the
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generation of therapeutically relevant knowledge, and India has lagged behind especially many
Latin American countries in coming up with legislation to deal with the dangers of expropriation
of this genetic material by (usually Western, often corporate) researchers.
Many of Brahmachari's colleagues and friends thought he was crazy to move from IISc,
where he could continue to grow and establish himself as a premier genome scientist, to assume
Directorship of a CSIR lab, one of the most politically charged positions in the Indian scientific
establishment, in Delhi, one of the most bureaucratic cities in India. And yet, this move has seen
his career path go from scientist to entrepreneur and policy maker, making his a fascinating
biography to trace as part of a tracing of multiple hybrid genome worlds. What is important to
emphasize is that this is a trajectory that could only have emerged by physically moving to Delhi
and to CBT, which has the additional advantage of being located on the campus of Delhi
University, and is thereby able to draw easily upon the students and resources of a major
university.
There is a third site that I have followed through contact with its key actor, who provides
a third biographical vantage point upon biocapital to place alongside those provided by Maulik
and Brahmachari. This site is PXE International, a patient advocacy group headquartered outside
Boston.
PXE stands for pseudoxanthoma elasticum, and is a rare genetic pigmentation disorder
that usually leads to blindness by the mid-twenties. PXE International was founded by Patrick
and Sharon Terry. Pat Terry used to be in the construction business, but started reading up on
PXE when he realized that both his children were afflicted with the disease. Now, the Terrys have
not only managed to form a transnational patient advocacy group for the disease, but Pat Terry is
also the co-founder of a new biotech company called Genomic Health, whose other co-founder is
Randy Scott, the co-founder of Incyte Genomics (one of the largest and most established genome
companies). Further, PXE International is writing itself into intellectual property agreements with
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companies like Genomic Health that they donate samples to. Therefore, organizations like these
highlight the huge investment that emergent biosocial entities such as patient groups have in
genomics, but are also involved in strategically recharting intellectual property terrains. In that
sense, they are engaged in an activity not dissimilar in substance (though often dissimilar in form,
tactics and motivation) from the policy making activities of the Indian state as it tries to regulate
the flow of genetic material from its territory.
A project such as this, not surprisingly, brings with it a host of ethnographic challenges.
The first is one of scale, when confronted by a range of disparate sites across two countries. This
makes the importance of different sorts of collaboration particularly salient. The call for
collaborative ethnographies has been an explicit part of Marcus and Fischer's agenda for multi-
sited ethnography. Even informally "collaborative" networks are often of unanticipated use in the
field. For example, Brahmachari was very keen to get a comparative sense of policy arrangements
on intellectual property issues regarding the circulation of genetic material in other (especially
Latin American) contexts, and the work of Corinne Hayden on bioprospecting in Mexico, and the
complicated benefit sharing agreements that get drawn up between various Mexican and
American institutional actors, was invaluable in helping provide answers.
The second challenge has to do with access, in an environment that is often defined from
the ground up by its secrecy. This is especially a problem in the US, where secrecy as part of
corporate culture is culturally sanctioned and legally institutionalized. Corporations are
understandably wary of researchers like myself who will be traveling to a range of other sites,
including possibly to visit their competitors. In addition, corporations are very careful about
regulating what gets said about them, their public relations apparatus often being sophisticated
and a central component of their corporate strategic apparatus.
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I have received a range of responses from various companies that I have tried to get
access to, and it is perhaps useful at this point to mention the divergent responses of three of the
main genome companies. Millennium Pharmaceuticals refused to even give me a tour, citing
reasons of lack of time. The fact that Millennium is one of the most aggressively growing biotech
companies, and the fact that this growth has largely been fuelled so far by clever corporate
strategy and public and investor relations rather than the in-house development of tangible
therapeutic products,'9 however, makes it seem quite evident to me that the lack of time was
probably not the only factor contributing to Millennium's hesitation to show me around. Indeed,
it is often possible, even when not given a formal tour of a company, to informally get to know
some of the company's employees and learn about non-proprietary aspects of the company's
activities, or what it is like to work there. Those of Millennium's employees whom I have met
have undoubtedly been the most reticent and least informative of any biotech employees that I
have met in my travels. This leads me to suspect that an aggressively closed-door attitude is very
much a part of Millennium's corporate culture, and has also meant that I have only been able to
19 Millennium's major therapeutic areas are cardiovascular disease, oncology, metabolic diseases and
inflammatory diseases. Their cardiovascular products include Integrilin® and Campath®. Much of
Millennium's cardiovascular disease focus has emerged as a consequence of its merger with COR
Therapeutics, which had done the early discovery work on Integrilin®. Campath® is a 50-50 joint venture
of Millennium with ILEX Products. Millennium has two other development stage product candidates in
Phase I clinical trials. VelcadeTM, their major oncology drug, is also an acquisition, and as of August 2002
was in Phase II and III clinical trials for multiple myeloma, Phase I and II for other hematological cancers,
and Phase I and II for solid tumors. In addition, Millennium has three other oncology candidates: MLN 518
has finished pre-clinical trials, and MLN 591 and 576, as of August 2002, were in Phase I clinical trials. In
the area of inflammatory disease, as of August 2002, MLNO02 was in Phase II trials for Crohn's disease, and
Phase I and H for ulcerative colitis, while MLN 519 and MLN 01 were in Phase I. In the area of metabolic
disease, MLN 4760 was in Phase I.
All in all, Millennium, as of mid-2002, was testing seven drugs in people, out of which only one
was derived from its own gene databases. This is in contrast to Human Genome Sciences, several of whose
drugs in human clinical trials have been derived from its own gene databases. Millennium's strategy of
buying potential drugs to tide them over, rather than developing drugs from their own databases, is
evidenced in the case of MLN 341, a candidate for the treatment of multiple myelomas. The initial work in
discovering this drug was done at Proscript, which got acquired by LeukoSite, which in turn was acquired
by Millennium. It is now Millennium's most-funded drug. If this drug clears FDA trials, then it will be the
first that Millennium has brought to market entirely on its own. Millennium, however, is not unique in
adopting such strategies. For example, the most promising drug in the pipeline for Myriad Genetics, R-
flurbiprofen, was acquired from the Riverside, CA based company Encore Pharmaceuticals.
The above information was obtained from Millennium's website, www.mlnm.com. For the story
of MLN 341, see Herper 2002a. For the story of Myriad's acquisition of R-flurbiprofen, see Herper 2002b.
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learn about Millennium from public documents, which, unsurprisingly, are invariably spun to
Millennium's advantage.
Celera Genomics, the controversial company that raced the public Human Genome
Project to sequence the genome, was willing to give me a tour, but wanted to know exactly what
the purpose of my visit would be. When I explained my research project, their Investor Relations
person said, "Oh, I get it! You want the media tour, not the investor tour!", thereby letting on that
Celera's PR apparatus is so evolved as to be compartmentalized into "media" and "investor"
components.
Incyte Genomics, based in Palo Alto (unlike Millennium and Celera, which are both East
Coast companies), was in contrast by far the most open of the three major genome companies,2 0
and I received a wonderful and extremely informative tour of their premises. In addition, Incyte
executives that I have met have always been willing to spend lots of time talking to me,
suggesting that cultures of openness and secrecy are established at the top, and permeate to
become normative corporate behavior: "corporate culture", if you will. This difference might to a
certain extent simply reflect a more laid back, informal and friendly West Coast attitude
compared to the hard-nosed formality of the East Coast. Whatever the reason, I am extremely
grateful for the generous amounts of time and information I have been given by people at Incyte.
Having said this, when I pressed Incyte with a request for doing longer term ethnographic
research there, I was asked to send a research proposal so that it could be vetted by Incyte's team
of 60 lawyers (in a company of around 700!). Needless to say, I never saw my proposal again, or
heard back from Incyte.
It is, of course, much easier to negotiate with a company that has 20 people as opposed to
one that has 60 lawyers, since in the former case the CEO often has a definitive say in deciding
20 Is it perhaps not a coincidence that Millennium is one of the most aggressively growing biotech
companies today, while Incyte is in serious trouble?
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on issues such as access to a traveling ethnographer. This makes me no less grateful to the people
at GeneEd for the time and information they gave me. Before meeting with them, however, I had
engaged in lengthy negotiations with another Bay Area start-up called Neomorphic. I met with a
number of people in their management team, all of whom were intrigued, if cautious, regarding
my proposal, but was finally denied access when Neomorphic got bought up by Affymetrix,
making it overnight a part of a company of 750 from one of 25.
As mentioned above, it is that much easier to get access to a small start-up like GeneEd,
that only has about 20 employees and a CEO who likes the idea of being written about, but even
such access has to be negotiated. An account of the encounters leading up to my getting access
there will I think provide interesting insights into the challenges of initiating corporate
ethnographies.
I first met Sunil Maulik at one of the many receptions that define industrial genome
conferences, in September 2000. He immediately struck me as being very smart and extremely
erudite. We went to his hotel and had a wonderful lunch in a restaurant by the seaside. It got
established right at the outset that this was going to be a conversation, as Maulik clearly wasn't
one of these extremely-busy-corporate-executive-doing-grad-student-a-favor type of people, but
was really interested in what I wanted to know and why I wanted to know it. So in fact we started
with him wanting to know about my work rather than the other way round. When I told him that
I'm interested in studying the changing corporate strategies of genome companies, he
immediately said this is going to be a very interesting lunch.
After a fascinating initial conversation, I stayed in touch with Maulik, and met him again
on a trip to the Bay Area in November of that year, when he was in the midst of dealing with a
company that wanted GeneEd to design a bioethics course for them. By this time, I had broached
to Maulik the idea that I might do fieldwork at GeneEd. Maulik himself was open to the idea, and
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so arranged for me to come and give a talk at GeneEd, as a way of introducing myself to the other
people in the company to see how they felt.
The day I went to give my talk, GeneEd had just signed a major agreement with
Sumitomo Corporation in Japan, who had bought all of GeneEd's packages and translated them
into Japanese for a Japanese market. This was a major coup for the young start-up, and one that
occasioned them much optimism.
What daunted me most about having to talk at GeneEd was Maulik's generous e-mail
introduction of me to the company earlier in the week, which he had circulated along with my
abstract, and in which he told his employees "Don't be discouraged by all the big words, Kaushik
will give a very interesting, stimulating and articulate talk". So now I had to be interesting,
stimulating and articulate, and watch out for the big words!
I proceeded to give them a quick overview of science studies and cultural anthropology,
how the two came together (especially with Sharon Traweek and then quite a bit about Paul
Rabinow's work), how they meet in my work, and how I expect GeneEd to fit into it. I actually
thought I'd have to do a lot of explaining about the last part, as GeneEd is not a genomics
company, and I expected them to be preoccupied with the question of how they would fit into a
contemporary (which generally gets understood as linear) history of genomics. On the contrary,
they seemed to assume that GeneEd would quite obviously fit into a story such as mine, and in
fact picked up on a lot of the history I was giving to ask me questions, something I really didn't
expect as I was basically reeling off names.
In fact, I received many questions and comments on my summaries of science studies
literature. For instance, they really took on Bruno Latour and actor-network theory, and Salil
Patel in particular really wanted me to explain how actants work (being quite readily convinced at
the outset that science is basically a recruiting exercise!). Maulik meanwhile wanted to know
what I thought scientists' motivations were, since scientists constituted GeneEd's consumers, so
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they really needed to understand what drove them. In other words, I was already being co-opted
into their interdisciplinary enterprise in a way I just couldn't be at a genome company like Incyte
or Neormophic.
After the talk, the employees went round the table4ntroducing themselves, and then
Maulik got up and started what he called a "values and visions" session. Apparently the
management (which consists of himself, Patel, Paul Eisele [a much more senior person, the chief
operating officer who was steeped in years of sales and marketing experience in the entertainment
industry] and Barry Giordano, the VP sales) had sat down together and tried to come up with a
series of core values for the company. Basically, this was an acknowledgement and reflection of
the fact that their relationships between their primary markets (executives of other biotech /
pharma companies) and their secondary / tertiary markets (which really could be anyone,
including other biotech / pharma companies but also more lay consumers as they made courses
more accessible to lay people) was so complex. Maulik started by talking about an article in the
New York Times (January 31 2001) on direct-to-consumer advertising to parents of children with
respiratory syncytial virus (R.S.V.), but out by the biotechnology company MedImmune, in order
to highlight GeneEd's complicit and complicated relationship with the marketplace they are so
invested in.
Issues like direct-to-consumer advertising point to situations that directly confront a
company like GeneEd as "value" questions, in both senses of the word. This is because GeneEd is
caught in a peculiar dialectic between being an education company and an advertising company.
In the former role, it creates its own, supposedly "neutral", education packages: neutral in the way
a textbook would be neutral, drawing on generally known scientific literature to create the
packages. But much of GeneEd's immediate revenue comes from doing contract work for other
companies. In these cases, GeneEd doesn't provide the content, only the form. Therefore
situations such as the MedImmune advertisemerits immediately highlight the need to question and
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critique what is meant by "public education". Further, these are not hypothetical situations:
GeneEd had already developed an antibodies course, and had already been approached by one of
MedImmune's competitors to develop courses that they could use.
So Maulik talked about GeneEd's values. There is a tension in that word itself which
reflects the tensions in GeneEd's complex relationships with its primary and secondary / tertiary
markets. These values, as mentioned earlier, were initially outlined by the four executives of the
company, and Maulik was now laying them open for discussion by everyone else. Eisele
summarized some of the "internal" values by saying that basically GeneEd wanted to be a
company that would allow its employees to "have a life". Tara Beyhm, one of the younger
workers, mentioned the need for the company to have an ethic, to have "unbiased opinions" on
ethical issues. Patel immediately scorned the possibility of such a thing as "unbiased opinion",
and said instead that they need to have at their disposal "enough information to make up our own
minds". Maulik now introduced the central tension for the company, that half of their courses are
customized for companies. The question then becomes what to do when the company has ethical
conflicts. The question, as Maulik posed it, was: "Should it be the company [GeneEd]'s business
to walk away from business?"
Jill Blue Lin, one of the graphic designers, immediately translated Maulik's hypothetical
company that GeneEd might have ethical conflicts with into "evil company", and equally
immediately into the hypothetical case that Monsanto might approach them for business. 2 ' Lin
said that a company like Monsanto, whether regarded as "evil" or not, should be allowed to say
(through the medium of GeneEd) whatever they wanted to. She didn't think it was unethical to
work with a company whose business plans or projects were controversial. Her argument was for
a company (like Monsanto)'s free speech.
21 This emblematic status that Monsanto has acquired as the "Evil Company" in activist circles is
interesting enough; even more interesting that it has done so in corporate circles, as the benchmark to either
avoid or be distanced from.
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Eisele however said that GeneEd's walking away from a company doesn't deny that
company its free speech. Neil Mackenna, a bioinformaticist visiting GeneEd for the day, then said
that it was important for a company like GeneEd to maintain its credibility. Patel said that in fact
one of the first suggestions doing the rounds amongst the executives was to prepare courses on
genetically modified foods, but that he personally was disinclined because it is such a polarized
issue and GeneEd didn't want to get caught in the middle. Maulik then asked the central question:
Is it GeneEd's role to rule on the content? Do they want to be a censor? Patel admitted that
GeneEd had already developed a number of custom courses in which the content isn't a hundred
percent honest, and gave the example of a course they developed for a customer that he knew had
lies in it. Eisele argued that in these cases GeneEd was the messenger and not the message.
Again, therefore, the central question being contended with here was: Is GeneEd an education
company or an advertising company?
Eisele then phrased the tension in so many words: "How do people feel about the aspect
of the company that makes GeneEd similar to an advertising company?" Mai Grant, GeneEd's
office manager, responded that in capitalism, this compromise always had to be made. Spencer
Yeh, the Chief Information Officer and Systems Administrator, said that GeneEd was trying to be
neutral. Maulik added that it made good business sense to be seen to be neutral. One way of
seeming neutral is to do business with everybody. But that means that if an evil company X
comes along, you'll have to do business with them. Beyhm pointed out that usually the most evil
companies have the most money. Maulik then said that companies are composed of individuals,
and are not intrinsically bad or good. He said that his sister is a pharmaceutical company sales
rep, so he knows the levels that these companies will go to sell their product. Therefore, he said,
"they're not inherently evil, they do business".
At this point, Maulik looked at me, and said, "You're scribbling furiously. What do you
think?" Of course, putting the neutral participant observer out on an extremely brittle limb! Even
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if I had an answer, I presumed that telling them I was a Marxist who sought death to
multinational capital would not be strategically a wise move, so avoided an answer altogether by
telling them the story of Jim Kim, a doctor-activist-medical anthropologist at the Harvard
Medical School, and how he does business with pharma companies because as a doctor he has to
get drugs to patients who need them desperately and fast, while he at the same time urges Act-Up
on the side to storm the offices of Pfizer. It's precisely that idea of a strategic field of action that
GeneEd could, in this introspective moment, still develop, even though, as they themselves
admitted in so many words, business is a form of prostitution, an enterprise of selling oneself at
the highest cost possible, but also at any cost. Maulik arrived at in many ways the happy (albeit
easy?) for the time being compromise that "if we get lots of money from pharma companies, we
can redistribute it". He then suggested that 5% of GeneEd's time and resources would be used to
contribute to non-profit sources. He also, in that vein, mentioned the possibility of being involved
in technology transfer to developing countries, and of course all sorts of possibilities exist for a
company like GeneEd in a place like India.
So that was the conclusion of the Values and Visions session. Maulik then took me aback
by asking everyone publicly and in front of me what they wanted to do with me, whether I should
be invited back for a longer-term interaction. Both an uncomfortable and a refreshingly honest
mode of operation. I suggested that this might be a conversation better had in my absence. Beyhm
said she would be happy to have me back if it meant free lunch again. Generally, everyone
seemed receptive, though Yeh suggested that they eventually decide through secret ballot. But
Maulik was very upfront about the fact that he certainly wanted me back, and was equally upfront
about the fact that it was his ego prompting him to be written about as much as anything else. On
the other hand, both he and I realized that I might be valuable to him in ways I simply might not
to a genome company, precisely because his consumer base is potentially anyone, and he knew
that I could give him access to consumers such as patient groups, bioethicists and other scientist -
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businesspeople, and that I might also be invaluable in helping him think through ways of moving
into India. This was always already a complicit ethnographic relationship.
What remained at GeneEd, then, was negotiating the terms of access, especially as they
related to confidentiality. After two weeks of negotiation, we finally agreed upon a 14-point,
legally binding, modified non-disclosure agreement (NDA), that requires me to respect GeneEd's
confidential information but that allows me to write or speak about their non-proprietary
information for academic purposes. On the strength of this contract, I was given full access to the
company, including to their weekly management operations meetings and their company financial
documents. I reproduce the agreement in Appendix 2, as a possible template for future
ethnographic work of this kind.
Getting access to CBT, in India, brought with it a host of other issues. I describe these to
point to some of the concerns over confidentiality that structure terrains of ethnographic access-
concerns that often manifest in similar ways, but for different reasons, in India and the US. I
therefore follow my story of negotiating access to CBT with that of getting Institutional Review
Board (IRB) clearance from MIT for undertaking my project in the first place.
Indian corporations, while keen to protect their confidential information, do not adopt
their American counterparts' attitude of extreme defensiveness, and I in fact received immediate
permission from the pharmaceutical company NPIL (through the mediation of Brahmachari) to
do fieldwork at Genomed, which as I mentioned earlier is physically located in CBT and in which
NPIL have equity stakes, without even having to sign any agreements with them. Getting formal
approval to do work at CBT, however, proved much more fraught, this time not because of the
concerns of the defensive American corporation but because of the concerns of the defensive
Indian state, as operationalized by its bureaucracy.
Once again, Brahmachari, like Maulik, was keen for me to do research on CBT, for
reasons very similar to Maulik's: the self-satisfaction of being written about on the one hand, and
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the idea that I could help Brahmachari by inserting him into my networks in the US, by helping
him think through policy and managerial issues and by publicizing some of his concerns
regarding the expropriation of Indian genetic material to a wider audience. My presence was also
accepted by the Director General of the CSIR, Ramesh Mashelkar, who was the ultimate
authority to sanction my access. And yet, doing the paperwork to actually get access at CBT was
an intricate and frustrating maneuver that highlights the bureaucratic contexts in which Indian
institutions work; the security concerns of the Indian state; and a whole local political economy of
red-tape that is of some importance to understand if one is to adequately understand India's path
to globalization in ethnographically informed ways. Since these encounters also ended with a
legal agreement (also reproduced in Appendix 2), I feel they are useful in throwing comparative
light on the politics of ethnographic access.
The formal paperwork at CBT had to be negotiated with the person in charge of their
Business Development and Marketing Group, a man called Pankaj Bansal. I had initiated
correspondence with Brahmachari more than two months before I was due to start my fieldwork
at CBT, because he had warned me that it would take time to get all the clearances, especially
from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), since I qualify as a "foreigner" on account of my
American institutional affiliation. I had been assured by Brahmachari the week before reaching
India that all the clearances had been obtained. Here was Bansal, however, who was clearly
completely ignorant of any of these happenings, and who decided to go about reinventing the
wheel.
Bansal started off by saying that I need to get both MEA clearance and security
clearance. I told him that Brahmachari had already obtained these. He said, how can Brahmachari
obtain these on his own, he has to go through proper channels (which meant Bansal). So Bansal
told me that I couldn't start tape recording until he had sorted out clearance issues, and suggested
that until then I just have "broad" conversations with various people so that I can decide who I
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wanted to formally interview later. I told him that I've now had "broad" conversations with people
three times over (since I had made earlier shorter visits to CBT, when I talked to a number of
their scientists off-tape. Also, like Maulik, Brahmachari had arranged that I give a talk to the
entire institute explaining my work and where I'm coming from). What's more, I had already
drawn up a list of people I wanted to interview, and Brahmachari had formally approved that list.
None of this, of course, was good enough for Bansal, who kept talking about security
considerations, and about how he'd be in trouble if I turned out to be a Pakistani spy. Bansal then
called up someone in Ramesh Mashelkar's office to consult with him. This other person made it
clear that:
a. I would have to get all the clearances, and
b. Getting all the clearances would take a lot of time.
Bansal then started looking over the NDA I had drafted, which involved him ruminating over the
document for a full 20 minutes. As a part of any ethnographic agreement that I draw up with my
informants, I tell them that they will get transcripts of on-tape interviews for review, in order to
address proprietary concerns. Bansal said that getting transcripts for review is all very well, but
there might be written notes that I take that won't include what is in the tapes, and that CBT
would like to see those too. I made it clear that showing him written notes is not on, and a clear
violation of my professional ethics; but that what I am willing to do is provide them with a
written synopsis of what I have observed at the end of the month.
Bansal then got an assistant to draw up a list of people I could talk to, even though
Brahmachari had already formally approved a list of people that I had come up with. Needless to
say, Bansal's list was much more selective than the one I had got approved. Bansal then asked his
assistant to e-mail the people on the list he had made, to sound them out about the likely
questions I would ask, and to ensure that they gave "proper" answers.
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The next morning was spent in continued negotiations with Bansal, who was a lot
friendlier, since he had to talked to Brahmachari and realized that, as I had been insisting, all the
paperwork had indeed been done. However, friendly, it was evident from the get-go, doesn't
translate into productive. Bansal had wanted me to e-mail him a copy of the agreement that I had
drafted, since he didn't warit to retype it all. This I had done the previous day, but he still hadn't
received it. I told him I'd e-mail it again to him from the Centre, but couldn't follow through
because the servers at the Centre were down all day. No more progress.
The following day, I did manage to get the agreement e-mailed to Bansal, but by the end
of the week found that he had still not signed it, because he wasn't the person vested with the
authority to do so. The only person who can sign agreements of this sort in a public institution
like CBT is their administrative officer (AO), and CBT didn't have one. A new one was supposed
to join the following week, which ended up delaying the whole process by another week. Once
the new AO did join, Bansal insisted that it would only be fair to give him a few days to review
my proposal before being asked to sign it.
Finally, two weeks after starting at CBT, I got the agreement signed. This however was
no simple feat, but rather a protracted ritual. Bansal outlined the projected modus operandi for me
to follow, since as far as he was concerned the moment of signing the agreement was the time
when I actually started my research at CBT. This modus operandi involved my having to report
every move to Bansal's assistant, so that Bansal could constantly monitor who I talked to, and
when. The agreement itself had to be signed on judicial stamp paper, because plain paper
agreements in India are not legally valid.
Bansal and I then went up to the new AO, a rather pleasant man called Jayaram. But that
didn't make him any less bureaucratic. He wasn't trying to obstruct the signing any further, but it
was clear that he was quite perplexed by the sort of agreement we were signing, and it was not the
sort of thing he was used to encountering. More than anything else, it was very evident that he
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wanted to cover his back in case anything went wrong, and kept saying that people shouldn't later
put him on the spot and ask him questions if anything went wrong. Therefore, he wanted me to
pass on to him not just the transcript but the actual physical audio-tape also after recording, which
seemed to me a bit excessive.
Jayaram had meanwhile ordered tea for all of us from the cante en. The waiter from the
canteen brought tea in plastic Nescafe cups, and Bansal threw a fit at him. He said that the
canteen had no business sending tea up in plastic cups when it was being sent to the room of an
Officer such as the AO, and insisted that the canteen manager be summoned. He then ticked off
the canteen manager for his impropriety, in public, and threatened to fire him if proper deference
wasn't shown to the officers in the future (deference here meaning that tea should always be
served in the ancient chipped bone china cups that one gets in government offices, rather than in
plastic cups).
Bansal then decided that he would continue to make things hard for me, so after all these
conversations, and in spite of the fact that Jayaram had had two days to read my proposal and all
the paperwork, he insisted that I repeat my project to Jayaram. Fortunately, Jayaram wasn't too
keen on my doing so, and just wanted to go ahead with the signing.
The actual signing itself was quite a ritual, since each person's signature had to be
counter-signed by a separate witness. In other words, quite a congregation for tea in Jayaram's
room. But the job was finally done, and I was finally ready to officially roll.
I mention these access stories not so much to throw scorn on a mid-level Indian
bureaucrat (though the hassle of getting my paperwork done at CBT was indeed extreme), but
rather to point to the situations that ethnographers have to face when access is not just a question
of personal intrusion into lived individual or community lives, but is access to information, which
is always already over-determined as commodifiable, valuable and sensitive, whether by
corporations or by the state. While at some level Bansal was acting difficult, at another he was
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merely playing out an institutional role that in all likelihood would have been played out in
similar ways (though perhaps in less antagonistic fashion) by others in his position. Having said
this, the level of petty bureaucracy that prevails at CBT is a function both of its institutional
culture and of its location in Delhi, notoriously the most bureaucratic city in India. The Centre for
Cellular and Molecular Biology (CCMB) in Hyderabad, a CSIR lab with an almost identical
mandate to CBT's, is marked precisely by the absence of this type of bureaucratic hierarchy that
is directed not just against outsiders like myself, but also against CBT's own scientists. CCMB's
more co-operative and egalitarian, and less bureaucratic, culture, is both a function of its location
in Hyderabad, and of the managerial practices of its founding Director, Pushpa Bhargava, who
ensured through personal example that bureaucratic one-upmanship would not be tolerated. Once
again, place does matter, leading to differences even within entrenched and institutionalized
normative behavior. 22
It must also be emphasized at this point that bureaucracy is by no means an Indian
prerogative, and the time it took me to get Institutional Review Board (IRB) clearance at MIT for
my project far exceeded the time it took CBT to sort out my paperwork. In principle, of course,
any professionally ethical researcher would recognize the importance of having IRB mechanisms
in place for any work that involves human "subjects". And yet, IRB guidelines have clearly been
drawn up with biomedical experiments in mind, and these guidelines translate poorly (if at all)
22 Further comparison between CCMB and CBT would be instructive, since they have almost identical
research mandates from the Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). While both are
"academic-sector specific" (as opposed to business sector specific) labs of the CSIR, both labs are
encouraged to be entrepreneurial. It is impossible for me to say from a much shorter duration of time spent
at CCMB whether there is an equal degree of conflict there over the introduction of a new mandate, though
it is very clear that this new mandate is not received with unanimous approval amongst every scientist at
CCMB.
Further, I do not wish to imply a comparison between Bhargava and Brahmachari, or to blame
Brahmachari for setting an example of, or tolerating, one-upmanship and stifling hierarchy. Indeed,
Brahmachari is acutely aware that the only way the changes he brings about can outlast his tenure as CBT's
Director is to introduce a more democratic and egalitarian style of functioning. The contradiction is that it
is precisely through taking advantage of the already existing conditions of possibility for hierarchical,
inegalitarian functioning that Brahmachari is able to introduce the changes that he wants to introduce in the
first place. It would be an interesting hypothetical question to consider how similar, or different, CBT's
culture might have been under Brahmachari had it in fact been in Hyderabad and not Delhi.
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into a context where the experimental "subject" is simply an interviewee. After assuring MIT's
IRB that I did not intend to cause any of my interviewees serious physical or psychological
trauma, I was confronted with the IRB's core fear, which was that a legal issue might arise with a
company that felt I had violated their confidentiality. In other words, just as CBT's bureaucracy
stemmed from a fear of being held accountable by the Indian state for a breach of security, so did
MIT's bureaucracy stem from the fear of being held accountable by the American corporation for
a breach of confidentiality.
This fear, however, was layered under another institutional manifestation of MIT, as
itself a corporation rightfully seeking to protect its intellectual property. Therefore, just as MIT's
ethicists were insisting that I produce proof that I would be adequately protective of my
informants' confidentiality, so MIT's lawyers were insisting that the copyrights on any audio
recordings I might make would belong not to me, but to MIT. I finally succeeded in assuaging the
former fears by reproducing the GeneEd NDA for them, and argued further that there was no way
MIT could have copyright over recordings that they were legally (as per the NDA) not entitled to
see (since of course the recordings might contain proprietary information that I would
subsequently edit out before making public). It must also be remembered that the MIT IRB only
concerned itself with interviews I was doing in the US, not in India, suggesting again that it
wasn't an ethical concern over the possibility of breaching individuals' privacy that was at issue
so much as it was a legal concern that MIT shouldn't land in a litigious situation.
The third major ethnographic challenge in a project such as this involves having to be
vigilant. My project involves going into the belly of the corporate beast that I have from the
outset regarded in broadly adversarial terms. And yet, it is easy to get swept into the enthusiasm
of one's informants, in a field that is essentially driven by its own salvationary promises.
Biotechnology's various scientific-corporate actors are completely caught up in and live the hype
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that they create, and it is hard to be a faithful ethnographer without getting caught up in some of it
oneself.
Ethnography also brings with it a host of complicit trade-offs, some of which I have
already hinted at in terms of my interactions at GeneEd and CBT. Some of those complicities get
painfully highlighted while translating fieldwork into narrative, as I discovered while writing
Chapter 5 of this dissertation, on ownership. These dilemmas are quite common for medical
anthi upologists, for instance, who come across questionable ethical practices in their sites of
study, necessitating a choice between an obligation to publicize unethical behavior, and an
obligation to respect one's informants' anonymity. The best way to highlight some of these
dilemmas, as a segue into talking about the outline of this dissertation, would be to reproduce a
footnote that appears in Chapter 5, regarding my decision to anonymize the name of a company
(that I call Rep-X) that I had toured and have written about, whose practices in India have been
quite controversial:
I have wrestled with the issue of whether to name this company or not, and am still not
sure that my decision to keep it anonymous is the correct one. However, there are a
number of reasons why I have chosen to do so, and I think this extended footnote is of
some consequence in thinking through methodological questions surrounding the ethical
choices that one makes while doing corporate ethnographies.
Joseph Dumit ponders these questions very seriously in his recent work on venture
science (still unpublished), where he names two biotechnology companies and has
therefore consciously decided to avoid interviewing people at these companies. In this
case, however, I had already interviewed two people a Rep-X (one employee and one
manager, one on-tape and one off-tape) before I learnt of the company's controversial
situation in India that I discuss in this chapter. At no point in this chapter do I draw upon
these conversations. As Dumit has shown, it is both legitimate and a challenge to do
corporate ethnography by working from the public record in order to reserve the right to
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"tackle" certain actors. While that is precisely what I have done in this chapter (using not
just the public record, but public documents that Rep-X has had a significant hand in
"spinning" to its own advantage), the problem of how to "forget" my conversations at
Rep-X is a lingering one. I have decided to keep Rep-X anonymous until I have resolved
it for myself.
This is, as much as anything, an acknowledgement that anthropology is different from
journalism, and one of the lines of difference is the relationship with informants.
Journalism is adversarial by nature: the work is to "get" a story out of a subject, even if
there is a long-term relationship involved. The challenge for an anthropology such as this
is to be ethical and non-adversarial, which is not to say non-critical. At the end of the day,
anthropologists write, in part, to their subjects, not just to their colleagues and beyond.
Corporate ethnography involves writing about what is fundamentally a culture of secrecy.
It is possible to be fascinated by how and why things get made secret, without necessarily
feeling the obligation to make public what the subjects want kept secret. This is precisely
the opposite of the investigative journalist. On a basic level, the journalist wants the
"truth" that is "out there", while the anthropologist wants, at least as one set of
perspectives without which one cannot understand the motivational or intentional side of
social action, something like the subject's truth, or truth in Foucault's sense of "the system
of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and
operation of statements... linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce
and sustain it" (Foucault 1980: 133).
One strategy I considered was going to Rep-X's Investor Relations department to ask for
their comments on what I heard in India, but I decided against that journalistic tactic as
well. My sense is that if this really is a public relations disaster that is waiting to happen
for Rep-X, then there are strategies that can be employed in conversation with the
involved representatives of the indian state -- who are, after all, extremely articulate and
media savvy -- in making that happen.
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Finally, I believe that a number of people invested (in all senses of the word) in the world
I am studying will read this chapter with an eye that will see through most
anonymizations. Also, any agreements I have with companies that I have done longer-
term work with (this not applying to Rep-X, where I only had a couple of conversations,
and no long-term agreements) make it clear that I have the option of using the companies'
names unless they would explicitly prefer me not to. Until shown otherwise, I adopt the
methodological rule that the anthropologically interesting issues do not resolve into "dirty
secrets" but are structurally interesting dilemmas.
I feel, in spite of that discomfort, that the story of Rep-X will be illustrative of situations I
want to explain even if I don't directly locate it. This is a common dilemma for medical
anthropologists working in hospital settings, who often choose to report medical mistakes
with clinical consequences that they observe through official channels which are not
public. When they write about such situations, they tend to severely anonymize them so
that the account can't be pointed back at all.23
Another set of questions for ethnographic ethics gets thrown up when one studies the
work of those who operate not in the belly of the corporate beast, but with the most marginalized
and subaltern of sufferers. A particularly powerful example of this is the work of Paul Fanner,
Jim Kim and their organization, Partners in Health (see www.phi.org, and also Farmer 1993,
1999; Kim et al 2000). Farmer and Kim are medical anthropologists as well as medical doctors
with clinics in Haiti, Peru and Roxbury (an inner-city locality in Boston), and their work with
patients of AIDS and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) highlights for me the sorts of
ethico-political imperatives that anthropology needs to concern itself with. This is because the
work of Partners in Health is necessarily riddled with contradiction. For instance, their work
makes them acutely aware of the sorts-of price-gouging tactics pharmaceutical companies-indulge _ _
in, tactics that often make drugs unaffordable to Third World countries in the midst of major
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epidemics (I explore this in greater detail in the next chapter). At the same time, they are equally
aware of the importance of doing business with these very companies, since that is their only
chance, as doctors, of getting therapies to patients who sorely and urgently need them. This brings
into focus a tension between their role as anthropologists, writing about pharmaceutical corporate
tactics, and doctors trying to intervene in and cure patients in an epidemic.
It also leads to contradictions in the sorts of political "facts" they subscribe to, believe in
and do work with. For instance, their agreement with the received wisdom of the international
medical community that Brazil has provided a model in dealing with the AIDS epidemic,2 4 is at
odds with ethnographic analyses of the situation in Brazil such as that of Joao Biehl (Biehl 2001,
Biehl et al 2001), who shows how the non-accounting of AIDS deaths by the state amongst
certain segments of the population is constitutive of the former's mode of functioning, as
operating what he calls a "technology of invisibility". And yet, Farmer's and Kim's work is such
a powerful model of ethnographic ethics precisely because of their implicit acknowledgment of
the impossibility of uncontradictory practice, and therefore the absolute necessity of strategic
contradictory practice. Strategic contradictory practice is an imperative equally, in projects such
as mine, where the anthropologist inhabits extremely powerful spaces that s/he is politically /
morally / culturally / socially ambivalent about; and it is, after all, what corporations themselves
are so good at.
Let me, therefore, turn an ethnographic gaze away from scientists for a minute and
towards historians and social scientists - the tribes that I belong to, in the nebulous and constantly
morphing inter-discipline of STS - to locate symptoms, at the very least, if not offer a diagnosis,
of the difficulties of incorporating certain forms of ethical-political practice, difficulties that often
23 Many thanks to Joseph Dumit for a series of conversations and correspondences on this dilemma, many
of which I have directly borrowed from in making my argument for anonymizing Rep-X here.
24 This assessment is based on a talk given by Kim at a conference in Harvard in May 2002 on the subject
of "Global Pharmaceuticals: Ethics, Markets and Practice" and the subsequent discussion based on that
talk.
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have consequences for the politics that work produced from these by no means marginal spaces
subscribe to / operate within / create.
I start with a talk in the s'rs Department at MIT, organized by a group interested in
issues of technology and identity as they relate to psychopharmaceuticals. This group periodically
calls in speakers who are associated in one way or another with thinking about / writing about /
prescribing psyhopharmaceutical medication, to present to the group, and to others in the
department and outside, and to have a dis, ussion (the group itself includes scholars from both
within and outside MIT). One of the speakers the group invited was a lapsed historian of
medicine called Eric Caplan, who now work in an R & D unit at Pfizer. Caplan gave a Pfizer
pitch, interspersing his packaged powerpoint presentation with reflexive, situated musings that
provided fascinating ethnographic insights into the workings of a pharmaceutical company -
insights that are quite rare and valuable for an ethnographer interested in understanding how these
corporations work. And yet, the reception amongst the academics (not quite) hearing him out was
premeditatedly hostile; there seemed to be an implicit criticism of Caplan working for the "evil
empire" in the first place (even though a major reason he does so is because of a lack of adequate
job opportunities in academe), and a more explicit criticism that he could bring himself to present
a corporate pitch of a pharmaceutical company in addition o working there. So on the one hand,
there is a staunch "moral" refusal amongst enough of the broadly speaking "leftist" academic
community to listen to people inhabiting the spaces these very communities are trying to
understand - a refusal, of course, that is as old as institutionalized Marxism, to which most of the
said "leftist" community doesn't belong in ar :rmal way; anr' a refusal that has had a history of
devastating consequences for progressive p, 'al intervention in and through academic critique.
On the other hand, however, there are real questions that have been asked by thick
empirical critique, certainly from within medical anthropology (which, for perplexing, and I
believe debilitating, disciplinary reasons, is often regarded as separate institutional discipline
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from STS, with relatively little formal communication existing between the two) - questions of
state violence, often rabid and incomprehensible yet completely selective and discriminating; of
the inefficiency of state-market regimes of making things work on the ground; of irrationalities
that are completely embedded not just in the practice but even in the logic of rational action -
that, while in and of themselves are vital components of any rigorous critical enterprise, still beg
the question, and then what? Once thick description has shown the violence, contradiction,
inefficiency, instability, irrationality, disconcertment, disjuncture - then what? What are the
stakes in unearthing all of this?
In other words, reflexivity and critical nuance - which anthropology, perhaps more than
any other social scientific discipline, can pride itself on - are up to a point important as ends in
and of themselves, but it is precisely a continuation of that same process of reflexivity and critical
thinking that should be pushing the question of "and then what" as a consequence of such
critiques. The question that I am asking, then, is how can we, as academics, inhabit structures of
contradiction productively rather than paralytically? I do not profess answers, but I think work
such as this dissertation, as well as the work of people like Jim Kim (described above) and of a
number of others (the work - as in not just product but practice - of Byron Good, Sheila Jasanoff
and Paul Rabinow have, in addition to Kim's, been particularly influential for me in this regard)
fbrce us to constantly ask such questions. These are, precisely, the questions of theorizing praxis.
These are exactly the problems that Marx (1977 [1852]) is writing with and through in 771e
Eighteenth Brumaire. These are exactly the questions of the tension between describing the world
and changing it, that Marx poses in the 1 Ith Thesis on Feuerbach (Marx 1963 [1845]: 199), where
the problematic posed by Marx is not a choice between the two (as it is often misread as being),
but the question of how those spaces of critique can be productively inhabited. As mentioned
above, these are not important questions because they are part of some Marxian "program" that
"leftists" should subscribe to, but because it is asking these questions, of productively inhabiting
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structural contradictions, that capitalism is so good at doing, and it is impossible to understand,
engage with and, to the extent one might want to, counter, the capitalist enterprise without being
able to understand and inhabit that mode of productive being.
A common misreading of a call such as I have just madc would be to equate it with a call
for reducing all critique to either activism or policy formation (and indeed, similar arguments that
I have made at various academic fora have often been precisely misread in such a banal
reductionist manner). Praxis, however, as I have been trying to argue above, is not simply
prescription, it is in itself an ethics of reflexive critical engagement that goes beyond the
understanding of nuance and complexity - "thickness", if you will - to interrogate the thickness
itself. It is a deconstructive ethics, a hermeneutics of suspicion, that has been so powerfully
enunciated by Derrida, and incorporated into works of thick ethnographic analysis such as
Debating Muslims (Fischer and Abedi 1990), that I argue and strive for.
The danger of not theorizing praxis is particularly acute, I believe, in anthropology,
because there is the tendency amongst anthropologists to reify and fetishize presence - the
ethnographic "encounter" - as somehow definitive or authoritative. The recent work of Joseph
Dumit on venture science (unpublished), where he tracks the histories of certain biotech
companies that he feels typify the new assemblages of naturalized corporate bioscience, is, as I
have argued earlier in this chapter, an important example of strategically knowing when, as an
anthropologist, not to be present in a naive manner that simply fetishizes the ethnographic
encounter, and hints at the sorts of critiques that are in fact made impossible by presence. I think
anthropology is most powerful - and it is the way I use ethnography myself in this thesis - when
it is used as illustration rather than evidence, especially since believing in the latter involves
reifying ethnography as an enterprise offactual knowledge production that is precisely what
anthropologists of science and technology try and deconstruct in the objects of their study. In
other words, in this dissertation quite explicitly, "I was there" doesn't translate in any simple way
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into "that is how it is", though "being there" undoubtedly can provide a set of situated
perspectives that would be impossible to come by otherwise, perspectives that carry with them
not just insights but erasures.
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CHAPTER 3: BIOTECH AND PHARMA
Overview
The drug development process is basic to understanding the ways in which biocapitalism
is reshaping the strategic terrain for companies (both established pharma and small biotech ones),
and for the relations among research in academia, government regulation, industrial development,
and clinical practice. This chapter provides an overview as a basis for the arguments for the
following five chapters which take up the five theoretical themes of the dissertation.
There are two basic principles underlying the drug development process. The first is that
the conduct of any human experimentation, which at the end of the day is the basic necessity
before a developed drug can go to market, carries with it the greatest ethical responsibility that a
physician can bear. The ethical concerns here include the necessity of respecting the people being
experimented upon, and the principles of beneficence (the experiments need to both do good for
the individual and advance science) z5 and justice. These concerns translate on the ground most
directly into mechanisms of oversight and protection of privacy.
The second is that the basis of medicinal chemistry, which ultimately underlies most
therapeutic development, is a biochemical hypothesis that gets translated into clinical benefit.
This means that when a drug is put into a patient with a disease, and it doesn't work, it means
either that the initial hypothesis was wrong and a new one needs to be formulated, or that the
biochemical objective was never achieved. Therefore, one of the fundamental sets of techrologies
25 Many new biotechnologies of course problematize some of these principles. For example,
xenotransplantation (trans-species organ transplantation, usually from pigs to humans) has great potential
for both advancing science and doing good to the individual who receives the transplant, but the collective
risk to society from the possibility of transmitting a porcine retrovirus that subsequently mutates and
creates an AIDS-like pandemic in the human population is considerable. Such situations force a re-
evaluation of the basis of medical ethical principles that are founded ultimately on considerations of
individual benefit. Nonetheless, the fact remains that it is these medical ethical principles that form the
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underlying drug development which needs to be emphasized at the outset, are measurement
technologies'. Perhaps more than anything else, measurement if critical to drug development from
the get-go; and the development of technologies that enhance measurement capabilities, rather
than fundamental conceptual advancements, are critical to the emergence of cutting edge drug
development technologies. These are important facts that I will return to in the next chapter on
speed and information, where I talk more specifically about the paradigm shifts that genomics
represents.
Industry estimates put the average cost of bringing a drug to market as being between 300
and 500 million dollars. This might be a contentious figure,2 6 but it is one whose naturalization by
the industry has consequences for technological development, especially for the development of
technologies, like genomics, that purportedly speed up drug development. A blockbuster drug can
generate revenues for a pharmaceutical company of $3-4 billion a year. Therefore, goes the
rhetoric, a delay in bringing a possible blockbuster drug to market (and of course, any drug that is
being brought to market, it is hoped, will be a blockbuster drug) costs the pharmaceutical
company potential revenues of about a million dollars a day. This is the material justification
made for constant speed within the industry, where daily delays are alculatcd as hug.. possible
losses in an endeavor that usually takes up to 15 years from initial R & D to market launch. But
speed is also a rhetorical fulcrum, integral to the operation of hype and the making secondary of
ethical issues and consderations, to lever the government, venture capitalists and the public to
further invest themselves in biotech.
Therefore, on the one hand, the estimated cost to bring a drug to market emphasizes from
the get-go that drug development needs to be as speedy a process as it can possibly manage to be.
On the other hand, it also restricts the types of drug development ventures pharmaceutical
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templates for much formal bioethical reflection, which is why I state that doing good for the individual is
deemed to be one of the fundamental ethical principles underlying drug development.
26 And I examine its contentiousness later in the chapter.
companies want to get into in the first place. In the United States, the minimum estimated market
that a big pharmaceutical company is likely to be interested in, for it to undertake the
development of a drug, is in the vicinity of $250 million a year. Drugs that are predicted to garner
a significantly lower revenue than this are simply not likely to be developed by a big pharma
company. The third consequence of the capital intensitivity of drug development is that it makes
it a struggle for smaller biotech companies, who often have considerable innovative capabilities
but not the deep pockets to translate those capabilities into predictable therapeutic pipelines.
Therefore, the capital intensivity of drug development makes it much more likely that big
pharmaceutical companies, that are often less innovative than their smaller biotech brethren, and
that are less likely to invest in small therapeutic markets, are much more likely to be successful
developers of therapy. This is the fundamental market terrain of drug development, that I will
constantly re-emphasize, and that structures the political and strategic terrain on which the drug
development enterprise plays out.27
Drug development stems, in the simplest possible terms, from an unmet medical need. An
unmet medical need is determined through medical assessments, marketing (commercial)
assessments and scientific assessments (which generally have to do with what is called
"druggability", which means the determination of whether there are any targets that the drug can
act upon within the body). Commrercial assessments are, ultimately, determined by the marketing
department of a pharmaceutical company. Marketing departments tend to be brilliant at assessing
possible revenues when there is already a similar drug on the market. When there is absolutely no
therapy for the disease in question, however, it is impossible for marketing people to identify the
market. This places a further stymie on the development of drugs for needs that are truly
medically unmet, and places a contradiction at the heart of the decision making process of a
27 Pharmacoeconomics, therefore, represents one of the many forms of what gets accepted as expert
calculation, forms of"scientific" expertise that have a huge impact in shaping political and strategic
terrains of drug development (as I explore at a number of points later in this chapter).
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pharmaceutical company: on the one hand, an untapped market is precisely the potential
goldmine that a pharmaceutical company is looking for, but on the other it is precisely the
unquantifiable quagmire that a pharmaceutical company doesn't want to risk getting into.28 What
is important to emphasize, therefore, is that drugs are developed primarily for markets, not
diseases.
Related to the unmet medical need is the pharmaceutical company's "wish list", which is
what is called the package insert, that describes the properties of the drug once it gets approved
for marketing. These properties have to do, firstly, with the indications for the use of the drug.
Pharmaceutical companies want the broadest possible indications. Secondly, they have to do with
warnings regarding the use of the drug. It is possible for physicians to prescribe use of a drug that
isn't indicated on the label (off-label use), but pharmaceutical companies prefer not to rely on off-
label use for covering certain indications, as it tends to be much less financially rewarding than
on-label use.29 Drug development plans, therefore, are significantly organized from the get-go in
terms of what the company wants on the package insert.
The stages of drug development then go from an idea to a multi-disciplinary project team
through discovery to manufacturing. The key first step after going through these preliminary
processes, in the US, is the filing of an investigational new drug (IND) application with the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This is the beginning of what transpires as a lengthy
dialogue of the pharmaceutical company with the FDA, that extends all the way through the drug
'2 Actually, the situation is a little more complicated. While on the one hand, developing a "me-too" drug
allows an assessment of existing markets for the drug, on the other, it is much harder to quantify or predict
how much of the existing market share will be successfully cornered by the new drug that gets developed.
In other words, one can assume a 100% market share for a novel drug, but not for a drug that is simply an
improvement of existing therapies for a particular indication. In the latter case, in fact, it is not rational
economic calculation but strategic marketing practice - in the form of selling the new drug to physicians, or
to consumers through direct-to-consumer advertising - that will really determine the market share. This is
why sales and marketing is much more than a calculating agency for a pharmaceutical! company, and also
why companies spend so much on their sales and marketing forces. Many thanks to Naira Ahmad for
discussions that helped me clarify some of the difficulties and contradictions involved in assessing
pharmaceutical markets.
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development process to launch. The consultative role of the FDA with industry is exceedingly
important throughout the drug development process. After this, the drug enters Phase H clinical
trials, then Phase III, before filing a new drug application (NDA).
The earliest stages of trials for a drug start with pre-clinical testing, which in 'olves the
identification of an appropriate model system in vitro and in vivo (the in vivo system being an
animal model); 30 the definition of end points (what are called outcome variables); an initial study
of efficacy, and an initial study of toxicity. In many ways, the initial toxicology constitutes the
most basic and important early study in the drug development process, because it will indicate
whether the drug is at all safe to even try going further with. Toxicology studies involve looking
first at a single species for acute toxicity (what is known as an LD50 study), then at multiple
species with more prolonged exposures to the drug (of 30 - 90 days) followed by a full autopsy
evaluation of any animals that die in the process. After this comes the clinical pharmacology,
which involves studying pharmacokinetics (what the body does to the drug) and
pharmacodynamics (what the drug does to the body), and coming up therefrom with dosing
schedules for humans. The esserce of drug development lies in relating pharmacokinetics to
pharmacodynamics, as it is this relationship that ultimately relates to dosage.
Pre-clinical testing is done in order to gather the data necessary to file an investigational
new drug (IND) application to the FDA. A successful IND is needed to try the drug in humans.
Complete pre-clinical data limits the risks in clinical trials. Pre-clinical tests are done in test
tubes, cultured cells and animals. This is a stage at which pharmacogenetic tools -- sequence
analysis, expression analysis and family and population studies - could be very attractive
strategically for pharmaceutical companies. The strategic importance arises because
pharmaceutical companies are very eager to kill those projects that eventually won't lead to the
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29 Though it is always possible to add further indications to the package insert subsequent to initial
approval.
30 This is generally what smaller biotech companies do a bad job of.
development of an FDA approved therapeutic as early in the process as possible. One way to use
pharmacogenomics, as explained in greater detail in Chapter 8, is to profile the genes involved in
coding for the isoforms of the cytochrome P-450 family of enzymes, which are involved in drug
metabolism. Pharmacogenomics can increase drug efficacy and reduce risk to patients by
predicting their drug response based on their genetic profile, and can be used to develop
diagnostic tests for directing therapeutic decisions for improved care.
Clinical testing in humans consists of four phases. Phase I involves pharmacokinetics and
initial human safety testing, and is usually carried out on up to 50 normal volunteers. The purpose
of this phase is to narrow the dosimetry to one - two doses. Phase II involves dose finding in
human disease, and it is in this phase that specific patient populations who can signal efficacy are
leveraged. Usually about 100 patients are recruited for Phase II trials. Phase III trials are the
pivotal clinical trials for the NDA. Phase IV trials are post-marketing clinical trials for new
indications or to answer new questions. A pharmaceutical company really needs its Phase III
trials to be successful close to 90% of the time, because this is by far the most expensive stage of
the drug development process. In other words, if a drug isn't going to work, or is going to be too
toxic, the company would really like to know so before going in to Phase III. Also, a separate
Phase III trial is needed for each claim the manufacturer makes for the drug. This also means that,
strictly speaking, one can only get intellectual property protection for specific claims, and, though
rare, it is possible for someone other than the original manufacturer to market an identical product
with a different claim.3' The valuation of a drug, were it to be out-licensed to another company
(which is often the modus operandi adopted by smaller biotech companies who don't have the
capital to take a drug all the way to market), increases exponentially in value the further through
the clinical trials process it has gone, though such valuations arc often extremely critical
3' For example, MIT has obtained a use patent to use Prozac, manufactured by Eli Lilly, for pre-menstrual
syndrome. See http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/nr/1997/pms.html for MIT's press release on this matter.
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judgment calls made by the in-licensing department of the concerned (usually big
pharmaceutical) company.
Therefore, clinical trials are, from the get-go, about integrating both clinical and
economic research efforts. Pharmacoeconomics is not simply a given body of knowledge that
biological researchers can draw upon to formulate research and trial designs, but is rather
constantly evolving with and being co-produced by research considerations. Further, this
emphasizes the basic point that drug development is not about linearly progressive science that
drives evolving economic considerations to adjust to its progress. Rather, it really is about the
operation of a whole set of economic indices that are based in various forms of market
calculation, cost-benefit analyses and risk profiling.
Phase I trials represent the first exposure of humans to the drug being developed. Most
often, as mentioned above, normal volunteers are recruited to address risk / benefit issues on
single dose and multiple dose schedules. This is a major point at which genomics, especially
population genomics, is likely to have an impact (see chapter 8 for a further elaboration of the use
of genomics in clinical trials).
Phase II sees expanded clinical testing for efficacy in the target population. These are
controlled clinical trials, in which expanded pharmacokinetic profiles are developed along with
tolerance profiles, that indicate side effects and dose tolerance. Endpoints are established at this
stage, making this the stage where measurement technologies become important. A successful
Phase II development program should assure success in Phase HI. Dose measurement really is the
key here, and of course dosage is intimately linked to race, gender and the problematic notion of
population. I will return to this in the last chapter while talking about how personalized medicine
is all about generating information at the population level, when the "population" is often
arbitrary nd hard to define. This is a key point of insertion for genomic approaches (see Reardon
95
2000 for the controversial history of population genomics as science and as organized [public]
scientific enterprise in the Human Genome Diversity Project).
Phase III trials are large scale controlled randomized clinical trials. These are the trials
that are used as the basis for submitting an NDA to the FDA. What might be called
"pharmacovigilance" becomes integral to the operation of Phase III trials and after. This is
because a truly successful drug development process that leads to a blockbuster drug has within it
the germ of a contradiction that can manifest itself quite acutely after successful Phase III trials.
This is that drugs, after Phase II, are basically approved on the basis of trials in five to ten
thousand patients. Certain adverse events, however, occur at much lower rates (for example, once
in every 50000 patients). Therefore, there could be serious adverse events that do not show up in
Phase III trials, and that could become serious problems in a really successful drug that has a very
large market.3 2 There are two antibiotics that have actually faced such problems. Augmentin
showed rates of liver failure of 40 / 100000 patients taking the drug after it was approved, an
indication that didn't show up in clinical trials. A much more publicly covered adverse event
surrounded Pfizer's Trovan, which is a fluoroquinolone that looked like the best of its class to
have come along at that point. Within six months of its approval, reports of liver failure started
appearing, at a similar rate to augmenting and the drug had to be withdrawn.3 3 The result of such
adverse events has been a greater emphasis by pharmaceutical companies and the FDA on post-
marketing surveillance (what is known as Phase IV). An increased prevalence of Phase IV testing
makes it less likely that drug prices will get cheaper.
A major actor in the clinical trials process is the clinical research organization (CRO).
This is a lab (often private) to which pharmaceutical companies tend to outsource clinical trials
32 Pharmacovigilantism and its opposition by pharmaceutical companies of course brings into sharp focus
the discursive power and strategic importance of the public relations apparati of pharmaceutical
companies.
33 For FDA's public health advisory regarding Trovan, see http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/trovan/trovan-
content.htm.
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operations. The job of the CRO is to accumulate trial data and keep records; they are generally
not involved in the design of the studies, which is usually done by the pharmaceutical company
itself.
The relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA has been an
ambivalent one, and is not something that I explore fully in this dissertation. However, a brief
mention of some of the contradictions embodied in this relationship would be worthwhile in
understanding the larger institutional dynamics within which drug development (and clinical
trials in particular) operates.
Contrary to popular intuitive perception, the pharmaceutical industry really does
welcome the existence of the FDA, because it provides a foil for adverse events that, if seen as
the consequence of an unregulated drug development marketplace, could represent disastrous PR
for a company. In practice, however, the FDA's stringent regulatory requirements are what
contribute dramatically to an increased time and cost of drug development. Therefore, ideally,
they would like the FDA to "streamline" its activities in order to be as close to a rubber stamp as
possible. This is reflected in the following quote from an overview of the drug development
process by John Somberg (1996: 17), a clear enthusiast of the pharmaceutical industry and the
free market:
There are times when the delays [at the FDA] are needless and the debate is not
helpful.... [E]xcessive drug regulation is not the goal. Rather more expeditious, less
costly development in the information age is a goal that needs to be set by the FDA. A
case-by-case review is no longer needed. To have each data point separately chronicled
and meticulously reviewed for efficacy and toxicity by a junior reviewer is an immense
waste of time. Having the primary reviewer recreate the NDA piece by piece and then
producing [sic] their own summary is a laborious process that obviously can take a year
or more. The NDA is put together by hundreds of individuals highly trained in the
phamaceutical industry and having one or two people go through this on a line-by-line
97
basis and check every data point and reanalyze the presentations is going to be a most
arduous time-consuming process.
In other words, people like Somberg would like the review process to exist, as long as it
does less reviewing. Presumably, in the case of an adverse event in such a review situation, the
blame could also conveniently be placed on the FDA's "shoddy" review mechanisms rather than
on the industry. Paradoxically, it is also true that the laborious FDA procedures are a competitive
advantage for big pharma over smaller biotech companies. While in absolute terms, FDA reviews
lead to increased delay and expense for pharmaceutical companies, in relative terms, it's a delay
and expense that big companies can deal with much more readily than small ones. It is also true
that less stringent approval procedures do not necessarily need to lead to less stringent monitoring
of drug safety. In Britain, for instance, initial approval tends to be much quicker than in the US
because of less stringent clinical trial requirements up to Phase III, but there is much greater post-
marketing surveillance of the drug there than there is in the US.
Therefore, a stringent American regulatory environment has led to a legitimate "ethical"
image being created for the clinical trials procedure in the US. This is a particular, historically
specific, framing of ethics, as concerning itself specifically with safety rather than other possible
"ethical" issues, that goes back to the marketing of "ethical pharmaceuticals" as safe,
prescription, non-quack medication in the early part of the 20 h century (see Silverman 2000 for a
discussion of ethical pharmaceuticals). A similar concern with ethics as safety manifested itself in
the initial years of the biotech industry, with the Asilomar conference on recombinant DNA
issues concerning itself exclusively with safety concerns surrounding recombinant DNA
experiments. US clinical trials fit this ethical paradigm, of ethics as safety.
However, issues around clinical trials, I argue, don't just have to do with ethics and
experimental regimes, but relate directly to modes of production. For example, Indian
pharmaceutical companies that might want to sell generic drugs in the United States need to set
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up a manufacturing plant to FDA specifications, which is much more expensive than the plants in
which they manufacture drugs for consumption either in India, Africa or Europe (which usually
adhere either to South African or British regulatory guidelines). Just as FDA guidelines operate as
a bigger barrier to biotech companies than big pharmaceutical companies, they in this situation
operate as barriers to entry for "Third World" pharmaceutical companies into US marketplaces.
In other words, regulatory environments quite literally regulate capital flows, setting up a political
economy of drug - subject - capital circulation that is completely intertwined: the "Third World"
becomes porous, especially as a site for recruitment of subjects, while US borders become more
rigid. It is in such a political economic regime of differential circulation that the "homogenizing"
effects of global trade as instituted through multilateral fora such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) need to be situated and read.
The rationality of pharmaceutical governance - what one might call pharmamentality -
that emerges around clinical trials is particularly emphasized when it comes to
pharmacogenomics, which, as I describe in detail in Chapter 8, is about the stratification of trial
populations on the basis of genetic variability to drug response. On the one hand, as the industry
enthusiasm for pharmacogenomics generally gets articulated, pharmaceutical companies
absolutely want to stratify patients based on safety profiles - they absolutely do not want a drug
either to fail clinical trials or be pulled off the market because of adverse events that only occur in
certain population segments that could be identified and isolated from the trials. On the other
hand, pharmaceutical companies are much less enthused with the idea of stratifying patients
based on efficacy, because that will fragment their market. A drug that doesn't work for someone
is not a public disaster in the way that a drug that is shown to be toxic is, and indeed the FDA's
99
own concerns, in spite of being stated as being both about safety and efficacy, and much more
about monitoring safety than monitoring efficacy.34
For a small biotech company, however, pharmacogenomics presents a whole different
strategic rationality, as it may well want the fragmentation of, for instance, Bristol Myers-
Squibbs' oncology market today (thereby allowing a rupture in big pharma market monopolies),
but not its own fifteen years from now, when it (hopefully) becomes a big pharmaceutical
company in its own right. The emergent rationality of pharmacogenomics has everything to do
with the structural contradictions inherent to the marketplace as they get exacerbated and made
visible by clinical trials regimes.
A major mode of analysis that I adopt throughout this dissertation is, indeed, to map such
structures of contradiction, as a way of getting at pharmamentality without simply attributing
motives. It is important, however, that such a structural analysis is always tempered by a mapping
and understanding of the political agencies of different corporations.3 s I believe it is precisely this
challenge, of analyzing political agency in the face of structural contradiction, that Marx (1977
[1852]) faced in the writing of The Eighteenth Brumaire. Of course, it is difficult to get access to
something such as corporate political agency, for instance in the case of pharmaceutical
corporations and their interactions with the FDA, especially when companies themselves are
extremely secretive about their actions. At best, it is possible to construct tell-tale patterns from
publicly available FDA information, patterns really that are more illustrative of particular
34 The parallels of such logic to the logic of the automobile industry are striking. Car makers have never
been particularly worried about the odd car that doesn't perform so well, but are absolutely terrified of cars
getting a reputation for being unsafe, even if that reputation is based on accidents in the hands of
particularly crazy or ma .. ick drivers. For an early discussion of safety issues in the automobile industry,
see Nader (1965).
35 I am grateful to Harry Marks, for instance, for pointing out to me that Eli Lilly has always been
particularly aggressive in pushing the political limits of FDA regulation, in ways that other companies have
not been willing to do. In other words, corporations in the same structural position do not necessarily act
the same way, and these strategic patterns are important to the dynamics of the strategic terrain.
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interactions with the FDA than they are evidentiary of the "character", in any fundamental sense,
of particular companies.36
But what I also want to highlight through my brief account of clinical trials politics is
how values are incorporated into specific techniques. The clinical trials procedures are a major
site for such incorporations, of values in all senses of the word. They are the key set of practices
that determine whether a pharmaceutical company can realize value off a promising lead
compound by developing it into a drug. A well regulated procedure leading to the generation of a
"safe" compound is both a requisite badge of ethical legitimacy for the drug and the company, but
also a symbolic badge, in terms of the brand value that accrues to an FDA approved patented
therapeutic. And these are techniques that directly speak to ethical issues about human subject
experimentation globally, and trade issues in terms of global "homogeneity" and differential
barriers to entry in a "homogenous" trade regime comprising different regulatory standards.
36 For instance. he FDA makes available a list of warning letters that it has sent out to different companies.
As an experiment, I analyzed the warning letters the FDA had sent out over the last five years (1998-2002)
to pharmaceutical company headquarters relating to issues of drug marketing and communications (which
is a different category of a slap on the wrist than, for instance, warning letters regarding non-compliance
with safety directives or good manufacturing practices). I found that, generally, companies get between one
and three warning letters from the FDA's division of drug marketing and communications yearly.
Generally, the number of warning letters issued in 2001 was far fewer than especially in 1998 and 1999
(whether because companies were being more compliant with FDA advertising regulations or whether
because the FDA was being more lenient, with its regulations or their enforcement, I don't know).
Pharmacia topped the list with 5 warning letters in 2001. In 1999 and 2000, it was Glaxo-Wellcome (the
British pharmaceutical company that merged with SmithKline Beecham in 2001 to become Glaxo
SmithKline) that topped the list, with 8 and 6 warning letters respectively in each of those years. Glaxo
Wellcome, indeed, had 8 warning letters in 1998 as well, but lost out to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS),
which staggering 15 warning letters that year. All in all, companies that received an average of more than 3
warning letters a year over this time period include Glaxo-Wellcome (7.3 a year for 3 years, before merging
with SmithKline Beecham), BMS (4.4: after 1998, the number of letters BMS received dropped drastically,
so that they have only received 7 warning letters in the following 4 years); SnithKline Beecham (4), Zeneca
Pharmaceuticals (4; Zeneca merged with Astra in 2001 to becomes AstraZeneca), Pharmacia (3.6, together
with its predecessor, Pharmacia Upjohn), Schering Corporation (3.4) and Merck (3.2). Companies that have
received an average of less than one warning letter per year over this period include Boehringer Ingelheim
(0.8), Johnson and Johnson (0.8), Fujisawa (0.8), Baxter (0.6), Abbott Laboratories (0.6) and Novo Nordisk
(0.4).
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I have so far broadly outlined and hinted at differences between big pharmaceutical
companies and smaller biotech companies. The historical beginnings of the latter really can be
traced to the beginnings of recombinant DNA technology (RDT). RDT led to an increased
complexity of drug research, but it also led to a change in its institutional structure. Once again, it
must be remembered that from the outset, drug development is a highly inter-disciplinary
enterprise. The emergent biotech industry simply represented an additional new discipline that
got incorporated into this enterprise, but one that institutionally got incorporated as the "discovery
arm" of the pharmaceutical industry. The biotech industry has often played the role of a bridge,
facilitating technology transfer between academe and big pharma. There are two modes of
relationship between biotech and pharma: either pharmaceutical companies purchase small
biotech concerns, or they form strategic alliances with them. An early example of the latter is the
alliance between Genentech and Eli Lilly, in which Genentech developed human insulin, which
was then marketed by Lilly under its trade name Humulin.37
The initial, pre-biotech, development of different therapeutic areas was largely
spontaneous and occurred by chemical diversification, where often serendipitously found
biological substances with therapeutic activities were derivatized to obtain better therapeutics
with better safety and efficacy profiles. The major driver of new molecule development over the
last 75 years has indeed been synthetic chemistry. These traditional methods haven't gone away
with the emergence of biotech and now such tools and genomics and bioinformatics, but have
been added upon.
37 A major exception to this latter mode of functioning is provided by the Cambridge, MA based company
Genzyme. In the words of its first CEO, Henri Termeer: "We looked at the other companies and came up
with a strategy that is still the underpinning of what Genzyme does now - a diversified business, a plan to
try to get profitable as soon as possible, all financed through product sales or selling equity rather than
through corporate partnerships. This would give us off-balance-sheet benefits and still avoid us being
dependent on other companies that might change their strategic plans. To this day, we still have no major
partners" (quoted in Robbins-Roth 2000: 44).
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Without a doubt, the story of the pharmaceutical industry has been one of the most
dramatic stories of industrial growth in the 20th century. At the risk of an extremely compromised
and sketchy history, it is worth mentioning that what is arguably the largest legal industry in the
United States today was basically an "industry" consisting of a total of four drugs - digitalis,
quinine, pecacuanha and mercury - at the end of the 19th century. The pharmaceutical industry
was actually incubated in and grew out of the dye industry, just as, indeed, the biotechnology
industry in the 1970s was initially supported by and grew out of the petrochemical industry. The
"boom" in the pharmaceutical industry occurred in the 1930s, with the discovery of the sulpha
drugs, followed by the industrial scale manufacture of penicillin as part of the World War II
effort, which highlighted the importance of the links between defense and security needs during
war and pharmaceutical innovation.38 At the end of the 19"' century, the two companies that could
be called pharmaceutical companies were Bayer and Hoechst. They were joined in the 1930s and
40s by would-be pharmaceutical giants such as Ciba Geigy, Eli Lilly, Wellcome, Glaxo and
Roche. The burst in natural product chemistry occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, starting with the
successful development of streptomycin for the treatment of tuberculosis. The most successful
early biotech companies that have produced biopharmaceutical products are Amgen (which has -
developed granulocyte colony stimulating factor [G-CSF] and eyrthropoietin) and Genentech
(which has produced recombinant insulin, tissue plasminogen activator [tPA], human growth
hormone and a-interferon products) (see Walsh 1998: 1-36 for a good summary, from which I
have drawn for this account).
While I have argued so far for a considerably constrained playing space for biotech
companies in the face of the power and clout of big pharma, it should not be misunderstood as a
38 This becomes particularly pertinent in the wake of the recent bioterrorism scares in the United States,
including the incidences of letters coated with anthrax spores in September and October 2001. At a venture
capital conference that I attended in Boston at the end of October 2001, there was unmitigated excitement
amongst the VCs I met, who saw anthrax as a pure and simple business opportunity because it would focus
the attention of the Defence Department on the biotech industry. See also Hoyt (2002), who analyzes the
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reflection on the biopharmaceutical market, which is very significant and growing. In 1997, the
world-wide sales of biopharmaceutical products was over $7 billion, and is expected to grow to
be in the region of $30-35 billion by 2003, which would be about 15% of the overall world
pharmaceutical market (figures from Walsh 1998). At least three biopharmaceuticals: ca-
interferon, erythropoietin and recombinant insulin: had world market values of at least a billion
dollars in 1997 (Walsh 1998: 10). On the other hand, biotech has had a wildly fluctuating
presence on Wall Street, its stocks subject to periodic cycles of boom and bust. I analyze this in
greater detail in Chapter 6.
If biotech has on origin story, then it probably is that of Genentech, even though Cetus
Corporation, formed five years before it in 1971, is considered the first biotech company. It was
Genentech's initial public offering (IPO) on October 14, 1980, however that really announed to
the world the reality of biotech companies on Wall Street, and further pointed to the market
possibilities of companies that could by definition only operate on promise for years, until
tangible therapeutic products could emerge from their R & D efforts (and I analyze this
fundamental driving temporal structure of the biotech industry in Chapter 6). Initially, however,
biotech companies were far from focused on biopharmaceutical development, but were much
more diffuse in their aims. This at least partly comes fromn the contexts of their genesis, with
Cetus, in particular, being supported and incubated in large measure by the petrochemical
industry in the 1970s (see Rabinow 1997: 46-78 for a brief history of Cetus as it transformed into
a more focused biopharmaceutical company that eventually developed polymerase chain reaction
[PCR]). While Genentech, co-founded by one of the developers of recombinant DNA technology,
Herbert Boyer, was more focused on human healthcare aspects than Cetus initially was, it too had
in addition industrial chemical applications and animal health as two additional foci in its initial
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role of the military-industrial complex in post-World War II America in the innovation of vaccine
development.
years (indeed, Genentech's earliest achievements included the production of a human protein,
interferon, and an agricultural product, bovine growth hormone).
It also needs to be remembered that the innovative capabilities of smaller biotech
companies that I have alluded to is not simply the consequence of them doing "newer" science,
but is actually a manifestation of a smaller, more adaptable and managerially supple
organizational structure. Understanding how big pharmaceutical companies work involves being
attentive to an inertia that is constitutive of their mode of functioning. This is an inertia that is
often simply a consequence of the companies' size, and results in a reluctance both to embrace
new technologies (therefore, most pharmaceutical companies "do" genomics by in-licensing
genomic information from upstream companies, rather than undertaking genomics or
bioinformatics research within their own companies) and to abandon what in some cases may be
flagging technologies, modes of operation or research projects. This inertia due to size is further
compounded by what might be called a strategic inertia, where pharmaceutical company
managers are also reluctant to abandon technologies, products or markets in which their company
or research division already has a significant lead or stranglehold. In other words, like many other
"high-risk" enterprises (venture capitalism, which I will talk about later in this thesis,
immediately comes to mind), the everyday strategic operations of a pharmaceutical company are
all about minimizing risk rather than taking it.
Nonetheless, there is no questioning the starkly differential positions of power and
bargaining that biotech and pharmaceutical companies occupy when they actually do business
with one another. This is wonderfully captured in Barry Werth's accounts of the negotiations
between the then start-up Vertex Pharmaceuticals with the British pharmaceutical giant Glaxo-
Wellcome (now Glaxo Smith-Kline, or GSK), as they tried to interest Glaxo in a collaboration
that was anticipated as structurally quite typical for biotech - pharma alliances (Werth 1994: 100-
103). In this situation, the only way Vertex could interest Glaxo in the collaboration was by
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revealing enough about their projected immunosuppressive targets that they risked being scooped
by Glaxo: a risk that was considerably larger than being scooped by a competitor with relatively
similar resources to Vertex's own, since Glaxo were in a position to throw many more people and
far more resources into a project to gain competitive advantage than Vertex ever could, should
they desire to develop targets in-house rather than through a biotech collaboration. The tension
was even more acute because the decision by Glaxo to enter into a collaboration with Vertex
would imply that the money for that collaboration would come out of the budget of Glaxo's
immunology department, whose chief, Leslie Hudson, by virtue of his expertise in the field, was
one of the people Vertex was presenting to. In other words, in order to interest Glaxo in a
collaboration that at the time was quite crucial for Vertex's future, they had to convince a person
who would be undercutting his own budget in order to accommodate the collaboration, and who
further could walk away from the meeting having gleaned an intimate knowledge of the research
being conducted at Vertex, decide against the collaboration, and use that information to compete,
with far more resources and humanpower, with Vertex. The stakes, in such interactions, are high
indeed for the biotech company, and they really have little choice but to hope that the big
pharmaceutical company, perhaps as much as anything else because of its constitutive managerial
inertia, will prefer a collaborative in-licensing agreement to an in-house research initiative.
There are, however, historical parallels between the biotech industry and the
pharmaceutical industry in its early days, and one of those parallels has been the mantra of the
"magic bullet", the drug that can cure not just the symptoms of disease but its causes, and that is
tied inextricably into the miracle and magic that provides the drug development enterprise with so
much of its symbolic capital. This mantra was first noticeable as far back as the the mid- 930s,
with the development of the sulpha drugs, which really did mark the beginnings of the
pharmaceutical industry as a legitimate industry rather than as a largely failed purveyor of quack
medicine. Another parallel is the aggressive patent environment in the 1930s, that often did lead
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to a stifling of innovation in ways ironically similar to the ways big pharmaceutical companies
now accuse biotech (especially genomics) companies of stifling innovation through upstream
patent protections, such as on DNA sequences (see Chapter 4 for an elaboration of this).
What is different, if one is to believe Werth's account of Merck in the 1940s in The
Billion Dollar Molecule (which he uses as a backdrop in many ways to his story of Vertex in the
early 1990s), is the fact that the existence of pharmaceutical companies as a ruthless business
alone (in spite of the huge investment that the industry does place in the generation of symbolic
capital by distinguishing itself as being in the business of therapeutic development), which,
indeed, is not just a value system but a fiduciary duty for the heads of these companies under US
corporate law, was far from naturaiized in those days. Indeed, one of the criticisms I have often
heard of pharmaceutical companies today is that their corporate cultures have shifted to an "MBA
culture": that, unlike in the days of George Merck, pharma companies are not run by visionary
founders, but by professional managers. Therefore, goes this line of criticism, pharmaceutical
companies' corporate cultures today are little different from corporate cultures in the oil or
tobacco industry, even though the symbolic capital associated with pharmaceutical development
is significantly different.
This is very different from the image of the industry in the post-World War II years. For
one thing, the industry had just emerged from a war effort, where it had been mobilized, pretty
much in its infancy as a legitimate industry, in the cause of public health. At that point in time,
therefore, the symbolic capital of especially the American pharmaceutical industry, which could
easily distinguish itself from the German pharmaceutical industry that was heavily implicated in
the Holocaust, did not come from saving individual lives through blockbuster drugs as much as it
came from being a crucial ally of the State in the defeat of Nazism (I explore the former, current
imaginary of the pharmaceutical industry as being in the business of individual therapeutic
salvation in Chapter 7). But secondly, this tied into the public image of the leaders of Merck - its
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founder, George Merck and its most famous chemist, Max Tishler - as altruistic, as being in the
business, in the words on the cover of Time magazine in August 1952, of an industry that is "for
people, not profits" (cited in Werth 1994: 131). Indeed, Werth goes on to tell of the annoyance
that Tishler, a Jew who had been involved in Merck's wartime R & D efforts with a passionate
zeal, felt when the company merged in 1953 with Sharpe and Dohme, who were best known for
manufacturing throat lozenges, and who were keener to make products for people who were well
rather than those who were sick, believing that the former represented a greater market.
The current image of the Western pharmaceutical industry culture as "merely corporate"
is also at odds with the image of the Indian industry, which, because of the provisions for bulk
generic manufacture that were allowed by the Indian Patent Act of 1970, has been an industry
whose fundamental value system (in every sense of the term) over the last 30 years has been
based in making large amounts of cheap drugs available to many people in competition with other
generic manufacturers. Here again, there is a "culture" that gets marked out and epitomized by
people such as Yusuf Hameed, Chairman and Managing Director of Cipla, the Indian
pharmaceutical company that (in)famously made available anti-retroviral therapy to Southern
African countries at a third of the price that Western multi-nationals were selling these drugs at.
While Cipla's action is in every sense a shrewd business move that garners symbolic capital
while opening up potential African markets for the company, it is not an insignificant fact that
Hameed runs a company started by his grandfather in the 1930s, and that he was one of the
people involved in drafting the 1970 Act that was responsible, in almost sole measure, for the
reduction in drug prices through the generation of a competitive generic market. Similarly, Anji
Reddy, the founder of the Hyderabad based company Dr. Reddy's Laboratories (DRL), has
succeeded in being hugely influential in creating a public image of DRL in his own image:
studious, humble, academic, committed to research, anything but an "MBA culture". I will
digress to a more detailed analysis of the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the next section,
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before coming back to analyze some economic considerations in drug development, and the sorts
of politics such considerations tie into.
The Indian pharmaceutical industry
The Indian pharmaceutical industry is one of the most interesting "national"
pharmaceutical industries in the world, in large measure because it has been co-produced by
patent regimes. As mentioned above, the 1970 Indian Patent Act fundamentally helped shaped
this industry into one that was capable of cheap reverse-engineered bulk drug manufacture, that
enabled Indian drug prices to become amongst the lowest in the world. In 1995, India became a
signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and needs to be completely WTO compliant
by 2005. It is in this context that I am interested in outlining a brief history of one Indian
company, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories (DRL).
DRL started in 1984, very much a product of the business environment created by the
1970 Patent Act. At that time, the company purely concentrated on the development of cost-
effective processes for existing molecules, catering entirely to domestic market requirements. The
provision in the 1970 Act that enabled this was one that only allowed process patents, and not
product patents, thereby allowing Indian companies to manufacture molecules that were already
available in Western markets. DRL's focus initially was to supply active pharmaceutical
ingredients (APIs) to other companies at an affordable price for bulk drug manufacture. In 1988,
they started making their own branded formulations. This was quite a profitable business model,
and allowed a number of Indian pharmaceutical companies, most notably Ranbaxy and Cipla, to
generate significant revenues. Indeed, the profitability of such a business model was one that was
judged by revenues rather by growth (growth being the index by which Wall Street judges U.S.
pharmaceutical companies). The change in patent regimes towards a WTO-imposed one therefore
necessitated a paradigm shift in the Indian industry, as after 2005 Indian pharmaceutical
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companies will not be able to take a molecule already on the market, remake it through an
indigenous process and then sell it. Indian companies will now have to focus on novel drug
discovery.
DRL actually envisioned drug discovery as a business model well before India became
party to the WTO: ill fact, they were thinking of this as early as 1986, even before they had
started putting reverse engineered branded formulations on the domestic market. Along with
Ranbaxy, India's largest pharmaceutical company, DRL has been India's R & D pioneer.
The reason for this, according to the Director of DRL's research foundation (Dr. Reddy's
Foundation, or DRF), R. Rajagopalan, has to do with the fact that the major visionaries who
charted the agendas of these two companies, Anji Reddy for DRL and Parvinder Singh for
Ranbaxy, were themselves scientists - an argument for the shaping of a corporate ethos by the
value systems of its visionaries that completely echoes the story of Merck under George Merck in
the 1940s. Anji Reddy was trained as a chemist at the National Chemical Laboraties, Pune, a lab
of India's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and itself the pioneering Indian
public lab to go global.
In 1993 (a year before India signed the Dunkel Draft at the Uruguay Round on the
General Agleements on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, the prelude to India's becoming a signatory to
the WTO), DRL officially established its research foundation, DRF, on a sprawling compound
north of Hyderabad, a beautiful 100,000 square foot building with lots of courtyards, open
corridors and fresh air, expensive art work on the walls, bouganvillea lining the driveways, that
looks more like a Mediterranean villa that it does a research lab. DRL, the parent company,
recently merged with Cheminor, a bulk drug manufacturer that has provided active
pharmaceutical ingredients to global pharmaceutical markets and that has a manufacturing facility
built to FDA specifications, and, in addition to DRF, has seeded a small U.S. based subsidiary
that focuses on biopharmaceutical research, Reddy U.S. Therapeutics. The founding of DRF is
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not simply a reflection of DRL's interest in R & D; it is also a sound strategic move, since non-
profits like DRF can import chemicals and equipment without having to pay the duties that would
be applicable to for-profit chemical or drug companies.
While a few Indian companies are getting into novel drug discovery ventures, the basis of
these efforts, Reddy U.S. Therapeutics notwithstanding, still lies firmly in traditional organic
chemical synthesis rather than in biopharmaceutical development. Understanding DRL's rationale
behind their continued, what might be perceived as "conservative", faith in organic chemistry as
the continuing route to drug development, will help place in a certain situated context the hype in
the West surrounding the impacts of biotechnology, genomics and proteomics on the
pharmaceutical industry, and will also perhaps help one understanding of the ambivalent
enthusiasm that even Western pharmaceutical companies have for these technologies. For this, I
will quote DRF's director Rajagopalan extensively39
In my personal opinion, sequencing genes per se is not going to say anything. The gene
has to be functionalized: what exactly is the function of the gene? What exactly is the
protein that is going to come out? People might take the gene sequence and make an
arbitrary call, okay, we'll take the patent. But that may not give us any information. We
have to go in deep. That is, more and more information from genomics, and finctional
genomics, is most important. And proteomics. They are going to really serve us lots of
templates for making molecules.
Now we know what exactly goes wrong in the case of breast cancer. A particular gene
has been up-regulated. A particular protein is over-secreted. A particular thing has been
over-expressed. Now expression per se is not going to lead us to disease or lead us to
abnormal proteins, by looking at one aspect you cannot... looking at one tooth of an
excavation, you can't build a whole man. It's not that simple. Even though most of the
39 R. Rajagopalan, interview with the author, 8 August 2001.
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multi-national companies invest, a lot of hype has been created, I still feel it will take
some time for us to understand what exactly is happening.
Similarly biotech also. Biotech is a sort of buzzword now. They say everything is going
to be biotech. I have a strong belief in that also. But at the end, we have to go step by
step. It cannot be done just overnight. You know in the US, especially on the West Coast,
there are one dozen companies that have started and one dozen companies that have
vanished. Because most of the companies are based on one platform technology. A
particular professor or particular scientist feels that is going to be the answer, and then
when they try to translate it in terms of effectiveness in humans, they tail. We tend to
make it very simple, Kaushik. You know, our body is highly complex.... Definitely they
are the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Today, it may not be helpful for you to understand it.
But in the long run, we can put it together. That is what my perception of genomics and
proteomics and biotech industry is. Definitely they will be a future source of potential,
but it is too early for us to make sort of an effort that, okay, you just have to jump in.
Rajagopalan, therefore, straddles an interesting middle ground. He does not buy into the
hype surrounding biopharmaceutical development, whether in the biotech, genomics or
proteomics industries, because it is a hype that he feels, as a business, DRL cannot afford to buy
into. But his is not a cynical repudiation of genomics as "simply hype" either. On the one hand, it
offers a stark contrast to the extreme enthusiasm shown by some for the biotech industry, as
somehow a one-stop replacement for outmoded and antiquated chemical bases for pharmaceutical
development, enunciated quite bluntly by analysts like Cynthia Robbins-Roth, precisely the West
Coast U.S. biotech consultant that Rajagopalan would probably be wary of. In sharp contrast to
Rajagopalan's views, for instance, Robbins-Roth prefaces her glory story of the biotech industry,
From Alchemy to IPO, thus:
[T]here are 65 new drugs on the market that came from biotech labs and another 140 in
the final stages of the regulatory process. Every day, the industry labs generate more
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information about how our bodies work, in sickness and in health, down to the single-
molecule level. For the first time in history, it is possible to design new treatments for
diseases such as Alzheimer's disease, Lou Gehrig's disease, breast and prostate cancer,
and heart disease - and aim those drugs directly at the molecular causes of the disease.
More effective drugs, with fewer nasty side effects, will be possible because of
biotechnology....
As we begin the 21st century, literally hundreds of new biotech projects begun in the last
decade are poised to power into the marketplace. This explosion will fuel opportunities
for investors and employees alike, and we will all benefit from the products....
Biotech's Golden Age lies ahead. (Robbins-Roth 2000: ix-xi).
On the other hand, Rajagopalan's views are a reflection of a certain temporal
understanding, whereby insights gained in the present build up to future technoscientific
advancements, that is completely inverted by the very rationality of biotech, that, as I argue in
Chapter 6, depends on the conjuration of futures in order to create the present that might enable
those futures to happen. In other words, the contrast between Rajagopalan's careful appraisal of
the promise of biotech and Robbins-Roth's enthusiastic embracing of it is not simply a contrast
between cynicism and hype, conservatism and risk-talking, chemist and biologist, Indian and
American, but relates to their very different conceptions of temporality and its relationship to
inventiveness and to business strategies.
Rajagopalan, further, points to the fact that the difficulties with biopharmaceutical
development are not simply difficulties in understanding enough to develop a molecule that might
be therapeutically efficacious, but also have to do with delivery systems that biopharmaceuticals
often require compared to small chemically synthesized drug molecules:
[Y]ou cannot go in to treat every disease by giving proteins, you know? Patient
compliance is going to be a problem. Some sort of a via media has to come out. Novel
delivery systems, so that the proteins can be given. As you know, now people are trying
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to make insulin that can be inhaled. You know, otherwise insulin has to be given by sub-
cutaneous injections. No patient would like to have the injections. It is still painflul.
Nothing like popping one pill, rather than taking one prick.
In addition to the technoscientific difficulties Rajagopalan sees in an unreflexive embrace
of biotechnologies are the actual logistical difficulties for an Indian company doing so:
In our country, we are quite strong at organic chemistry. We have to take leverage on our
strength. We cannot compete with all the things, what is happening at NIH or some
private competitor, Celera and all. We cannot really compete with them, because they are
much more advanced in terms of technology.... We are leveraging the strength of our
country, which is quite strong in organic chemistry.... You know, you cannot really fight
the multi-nationals. Multi-nationals have got strong muscle power, money power. They
have deep pockets. There'll be about 5,000 people working in that R & D, whereas a
company like Reddy's, you can't expect them to. We are 250 people.
Two things emerge from this analysis. The first is the question of leveraging "national"
strength. For DRL, that "national strength" is in organic chemistry. However, there is also the
case of the Centre for Biochemical Technology, the CSIR lab that I write about in detail in
Chapters 5 and 7, that is precisely going into the sorts of genomic research that Rajagopalan is
wary of because its Director, Sameer Brahmachari, feels that India can leverage its "national
strength" in population genomics. The "national strength" in question here is a combination of
software talent that can be put to use to generate bioinformnatic tools and applications, combined
with the genetic heterogeneity of the Indian population. The latter itself seems a paradoxical
position for those who are aware of the pitches made by the Icelandic genome company DeCode
Genetics, that is also a population genomics company that is leveraging the purported genetic
homogeneity of the Icelandic population as their source of competitive advantage. The DeCode
pitch suggests that it is in homogenous populations that genetic variability really can be traced
back to population patterns. Brahmachari, on the other hand, asserts that heterogenous genetic
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populations can be significant sources of genetic information if, like in India, they are present in
large families with very little genetic counselling, thereby allowing researchers to do linkage
analysis on genetic diseases across whole families in a way that just wouldn't be possible in the
West.
The difference in the apparent "national strengths" between DRL and CBT doesn't just
have to do with the fact that DRL is a corporation in the business of doing research that can be
translated into commercial value, while CBT is a public lab that wants to do "basic" research,
since much-of CBT's population genomics effort is feeding into a start-up it has seeded,
Genomed, which has been co-seeded by another Indian pharmaceutical company, Nicholas
Piramal India Limited (NPIL). In other words, "national strength" is invoked to provide
justification and rationality to two very different ventures relating to drug development, in the
case of DRL to offset any potential criticism that they might somehow be acting conservative, or
behind the times, in their continued faith in organic chemical synthesis, the other, in the case of
CBT-Genomed-NPIL, to rationalize what really is a high-risk enterprise that directly throws them
in competition with Western genome companies like DeCode.4 0
The major question facing the Indian pharmaceutical industry today does regard the
effect becoming WTO compliant will have upon it, a question of what exactly the consequences
will be of a paradigm shift towards a property regime that will not allow reverse engineered bulk
drug manufacture. According to Rajagopal (and this in spite of the fact that DRL is perhaps
amongst the Indian companies best positioned not just to deal with WTO, but also to take
advantage of the new regime to itself leverage global playing fields), much of the Indian industry
4 0 DRF has, indeed, been quite successful so far with its R & D efforts, and has struck three major licnesing
deals with multi-national pharmaceutical companies. DRF 2593 is an anti-diabetic molecule that has been
licensed to the Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk (as early as March 1997), after which was
licensed another anti-diabetic, DRF 2725 in August 1998, also to Novo Nordisk. DRF had as of summer
2001 received $8 million from these deals, and is likely to get a total of $17.3 million in fees if the
molecules pass Phase III. In May 2001, they licensed DRF 4158, a novel insulin sensitizer, to Novartis for
$55 million in up-front and milestone payments.
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was against WTO, and he feels - in stark contrast to constant government assertions to the
contrary - that the government was, in fact, directly pressured by the West into becoming a
signatory. The basic fact that needs to be remembered is that the Indian pharmaceutical industry
was not a sick or a dying industry in need of market rejuvenation, but was, throughout the 1980s,
a quite profitable industry. Therefore, changing over to a WTO regime, for this industry, does not
just mean adopting new and unfamiliar methods of drug discovery, which necessitates the setting
up of R & D facilities; it also means abandoning a revenue based business model in favor of the
potentially lucrative but far riskier growth based model, in which Indian companies would be
pitted in direct competition against more powerful Western companies in order to achieve any
growth.
There are, however, an increasing number of Indian companies who have been in the
process of retooling themselves to become companies that can discover new chemical entities.
The stakes, as suggested earlier, are not just profits, but global expansion. The niche that those
Indian companies, such as DRL, that invest in R & D occupy becomes similar to that a Western
biotech company occupies with respect to big pharma. DRF, for instance, has 250 people, the size
of a small-to-midsize biotech company; it is involved in drug discovery rather than development,
and out-licenses any molecules it discovers to big pharma, so that the latter can take the molecule
through clinical trials. From the revenue garnered from such licensing, companies like DRL hope
to move further up the value chain by holding on to the molecule longer before out-licensing it.
While it is near impossible to actually get breakdowns of milestone payments at different stages
of drug development when the drug has been licensed from a discovery company to a
development company, it is well understood that the value of a molecule increases exponentially
the further up the clinical trials it gets taken before being out-licensed.4 '
41 The difference of DRL / DRF from many US biotech companies is that the former are organizations run
by some of the most experienced members of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, many of whom have been
in the business for the last 20-30 years, and therefore come much closer to the ideal type of the "grey-
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The company with the most aggressive global ambitions in India, however, has not been
DRL but Ranbaxy, which already operates in 40 countries, with five manufacturing units outside
India. While DRL is focused on out-licensing as the cornerstone of its business strategy, Ranbaxy
is trying to take molecules to clinical trials on its own. The corporate cultures of the two
companies also could not be more starkly different. As mentioned earlier, DRL is a
quintessentially "scientific" company: laid-back, pleasant, relatively open and deeply informed by
Anji Reddy's own background as a basic researcher. Ranbaxy, on the other hand, is an aggressive
streamlined corporate entity, providing, by Indian standards, many luxuries and benefits for its
employees, but demanding more than its pound of flesh in return. The driving force there is the
head of research, J.M. Khanna. Ranbaxy has a high employee turnover, and every former
employee I have talked to has emphasized Khanna's authoritarian manner of running research
activities in the company. One former employee told me that when even senior managers in the
company made presentations to Khanna, their hands would be visibly trembling.
Management ofpharmaceutical R & D
The question of innovation is the question of where the transition from scientific research
to drug development originates. Drug research and development (R & D) is funded by both the
public and the private sectors. This section briefly traces the enabling role that the public sector
plays in making drug development possible.
The question of why is it even an important question to ask where research money for
drug development comes from is both a banal and an important one to ask, because along with it
are tied issues of both ownership and productivity, that are central thematics returned to
throughout this thesis. It is important to emphasize here that it isn't just industry that is interested
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haired big pharmaceutical manager" that epitomizes the perceived managerial caricature of American big
pharma companies.
in return and productivity, with public labs left to pursue "basic" science out of some kind of
"pure, altruistic" motive. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is as interested in returns on
investment as big pharma is. The difference lies in the constituencies (Congress versus a
company's board of directors) that are involved in the respective cases. In other words, I am
arguing that political debates over the corporatization of research are best served not by taking
recourse to some inherent (and possibly ahistorical) notion of the "purity" and (in Robert
Merton's terms) disinterestedness of public research, but by acknowledging that questions of
representation - democratic access to control over research agendas and consequences - is what
is really at stake. It is the privatization of public research (an encumbrance of the commons and
the stifling of certain types of discursive and strategic praxis), rather than the corporatization of
academic research (the shifting normative structure of what counts as legitimate science) that is
of primary political concern to me throughout this thesis. Of course, the fact that both of these are
the same process of science becoming venture science means that it is impossible to entirely
disentangle the two as political concerns; but to the extent that the changing normative structure
of science does bother me, it is because of the constraints that such changes place on genuinely
democratic representational possibilities in the republic of technoscience.
The question of where research money comes from is also an ethical question that is
recognized as such within the scientific community. Editors of the major medical journals, the
New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Association, Lancet, Annals
of Medicine and British Medical Journal, have for instance set up a series of disclosure rules for
all authors in terms of where funding has to come from, the concern here being one of avoidance
of conflicts of interest.
A working paper by MIT's Program on the Pharmaceutical Industry (POPI) has studied
the contributions of public sector and private sector R & D to commercial drug development
(Stallings et al 2001). This is based on and taking off from two landmark studies on this topic. In
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1976 Comroe and Dripps published a seminal paper that has been hugely influential on science
and technology policy, demonstrating that 41% of all articles judged to be essential for later
clinical advance in cardiovascular and pulmonary medicine between 1945 and 1975 (including in
cardiac surgery, vascular surgery, oral diuretics, chemotherapy and antibiotics to prevent
infection and prevention of polio) were not clinically oriented at the time of the study and 62% of
key articles described basic research (Comroe and Dripps 1976). This was an identification of
what the researchers called "essential bodies of knowledge", in a review and classification of 500
published articles into "basic", "clinical", "mission oriented" and "non-mission oriented"
categories. A 1990 study by Robert Maxwell and Shohreh Eckhardt found that 60% of innovative
drugs would not have been discovered or would have taken much longer to discover without
research contributions from government labs and non-commercial institutions (Maxwell and
Eckhardt 1990). The conventional wisdom that comes out of such studies is that fundamental
scientific advances are much more likely to come from public sector research and are crucial
inputs to the development by the private sector of successful commercial products.
The MIT POPI study identifies what constitutes the top therapeutic advances, considers
the relationship between top therapeutic advances and market success, undertakes a detailed
literature review of 21 important drugs, conducts detailed field interviews with scientists at 13
large pharmaceutical firms and identifies the "key enabling discovery". Of course, this covers
various modes of discovery and development, ranging from "old-fashioned" or "random" drug
development, through mechanism driven research that involves targeted mechanism specific
screening of compounds42 and drugs discovered through fundamental science (such as cisplatin,
erythropoietin [EPO] and 1-interferon). Their results show that the overall percentage of
"enabling" discoveries made in the public sector is 67%. This figure is 33% for drugs discovered
through "random" screening, 90% for "mechanism" driven research and a 100% for drugs that
42 The genomics era is premised on mechanism based drug discovery.
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emerge from fundamental science. The insights they provide therefore are that most "basic"
discoveries are made in the public sector; that there are very long lags between the "enabling"
discovery and the enabling research that translates these discoveries into drugs; that publicly
funded "clinical" or "applied" research may be as important as "pure" or "fundamental" research;
and that the US institutional structure may play a crucial role in the transfer of knowledge from
the public to the private sectors, with individual researchers playing a key role.43
Studies such as these assume importance in the context of the vexed relationship of drug
development to drug prices. This is especially so in the US, which has the highest prices in the
world for prescription drugs, but is increasingly becoming a global issue due to efforts at
homogenizing global intellectual property regimes through the World Trade Organization
(WTO).44 The pharmaceutical company argument is that lower prices would lead to lower
incentives to innovate. Of course, such an argument naturalizes as fact what is an implicit
assumption, that it is the private sector that is chiefly responsible for breakthrough prescription
drugs. This is the context in which studies such as the ones conducted by Comroe and Dripps,
Maxwell and Eckhardt and the POPI group become important counters to pharmaceutical
company rhetoric (even if they didn't intend to be appropriated thus).
Breakthrough drug development has always, at least since the sulpha drugs, had an
element of miracle associated with it (and I talk about this in greater detail in chapter 7). It is this
element of miracle that becomes an integral part of pharmaceutical company rhetoric - the fact
that these are companies that are in the business of "Food, Health and Hope" (to use Monsanto's
logo) is hugely significant to the symbolic capital that this industry accrues, symbolic capital that
in all sorts of ways enables the refiguration of political terrains so that huge amounts of material
43 A landmark Congressional Act that facilitates this transfer is the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act (1980 enactment of
P.L. 96-517, The Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act).
44 Of course, this is a particularly poignant is situations such as the AIDS epidemic in Africa, which many
anti-pharmaceutical company activists claim would not have been so serious if drug companies had made
anti-retrovirals available at affordable prices to these communities.
120
capital can accrue as well. It isn't surprising, therefore, that an author like Cynthia Robbins-Roth,
a long time biotech industry consultant, starts her account of the biotechnology industry, From
Alchemy to IPO: The Business of Biotechnology, with the rhapsodic story of how IDEC
Pharmaceuticals' monoclonal antibody Rituxan provided a miracle cure for a patient afflicted
with what would otherwise have been an intractable cancer (Robbins-Roth 2000). These stories
are not untrue - far from it - but what they hide is the economic context within which such
"miracle cures" take place. It is in situating such miracle cures in political economic contexts that
the story of Genzyme's Ceredase (and its successor drug Cerezyme) becomes so interesting.
Here, I draw upon and summarize Merrill Goozner's history of this drug and its relationship to
the history of Genzyme as a company (Goozner 2000).
Ceredase is Genzyme's miracle drug for Gaucher's disease, a rare genetic disorder of
lipid metabolism that leads to progressive lung, kidney and bone problems and usually death by
the early 40s, and that only afflicts about 5000 people worldwide. Fortnightly infusions of
Ceredase, however, cost $8000, which means that an annual treatment regimen can cost nearly a
quarter of a million dollars. In a context of a managed care environment where insurance
companies constantly seek to reduce or remove coverage from patients who cost them so much
(and Goozner's account does draw upon a real case, that of Brian DeGrenier, whose father had to
face such insurance company battles to continue to get Ceredase treatment for his son), this puts
such patients in a very vulnerable position.45
Of course, it must be remembered that it is only biotech companies that are even likely to
develop such "orphan" drugs as Ceredase. But this does not mean that Ceredase has in any way
been an unprofitable venture for Genzyme. With 1999 revenues of $479 million, Ceredase
45 Of course, the political economy of healthcare reimbursement is an important part of the political
economy of drug development, and as much so in countries (such as much of Europe) where the state has a
significant role in healthcare reimbursement as in the managed care environment of the United States. Even
without the direct economic pressures that operate in both managed care and welfare systems, there is a
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accounted for 70% of Genzyme's total revenue (figures from Goozner 2000). According to its
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, Genzyme's pretax profits for the year were
$223 million, compared to the $98 million it spent that year on research and development.
These are the sorts of figures that are used both by companies and by activists to justify
their cases for or against exorbitant pricing. Companies will precisely point to the fact that orphan
drug innovation would never have happened without the possibility of patent monopolies that
allow exorbitant pricing, which therefore again gets justified through a logic that suggests that
exorbitantly priced drugs are better than no drugs at all. Activists such as Goozner will precisely
point to the fact that drug regimens are exorbitantly priced, and make access to therapeutic
advances impossible or very difficult for the consumer.
This becomes particularly magnified in the context of biotech (as opposed to big
pharmaceutical) companies, because while on the one hand one could point to the huge profits
Genzyme makes from Ceredase in a manner that accuses Genzyme of somehow illicit surplus
value generation (and there is no doubt that the surplus value that successful drugs generate is
enormous), these figures also suggest how important Ceredase is for Genzyme's continued
existence as a company. The field of politics, in drug development (which is always already
intimately related with drug pricing), is quite literally a struggle for survival, where the survival
of the company is often pitted directly against the survival of the patient. Of course, when it is a
big pharmaceutical company that is involved, the question of corporate survival is often not so
acute, as bigger companies often don't depend to the same extent on a single drug for their
revenues.4 6
contradiction at the heart of the reimbursement process: health planners make reimbursement at a
population level, while physicians prescribe at a patient level.
While this is very true in speaking of pharmaceutical companies relative to biotech companies, the
situation is much more complicated, since many of even the bigger pharmaceutical companies make 40-
70% of their profits from one or two blockbuster drugs. This is why patent protection for those drugs is of
such vital importance to these companies. Hence the serious hits that have been taken by Eli Lilly, with
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The question of survival and incentive alone however still implicitly assumes a narrative
whereby it is the corporation that is the entity responsible for drug development, and that it
therefore ought to be "justly" recompensed for its efforts. However, as Goozner shows, the
enzyme glucocerebrocidase, which is what Ceredase is, was purified, clinical trials conducted on
two patients and the results published as far back as 1974 by Roscoe Brady, who has been a basic
researcher at the NIH since the 1950s and who still conducts research in the field. Brady's
problem in the 1970s was an "industrial" problem, of large scale manufacture of the enzyme for
use as a therapeutic. This ramping up, and the provision of large quantities of the enzyme, was
still done not in a company, but by researchers at Tufts University. And yet in the world of
venture science, university researchers are always already corporate entrepreneurs in waiting, and
indeed in this case it was the scientists at Tufts who provided Brady with the enzyme who then
left Tufts in 1981 to form Genzyme to conduct dosing studies on the enzyme. Genzyme built an
enzyme purification plant on the strength of $72 million raised from private capital markets, and
it was this plant that finally enabled the generation of enough enzyme for clinical trials.
However, this plant relied on purification of the enzyme from placenta, which was still
time consuming and costly. The next generation drug to Ceredase, Cerezyme, is a recombinant
version of Ceredase. However, the gene for glucocerebrocidase was discovered not at Genzyme,
but by public researchers at the Scripps Institute in La Jolla, from whom Genzyme licensed the
gene.
It is in the context of these sorts of strategic and extremely high-stakes political terrains
that the estimate of $500 million as being the amount required to bring a drug to market becomes
so contentious, because much of the rationale for the subsequent rhetorical justification by the
industry for their pricing strategies comes from the existence of this figure, that somehow serves
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Prozac going off patent, and Schering Plough, with Claritin going off patent. What is definitely the case is
that big pharmaceutical companies can cushion the failures of upcoming products more easily than biotech
as a "fact" that can be bandied about without dispute. However, as Goozner argues, these are
themselves extremely contentious figures that have histories tied into them. The figure is in fact
derived from a substantially industry-funded 1991 study carried out at Tufts University (DiMasi
1991), which mentioned the figure to be $231 million. This figure was arrived at by looking at the
number of new drugs approved by the FDA and dividing it into industry research and
development budgets that were discounted for the length of time taken to bring a drug to market.
Since then, this figure has been adjusted for inflation and the time taken for the development of
new drugs. But, as Goozner says, two-thirds of development costs come in pre-clinical research,
most of it taking place in government-funded settings. Further, as mentioned earlier, most drugs
that come to market are not new drugs targeting new, genuinely unmet medically needs, but are,
rather, "me-too" drugs that serve to improve upon already existing medication or to replace a
drug that is coming off-patent. Indeed, as I have already argued, there is a serious disincentive for
especially big pharmaceutical companies to invest in drugs that don't already have a predictable
market on the basis of which market assessments for the new drug in consideration can be made.
Goozner also indicates that company research and development budgets are invariably rivaled by
their marketing budgets, and states that the direct marketing costs of pharmaceutical companies in
1999 was $13.7 billion (55% of their R & D budget for the year). Out of this, $1.8 billion was
spent on direct-to-consumer advertising alone.
Having said this, it is true that pharmaceutical R & D is a complicated and expensive
enough proposition for its planning and execution to be an integral matter of corporate strategy
for a company. Pharmaceutical R & D is divided into drug discovery, drug development and
marketing support (though often market support drives, rather than follows, the discovery and
development). It is important to emphasize the distinction between the discovery (identification
and prioritization of promising leads) and development (going through the clinical trials process
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companies can, since they usually have larger product revenues to fall back on.
for a lead compound that has been identified as a potential therapeutic) phases, because costs, and
the strategic allocation of costs, differ in these two phases. The biggest cost in the discovery
phase has to do with personnel, materials and facilities, but contracting becomes a major cost in
the development phase, especially if the company contracts its clinical trials to a CRO. Often,
strategic resource allocation within the company becomes a case of discovery and development
teams competing with each other for company resources. The calculation of risk, which is the
theme I will return to in the final chapter of this thesis, is a major driver of strategic portfolio
development, which ultimately is about mcasuring risk-reward indices; these indices too are
different in discovery and development.
Early economic considerations in the development of a new drug
As mentioned above, a benchmark study describing the cost of developing a new drug is
the Tufts University study by DiMasi et al (1991). A second benchmark study, which, like the
DiMasi study gets periodically updated, relates to the returns to R & D for new drugs, and was
done by Grabowski and Vernon (1994) at Duke University. The cost of developing a new drug, in
studies such as DiMasi's, includes all costs of discovering and developing a drug to the point of
regulatory approval, as reported by a survey of representative samnples of large pharmaceutical
firms. The cost of developing a new drug also incorporates the cost of failed candidates, and the
opportunity cost of capital. As mentioned above, DiMasi's study puts this figure at $231 million.
An Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study done in 1993 puts the cost at $350 million, a
study done by Myers and Howe in 1997 puts it at $467 million, and the $500 million figure is the
one commonly cited in the media. The latest Tufts study, also conducted by DiMasi (yet to be
published) puts the figure at close to $800 million. This new high figure is partly because of high
opportunity costs, since returns in financial markets in the 1990s has been staggeringly high.
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"Opportunity costs" themselves are calculations based on a rather perverse logic, and represent
the money companies would have made if they had been an investment bank, investing in the
financial markets, rather than companies ploughing money into R & D (in other words, by putting
opportunity costs into my personal budget, I could say that a new car I plan to buy costs me
$36000 even though its MSRP is $18000, because buying it prevents me from spending the
$18000 on other things! If those "other things" are wildly profitable financial investments that I
might otherwise make, such as would have been possible in the dot com heyday, then I could
appropriately indicate that my car is orders of magnitude more imaginatively expensive by being
an even bigger "lost opportunity"). And of course, these are costs that are derived largely by the
self-reporting of their own expenses by pharmaceutical companies.
Indeed, the validity of the DiMasi study has been seriously called into question by James
Love (1997), who re-examined the costs of clinical trials for orphan drugs by looking at tax
credits for orphan drug development that pharmaceutical companies received, and by analyzing
the costs of 58 NIH-funded clinical trials. He obtained a figure of $7 million as the cost of clinical
trials from the NIH data, which, even if adjusted by the same parameters DiMasi used in a
confidential industry survey in 1995 to determine clinical trials costs, yields an overall clinical
trials cost of $16.1 million. Meanwhile, from the Orphan Drug Tax Credits evaluation, Love
shows that pharmaceutical companies only report spending $3.2 million for clinical trials of each
orphan drug. Love cites DiMasi's confidential 1995 report as placing the cost of clinical trials for
a single drug as being being $24.5 million, which is adjusted to $54.8 million to account for the
risk of failed trials.
The first major question, as Love points out, is that of where figures such as DiMasi's
come from, and the conflicts of interest inherent to a survey procedure that depends significantly
on industry figures to calculate industry costs. While it may be understandable that Di Masi's
study would use industry figures that are favorable to industry, since the Tufts Center for the
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Study of Drug Development, to which the authors belong, is significantly funded by the industry
(a vital issue of conflict of interest in itself), it is particularly ironic that the OTA report in 1993 -
a government document - used as its only source the DiMasi study, and did not look for any
public sources to arrive at its conclusions. In other words, the OTA report ultimately relied on
unaudited industrial calculations to further naturalize the $300-500 million figure as state-
sanctioned "fact". It is even more ironic that these questions are still not being revisited in spite of
the accounting scandals surrounding corporations like Enron, when in fact the latest Tufts study
results putting the figure at $800 million were announced around the same time as the Enron
crisis was breaking.47
In the 1991 study, the "expected" costs DiMasi et al. arrived at for clinical trials after
adjusting for the risk of failed drugs was $48.1 million per approved drug. From here, the figure
of $231 million (which has since been added upon, as mentioned above, by the OTA report and
the latest Tufts study) for the entire drug discovery and development process was arrived at by
firstly assigning $65.5 million in "expected" outlays for pre-clinical research. This itself was a
rather imaginative undertaking, since as Love shows it was based on no project-level data.
Indeed, logically, it is completely counter-intuitive that pre-clinical research would cost more
47 Indeed, it is quite likely that pharmaceutical companies adopt many imaginative, if not necessarily
illegal, auditing procedures to increase profit margins. One such was recounted to me by an anonymous
informant. Since I have not been able to verify this, it must remain simply as a story told to me by a
possibly reliable source, rather than a "fact" (though it is arguably every fit as "factual" as the DiMasi
studies are).
Apparently, many of the biggest pharmaceutical companies have offices in Singapore. This is not
because they manufature lots of drugs in Singapore, or because Singaporeans drug themselves much more
than people in other parts of the world, but because it is a tax haven. Apparently, these companies select
specific drugs that they decide will be "imported" from Singapore. Pfizer's blockbuster Viagra is one such.
Therefore, a Viagra pill manufactured in a Pfizer manufacturing plant in the US will be exported to
Singapore and reimported back into the US before it is sold in the US market. On their US tax returns,
Viagra can then be stated as having been taxed in Singapore, and therefore, on the basis of double taxation
avoidance treaties, Pfizer would not have to pay taxes on Viagra in the US. Given that Viagra earns
revenues of $1.5 billion a year, that is a pretty substantial loss to the American taxpayer. If multiplied by
other, carefully selected, blockbuster drugs by other companies who also export and reimport drugs to and
from Singapore, and if further multiplied by the fact (as suggested by critics such as Goozner or Love, but
also by studies such as Stallings') that much of the enabling research for these drugs occurs with public
money in any case, then the loss to the exchequer is truly significant.
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than clinical trials, especially since the value of a molecule as one goes further along the clinical
trials procedure increases exponentially. The remaining costs, roughly equal to the combined
purported costs of pre-clinical and clinical research, are the opportunity costs of capital.
Therefore, Love points to a host of problems with the DiMasi study: the fact that the
figures rely solely on unaudited information supplied by the industry, the fact that there are no
reliable pre-clinical estimates upon which to base those figures, the fact that the clinical trials
estimates themselves don't bear up, the fact that much of the enabling research was done in
public labs (as Goozner's story of Ceredase and Cerezymne shows, but also as the Stallings study
- done by a group that is hardly a pharmaceutical company antagonist - shows) and the dubious
logic of opportunity costs, which by definition are calculations that are based on the assumption
that pharmaceutical companies are investors playing the financial markets - a rather odd
assumption for an industry that takes great pains to continually project itself as being in the
business of "people, not profits". (For example, Alan Holmer, President of the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers Association [PhRMA], insists in his message introducing the
Association's 2001 Pharmaceutical Industry Profile that while the Profile "does not discuss the
millions of patients - in this country and around the world - who are being helped and healed
every day by the medicines discovered and produced by this country's pharmaceutical
companies", we should "make no mistake - these patients, today's and tomorrow's, are the
motivation that drives all of those fortunate enough to work in America's pharmaceutical
industry'").48 Clearly, however, this is a motivation that needs to be budgeted as a huge lost
financial opportunity.
As mentioned above, Love shows through an analysis of Orphan Drug Tax Credits that
the cost of clinical trials for orphan drugs comes to $3.2 million per approved drug, which is a
fraction of DiMasi's 1991 figure of $18.9 million per approved drug before accounting for failed
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candidates. Love therefore argues that either DiMasi's figures are an over-estimate (and
remember, these are just clinical trials figures, and don't take into the account the further over-
estimations from pre-clinical and opportunity cost additions), or, if in fact clinical trials are as
expensive as DiMasi argues they are, then the fact that companies get such a small tax credit (the
Orphan Drug Tax Credit is 50% of the amount spent out-of-pocket on human clinical trials)
indicates clearly the extent to which clinical trials are in fa-t paid for by the public and are not
out-of-pocket expeii.,s for the company (Love calculates that if DiMasi's figures are to be
entirely taken at face value, then that means that 92% of the costs of human clinical trials for
orphan drugs are paid for by the taxpayer).
PhRMA, predictably, spoke up vehemently against Love's study,49 but it was a response
that continued to leave most of the questions Love raised on the DiMasi study unanswered.
PhRMA did emphasize that figures arrived from looking at Orphan Drug Tax Credits cannot
legitimately cast aspersions of DiMasi's "average" cost figures because orphan drugs are tested
on fewer patients, and are approved more easily by the FDA. However, as shown by Goozner's
story of Genzyme, the high prices of Ceredase and Cerezyme are very much justified by taking
recourse to the naturalized DiMasi figures, figures that PhRMA itself in its response to Love
admits is higher than the costs to develop orphan drugs! Further, the PhRMA response doesn't
address any of Love's other challenges, regarding the conflict of interest, dubious pre-clinical
cost estimates, the extent to which R & D is publicly subsidized and the opportunity costs that get
imaginatively added on. Indeed, what qualifies as an orphan drug is itself somewhat of a question,
for it is by no means guaranteed, as the case of Ceredase and Cerezyme shows, that orphan drugs
are unprofitable. Some extremely profitable drugs that have qualified for orphan drug status
include Amgen's blockbusters Epogen ($1.96 billion in 2000 sales) and Neupogen ($1.2 billion)
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48 Available online at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profileOl/intro.phtm
49 See Jeffery Warren's letter to the editor of Marketletter, available online at
http://www.cptech.org/pharm/phrmarep.html
(figures from Love 2001a). Perhaps one of the most perverse classifications of an orphan drug is
Bristol-Myers Squibbs' breast cancer drug Taxol. While the market of breast cancer patients for
Taxol far exceeds the 200,000 patient limit below which a drug can qualify as an orphan drug,
Taxol qualifies as a drug that is also used for AIDS-related Kaposi's sarcoma, and is thereby
eligible for tax credits even though it might be used for indications that don't qualify for the
credit.
The original study on returns to R & D for new drugs looked at the universe of new
medical entities approved from 1980-84, while an update (cited earlier) looked at the universe of
new medical entities approved between 1990 and 1994. Approximately 80 drugs were included in
each cohort. The authors accessed actual worldwide sales data for each drug, projected future
sales revenue for the remainder of each product's life, classified drugs in deciles, according to the
total returns and calculated the rates of return (using estimates of out of pocket costs from the
DiMasi study). They showed that for a breakthrough drug, which could have annual worldwide
revenues of up to $1400 million dollars, the corresponding cost for each day of delay amounts to
$3.8 million (again testifying to the material - rhetorical importance of speed in drug
development).
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Studies like this are really important for the public relations apparati of pharmaceutical
companies, who like to talk about how expensive it is to develop drugs. Not only does it justify
high drug prices, it also makes the companies look less potentially profitable. And herein lies a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, pharmaceutical companies like to look less potentially
profitable to Congress, in order to avert the always existent possibility of Congress introducing
drug-pricing legislation;5 0 on the other hand, these companies want to look as potentially
profitable as they possibly can to their investors. PR often reflects in acute fashion the
contradictions inherent in biocapitalism.
My purpose in this section is not to adjudicate between Love's figures and DiMasi's.
Even though I think Love makes a completely convincing case that DiMasi's figures are a gross
exaggeration of the actual costs of drug discovery and development, that in itself is incidental to
my larger argument, which is to show how figures such as DiMasi's get naturalized and assumed
asfact, to the extent that they subsequently get used as the starting point for firther studies, such
as the OTA's on drug pricing, or Grabowski's on returns to R & D. In other words, these are
constructed "facts" with huge consequences not just for policy or legislation, but for further
enterprises of fact production. What is key then are the silent rhetorics that go completely
unquestioned. For instance, Love shows that the latest announcement regarding the $800 million
figure (announced by the Tufts group in an event co-organized by PhRMA, Merck and the Boston
Consulting Group), while based on data obtained from ten companies, was said to constitute an
"average" estimate (see Love 2001b). What the word "average" suggests is both normativity and
naturalization on the one hand, and, on the other hand, that some drugs cost much more than $800
million to develop - an "average" cost cannot by definition be the highest cost. Other normalizing
techniques included the assertion by Merck CEO Richard Gilmartin that the "typical" clinical
trial involves 4,000 patients, which is by no means the case (Love shows that this is, for instance,
50 Lobbying Congress tends not to be such a major concern for most biotechs.
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three times the number of patients enrolled in anti-HIV drug trials, as cited by the FDA). Further,
it was claimed that the increased cost of drug discovery and development from $500 million to
$800 million was largely a consequence of the increased cost of clinical trials - and yet the
researchers did not disclose the cost of clinical trials at this event. Once again, Love's research
based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data shows that even if 4000 patient clinical trials were
assumed as "typical", there is no way clinical trials costs alone could account for the increase,
suggesting that much of the increase is likely to be mainly a consequence of assuming increased
opportunity costs (especially given the staggering returns on the stock markets in the last few
years of the 1990s).
Innovation and Emerging Technologies
Where, then, does genomics fit into all of this, and what exactly is "post-genomic" drug
development all about? The answers to these questions are more properly explored in Chapter 8,
on personalized medicine, but a brief summary would be appropriate here. Quite simply, the steps
involved in what might be called a "genetic approach" to the diagnosis and treatment of disease
could be said to consist of the following: first, the identification of a disease with a genetic
component; second, the mapping of the gene(s) involved in the disease to specific chromosomal
regions; and third, the identification of the involved gene(s).5 ' At this point, one could develop
diagnostics to identify the presence or expression of the involved gene(s) in patients to determine
predisposition to the disease in question; use the gene itself as a drug (gene therapy); or
understand the underlying biology of the disease to "rationally" develop therapeutics to target the
molecular mechanisms of disease etiology. The diagnostic tests could further be a precursor either
51 The question of whether the gene(s) in question are singular or plural, or whether they are understood as
being either singular or plural, of course has great consequences for understanding etiologies of genetic
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to steps taken to prevent the onset of disease (that could either be interventionist or involve
lifestyle changes), or to what is known as pharmacogenomics, which involves tailoring
prescriptions and drug regimens to individuals based on their likely, genetically determined,
response to these drugs (these steps are summarized from Collins and McCusick 2001). Of
course, some of these advances are likely to be more easily realized than others. The development
of diagnostic tests, for instance, is relatively straightforward (and indeed, as I argue in Chapter 8,
likely to be the one realizable goal of"genomic" or "personalized" medicine for some time to
come). Targeted therapeutics based on understandings of the underlying biology of disease is
much more complicated, since diseases are always complicated multi-factorial events that are
difficult to understand at the molecular level, and further not necessarily easy to target and set
right even if ever properly understood. Gene therapy, too, has been hindered by the lack of
finding optimal methods of gene delivery, and was further hindered by the death of a volunteer,
Jesse Gelsinger, in a trial in 1999.
Most scientists, when they write or speak of "histories of' or "prospects for" genomics,
do admit that some of these advances are more immediately realizable than others. Francis
Collins and Victor McCusick's way of summarizing this is that "[t]he rate of progress for
applying a genetic approach to the diagnosis and treatment of each disease will be different
depending on the research investment and the degree of biological complexity underlying the
disease.... Diagnostic opportunities may then come along rather quickly, but will be of greatest
clinical usefulness [sic] once prevention measures are developed that have proven benefit to those
at high risk.... In general, full-blown therapeutic benefits from identification of gene variants will
take longer to reach mainstream medicine" (Collins and McCusick 2001: 543). And yet I argue
that it is this temporality - the different likely rates of realization of each of these genomic
advances - that is the real issue, and that gets elided over as a relatively linear and equivalent set
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determinism, and consequently for the role of genomics in fashioning subjectivity. I explore this in greater
of outcomes in accounts such as Collins and McCusick's. It is this what might be called
therapeutic lag that is actually both the ethnographic window and the political terrain of "post-
genomic" drug development, and it is the ensemble of events in the world that happen during the
therapeutic lag that will determine whether, how and what "full-blown" therapeutic development
actually takes place, and when. Making what seem suspiciously like Soviet-style 5-year and 10-
year predictive plans, as Collins and McCusick do in their article, closes down this ethnographic
window at the expense of relatively banal crystal-ball gazing (though, as I will argue in Chapter
6, such modes of prediction themselves have powerful influences in creating ethnographic
windows and political terrains).
Political Terrains and Fields of Action
I have made numerous references to political terrains within which drug development
operates: terrains of competition and collaboration between biotech and pharmaceutical
companies; global regulatory terrains within which clinical trials operate; discursive terrains that
involve interactions between pharmaceutical companies, investors, policy makers and activists
regarding drug pricing (both locally and globally); and discursive terrains of marketing and public
relations that are integral to the generation of sales as well as symbolic capital. It might be useful
at this point to indicate the broader sweep of political conflicts that biocapitalism gets framed by,
because it is such a sweep that constitutes the fields of strategic action that get thrown up by these
multiple political terrains.
While issues of drug pricing are as vexed in the US as they are in, for instance, Africa,
they do not tie in to issues of drug access and availability in the same way, since the US, at the
end of the day, does have an institutional structure (however vexed or controversial) that does, at
least for middle to upper class consumers, pay for prescription drugs. The real political battles in
detail in Chapter 8.
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that case then get fought around what gets perceived as the excessive and unnecessary marketing
of pharmaceuticals, especially through direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising (that is allowed in
the US but not in Europe). These controversies are particularly highlighted in the case of mental
health therapeutics, since defining mental illness is often so difficult and often discursively
shaped by corporate advertising as much as it is by "neutral" or "objective" scientific knowledge
(see, tir example, Healy 1997, 2002). On the other hand, in places like Africa, or Haiti, or
Siberia, the criticism of pharmaceutical companies is that their high pricing strategies make drugs
that are absolutely and urgently needed, in epidemic situations (such as of AIDS or multi-drug
resistant tuberculosis IMDR-TB]), unavailable (see for instance Farmer 1999, Kim et al 2000).
These two extreme scenarios, of excessive drug marketing leading to the creation of a
"therapeutic society" in the First World on the one hand, with people dying in the Third World
due to the lack of accessible therapeutics that do exist on the market, on the other, frame the field
of action within which pharma-politics takes place. It is a field of action that highlights a problem
of distribution that is conceptually similar, though politically very different, from the problem of
food distribution in famine (see, for instance, Sen 1981). It is also a field of action that has at its
extremes a binary set of politics of regulation, at the level of demand in the former case and
supply in the latter, that ties into different sets of theoretical concerns - broadly speaking,
Foucauldian in the former and Marxian in the latter - that often operate at odds with one another
in academic debates about what the "problem" with the pharmaceutical industry actually is.
What the work of people like Paul Farmer, Jim Kim and their organization Partners in
Health (www.pih.org) indicates, however, is that, unlike in the case of famine, the problem is not
just the equitable distribution of already available drugs, but, in the case of diseases like AIDS
and MDR-TB, the problem that already available drugs still aren 't good enough, in terms either
of efficacy, safety or the complexity of drug regimes required to effect treatment, complexities
that tie directly into the difficulties of patient compliance, leading to the further generation of
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drug resistant pathogens. Therefore, there still remains the problem of innovation, and therefore
still the need of pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs. This is quite different from the
controversy surrounding agribusinesses over the development of genetically modified (GM)
foods, for instance, where the need to innovate and come up with new modes of food production
is not at all perceived as urgent by many of its critics. The question of food inequity, in spite of
the efforts of agribusinesses to turn it into a question of innovation, is still embedded much more
straightforwardly in a politics of distribution than pharma-politics is.
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CHAPTER 4: SPEED AND INFORMATION
We have the awesome potential - should we so desire - of rewriting the language of God and the
responsibility of harnessing the genome to improve the human condition in an equitable and ethical
manner. The childhood of the human race is about to come to an end.5 2
If we regularly speak here of technoscience, it is not in order to cede to a contemporary stereotype, but in
order to recall that, more clearly than ever before, we now know that the scientific act is, through and
through, a practical intervention and a technical performativity in the very energy of its essence. And for
this very reason it plays with place, putting distances and speeds to work. It delocalizes, removes or brings
close, actualizes or virtualizes, accelerates or decelerates.5 3
4.1: A brief history of genomics: stories and polemics
The US National Institutes of Health (NIH)-fimded Human Genome Project (HGP)
started at the end of the 1980s as a public-funded effort by five nations to sequence the human
genome. The original plan was to sequence the genome starting from one end and working
towards the other, with a very stringent error frequency of not more than one every ten thousand
base pairs (10X). The HGP, in its initial years, was indeed a rather languid affair.
In May 1998, however, the HGP was thrown into turmoil by an announcement by J.
Craig Venter that he was going to sequence the human genome through a more rapid method that
involved shredding the genome into pieces, sequencing the pieces and putting them back together
again, with somewhat less concern for error, through his private sector labs and using his new
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52 Davies 2001: 10.
extra-quick automated sequencing machines. The major reason for the turmoil was the well-
known fact that Venter (and other private sector genomicists who were entering the sequencing
fray in a big way at this time) would patent the DNA sequences they generated, thereby keeping
them out of the public domain. This announcement turned the genome program into a competitive
race, in which the HGP researchers were forced to redraft their plans (Collins 1998).54
It is perhaps useful at this point to outline some of the other major actors. The NIH-
funded HGP is, as mentioned, a public-funded consortium of five nations, the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan, coordinated by the National Human Genome
Research Institute (NHGRI) of the NIH. The current head of the NHGRI is Francis Collins. The
major sequencing centers of the HGP are located at the Whitehead Institute in Cambridge, MA,
Washington University, Baylor College of Medicine, the Joint Genome Institute of the US
Department of Energy and the Sanger Centre located near Cambridge, England. In addition to the
Rockville, MD based Celera Genomics, which is Craig Venter's company and a daughter
company of Perkin-Elmer,55 some of the other major genome companies include Incyte Genomics
(based in Palo Alto and Cambridge, England), Millennium Pharmaceuticals (Cambridge, MA)
s3 Derrida 2002b: 80.
54 Before the HGP decided to "race" Celera, largely on the latter's terms, of course, the public project
heaped scorn and vitriol on the likely outcome ofCelera's enterprise, especially in terms of it being able to
generate a good quality sequence in its rush for speed - statements that they seemed to have no
embarrassment about once they realized that they needed to follow Celera's lead and get the sequence done
quickly for reasons of credit, credibility and ownership. Consider, for instance, the following quotes made
before the HGP redrafted its plans in October 1998 (quoted in Davies 2001):
* Harold Varmus said that the feasibility of Venter's approach "will not be known for at least 18
months" (148).
* John Sulston of the Sanger Centre said: "I really don't see this as being any great advance whatsoever.
We are going to provide the complete archival product, and not an intermediate, transitory version of
it" (151).
* Robert Waterston of Washington University equated Venter's version of the sequence to "an
encyclopedia ripped to shreds and scattered on the floor" (151).
* Maynard Olson of the University of Washington Genome Center accused Venter of "science by press
release" and predicted "over 100,000 serious gaps in the assembled sequence" (153).
55 One of the many trials of writing a contemporary history of a field that is as rapidly changing as
corporate genomics is that events very quickly outrun the moment of their writing. In January 2002, after I
had first written this sentence, Celera got rid of Venter as its CEO, in an ironical attempt to reinvent itself
as a drug discovery company from an information / database provider. The reasons for shifts like this are
explained more fully in Chapter 8.
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and Human Genome Sciences (Rockville, MD). Incyte is a major rival to Celera as well as to the
public-funded project. Millennium, which is also involved in drug development in addition to
DNA sequencing and functional genomics work, is by contrast rather more friendly with the
public-funded project, as one of its co-founders is Eric Lander, who is the head of the Whitehead
Genome Center and thereby a major player in the HGP.
A major actor in the recent history of the genome project is the Wellcome Trust. The not-
for-profit fund of the big multi-national pharmaceutical company Burroughs Wellcome (which
since then became Glaxo Wellcome and is now, after a merger with SmithKline Beecham, Glaxo
SmithKline), the Wellcome Trust is well known as being one of the primary supporters of
biological research in the United Kingdom. It is important to remember how big a player Britain
has been in the sequencing race: the Sanger Centre in Cambridge is in fact the largest of the
genome sequencing centers, and generated a third of the public sequence. It was, in fact, the
Wellcome Trust that really persuaded the NIH to take up Craig Venter's challenge and not throw
in the towel, who really convinced the NIH that it was possible and feasible to get the sequence
done first, and who assured the Americans of their support in making that happen.
It is important to recognize just how much the generation of the working draft sequence
had to do with technological rather than fundamental conceptual advances. In this regard, major
actors in the sequencing of the genome were the sequencing machines called ABI 3700.
The story of the 3700s, as well as of the race to sequence the genome, is in considerable
measure the story of an apparently rather unglamorous company, Perkin-Elmer (PE). PE was a
maker of lab instruments, hardly regarded as the market segment that does the cool, cutting-edge
science. And yet, it was PE that really made it possible for the working draft sequence to be
generated by 2000, 5 years ahead of the initial schedule for the genome sequence set by the public
HGP (a good summary of this can be found in Ross 2000, from which I draw substantially for
this account).
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In the mid-90s, in fact, it didn't seem obvious that PE would be making anything
revolutionary possible. It was one of a number of ailing instruments companies, with a wide
range of products and no particular direction. Three things happened to change this. The first was
the acquisition of the rights to Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), the technology to amplify
DNA that was absolutely essential for genomic sequencing. The second was the acquisition, in
1993, of Applied Biosystems Inc., an instrumentation company that was making sequencing
machines; and the third was the induction of Tony White as CEO. White changed the business
direction of PE and got it to focus on genomics, changing the name of Perkin-Elmer to PE
Corporation, which in turn comprised PE Biosystems, that made instruments, and Celera
Genomics, the new genome company that PE seeded and got Craig Venter to head. Celera was
able to throw the sequencing gauntlet at the HGP because they had PE Biosystems' 3700s to
sequence with. In order to compete with Celera, now, the HGP had also to buy the 3700s. This, in
the dramatic words of White, "set off an arms race, and we were the arms business" (quoted in
Ross 2000: 102).
In such a conception of the history of the race to sequence the human genome, then,
Celera is merely a vehicle, birthed specifically for PE's growth, rather than the "driving force" or
"primary agent" in generating the sequence. Indeed, this has been ironically driven home with the
recent removal of Venter as CEO of Celera, as Celera seeks to reinvent itself away from being an
information provider and towards becoming a diagnostic and drug discovery company.
A key moment in the race to sequence the genome was the generation of the genome
sequence of Drosophila (fruit fly) by a consortium consisting of Celera and researchers from the
University of California at Berkeley. A number of things emerged from this event. The first was
that the Drosophila sequence was generated by Celera's controversial method of shotgun
sequencing, showing that shotgunning genomes was a feasible way to sequence them, and also
indicating Celera's abilities to successfully sequence genomes in the first place. The second was
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that this sequence was generated by Celera in partnership with a public university, indicating that
the divide between Celera and the HGP wasn't a clear-cut divide between public and private
research worlds, but was more specifically a divide between Celera and those public researchers,
of the HGP, who had deeply invested public money and their reputations in getting the genome
sequenced first. The third was that, quite clearly, the human genome sequence was only the most
glamorous of the genomes to be attempted. Lots of value could be garnered from sequencing the
genomes of other organisms, and indeed, for really valuable information from the human genome
sequence, it was essential to have the ability to compare genomes of a number of organisms. In
addition, organisms like Drosophila were being enrolled as Latourian actants in the unfolding
race, just as the roundworm, Cyanorhabditis elegans, was enrolled by the HGP as the preliminary
example of their sequencing prowess.s6
Fourth, almost incidentally to a grand history of genomics, but absolutely central to a
project that is interested more in emergent contours of venture science than to what happened or
not to the genome sequence, was the role of a small start-up in the Drosophila sequencing
enterprise. Called Neomorphic, and set up outside Berkeley by a group of Berkeley and Santa
Cruz graduates, Neomorphic was the archetypal late 1990s Silicon Valley start-up, a group of
cool and laid back young men, who wouldn't have looked out of place as members of a rock band
instead of as scientists in a company, but whose genome annotation tools played a central role in
the creation of the Drosophila sequence. In other words, a major reason why Celera was able to
show off its sequencing prowess to the public project, and garner the symbolic and material
capital that it did in those heady days of 1999-2000, was because of a small group of 20
programmers in a garage in Berkeley who were writing the code to make some sense of the series
of nucleotide bases being churned out by sequencing machines made by Celera's sister company,
56 Indeed, model organisms are not just recruited as strategic actants in battles for what Latour calls
recruitment of allies, but are also recruited as metonymic constructions of what it means to be human. This
is, of course, particularly true with primates, as Haraway (1989) so wonderfully shows in Primate Visions.
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Applied Biosystems. While Celera could be seen as the company that altered the face of medicine
by sequencing the human genome, it could also be seen as a company birthed by an
instrumentation giant, that used machines that itself were developed in another, acquired,
instrumentation company, and that initially validated itself sequencing Drosophila, a project that
it couldn't have successfully completed without significant input from a public lab and a 20
person start-up in a Berkeley garage that was writing code. 57
At around the time that Neomorphic was collaborating with Celera to annotate the
Drosophila genome, the Santa Clara based company Affymetrix was trying to acquire
Neomorphic's competitor, Doubletwist.s8 At some level, the histories of companies like
Affymetrix and Doubletwist, rather than of the "heroes" of the genome sequencing effort such as
Celera or the HGP, are more interesting to outline as a means of generating a stratified analysis of
genomics as, firstly, not something that had two distinct originary points (the start of the HGP and
the seeding of Celera), and secondly since sequencing itself is just the "end of the beginning" of
genomics, as many genome scientists like to say. Companies like Affymetrix and Doubletwist,
the former one of the most unique "genome" companies in the business and the latter the most
spectacular corporate failure of the genome era, point to the emergent contours of corporate
genomics, biocapitalism and venture science in a way that a linear history of Celera's histrionics
vis-A-vis the HGP simply doesn't.
57 Compare this with the linear historical account provided by Davies (2001: 52) in his "inside account" of
the race to sequence the genome: "[I]f there were to be an award for the most influential scientist of the
1990s, the odds-on favorite would have to be John Craig Venter....[A]s the founder of Celera Genomics, he
almost single-handedly transformed the odyssey to obtain the sequence of the human genome....If he had
not stirred up so much controversy and resentment over the past decade, he would be a certainty for
Stockholm's annual Nobel party". This last in spite of the fact that the Nobel is explicitly given for
discovery / invention / fundamental conceptual advances, whereas what Venter did most successfully was
use strategy, rhetoric and machines developed by a sister company to do what was already being done more
quickly! If anybody has indeed come up with a "key enabling invention" (and works such as Paul
Rabinow's [1997] Making PCR should immediately make us wary of ascribing invention so simply to the
solitary romantic inventor), it is probably the pair of Michael Hunkapiller and Leroy Hood, who came up
with automated sequencing technology and seeded Applied Biosystems.
58 This account is based on conversations with a number of people at Neomorphic, Affymetrix and
Doubletwist. For obvious reasons, individual informants are kept anonymous.
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Affymetrix, as mentioned in the Prologue, is a tool company that makes DNA chips
(GeneChip®), Icm x I cm silicon wafer substrates with known DNA libraries stuck onto them
upon which it is possible to perform comparative hybridizations of different samples in order to
analyze differential gene expression, in, for instance, normal or diseased states. Therefore, these
chips are basically arrays of DNA probes. It is a technology that has in itself been a driver and
marker of the importance of information in genomics (and I analyze the role of the DNA chip in
slightly more detail in Chapter 8), and of speed: like the ABI 3700s, the DNA chip is a definitive
indicator of the fact that it is the high throughput generation of information that defines genomics.
Massive amounts of information that are potentially useful for gene function analysis can be
obtained at one time using these chips.
Like Applied Biosystems, Affymetrix doesn't "do" biology: it makes technology relevant
for biological applications. It has been using processes borrowed from the semi-conductor
industry and making DNA probe arrays. Affymetrix has been making such arrays since 1994,
basically increasing probe density on each chip to the point where they have managed to fit the
entire human genome on to two chips.
Doubletwist, meanwhile, was initially founded as Pangea Systems, and started as a
bioinformatics company that was a direct competitor of Neomorphic in its early days.5 9 My own
first encounter with them was at their stall at a 1999 industrial genome conference organized by
Craig Venter's Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR). At that time, they were still Pangea, but
on the cusp of reinventing themselves as Doubletwist. They were without a doubt the loudest and
most visible presence at any of the public relations events at the conference, typifying the dot
com corporate attitude of the time, and clearly spending huge amounts of money to keep
themselves garishly visible (indeed, at one point, they even had a billboard advertisement for their
company on Highway 101 as it entered San Francisco, possibly the most expensive spot for
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roadside advertising in the United States). The reinvention from Pangea to Doubletwist was a
reinvention of a bioinformatics company that wrote code (such as Neomorphic did) to a dot com
company which was, in the words of its Vice-President of Marketing Rob Williamson "a life
science portal for online genetic research geared to go directly to the scientist".
The story of Pangea / Doubletwist is such a fundamental part of the type of contemporary
history that I am trying to write because central to it is the role of venture capitalism and venture
capitalists, who get written out as significant actors in the Celera - HGP story of the genome
sequence (since Celera was seeded by a parent company, and not started by entrepreneurs seeking
venture capital), and who are central components of the assemblages that constitute genomics /
venture science / biocapital (indeed, the role of venture capitalists in DoubleTwist's saga led a
number of its employees to refer to the company as "DoubleCrossed").
Pangea was started by two Stanford graduates, Joel Bellenson and Dexter Smith.
Bellenson and Smith were actually crack programrs, and wrote the code, as contract workers, for
the first version of Incyte's gene expression database, LifeSeq, that became the industry standard
expression database. Of course, as contract workers, the two did not get any share in the
intellectual properties or royalties Incyte received, something that they felt very bitter about,
though equally something that Incyte felt was hardly to be expected, given that they were hired as
contractors and not employees. In starting Pangea, Bellenson and Smith were offered $10 million
by the famous Silicon Valley venture capital firm kleiner, Perkins, Caulfield and Byers,
arguably the best known venture capital firm of the dot com boom. In exchange, Kleiner Perkins
wanted 50% of the company, which Bellenson and Smith, not knowing any better, were happy to
give up. Indeed, on the back of Kleiner Perkins' investment came a number of other extremely
prestigious venture capitalists, including some of the most powerful high-tech VCs in the
business such as the Mayfield Fund.
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59 The account of Doubletwist's rather sorry but extremely entertaining history is based on conversations
Now Kleiner Perkins had also seeded a small bioinformatics company in San Diego,
which was going nowhere in particular. They suggested to Bellenson and Smith that Pangea buy
the small company. Since Kleiner Perkins had a substantial ownership share in the acquired
company, the acquisition served to further dilute Bellenson and Smith's share in Pangea. In other
words, Kleiner Perkins had managed to get Bellenson and Smith to spend their money in order to
further relinquish hold on their company. Eventually, the venture capitalists managed to so dilute
Bellenson and Smith's holdings in the company that they finally even got rid of the founders from
the company's Board.
Meanwhile, Affymetrix was hoping to go beyond simply being a tool provider to actually
turn into an informatics and dnlg discovery company in its own right. They were hoping to do
this by acquiring a promising young bioinformatics company. Pangea / DoubleTwist, perhaps by
virtue of their high visibility, was the company they initially sought. In March 2000, they offered
to buy DoubleTwist for $300 million: a quite staggering figure to offer for a company that really
hadn't developed any genuine value-added commercial products. DoubleTwist, however, felt
they were worth much more than that, and turned Affymetrix down.
This failed acquisition was perhaps the most fortuitous event in Affymetrix's history.
Seven months later, they had completed their acquisition of Neomorphic instead. Neomorphic
had proved their skills as a bioinformatics software developer in their collaboration with Berkeley
and Celera in annotating the Drosophila genome. Without exception, everybody I have talked to
at Affymetrix hails the Neomorphic group as significantly contributing to Affymetrix's value
today. Affymetrix, in a further step at diversification, seeded a functional genomics company,
Perlegen Sciences, whose job is to leverage their access to Affymetrix's chip technology to
identify genetic variations amongst individuals, and find patterns that might be developed for
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with former employees, who are both kept anonymous and not directly quoted.
Perlegen's own commercial use, but also fed back to Affymetrix to enable the latter to develop
new genotyping arrays based on this information.
DoubleTwist, meanwhile, spiralled through its huge reservoirs of venture capital money,
attempted and failed thrice to go public, and finally, in a symbolic gesture of supreme insult, were
offered to be bought for $10 million by Celera Genomics at the end of 2001. Spuming that last
offer as well, DoubleTwist finally ran out of money and closed its doors in March 2002. It had
managed to bum through $78 million of VC money, a remarkable amount for what was purely a
software company, with no wet lab facilities.0
What, then, was the significance of the human genome sequence? Answering that
probably requires acknowledging the iconicity of DNA, an iconicity that is perhaps only rivaled
in recent times by the cloned sheep Dolly (see, for instance, Franklin 2000). Related to this is the
probability that its significance is held dearest by those who believe most strongly in definitive
causal relationships between genes and traits. Indeed, much of the early mapping projects of the
1980s and early 90s were about finding genes "for" diseases such as muscular dystrophy,
Alzheimer's, certain cancers (the most well known being the breast cancer related gene brca-1)
and, perhaps most famously, Huntington's disease. As I show in Chapter 8, this particular
conception of the genomics "revolution", as being about target identification, is already
historical, as scientists - especially those actually in the business of developing drugs - realize
quickly that simple attributions of causality don't lead in any simple way to therapy.
6o Bellenson and Smith, meanwhile, started another company in 1999 called DigiScents, which manage to
get featured on the cover of the November issue of Wired magazine that year. This was a company that had
nothing to do with biotech, and the products intended included the "iSmell" (a computer peripheral that
would emit fragrances to enhace a user's multimedia experience), "ScentStream" software to drive iSmell,
and the "Scent Registry", a licensable digital database of thousands of scents to sell to developers of web
sites, games, movies, advertisements and music. In April 2001, DigiScents laid off all 70 of its employees
and shut shop, after failing to attract enough VC funding to go beyond developing a prototype.
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The question to be asked, then, is the question that I asked at the end of the Prologue:
what sort of a revolution is genomics? Most (in)famously, the genome sequence has been referred
to by Walter Gilbert, a genome pioneer at Harvard and founder of many biotech companies, as
the "holy grail" of biology. It has also been referred to as "the book of life", "the code of codes",
phrases that have also been imported into some of the most interesting historical and social
scientific works dealing with the genome (see Kay 2000, Kevles and Hood 1992). A more
apparently secular version of the "holy grail" metaphor is provided by Eric Lander, who
analogizes it to the periodic table. And yet in the process of making this analogy, Lander cannot
help invoking the metaphor of the evolutionary tree, for instance, in this quote: "The Human
Genome Project aims to produce biology's periodic table - not 100 elements, but 100,000 genes;
not a rectangle reflecting electron valences, but a tree structure, depicting ancestral and functional
affinities among the human genes" (quoted in Davies 2001: 14).
While the tree may be a secular image, it is by no means apolitical, and conceiving of
evolutionary relationships in that classical Darwinian sense is by no means without consequence
for the way "genes" and "genomes" and, indeed, humanity, gets understood. As Deleuze and
Guattari (1987) argue, the imaginary of the tree metaphor is completely rooted in binarisms, it is a
"system of thought [that] has never reached an understanding of multiplicity: in order to arrive at
two following a spiritual method it must assume a strong principle unity" (5). They propound the
image of the rhizome in opposition to that of the dichotomous tree-root. The three principal
characteristics of rhizomes, they argue, are connection, heterogeneity and multiplicity.
Understanding genomes, and reading the language of the "book of life", involves a
projection of a future and a deciphering of a past. I do not primarily concern myself with the
evolutionary stories that genomes are supposed to tell, though I do refer, especially in Chapter 7,
to that which gets collapsed into the category "genetic determinism", in which genes are said to
be causal agents of organismic characteristics. I discuss this in the context of what I refer to as
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"genomic fetishism", whereby the gene is naturally assumed to represent the entire organism,
rather than understood as being a constructed and historically specific artifact that allows certain
situated perspectives on what we might call, following Foucault and Franklin, life itself. I do not,
in Chapter 8, explore deeply the possible causes of this deterministic conception as so quickly
reifying into naturalized "fact", at least partly because that particular mode of searching for
causality precisely falls prey to the desire to know, and the operations used to determine, a simple
relationship of cause and effect that in itself underlies the fetishistic determinism that is so
problematic, and that I seek explanation for in the first place. The tree metapahor may not be the
"cause" of genetic determinism in any fundamental sense, and indeed, determining that originary
"cause" is itself perhaps not the politically most necessary or strategic exercise to engage in in
order to denaturalize the fetish of the gen(om)e. But there is no doubt that it is a metaphor that is
strongly associated with the creation of a naturalized fetish of the gen(om)e as principal,
fundamental or originary, if only because the tree metaphor requires such an originary substrate
for it to hold up against the blowing winds of actual evidence that constantly suggest the
metaphor's own insufficiency to account for its continued self-image.
I explore this more fully in Chapter 8, but a brief digression at this stage to emphasize
what it is that I am saying with regard to this powerful imaginary of the genome as a set of sacred
(even when secularized) and rooted codes (for after all, the holy grail, the book of life, the code of
codes and the periodic table all subscribe to the same larger imaginary of the gen(om)e as
findament). This is that if one really believes in a science of evolution that demystifies the
religious myths of, for instance, the Creationists (and this, perhaps, is a science that needs to be
rigorously upheld and believed in for a number of politically very relevant reasons, certainly in
the United States), then one has to be confronted, by one's very method, by a genomic
heteroglossia that absolutely cannot be reduced, or deduced, to originary roots without oneself
performing an operation of myth-construction, and thereby performing an operation that is every
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bit as religious and counter-scientific and mystifying as the operations of those that sciences like
genomics claim to counter.
There are a number of ways to argue for the genome as rhizome. If champions of
sociobiology and genetic determinism such as Richard Dawkins (see, for example, Dawkins
1976) provide "evidence" from the plant and animal kingdoms for "selfish genes" that drive and
determine organismic behavior, then there are enough counter-narratives - and Deleuze and
Guattari, for instance, invoke bulbs, tubers, rat packs and burrows as some - that show the
connnected, heterogenous and multiple rhizomatic conceptions of life that are possible instead.
Donna Haraway, meanwhile, makes the rhizomatic argument through a study of dog genome
worlds, where she shows how it is possible to construct a counter-narrative of the co-evolution of
dogs and humans that might more accurately provide co-histories of the two species than the
rooted deterministic story that prevails of wolves being domesticated into dogs as a consequence
of human settlement (Haraway 2002).
In this dissertation (and especially in Chapter 8), I hint at the limits that such rooted
conceptions of genes come up against when the "facts" of deterministically conceived genomic
experiments come up against the exigencies of having to "work" in the corporate world, as
material-semiotic actants that need to be translated into commercial products. The difficulty of
turning "a gene for x" into a therapeutic that can be sold is, in many ways, both the "ultimate"
signifier, in venture science worlds, of the inadequacies of such concepts, and is also one
explanation as to why it is that industrial scientists are much less ready to jump to deterministic
conclusions than academic scientists are.
An example of such differential enthusiasm for genetic reductionism between academic
and industrial scientists was powerfully seen at The Institute of Genomic Research genome
conference in Miami in 2000. Richard Gibbs, a very high profile public genome researcher who
runs the HGP sequencing center at the Baylor College of Medicine, gave a general progress
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report of the HGP, which wasn't too different from the progress reports that one has become
accustomed to hearing in these fora over the last couple of years -- how well everyone has done,
how the challenge is only beginning, how the public and private enterprises must co-operate and
are co-operating, and so on. The talk got interesting at the end, however, when Gibbs said that the
real thing to do now is to start correlating genes with disease, and that this is the more immediate
(next 2 years) question to tackle than proteomics, transcriptomics, etc. (of course, it's also much
simpler to simply attribute genes to disease than to do the real biology of protein interactions and
transcriptional regulation -- which of course, scientifically, ought to come before any correlations
can legitimately be made. By creating this artificial separation of all of these into distinct
ventures, in a bureaucratic - corporate style, of course, Gibbs manages to rhetorically suggest that
studying genetic correlation with disease traits is a separate science from studying the basic [and
extremely complex] biology of pathways and feedback effects in the cell. If one wants to study
the mechanics by which genetic determinism gets instantiated, then the starting points are
precisely such slick rhetorical manouevers that pose as scientific like Gibbs was making). What
was interesting was that Gibbs was justifying his claims with evidence from scientific literature:
how an increasing number of articles in journals such as Nature Genetics for instance were
talking about "a gene / mutantfor", thereby suggesting such simple correlations (this is really
important to think about while responding to scientific assertions that genetic determinism is
merely "bad science", that "good science" will never say such things).6 '
61 Look, for instance, at the following titles of articles / letters / correspondence to a single September 2000
issue of Nature Genetics:
* Mutations in MKKS cause Bardet-Biedl syndrome pp 15 - 16 (Slavotinek et al 2000).
* Methylation of the CDHI promoter as the second genetic hit in hereditary diffuse gastric cancer pp 16 -
17 (Grady et al 2000).
* Domain-specific mutations in TGFB I result in Camurati-Engelmann disease pp 19 - 20 (Kinoshita et al
2000).
* A defect in harmonin, a PDZ domain-containing protein expressed in the inner ear sensory hair cells,
underlies Usher syndrome type C pp 51 - 55 (Blitner-Glindcicz et al 2000a).
* A recessive contiguous gene deletion causing infantile hyperinsulinism, enteropathy and deafness
identifies the Usher type IC gene pp 56 - 60 (Blitner-Glindcicz et al 2000b).
* Mutations in MKKS cause obesity, retinal dystrophy and renal malformations associated with Bardet-
Biedl syndrome pp 67 - 70 (Katsanis et al 2000).
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Gibbs then made the reinarkable scientific claim that 5000 single-gene diseases are likely
to exist. He wasn't quite allowed to get away with his assertion, and it was in fact Craig Venter
who took him up on it, saying that it's surely not scientifically tenable to say this. Venter's
analogy was that claiming single-gene correlation for diseases is basically looking under the
lamppost for keys dropped elsewhere: you claim that they're single-gene traits because you
haven't found the other genes that are involved. An interjection, of course, that was lost on Gibbs.
I recalled how a friend of mine in Delhi, who is doing a Ph.D. in molecular genetics, astonished
me with his indelible belief that genetic determinism is a scientific fact, that genes do directly
code for traits. I realized, from presentations such as Gibbs', that of course he gets that not by
reading Gina Kolata, but by reading Nature! Genetic determinism is scientific fact, to the extent
that what gets pronounced by a scientific journal is scientific fact. But genetic determinism is
also, as Venter was hinting, merely artifact that gets reified into fact. In fact, one of the scientists
who worked on the initial development of GenBank, the public DNA sequence database, later
expressed profound disgust to me about Gibbs' talk, claiming that one cannot, by definition, have
such a thing as a single-gene disease, since the very fact that every disease manifests itself at
different times in different individuals suggests that there is more than one gene involved in
* The common PPAR Pro l2Ala polymorphism is associated with decreased risk of type 2 diabetes pp 76 -
80 (Altshuler et al 2000).
* Heterozygous germline mutations in BMPR2, encoding a TGF- receptor, cause familial primary
pulmonary hypertension pp 81 - 84 (Lane et al 2000).
* Mutations of the gene encoding the protein kinase A type I- regulatory subunit in patients with the
Carney complex pp 89 - 92 (Kirschner et al 2000).
* Autosomal recessive lissencephaly with cerebellar hypoplasia is associated with human RELN
mutations pp 93 - 96 (Hong et al 2000).
* Mutations in MYH9 result in the May-Hegglin anomaly, and Fechtner and Sebastian syndromes pp 103
- 105 (Seri et al 2000).
* Mutation of MYH9, encoding non-muscle myosin heavy chain A, in May-Hegglin anomaly pp 106 - 108
* Nfl ;Trp53 mutant mice develop glioblastoma with evidence of strain-specific effects pp 109 - 113
(Reilly et al 2000).
* Identification of the gene causing mucolipidosis type IV pp 118 - 123 (Bargal et al 2000).
This is a total of 14 articles which are linking single genes to disease, out of a total of 30 articles published
in the entire journal issue. Some of the words are a little more innocuous: two groups merely associate
genes with particular diseases; one groups says that strains with a particular mutant develop x disease; one
group says that a mutation underlies y disease; two mutations result in a disease, while another three
mutations are merely [seen] in those diseases. Butfive mutations are claimed to cause diseases.
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regulating its onset. Further, he mentioned that the notion of a "single-gene disease" was
developed as a classification category in GenBank, to represent a shorthand for genes that might
be classified as not obviously complex in a database that depended on such shorthand
classifications for its creation. He claimed to be dismayed at the way in which a classificatory
manouever had been so completely appropriated by even credible and well known scientists to
represent the "fact" of the existence of 5000 single gene diseases.
Indeed, the notion of the "single-gene disease" doesn't even always hold up that well as a
diagnostic marker, let along as a route to therapy. An example is the equivocality of the tests for
the brca genes, hailed as the genesfor breast cancer. A positive brca test, like that of any other
genetic polymorphism that serves as a diagnostic marker, is, as I elaborate in Chapter 8, merely
an indicator of a probability of an event that might occur. Perhaps more worrying for those who
lay their stocks (quite literally) in the notion of single-gene diseases is that the absence of a brca
mutation doesn't necessarily indicate without doubt a low risk for breast cancer, suggesting
clearly that there are other factors at play.
Of course, it is not tenable to make the claim that industrial scientists are emphatically
not determinist. What I do argue is that the pressure and duty to produce commercial products,
paradoxically, sometimes forces corporate science to be more careful with what it claims as
scientific. Indeed, the difficulty of really generating any tangible therapeutic (or even diagnostic)
meaning from single-gene associations with disease is a fundamental assumption of many
business models, including that of Affymetrix: which is why, in some ways, it is companies such
as these that become much more interesting markers of emergent contours of "post-genomic"
lifeworlds than obsessively self-absorbed histories of the big vanguard intellectual men
(invariably) who lead the HGP. Indeed, Affymetrix's GeneChip®, mentioned earlier in this
section, is precisely a tool that analyzes whole genomes, or at least clusters of genes, rather than
single genes. Of course, in the process, the results of experiments from Affymetrix's chips, while
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it undoubtedly allows more complex biological analyses than single-gene reductionist hypotheses
do, merely articulates the fundament differently: a wonderful set of images (shown in the next
few figures) from Affymetrix's 2000 Annual Report, for instance, shows a grid of diverse people,
undergirded by a grid of not genes but chromosomes, further undergirded by microarray
information that Affymetrix chips provide, thereby suggesting that it is the patterns of gene
expression rather than individual gene expression that are ultimately constitutive of the being
"human"; patterns that are, of course, only discernable through Affymetrix technology. The
structure of the imaginary is still root-like, even through the Affymetrix chip, rather than
rhizomatic.
Another piece of "science" that has come out of the discursive babble of genomics is the
belief one can somehow determine one's evolutionary prowess as a species by simply discerning
the levels of similarity with DNA of other species, either in terms of the number of genes or in
terms of the percentage similarity of the DNA of two species. Therefore, on the one hand is the
consternation that there seem to be only 30,000 genes, again thereby reducing evotionary
complexity to some kind of a simple numbers game, where more genes add up to more
complexity. Of course, the real complexity comes not from the existence, or not, of genes, but
from their activity, their patterns of regulation, their ability to splice into alternative forms, and a
host of post-transcriptional and post-translational modifications that confer functionalities of
different sorts onto the proteins that these genes code for. On the other hand, the "fact" that
humans and chimpanzees are almost 99% identical at a nucleotide level is taken to imply some
kind of direct correlation with not just the evolutionary relatedness of the two species (because of
course sequence homology is related in some way with evolutionary divergence, but again only
related so simply if one assumes the evolutionary "tree", as opposed to co-evolutionary rhizomes,
to start with), but also with their fundamental "natures". Kevin Davies, for instance, argues that
since the DNA of humans and chimpanzees is 98.5% identical, while that
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of chimpanzes and gorillas is 97% identical, therefore, "humans have more in common with
chimpanzees that chimpanzees do with gorillas" (Davies 2001: 170).
Indeed, disagreements with such statements are voiced by some genome scientists, such
as S.K. Brahmachari, the head of India's public genomics initiative and a researcher for many
years on the function of nucleotide repeat sequences, that often exist in the non-coding segments
of DNA that tend to be dismissed, with little reason, as "junk DNA". According to him, "I believe
every nucleotide in the genome has a role in genome organization. It is not that there is junk,
there is coding and non-coding. If somebody tells me, man and monkey, they are 99% similar,
that is a foolish thing. Because two men vary in their polymorphisms so much more. Men and
monkeys vary enormously at their repeat sequences. But we don't understand the function of
repeats. So when you say it varies by 2% or 1%, it doesn't make much sense. Our understanding
of the 99% is very little".6 2
If the genome is not, then, fundamental in any sense of principal unity to humanity, then
neither is the discipline of genetics fundamental to the enterprise of genomics. Indeed, if
anything, the disciplinary fundament of what has today become genomics was built during the
glory days of structural biology and biophysical chemistry, by such scientists as Francis Crick,
Maurice Wilkins, Rosalind Franklin and Linus Pauling through the 1970s by structural chemists
such as Alexander Rich.
The other "non-scientific" but nonetheless expert discipline that has become fundamental
to the contemporary practice of genomics is bioethics, and I explore and critique some aspects of
institutionalized bioethics in Chapter 5. Bioethics was conceived as integral to the genomic
enterprise from the get-go, as evidenced by the allocation of 5% of the HGP budget towards the
study of its ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI). The official and pious discourse on
ELSI, mouthed by historians such as Davies, suggests that "[i]t was a sincere effort to ensure that
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society was prepared for the tidal wave of information on the horizon. The prospect of rapid
advances in the understanding of major genetic diseases also raised serious issues regarding
genetic discrimination, inadequate treatment options, and eugenics" (Davies 2001: 29). Davies
then goes on to quote James Watson, the co-discoverer of the double helical structure of DNA
and the first head of the HGP, being solemn about ELSI: "We need no more vivid reminders
[than Nazi Germany] that science in the wrong hands can do incalculable harm" (ibid). There are,
however, equally instances of Watson being less than solemn about ELSI.
What I have tried to argue in this section, through a series of disconnected stories and
polemics, is, firstly, the importance of automated technological hardware such as the ABI 3700,
in making "genomics", as both scientific knowledge and as a set of material-semiotic practices
that support the rhetoric of speed, possible, and secondly, the fact that genomic "information" has
valence as science, even if it is undergirded by what are no more than deeply rooted (both
literally and figuratively) assumptions about life itself, assumptions that are full of, to borrow
Marx's description of commodities, "metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties" (Marx
1976 [1867]: 163). explicitly transpose Marx's evocation of commodities in talking about
scientific "fact", as I will return to the way the fetishism of the two intertwines in Chapter 8.
Suffice to say at this point that origin stories, whether of genomics, or of humanity as a
consequence of events that we will discover through genomics, serve us poorly. More
immediately, I go on to explore more explicitly the place of speed and information as cogs in
capitalist market logic.
Major sites at which the dynamics of the race to sequence the human genome unfolded were two
annual conferences. The first, at Cold Spring Harbor, is a major academic conference, at which the
researchers of the public-funded Human Genome Project (HGP) gathered. The second, which was held
62 S.K. Brahmachad, interview with the author, 13 July 2001.
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from 1998-2000 in Miami, was organized by J. Craig Venter's not-for-profit research organisation The
Institute of Genomic Research (TIGR), and was primarily an industrial trade-show. 1999 was a particularly
interesting year to be at these two conferences, since it was the year after Venter had thrown down his
sequencing challenge to the HGP. The Cold Spring Harbor meeting in 1999 was the first since the HGP had
redrafted its sequencing plans the previous October and moved towards doing a working draft sequence at
5X frequency. It was a conference at which the animosity of the public researchers towards Venter and the
Celera sequencing project was very clearly on display.
The Cold Spring Harbor laboratories are amongst the most famous in the history of molecular
biology, and have been home to such great researchers of the 1950s and 1960s as James Watson, Max
Delbruck and Barbara McClintock. To get there, one takes the Long Island Railroad from New York's Grand
Central Station to the town of Syosset. It was raining when I got there in May 1999. Syosset in the rain isn't
quite Manhattan in the rain. Dismal Amerikana in the form of diners and parking lots and no public transport
presented itself to me upon arrival. The optimistic pronouncements of the Laboratory web page about
getting a taxi from the station to the laboratories are clearly misplaced. I had to wait well over 20 minutes for
one. I finally ended up sharing my car with Tom, a sequencer from the Stanford Sequencing and
Technology Center.
On the way to the labs, we picked up a woman who had to be dropped at the station. She should
have been picked up 20 minutes previously, so was in a deep and agitated frenzy at the prospect of missing
her train. So we doubled back to the station first, narrowly missing red lights and generally going too fast for
comfort. The cab driver was clearly having a wonderful time, managing both to terrify Tom and me, and, for
some reason, exasperate the woman further, even though she was getting to the station more quickly. But
in the midst of her agitation (and the driver's driving) she did find it in herself to get a conversation going with
us, which went like this:
Woman: Are you here doing research?
Sequencer: Yes, we've come for the conference.
Woman: What conference is that?
4.2: Genomic Capital
In this part of the thesis, I talk about the cultural transformations - institutional and
conceptual - that biocapitalism is creating in the materiality and exchangeability of what we call
"life". These transformations are created through shifting and variable use of market
commodification versus public commons or public goods formation, both of which are
disciplined by new forms of capitalist logic, conforming neither to those of industrial capitalism
nor those of so-called postmodem information capitalism. Hence "biocapitalism", which basically
asks the question of how "life" gets redefined through the contradictory processes of
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Sequencer Genome mapping and sequencing
Woman: Of what?
Sequencer: Oh, the genome.
Woman: Of what?
Sequencer: Human.
Woman: Yes, but of what? What are you mapping?
Sequencer (increasingly perplexed): The whole thing.
Woman: But that's already been done, hasn't it?
And here were these venerable people getting all worked up about Venter getting there firstP3
__ __ __
__
commodification, and thereby begs to be theorized not just in terms of the formation of
subjectivity (though this is undeniably as essential component of theorization that needs to be
undertaken, and that is the subject of Chapter 8), but also in terms of property regimes and
relationships.
Specifically, I want to start making the argument for the enterprise of genomics as being
a window on contemporary capitalism. It is a window that affords a particularly important view
into the latter's workings as the confluence today of the information and life sciences redefines
not just biology but society and its perspectival vantage points writ large. Paul Rabinow coined
the term biosociality to describe social relations organized and coordinated on the basis of shared
biological identifications (Rabinow 1992). If capitalism could be understood in the nineteenth
century through an understanding of the industrial revolution, which itself was powered by the
dynamics of circulation of money and commodities, then the twenty-first century could be said to
be an era of biotechnical capitalism, in which the sciences of life construct and articulate new
historical modes of capitalism.
While the argument that the life sciences are increasingly assuming a definitive
importance in illuminating capitalist dynamics in the 21 t century maybe a contentious one, there
is no doubt that biotechnical capitalism, or biocapitalism, can be used as an explanatory
framework for contemporary capitalism in its emergent and shifting topological manifestations
and conundrums of value generation and market logic that come out of the bio-informatic
(disciplinary and corporate) mergers of the genome sequencing revolution. The salient features of
biocapitalism as I explore them in this part of the chapter are: (I) a breathless rhetoric of speed,
implying seamlessflows of information, tempered by speedbumps in theform of ownerships
through patent protection; (2) mobile and unpredictable strategic terrains of conflict and co-
operation between different companies and types of companies as well as between companies and
164
63 From fieldnotes written at the Cold Spring Harbor Genome Sequencing and Biology Conference, May
public-funded scientists and institutions; (3) the establishment of new forms of contractual
alliance such as consortia that are claimed to destabilize the commodity status of information
while instantiating the gift regime as a logical, strategic and ethical mode of corporate
functioning,(4) the emergence offorms of symbolic capital through confluences of advertising
excess and ethical embodification; and (5) the emergence of new biosocialities and subjectivities
that are always-already embedded in the logic of the market - a logic which is itself very much at
stake in the ad-ventures of biocapitalism.
In trying to understand biocapitalism, therefore, I am interested in asking, firstly, where
value resides as biology becomes an information science (and some kinds of information become
"biological"), and secondly, what work and (whose) agencies are required to create these values.
Answering these questions involves understanding the circulation of information and the
changing forms of corporate activity. My attempt is to theorize the dynamics of information flow
and corporate action around the fact that information is something that can be and is now owned.
The rest of this section, therefore, will offer an analysis of the dynamics of information
ownership, and its effect. on both institutions and on information itself. Specifically, it focusses
on the relationship between information flows and the "speed bumps" created by private
ownership, in order to trace its implications for understanding the operation of biocapitalist
market logics.
It is, however, very important to emphasize that biocapitalism is not just an
understanding of an information system. Indeed, genomics itself, while marked most notably by
its material representation of life as information, is precisely information about life, that both
epistemically and materially ties into the creation of tangible knowledges and products. In other
words, "genomics" is both an information science and not just an information science. It is aimed
towards the production of particular kinds of things, such as pharmaceuticals and crops. It is
1999.
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important to keep in mind that what is at stake is an understanding of how the various elements,
practices and objects - informational and "thingly" - of genomics articulate. It is the particular
modes of articulation - of information and materiality, rhetoric and practice - that genomics
distinguishes itself from other information systems such as the internet economy or finance.
This section looks at corporate genomics today. All three of these words need to be
explained right at the beginning. By genomics, I mean an ensemble of events, technologies,
discourses and institutions that have sprung / are springing / are likely to spring up around the
sequencing of genomes. The "today" is important: there is a tendency to conflate genomics with
its best known institutional manifestation, the Human Genome Project (HGP). The HGP,
however, as I have already argued, is very much just a fragment, albeit a central one, of genomics
today. Firstly, a primarily State sponsored venture, the HGP occupies a particular political space
vis-A-vis genomics writ large, as an endeavour which has used and continues to use public money
to generate gene sequence information - and I will talk more about this particular political space
later in the chapter. Secondly, the sequencing of the human genome, a project that just a few
years ago seemed so dauntingly far away (if not temporally, then at least in sheer volume of
effort) as to be an end in itself, is today very much conceived of as just the end of the beginning,
at a moment when a working draft sequence of the human genome is already complete. Genomics
today therefore is largely what might have been called "post-genomics" even a year ago. And by
"corporate" I refer not just to the enormous number of what are called genomics corporations that
have sprung up in the last five years, but to the entire nature and agenda of genomics writ large.
There is a specific, busy and under-studied intersection that is marked by genomics.
Firstly, there is a general (public and academic) absence of understanding of biotech and its
specific forms of value. The approach of theorists of the information economy (such as, for
instance, David Harvey [1990] with his sector economy approach) misses the points where
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science and industry intersect Life as opposed to Work. 64 I am starting from within biotech to
understand its form of life, as described in Chapter 1. In other words, an approach followed by
theorists such as Harvey would treat biotech as a sector / industry producing things. My emphasis
on information is not to project genomics as an "information system" (in the way that "systems"
have been theoretically propounded in such literature), but to show the specific roles that
information comes to play. These include ways in which information:
· Affects / structures the entire dynamics of the drug development industry.
* Intersects with public culture. Particularly important in this regard are debates over ownership
and privacy that adopt tricky shapes which mask the capitalist dynamics of even those modes
of strategic action that present themselves as somehow altruistic or external to the market.
* Relates to the emerging notions of value specific to biotech as research / capital / life force,
notions that require close ethnographic attention in order to be adequately made sense of.
In other words, the locus of analysis for understanding emergent drug development
dynamics writ large is not information but the biological (which makes an analysis of biocapital
something that's not just derivative of other information economic / late capitalism analyses), and
what is considered constitutive of "genomic" information has itself been changing. In 1999-2000,
for instance, genomics was about the selling of databases. Since the completion of the working
draft sequence of the human genome in June 2000, however, a lot of information is in the public
domain, and a lot of the best commercial sequence databases have already been sold or licensed.
Therefore, in the "post"-genomic era that we are now in the midst of, there is a push even within
the industry towards focusing on diagnostics and drug development, and "genomic" companies
are being forced to reinvent themselves in various ways to contend with that. In other words,
genomics is not about information as much as it is about the relationship between information and
64 Meanwhile, literature in science and technology studies (STS) has not often enough engaged the question
of political economy (science as corporate), though this is clearly an emerging field of emphasis within the
167
that downstream, material "something else" that is a consequence of its availability and use. In
this relationship, information itself acquires materialities and types of value that are constantly
morphing.
The larger project of understanding biocapital then is less about understanding the flow
of information and more about understanding the circulation of various forms of biologicals,
information being a particular type of biological that creates and operates in particular
circumstances through particular modes of action. This isn't just about understanding a particular
type of information economy in which information happens to deal with "life", but is rather about
trying to understand the various inaugural moments in the process of life sciences constructing
and articulating different forms of meaning and value, in the realm of political economy and
otherwise.
Secondly, it is not possible to do justice to understanding biocapital without, firstly,
understanding the commodity status of the human biological, and secondly, inserting that
understanding not just into a political economic understanding but into understandings of how
new subjectivities get created - value in all the senses of the word have to be understood, as do
the modes of abstraction that are peculiar to the inaugural moments that biocapital marks.
(1) A breathless rhetoric of speed, implying seamlessflows of information, tempered by
speedbumps in the form of ownerships through patent protection...
One of the features of sequence information flow in genomics is the remarkable speed at
which DNA sequences are being generated, a consequence of considerable automation and
investment in technological hardware in the form of new DNA sequencing machines. The
pervasive rhetoric surrounding such rapid information generation is, not surprisingly, one of
discipline.
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speed - almost one of breathlessness, conveying a sense of being overwhelmed with a huge
amount of (presumably) valuable data that is virtually impossible to keep up with. As I will try to
show, this isn't merely rhetoric (though it's all rhetorical), because it is true that there is a huge
amount of data being generated, and while nobody quite knows the biological significance of
even a fraction of it, any piece of information in this haystack could turn out to be extremely
valuable, therapeutically and commercially.
Speed is also of direct material value, since a delay in the production and marketing of
what turns out to be a blockbuster drug could well cost a drug company in excess of a million
dollars per day. Speed manifests itself in two distinct ways: both as qualitatively massively
compressed research and production time,65 and as a number of emerging segments that
contribute to or feed off speediness. In other words, "speed" in genomics is not just important
because change is fast, but because "speed" is a material-rhetorical fulcrum used to lever first the
government, and then the public and other companies, into responding to "hype" and thus further
entangling themselves in biotech.
In order to stake a claim to the potential value of genomic information, there is a desire
(amongst private genomicists, for sure) to own it. Ownership, however, puts fetters on the
seamless flow of information, which is the desired condition in order to enable information to be
transformed into that valuable "something else", which is often a pharmaceutical or agricultural
product. I will unpack this dynamic in greater detail as the chapter proceeds, but this is the central
65 The idea of "qualititively compressed time" might seem anachronistic, but in fact reflects the actual
difference in modes of production -- to the extent that new ways of doing science emerge -- from an
increase in speed. This is reflected in the rapidly emerging high throughput industries, which require
battalions of advanced automated instrumentation that itself gives rise to new instrumentation industries. A
particularly striking example of the qualitative effects of time compression can be seen in the business
model and R & D activity of the new San Diego based company Syrrx. Syrrx is a high throughput
proteomics company, that seeks to automate all the steps of protein documentation and analysis from the
get-go. In the process, it claims it has robots that can actually crystallize proteins. Protein crystallisation has
always been one of the hardest things to do in biological research, and is often considered more of an art
than a precise science. That Syrrx believes it can automate such an intricate and unpredictable process is a
testament to how drastically high-throughputness (or its desire) can change the nature of scientific practice
as much as it is to the rhetorical powers of a company capable of dynamically selling itself to investors.
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theoretical problematic that I'm trying to contend with: the breathlessness manifested through a
speed surrounding information flow, tempered by the speedbumps installed as a necessary
consequence of an institutional regime that allows information to be owned. This leads to a
frictioned process. I use the notion of friction rather than that of noise (which has commonly been
used in information theory to denote obstructions to information that, if overcome, can lead to a
seamless flow of information),66 because such obstructions are not externalities waiting to be
subsumed in a seamless flow, but are, rather, internal to the dynamics of the flow itself. Friction
is both the product of things rubbing against each other and suggestive of conflict; it is not just
obstructive, but productive. Speed, speedbumps and friction, therefore, are all inherent to the
circulation of genomic information in contemporary capitalism.
(2) Mobile and unpredictable strategic terrains of conflict and co-operation between
different companies and types of companies as well as between companies and public-funded
scientists and institutions...
The broad terrain of the two types of genomics enterprise, one NIH-funded / academic,
the other industrial, can, for initial purposes, be set up as a dichotomy, though hopefully as the
chapter progresses the dichotomy will blur somewhat.
In order to start the mapping, I need to say a little bit more about Craig Venter.
"Craig Venter", says Timne magazine in an issue devoted to the Future of Medicine
(January 11, 1999) "is a man in a hurry, and now all the genome mappers are operating on Venter
time". This one sentence encapsulates the multiple embodiments of hastened temporality in the
contemporary world of Big Biology, where fast technologies are mirrored by fast CEOs. In May
1998, Craig Venter threw the genomics community into turmoil by announcing that his private
66 For the essay that "fathered" information theory, see Shannon (1948).
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sector labs would sequence the human genome far before the deadline of 2005 set by the public-
funded HGP.
Time continued to articulate the speeded up genomics enterprise in terms of Venter's own
characteristics, as it proceeded: "Driven, impatient, demanding, irritating, Craig Venter has a
knack for making the rest of the world run at Venter speed".67 This is not an unusual description
for the contemporary maverick of Big Biology: indeed, Time's character history of Venter - high
school discipline problem, life of surfing, sailing, beach bum, but lots of "raw intelligence" - is
uncannily similar to the popular character sketch of that other maverick-genius who has
revolutionized biology in the last decade, Kary Mullis.68 In the same article, Venter's wife and
fellow genomicist Claire Fraser is quoted as saying: "Vietnam changed him. It impressed on him
the idea that time is precious, that you have to make every single minute of every single day
count." Even two decades after the war?
Perhaps Big Biology isn't just a race though. Perhaps it is a war.69
Venter's history is controversial. He was at the NIH in the early years of the HGP, and
was involved in an NIH attempt to patent DNA fragments from brain tissue in 1992 (Cook-
Deegan 1994: 311-325). The NIH burnt its fingers in the process and Venter left the NIH. Not
surprising then that much of the ire of the HGP scientists towards Venter today is (at least on the
face of it) not just a fear of being upstaged, but the knowledge that Venter will patent the DNA
sequences that he generates. If the genomics enterprise is a race, then it isn't just a race for credit,
it is one for ownership as well.7 0
67 See also M. Fortun (1999b) for an analysis of speed in genomics.
68 Through his development of Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). See Rabinow (1997).
69 Indeed, as Sun Tzu has said, speed is the essence of war.
70 It must be remembered that it was not just Venter, but the NIH itself, which quite staunchly defended
Venter's 1992 patent applications, which were backed strongly by the then Director of the NIH, Bernadine
Healy. Therefore, this particular polarization into "public" and "private" is a particular contingent outcome
of a set of situated politics, perspectives and priorities, and is by no means a "natural" falling out of public
versus private roles.
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In 1999, the Human Genome Project was clearly haunted by the spectre of Venter. Much
as the HGP researchers insisted that the media overplayed the Venter story, he was referenced
everywhere, in often thinly veiled taunts ("combative entrepreneur" and "worm genome
detractor" being amongst the more colorful ones). So it is perhaps worthwhile to narrow in on the
dynamics of the HGP v. Venter race for a while, to see just how high the stakes indeed were for
the former, and how irrational their involvement post-Venter might seem to be.
I would like to mention here that much of the following perspective was obtained from
talking to students and post-docs, who feel less compelled to quote the Party Line that their more
illustrious seniors adhere to. A general consensus amongst younger public scientists at sites in
1999 seemed to be that the winner in the race, irrespective of who sequenced the genome first,
was always going to be Venter;7' that he was in a win-win situation simply because he always had
the NIH project's sequences to draw upon as soon as they were done (since they get immediately
released into the public domain), while he didn't need to divulge his sequence to the Project. So
effectively, the millions of dollars of taxpayers' money going into the Project has all gone into the
Venter project as well, without his having to lift a finger; and there's nothing anyone could have
done about it. Also, there really is a differential concern about quality between a project that is
essentially scientific, and one that is a means towards a commercial end.
The people who have undertaken all the risk are the NIH people. They've already spent
too much public money to pull out, and need to spend much more to win the race;72 and the more
they spend, the higher the stakes become.73
71 As it happens, both the HGP and Celera have generated a working draft of the sequence at roughly the
same time, though Celera insists it got there first.
72 The "race" of course gets constantly redefined; now that the working draft sequence of the human
genome has been completed, the "competition" between the NIH and the private sector shifts to other types
of information, such as annotated sequence information or information about genetic variability. This
competition, after all, isn't just about finishing first and getting the credit for it - who generates information
first has huge implications for whether that information goes automatically into the public domain or
becomes the property of particular companies. As I will try to show later in the chapter, however, this
opposition between the public and private sector is expectedly more complicated than it seems at first sight,
from the "race" to generate the working draft sequence.
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(3) The establishment of newforms of contractual alliance such as consortia that
destabilise the commodity status of information while instantiating the gift regime as a logical,
strategic and ethical mode of corporate functioning...
I now want to spend some time telling a story about the interactions between "public"
and "private" genome worlds that will hopefully complicate the opposition between the two that I
have just set up, while simultaneously unraveling the "private" genomics enterprise as something
infinitely more complicated and heterogenous.
Signals magazine, an online magazine that analyses biotechnology for executives, has the
following quote:
Coming soon: A global genomic map of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), the
tiny differences between two people's DNA that largely determine everything from
who's the natural athlete to who's the klutz to who's likely to get lung cancer from
smoking and who's not. In the not-so-distant future, scientists will also be able to tell
who's at risk for cardiovascular disease, whatever their lifestyle, as well as who will
respond, or not, to this drug or that. But the techniques now used for discovering or
mapping SNPs are costly, tedious and Ph.D.-intensive. The real mark of a SNP-detection
73 Of course, the "official" summaries of this extremely contentious history are predictably formal and
dyspeptic. For instance, Francis Collins, the head of the National Human Genome Research Institute, in a
review article co-authored with Victor McCusick, a leading public genome researcher at Johns Hopkins
University, written for the Journal of the American Medical Association summarizing the implications of
the genome project for medical science phrases this history in the following terms: "By 1996, the complete
sequencing of several bacterial species and yeast led to the conclusion that it was time to attempt
sequencing human DNA on a pilot scale. The introduction of capillary sequencing instruments and the
formation of a company in the private sector promising to sequence the human genome for profitable
purposes added further momentum to the effort. By 1999, confidence had gathered that acquiring the
majority of the sequence of the 3 billion base pairs of the human genome could be attempted. In June 2000,
both the private company and the international public sequencing consortium announced the completion of
'working drafts' of the human genome sequence" (Collins and McCusick 2001: 541).
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assay scale-up will be its downward mobility: For characterizing huge numbers of SNPs
among large populations, cheap, fast and easy is the way to go.74
Genomics is not just about the Human Genome Project, even though the Venter challenge
that turned genomics into a major media event was about sequencing the human genome more
rapidly. The HGP, however, will not yield any information about genetic variability between
individuals and populations, which has become an area of increased interest for scientists and the
biotechnology industry. The ultimate pharmaceutical aim of studying human genetic variation is
to generate individualized therapy - what is called pharmacogenomics. Determining human
genetic variation is a much more daunting task than sequencing the human genome, both because
the sample of humans required to be sequenced is much larger, and because a truly meaningful
correlation of genetic sequence and individual / population disease trait would involve identifying
the person from whom the sample came, which raises ethical concerns about genetic privacy and
informed consent. As the HGP has progressed, however, an increasing amount of interest has
been paid to informational and technological tools that may help study human genetic variation,
and conflicts and alliances have begun to arise around these tools.
The major informational artifacts in this emergent battlefield are called single-nucleotide
polymorphisms or SNPs (pronounced "snips"). SNPs are single base variations in the genetic
code that occur about once every 1000 bases along the 3 billion base human genome. Knowing
the locations of these closely spaced DNA landmarks both eases the sequencing of the human
genome and aids in the discovery of genes variably linked to different traits. A map of all the
SNPs in the human species would provide the basic database to perform association studies,
which compare the prevalence of particular genetic markers in individuals that possess a certain
74 From Signals magazine, an online magazine that analyses biotechnology for executives.
www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/O/DEC74B56C34589DC882567D 1006C676E. The genetic
determinism in this quote is particularly striking: while not directly relevant to this chapter, it is interesting
to see how it is precisely such deterministic language that is shed in, for instance, the promotion of cloning.
It is also striking to note how SNPs simultaneously seem to represent information about individuals,
populations and the "globe".
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trait (which may be a disease trait, a predisposition to a disease, side effects to certain drugs,
whatever) to those who don't. Association studies are a potential goldmine through the insights
they might provide in unearthing obscure disease-related genes or in helping preventive
diagnosis. SNPs, therefore, have a potential value as tools leading to therapy, in a more
pinpointed and versatile way than a random DNA sequence. Pharmaceutical companies, not
surprisingly, are extremely interested in SNPs.
A brief taxonomy of some involved "types" of companies in the drug development
marketplace may be useful to reiterate from the previous chapter at this stage. A crude distinction
may be made between a "genomics" company, whose business is to sell genetic information, and
a pharmaceutical company, whose business is to sell drugs. This is, of course, a simplistic
distinction. Nevertheless, a broad distinction can be made between the relatively small, new,
information-selling genomics companies and the relatively larger, older, information-buying and
drug-selling companies. Certainly, a common mode of operation for genomics companies is to
license their information to big pharma, which is often more convenient for the pharmaceutical
company than setting up an extensive genomics facility (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
In the autumn of 1998, the NIH allocated $30 million to the National Human Genome
Research Institute (NHGRI) to enter the race to identify SNPs. This itself was a more than
slightly breathless undertaking (or as Francis Collins, head of the NHGRI put it, an undertaking
of "some urgency"). The basic strategy that was decided upon in December 1997 involved the
collection of at least 100,000 SNPs from DNA donated by 100 to 500 people in four major
population categories: African, Asian, European and Native American (Marshall 1997b). Collins
first started promoting this project in September 1997, in response to the danger that SNP
information would get patented and "locked up" by genomics companies (Marshall 1997a). In
November 1997, Collins co-authored a Policy Forum piece in Science with Mark Guyer and
Aravinda Chakravarti that argued that SNP data will get locked away in "private collections" if it
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doesn't get public support (Collins et al 1997). Chakravarti has also argued for co-ordinated data
gathering with public support not just for reasons of unfettered access, but for reasons of ordered
access, saying that "we will lose information if we don't combine it all in one place" (Marshall
1997b). In other words, researchers like Collins and Chalravarti have been well aware since
before the Venter challenge that owning DNA sequence information slows down information
flow. What is interesting in the SNP story is the strategy that the public researchers have devised
to get around this, and the speed with which the strategy was employed. This is a speed that
potentially sacrifices some of the scientific quality of the data, an accusation that has ironically
been leveled by the public-funded scientists themselves against Craig Venter's sequencing modus
operandi.
In April 1999, the NIH strategy grew into a $45-million consortium fimnded by the British
non-profit Wellcome Trust and ten of the major multinational pharmaceutical companies. The
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objective of the consortium was to generate a full-length SNP map within two years of starting
and to place the results into a free public database. The members of the consortium read like a
Who's Who of big pharma combined with the major players of the HGP.75 The objective is that
the public databases will be filled with enough SNP data to get around anybody's patent.
According to SNP consortium chairman Arthur Holden, "Everybody will be able to do this sort of
work without being held hostage to commercial databases".76
While The SNP consortium database is not a commercial database (in that it isn't being
established as a commodity in itself), its setting up is without a doubt a commercial enterprise. In
the rhetoric of contemporary capitalism, this is framed not as altruism, but as "win-win". Indeed,
the setting up of the consortium, which was largely encouraged by the pharmaceutical giant
Merck, itself has its genesis in corporate battles, as Merck hoped thereby to challenge the hold
that its rival SmithKline-Beecham had over expressed sequence tag (EST) information as a
consequence of an exclusive agreement with Human Genome Sciences (See Davies 2001: 100).
The move for a SNP consortium, in terms of connections and networks, has to be seen as a
hegemonic move. Firstly, it recognizes and aims to remove the inherent contradictions tied in to
the commodified / regulated circulation of information that I have argued for above. Secondly, it
ensures that, by immediate release of information into the public domain, the major
pharmaceutical companies do not have to go through tedious or expensive licensing procedures
with smaller genomics companies. And finally, it gives an aura of legitimacy to the big
pharmaceutical firms. both in the eyes of public-funded scientists (especially when compared to
institutionalised Enemies like Venter) and in the eyes of the "public" at large, since it can be
profitably projected that consortium members have foregone patent rights on SNP information in
75 The academic centres involved are the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, Washington
University School of Medicine, the Wellcome Trust's Sanger Center, the Stanford HumanGenome Centre
and Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. The list of pharmaceutical members of the consortium is even more
impressive, and comprises AstraZeneca, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffman-la Roche, Glaxo
Wellcome, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Novartis, Pfizer, G. D. Searle and SmithKline Beecham.
76 Quoted in www.signalsmag.com/signalssmag.nsf0/DEC74B56C34589DC882567D1006C676E
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order to facilitate cheap, fast and easy public access to it. A wonderful example of, to use Edward
Grefe and Martin Linsky's term, new corporate activism (Grefe and Linsky 1995).7 7
The SNP consortium is not the only corporate collaboration out to hunt SNPs, and it is by
no means the first. In 1997, Abbott Laboratories seeded the French genomics company Genset to
the tune of $42.5 million in order to construct a SNP map.7 8 This is considered to be the first
"strategic alliance" (as Genset calls it)79 in pharmacogenomics. Like many other genomics -
pharma alliances, and unlike The SNP consortium, this is an exclusive alliance, and the division
of labour in this alliance is quite typical: while Genset's job is to develop a proprietary map of the
human genome with relevant markers and genes associated with responses to particular
pharmaceutical compounds, Abbott's job is to "develop, produce and market diagnostic systems
derived from these genes and markers to clinically test patient response to specific drugs".8 0 The
SNP consortium therefore replaces the direct contractual agreement of the Genset - Abbott type
with something that is more "communal" in nature, and at first sight counter-intuitive to "market
logic". What is evident however is that The SNP consortium is less an attempt to negate market
logic as much as it is to redefine the terrain in such a way that "market logic" is dictated by the
strategic interests of the consortium members (whose aims are by no means identical or even co-
terminous).
A major figure in The SNP consortium (officially referred to as TSC) is Alan
Williamson, former vice-president of research strategy at Merck. It was he who called the April
n In The New Corporate Activism, Grefe and Linsky provide a blueprint and strategies for political action
on the part of corporations actively influencing the outcome of issues affecting their organisations. While at
one level this is just a public relations manual, Grefe and Linsky's call for combining democratic values,
human psychology, grassroots organizing and modem technology into a winning corporate strategy draws
explicitly on Saul Alinsky's (1989 [1971]) templates for grassroots activism in the late 60s and early 70s,
and translates easily into a call for hegemonic corporate praxis. Even the key metaphors utilized - "setting a
strategic approach", "framing the message", "mobilizing the troops", "dealing with crisis", and "targeting
communications for maximum impact" - are clearly metaphors of the battlefield and come straight from
Alinsky.
78 http://www.sinalsma .com sinalsmal.nsf//799C47CDCD7A924788256609004E0503.
79 http://www.genxv.com/About/abt historv.html.
80 htt://www.genx.com /New/ReleaeS/abbothtl.
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99 meeting. According to him, "Some companies have a very positive attitude towards the idea of
supporting a public database".8 What statements like this imply, in the rhetoric of New Corporate
Activism, is that some companies are inherently open to sharing of information, while others are
nasty little spoilers who want to own it all themselves; what it hides is an element of corporate
subjectivity that shows all the nuances of social subjectivity, except that the playing field is
unquestionably of billions.82 And this is where the genomics / pharma distinction comes to the
fore again - even major genomics companies that might fancy themselves as pharmaceutical
companies, at least in the future, do not have the history of pharmaceutical R & D and regulatory
infrastructure that the big multinational pharmaceuticals have, and drugs are neither their primary
nor an assured product. For TSC members, however, any possible profit they might make on a
SNP patent is small compared to the profit they can make on a drug, and it is in their interests to
remove the necessity of sharing that profit with a genomics licensee. As Williamson says, "I
don't think a SNP patent per se is going to be worth much. It's the clinical significance that really
counts. Each SNP has to be evaluated epidemiologically or pharmacologically".83
Therefore, while The SNP consortium is purportedly against the ownership of DNA
sequence information, it is very much in support of owning biologicals per se - while speedy and
free access of information to a large number of researchers will undoubtedly be an outcome of the
TSC database, at another level it increases the monopoly of the big pharmaceutical partners in the
consortium on any therapy that might accrue, at a lower cost to the companies involved. In other
words, it isn't ownership itself, but the modes of ownership, that constitutes the terrain for
hegemonic struggle in genomics.
81 http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsma.nsf/0/799C47CDCD7A924788256609004E0503.
82 As Pierre Bourdieu insightfully remarks: "[W]e need to be able to recognize as such the strategies which,
in universes in which people have an interest in being disinterested, tend to disguise strategies" (Bourdieu
(1999 [1975]): 35).
83 http://www.sifnalsma.com/.signalsmag.nsfO/799C47CDCD7A924788256609004EO503.
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These disputes highlight issues of corporate subjectivity. While unobstructed access and
speedy progress of research remain the stated goals of all parties concerned, clearly for each party
research progresses "speedily" only when they have unobstructed access, combined with the
right, whenever they feel appropriate, to slow down and charge everybody else - the inherent
logic of ownership, after all, is that the owner can decide what to do with the object owned.
Big pharmaceuticals have indeed been complaining for years about what are called
"stacking royalties", which are the fees that they have to pay out to various other upstream
providers that stake a claim on the downstream drug product - indeed, something like a SNP
consortium is precisely a way out of having to deal with upstream information sellers who own
information. Pharmaceutical companies have for a long time used "anti-stacking language". 8 4 An
article in Signals magazine titled "Is the alliance deck becoming "anti-stacked" against
innovators?" describes the Big Pharma argument for anti-stacking language as follows: "If Big
Pharma licenses a lead compound from Biotech and that compound is later blocked by another
party's patent, it is Biotech who should bear the responsibility for that occurrence and shoulder
the burden of crediting Big Pharma for the amount due the third party."8 5 In the 1980s, biotech
companies themselves incorporated anti-stacking provisions in their dealings with universities.
Since the late 1980s, however, biotech companies have increasingly gone upstream, providing a
range of utilities and services to now downstream pharmaceutical companies, and thereby have
increasingly found themselves subject to similar anti-stacking agreements drawn up by
pharmaceuticals. The justification for anti-stacking is further increased as the number and range
of upstream providers increases.
84 This term and much of this analysis draws upon an excellent article in the online magazine for
biotechnology analysis, Signals, and is available at
http://www.signalsma.com/signalsmag.nsf/657bO6742b5748e888256570005cba 1/ffd2cf3f7f7ea56f8825
661200697ce3?OpcnDocument&lighlight=2,anti-stacking.
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(4) The emergence offorms of symbolic capital through confluences of advertising excess
and ethical embodification...
Two questions are central to the analysis of value in genomics: first, the question of
where value resides, in the various "informations" and for the various actors, and second, what
agencies are required to create and maintain the values and their directionalities.
Let us start by looking again at the actors involved in the contestation. There is, broadly
speaking, the "NIH", an umbrella term for an institution of the state that has sequencing under it
various generally academic research institutes; there are upstream companies, which may be
genome companies that sell information (either by simply sequencing, or after annotating the
information), or tool companies like Affymetrix; and there are downstream companies, of which
pharmaceuticals (and invariably big multi-national pharmaceuticals) are the most downstream.
Tied into the differentiation of upstream and downstream companies is the upstream -
downstream relationship of information itself to its "ultimate" product, the pharmaceutical (which
of course need never actually be realized, but, as I will argue further in chapter 6, its existence as
a future goal is vital to the operation of the entire dynamics of the present).
Now the NIH doesn't want information to be owned because it has a commitment, as an
institution of the state generating information with public money, to release the information into
the public domain.8 6 In other words, for the state as represented by the NIH, information has the
status not of commodity but of public good.87 The downstream companies do not want
information to be owned because their locus of surplus value generation is in selling the drug, and
the less they have to dish out to upstream companies on the way the better for them. However, by
85 Ibid. "Biotech" here refers to an upstream service provider for Big Pharma. I shall use "Biotech" in the
same context for the rest of this argument.
86 "Public", of course, is as vexed a term as information or commodity, but this chapter isn't the place to go
into that.
87 Of course, while the state, as represented by the NIH, and in the case of DNA sequence patents, defends
genomic information as part of a commons for the public good, it is also the state that constructs the
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framing this rather narrow self-interest in terms of a "relinquishing" of patent rights on DNA
sequences in order to enter into a "partnership" with the HGP to allow "free and rapid" flow of
information, the New Corporate Activism of the pharmaceutical companies shifts the nature of
information from the realm of commodity into the realm of gift.
The idea that information is a gift on the part of big pharmaceutical companies is well in
keeping with the tenets of New Corporate Activism. As Marcel Mauss (1990 [1954]) has shown,
the gift has attached to it cultural obligations both to receive and to reciprocate." The field of
gifting / reception / reciprocation is much less clearly delineated in genomics than in the "archaic
societies" of Mauss, and encompasses that extremely diffuse and undefined and constantly
recruited arena of the "public domain". As Jacques Godbout and Alain Caille have argued, the
gift economy is central to the dynamics of the market and the state, with the market absolutely
dependent on the existence of gift exchange (Godbout and Caille 1998).89
There is, therefore, a tension between a linear race towards comrnmodification and the
changing status of information from commodity to gift. In other words, the linear race towards
commodification has instabilities inherent to it, instabilities that push actors to take recourse to
mechanisms outside the sphere of commodification, mechanisms that it turn facilitate the "linear"
(now purposefully in quotes) race towards commodification. This is an instability that is a
consequence of the particular structures of biocapitalist knowledge production, especially its
upstream-downstream terrain, that are particularly well demarcated in the US context. Here,
boundaries between public and private goods in ways that, especially in the US, favour the appropriation of
the commons by private companies through intellectual property protection.
88 Equally important and often overlooked however is the obligation that Mauss emphasizes to gift in the
first place. A realization of such obligations whet exported to the corporate cause may not cause New
Corporate Activism to seem less cynical, but certainly points to a much more constrained agency for these
corporations. A difference between obligation and constraint is also important to tease out concomitant to
their causal equation -- by "constraint" I mean the limitation of strategic fields with the ultimate aim of
maximizing profit, and therefore use it specifically in order to define capitalist relations. By obligation I
refer to a more intangible system of socio-moral pressures that operate as strongly in the societies Mauss
describes as they co-exist with the market in capitalism. A standard utilitarian move is to collapse all
obligation into constraint.
183
academic research is at least discursively (and sometimes in actual fact) designated as
contributing to the "public domain".90 But also, public research is naturalized as being the enabler
of private research, but a silent one. In other words, the mantra that innovation comes from the
private sector hides one of the fundamental conditions of possibility that makes private
innovation possible, which is the naturalized assumption that public institutions exist to enable
private research. 9'
Now let us look at where else and in what other forms the value of information might
reside. Clearly, information has some use value, in being the "raw material", if you like, that
provides the knowledge and therefore the conditions of possibility to create a drug. But the reason
why any information needs so much work in order to be turned into a commodity is not just
because there are conflicting interests among the various institutional actors involved, but
because by its nature, the exchange value of information is entirely dependent on the context and
framing of particular transactions.
As soon as information is released into the public domain, it falls out of the system of
commodity circulation and its "ownership" is of no further value. In order to stay within the
sphere of commodity circulation, information needs to be circulated through specific transactions
of exchange between the seller and buyer. Even in these transactions, any exchange value for an
information seller like Venter's Celera is only obtainable, for each transaction, at the moment of
first sale - once the information gets bought, it reverts to being a pure use value for that particular
buyer-seller pair, and cannot be recommodified.9 2 Information can only retain exchange value if
the ownership rights on information are tied to downstream ownership rights on any product that
89 Indeed, as Georges Bataille ( 1998 [1967]) would argue, the importance of gifling in capitalism is not just
strategic but in fact a fundamental capitalist "impulse".
90 Academic research labs often aggressively pursue intellectual property protection. It is just that, in the
context of DNA sequence debates, they have generally avoided doing so, thereby framing themselves as
committed to the "public domain".
91 See Comroe and Dripps (1976), Maxwell and Eckhardt (1990) and Stallings et al (2001).
92 Though it can be encumbered, though contractual and legal devices such as non-disclosure agreements.
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might accrue. Which is why for an upstream company, it is vital to patent information and tie that
patent into downstream royalties.
Information, however, has a third form of value, a "moral" value that operates in the
realm of symbolic capital. This comes from two sources - one, as a primary good that the state
distributes or as a could-have-been commodity that the (downstream) company relinquishes as
gift, information acquires a decommodified status through a mechanism of rhetorical abdication
that suggests that its natural state is as commodity, and the decommodification is an act of virtue
- whether by the state or by the (downstream) company, which gets portrayed as a willing partner
to the state in maintaining the unfettered flow of information, and therefore of science. There is,
however, another more direct manner in which genomic information is virtuous, and that is its
extensive linkage, rhetorical and real, to therapy - a linkage indeed that is made real by the
rhetoric. There was this wonderful moment, for instance, at the very end of a 1999 industrial
genome conference, when Randy Scott, Chairman and Chief Scientific Officer of Incyte, raised a
toast, to "the genomic community. Because they aren't in genomics for themselves, they are in it
for Life". Mirroring, indeed, Incyte's own logo, which is Genomics for LifeTM .
It is very evident that the production of value in genomics is to a large extent a discursive
act, whether it be through advertising, the selling of futures or the rhetorical creation of a
genomic community committed to Health, or of many competing companies relinquishing
property rights for the common good. Indeed, the creation of this single genomic community has
as internal to its logic the existence of multiple competing actors all of whom try to propagate
their particular informational value at the expense of their competitors'.
What is evident is that information has to perform active work, work that may be
variously material, discursive and performative, in the process of which the genomic community
is created as a homogenous entity, but one that is simultaneously an ethical entity, an entity
represented (and encompassed) by the Incyte logo, Genomics for Life". It isn't just the subject
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within the genomics profession who gets in-formed at this moment; equally in-formed is the
subject (as in discipline / endeavour / venture) ofgenomics and the corporate subject such as
Incyte, as ethical subjects that are in the business of saving lives.
(5) The emergence of new biosocialities and subjectivities that are always-already
embedded in the logic of the market - a logic which is itselfvery much at stake in the ad-ventures
c biocapitalism...
In this section, I want to analyze the continuing unfolding of the dialectics (powered by
social contradictions) of history, against the ideologies of the "end of history" or the viewing of a
"post-capitalist" era as a resolution of capitalist contradictions into a structurally stable
eternalism. Social formations are composed of several modes of production, with the dominant
one providing constraints on the others. The challenge is to figure out the contours of which
contradictions really create a new generative dynamic that will emerge as the governing or
hegemonic mode of production, and then, as I explore in the following section on labor, to see
how that social formation produces new actors and new subjectivities. I take inspiration in this
latter endeavor from authors such as Ulrich Beck (1986), who shows how toxicities affect tourist
sectors and heavy industry differently and can cause a realignment of regional politics than that of
the 19* century political economy, and Adriana Petryna (2002), who shows how access to new
healthcare welfare systems acts as a new status and citizenship order.
To show how genomics provides a window into contemporary capitalism analytically
involves going beyond reading texts, doing data analysis and reacting to pre-existing
theorizations of the information economy with fresh data. It involves, simultaneously, figuring
out where the access points are and analyzing ethnographic data in a scene that is changing
rapidly even over the course of particular research projects. It is easy to become confilsed about
whether genomics is simply a puzzling, fast changing and really important set of objects and
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practices in the world, or a system whose understanding will contribute to general debates about
capitalism, which, in at least some sites and some ways, does not anymore depend on land, labor
and capital in the classic sense. To the extent that I attempt the latter, I do so through the route of
the former. 93 Before moving further, I will review the arguments that I have made, namely:
(a) Genomics can provide a window into contemporary capitalism, which itself is different from
earlier industrial capitalism.
(b) The contradictions of producing genomic knowledge are creating new legal and economic
structures, which are transforming not only the way knowledge is produced and money is
made, but also way the medicine will approach therapeutics and society will interpellate
individuals as bundles of genetic variations that can be targeted, tested, monitored and
changed in new ways. These contradictions, that arise around the contested commodity status
of information, include business models that must be followed; the ordering procedures (and
strategies) for demarcating what is in the public domain from what is available for proprietary
ownership, and the re-ordering procedures of re-accessing previously proprietary information.
"Good genomics" is judged not by truth and falsity as much as by efficiency or its lack,
an efficiency that is manifested through speed.9 4 What makes speed - efficiency not just
legitimate but desirable is the element of virtue that is associated with a seamless downstream
flow of information towards a drug product, and the actual material value at stake.
What is important here is to see how in genomics the "classical" scientific binaries of
truth and falsity are articulated with those of efficiency and inefficiency, justice and injustice -
93 Indeed, a Marxian analysis of biotech cannot simply be an attempt to slot biotech into a political
economy framework. Marx's own analysis of political economy was itself not the application of a pre-
existing framework as much as it was an exercise in coming to terms with and critiquing an entire
epistemic framework that attempted to explain how money and capital mediated and in-formed the way
people lived the lives they did. Understanding biocapital, therefore, involves understanding the epistemic
framework that is created, a framework that obviously has an economy embedded in it.
94 Indeed that this "efficiency" is often at odds with the quality of the data produced, and is likely to swamp
scientists with a deluge of "useless" information, is evidenced both by the criticism of many public-funded
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articulations of non-economic forms of socio-moral values that the sociology of science in its
earlier Mertonian guise regarded as separate. 9 5
In order to understand what is unique about genomics, it is not sufficient to analyze it
merely as a set of knowledge producing practices. These practices need to be positioned in a
particular framework of contemporary capitalism.
Genomics can be simply defined as an informational science, but of a particular sort,
where information is one of many biologicals, and indeed a precursor to other biological objects
of commodified circulation such as drugs. Many of its attributes, therefore, can be studied by
studying the social lives of the various forms of information (raw DNA sequence data / function
of a gene / SNP / protein information / information as database, and so on). I started this section
by analyzing the friction inherent to the flow of information in a regime in which private
ownership in general is considered the natural state of society, while its own ownership is
extremely contentious.
A fundamental question both of politics and of method, that has haunted at least dialectic
analyses of political economy since Marx, is: what implications does the unearthing of
contradiction have for understanding social practice, in the case of genomics the creation and
inhabiting of certain strategic terrains that inscribe a particular political topography onto a system
that economically can still be described away as "capitalist"? The question for this thesis then
becomes: how do the contradictions that are inherent to genomic circulations of information
create new forms of knowledge politics, and what do these contradictions imply for the stability
of the (capitalist) system that institutionalizes and sustains such contradictory flows? The
researchers of Venter's modus operandi as well as by the skepticism of some towards the public-fimded
SNP project's urgency.
95 Indeed, it could be argued that in the rhetoric of New Corporate Activism, truth and falsity themselves
have no meaning -- even if science is about truth and falsity, corporate PR is rather about credibility and
incredibility. A triangulation could therefore be made for the contemporary biotechnology corporation, in
which speed still mediates the linkage of efficiency and inefficiency to virtue or its lack, but it is credibility
rather than truth that is the "ultimate" aim to start with.
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uniqueness cannot manifest itself merely in the analysis of information as an object (of
knowledge / currency), but in the articulation of the social life of information with the social lives
who in-form and get in-formed by it. In this chapter, I have looked at the social lives of the
scientific - corporate actors of genomics. Understanding genomics as both a system of knowledge
and as a window to contemporary capitalism involves looking at how contradictions inherent to
information are articulated to specific modes of strategic response - modes of response that, I
shall argue, redefine some of the parameters of "capitalism" itself.
This ection, then, is about flows, of information and of capital, the former flowing
"downstream" from raw DNA sequence information through annotated and more "meaningful"
forms of information into the in-formed drug. The flows are constrained and enabled by legal
regimes and technological advances, but, intuitively at least, by that most nebulous and over-
arching of entities, "market logic". Market logic plays a similarly obstructive role to the analysis
of capitalism that scientific method plays in the analysis of science - these are terms that are at
once the ultimate signifiers of the boundaries of actions which the market and science
respectively can allow in order to be the market and science, and yet precisely because of that
they assume an almost transcendental position, impervious to analysis themselves. I have not
analyzed market logic as a single entity, but have tried, through an analysis of information and
scientific - corporate actors, to tease out elements of market logic as it gets played out. In the
process, have tried to argue, firstly, that information can mean many different things in
genomics, but is never at any point without meaning, even if it is raw "meaningless" information.
.Secondly, information is not a finite mathematically representable entity, but is, on the contrary,
overwhelming. This overwhelming nature of information is not just a consequence of its quantity,
but results from the speed with which it is generated. The speed with which it is generated is
indeed consequent to technological development, but is equally an intuitive outcome of "market
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logic", whereby the speedy progress of science is commercially beneficial. That it is
therapeutically beneficial lends speed further legitimacy.
This much is apparent and intuitive. What is hidden from the process is that the very
same "market logic" (which in this case is the possibility of private ownership of information for
its producer) has inherent speedbumps to the circulation of information; and this dialectic is not
unique to information, but to any intellectual property in biotechnology. Various institutional
strategies get devised either to perpetuate or to get around this impediment.
The crucial point is that both the perpetuation of ownership and its obstruction can be
argued as being "sound market logic": in the former case, ownership is the reward that functions
as incentive to innovation, whereas in the latter the regulation of ownership (or its strategic
elimination, as in the case of The SNP consortium) allows maximally efficient and rapid
circulation (which itself can be an incentive). Clearly, therefore, the contestation here is not
between market logic and "something else", but is over the very definition of what constitutes
market logic, the outcome of which has considerable implications for the overall terrain of co-
operation, conflict and value generation. Neither one nor the other alone can represent an
uncontradictory market logic.
Furthermore, sound market logic goes much beyond a quantitative generation of maximal
surplus value - it needs to generate other forms of symbolic capital, that in the case of
biotechnology already exists in the rhetorical and real construction of the biotechnology industry
as an industry that is in the business of Food, Health and Hope (to borrow this time from
Monsanto's logo). Meanvwhile, there is the NIH, an organ of the state, that has its own interests
and constraints as a consequence of being an institution that is funded by the public, and that
thereby needs to have a commitment to the public domain - a commitment that again gets
justified through "market logic" at a contemporary historical moment when market logic is
perceived to greatly exceed the bounds of the market. Such a formulation of market logic as
190
exceeding its boundaries however implies that it simply takes over the new terrain it encroaches
upon (such as that of the state or the university) while itself remaining immutable. "Market
logic", however, often (indeed necessarily) draws upon strategies that are external to the process
of commodity exchange, the gift regime being a major one. The SNP consortium, a wonderful
example of such a gift regime, therefore manages simultaneously to espouse "sound market
logic" (by allowing "cheap, fast and easy" circulation of information, leading ostensibly to
cheaper, faster and easier drug production) while gaining symbolic capital as a consequence of
the abdication of property rights on information, that can be projected as a self-sacrificial
abdication of market logic in the public cause. In the process, by the simultaneous holding up of
"market logic" while it is being negated, market logic as a terrain of hegemonic contestation gets
redefined. While the strategies of the various actors redefine the terrain of contestation, they
simultaneously redefine their own value as actors, as well as the value of the information they
produce.
This analysis tries to provide an insight into capitalism's adaptive mechanisms,
adaptations however that question the fundamental mechanisms of capitalism themselves while at
the same time upholding them. As Slavoj Zizek says: "The 'normal' state of capitalism is the
permanent revolutionizing of its own conditions of existence: from the very beginning capitalism
'putrifies', it is branded by a crippling contradiction, discord, by an immanent want of balance:
this is exactly why it changes, develops incessantly - incessant development is the only way for it
to resolve again and again, come to terms with, its own fundamental, constitutive imbalance,
'contradiction"' (Zizek 1994: 330). This incessant development is brought about not because of
the superiority of the indices - efficient production, competition, market logic, surplus value
generation and so on - but because of its willingness to constantly abandon / redefine / mutate
many of its own fundamental conditions of existence in ways that are contested, unpredictable,
but most importantly still the fundamental conditions of its existence.
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It would be hasty to conflate the specific logics of the enterprise of genomics with the
logic of capitalism - indeed, one of my attempts is to destabilize the notion that capitalism has
such a singular logic, and further, to show that it is the absence of such singular logic that is a
major source of its sustenance. Nonetheless, its peculiarities can show up the explanatory
categories through which contemporary capitalism is understood as complicated and mutable. In
particular, I have shown how the boundaries of commodification and commons / gift shift
according to the logics of upstream - downstream profit calculations. In other words, the
important point to remember is that the..-; contradictions manifest themselves in institutionally
specific ways, and at specific strategic conjunctures. Therefore, the "gifting" seen by The SNP
Consortium has everything to do with the upstream - downstream terrain of drug development.
Similarly, start-ups and "grown-up" corporations, as I show in the next section while talking
about the San Francisco based e-learning start-up GeneEd, often need to exhibit different strategic
rationalities that are often at odds with one another, but are both always "capitalist". To reduce
one institutional, conjunctural exhibition of capitalism to the fundamental dynamics / impulse /
rationality of the capitalist system is a mistake.
Equally mistaken is the idea that one can diagnose an epochal shift in capitalism as a
somehow definitive historical moment, when capitalism is always marked by contradictory
currents and logics, though perhaps marked by different contradictions, in different ways and to
different degrees, at different historical moments. Which leads to a fimdamental tension in an
analysis such as this, which I return to in my reflections at the end of this thesis, while talking
about notions of revolution and conjuncture: how is it possible to acknowledge something like
genomics, that undeniably is co-produced along with shifts in scientific understandings,
technological possibilities, normative understandings and institutional and political terrains, as a
"revolution" of quite dramatic consequence, while still remaining attentive to the historicity of
these shifts, to the ways in which shifts of such dramatic consequence do not indicate by any
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means that historical processes of transformation that have brought those shifts about have
somehow come to an end?
This danger, of somehow "sacrificing" history at the altar of making a point about
fundamental epochal change, however, is central to a certain Hegelian methodology that in fact
Marx did not remain faithful o, but which has been faithfully employed by prominent neo-liberal
thinkers such as George Gilder and Francis Fukuyama. Jean-Joseph Goux (1990), for instance,
reading Gilder, points to the "forever incalculable" nature of the future in Gilder's writing (see for
instance Gilder 1981, which is what Goux critiques). In the process, both Gilder and, one
suspects, Goux reading Gilder, fall prey, in Hegelian fashion, to a recognition of the "end" of
Enlightenment and modernity, marked definitively by the transition a welfare state capitalism to
an entrepreneurial, risk-taking capitalism. This is a binary, of "modern" to "postmodern", as
equated to "socialist / welfare" versus "entrepreneurial" capitalism, that assumes, again in
Hegelian fashion, that a "postmodem capitalism" is in fact an end of the dialectics that created
"modem" capitalism. This is the flaw, ultimately, that resides in a "reading" of the future by
taking recourse to a belief in the historical existence of the dialectic that has now resolved itself
into a determinate form, and therefore needs merely to be described (this, as Kojeve [1969
{ 1934)] points out, is Hegel's method, which in itself is not dialectic, but descriptive, as if he is
seeing the ultimate resolution of historical contradiction). Of course, this ahistorical attribution of
resolution involves resolving the dialectic into a binary - a dialectic whole constantly has its
contradictory components in tension with one another, but a binary can be posited in terms of a
"present" form of capitalism in opposition to the "past", "contradictory" form. This is the method
that Francis Fukuyama (1992) also adopts, and of course it is not insignificant that authors like
Gilder and Fukuyama are favorite ideologues of a Reaganite neo-liberalism. Therefore, the move
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to describe the logic of capitalism is also a move to deny its continuing historicity and
contradiction. 96
But more than that, I am putting forward an idea of capitalism, as a risky enterprise of
Deep Play that, as I will elaborate in a later chapter, is deeply embraced by a performative
rhetoric of ethics in the present and therapeutics in the future. 1'he notion of biocapitalism,
further, draws explicitly upon theorizations of biopolitics - Foucauldian notions of biopower built
upon by Rabinow's ideas of biosociality - and argues that such biopolitics must be encountered
with the understanding that it is always already positioned in the multiple frameworks and logics
of capitalism. It is precisely these multiplicities that need to be further explored and theorized,
and which I analyze in the later chapters of this thesis.
96 This argument is also of central importance to me in Chapter 7, when I talk about envisioning "India
Inc ", the attempt by certain Indian entrepreneurs, policy makers and politicians, based in both India and
the US, to change India into an "entrepreneurial culture". Such a framing, as I have argued above, is a
similarly ahistoric resolution of current contradiction, rather than a recognition that any process of
economic, institutional and social change is always a process of continued, contingent, irresolute, historical
and historicising contradiction.
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The Cold Spring Harbor meetings in 1999 afforded a window into the animosity of public
researchers towards the patenting of gene sequences. This was enabled by a site of speech whose genesis
is at least partly cynical and legitimatory. At the beginning of the Human Genome Project, a small proportion
of funds was set aside to discuss Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI). The idea was that ELSI
would provide a forum of visible rumination on many of the issues that the public might become concerned
with in regard to genomics, but equally therefore enable genome researchers to get along with the 'real'
science, unfettered. ELSI proceeded to occupy an increasingly marginal space in the calculus of the HGP,
especially after Francis Collins took charge of the project from Jim Watson. And yet, almost as ritual, every
year's Cold Spring Harbor genome meetings had a session devoted to ELSI, with a different 'ethicar, 'legal'
or 'social" (and in some spheres, they're so easy to compartmentalize thus, aren't they?) issue up for
discussion each time.
In 1999, the ELSI session was far from mere ritual. Rather, it afforded a space for the public
articulation of the concern public researchers had with the patenting of gene sequences in general, and the
Celera sequencing project in particular. Of course, the framing of the session indicated that it was indeed
gene patenting writ large that was the topic for discussion. It was impossible, even within such a generic
framing, for the participants to avoid Craig Venter, and the implicit and explicit references to him were
everywhere.
The whole critique of patenting gene sequences in the formal presentations of the session was
completely structured around the four requirements for patentability (novelty, utility, non-obviousness and
enablement). The concern, in this formal formulation, centered around how allowing gene sequences to be
patented, for one reason or another, goes against one or the other of these criteria. In other words, this was
not about a larger critique of the rationality of patenting per se.
Perhaps the most interesting talk was not by the "expert" patent lawyers, but by Randy Scott,
founder and Chief Scientific Officer of Incyte Genomics (then Incyte Pharmaceuticals). That Scott was the
genomic industry's representative" in this session was itself an interesting insight into the way the public
researchers' animosity towards gene patenting was at least a some level conflated with their animosity
towards Venter. True, there wasn't a lot of warmth towards Scott amongst the conference participants. But
at some level, the critique of gene patenting wasn't about Incyte in the same way as it was about Celera.
This is especially ironical given the fact that Incyte has more DNA sequence patents that any other private
company. One reason for this differential animosity is historical: as I mentioned earlier in the chapter, Venter
does have a contrary history at the NIH, and was involved in an attempt by the NIH to patent expressed
sequence tags (ESTs), an attempt that by and large was an embarrassment for the NIH. A second reason
has clearly to do with the respective personalities of Venter and Scott. Venter is the archetypal anti-hero,
and thrives on his maverick image. Scott, on the other hand, is a master rhetoricist, as I will have occasion
to show at other moments in this thesis. An example of his ability to frame his agenda in ways that invited at
least participation if not necessarily agreement was on evidence at this session as well.
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Scott started off with his talk with the central presumption, stated in so many words, that "biology is
information", anr:d proceeded to justify patenting gene sequences from that presumption. This is a
presumption that lies at the heart of the epistemic shift that genomics marks, and lies at the heart of the
reason why I believe genomics to be fundamentally an emergent form of life science. It is also a
presumption that was particularly naturalized between late 1998 and early 2000, when genomics was about
generating information, rather than making sense of it. So biology, in this presumption, stops being actual
living cells and organisms: it becomes abstracted, reified, not even into material commodity but
dematerialized commodity, without any questioning or contestation.
Scott then talked about the high-throughput patenting race, which, according to him, was really
between Incyte and Human Genome Sciences, suggesting again that the ire of public researchers towards
Celera had to do with more reasons than simply opposition to an aggressive patent strategy. Scott went on
to justify patenting by using prisoner's diiemma logic vis-a-vis HGS: how if they didn't go on and patent gene
sequences as aggressively as they were doing, then HGS would. There were some interesting discursive
mutations here: utility", one of the four fundamental conditions that needs to be met for anything to be
deemed patentable, was all about commercial rather than biological utility. Anything that is potentially
profitable, in this rhetoric, becomes patentable, irrespective of whether it has actual material utility. He then
went on to outline the arguments of the opponents of patenting, and much of his definition of the problems
of patenting was in terms of the possible barriers to innovation that gene patents would create. He then
quickly dismissed them as problems as far as Incyte was concemed, because ulncyte wouldn't do that"
(suggesting, perhaps obliquely, that Celera would, while suggesting at the same time that one needn't be
worried about barriers coming from patents as long as it was Incyte who was doing the patenting). So as far
as Scott was concerned, questioning or touching patents itself wasn't even an issue, and any concerns
around patenting could be addressed simply by sorting out and encouraging "good" licensing - which, no
doubt, would automatically be the modus operandi of "good" companies like Incyte.
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Th rl intprPt in the nAnnP hnwevPr was in the nliptinn and nswn.wr sP.qinn when thp fnrmnl
presentations wound down and the conference participants were able to have their say. Here it was Francis
Collins, head of the HGP, who took center-stage. His question was more of a statement, in which he
insisted on the importance of sequence accessibility and the unfetteredness of the public domain. He
attacked the Incyte patents, and was clearly, almost, angry. He talked about (and I'm quoting) how patenting
gene sequences was "applying principles in related but really different fields", about "the P[atent and]
T[rademark] O[ffice]'s role (as being) reading the law and what's there rather than benefiting the public", and
why haven't we decided to do something about the law"? This was a really interesting ask for a radical
solution, and much more than the genteel word-playing that even the 'opponents" of patenting were
indulging in on the panel. Indeed, the lawyer on the panel, a rather unmemorable man called John Barton
from Stanford, was all about procedural rather than substantive legislative reform, and it was Collins who
was actually voicing concerns that this is something that is fundamentally wrong that needs to be set right.
Here then was this cleavage between the academic and industrial scientific community actually
manifesting itself in an undisguised fashion, and here clearly were a group of extremely famous scientists
who were thinking and acting in a concerted and openly political manner against the interests of "industry".
As I have argued in the body of the chapter, however, what gets framed as "private industry" by public
researchers in settings such as these is in reality just upstream genome companies, and in actual fact the
complicities between public and private worlds are much more complex. The purpose of this set of field
notes is to amplify how that complexity can be rhetorically shed in certain sites of speech in order to create a
terrain that does, in some way, become one that opposes public and private, in ways that are impossible to
dismiss as simply rhetorical.
4.3. Labor
I now move away from talking just about genomics, to talk about labor in drug discovery
and development worlds writ large. It is, however, an analysis that is undergirded to a significant
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extent by factors that, as I argued in Section 4.1, fundamentally make genomics possible: speed
and information, as themselves made possible by automation and high-throughputness. I would
like to situate this, however, in the context of the labor practices necessary, both in genome
worlds themselves and in other nodes in the life science / drug development enterprise.
I do this not by making any coherent argument for the structure of labor practices across
different components of the drug discovery and development enterprise, but instead by putting
forward a series of vignettes, about labor practices, and the importance of different forms of
labor, in different institutional settings, both in the United States and in India. This is an
acknowledgment, as much as anything else, of the fact that a complete picture of biocapitalist
lifeworlds cannot even begin to be obtained simply from studying the more glamorous sites of
production and decision making, which ultimately is what much of this dissertation does.
Analyses of the pharmaceutical industry, indeed, often fall prey to this blind spot, as
supporters and critics alike tend to focus on research and development (R & D) on the one hand,
and sales and marketing on the other. The paucity of this set of foci, of course, is evident when
one tries to study the Indian pharmaceutical industry, which, as I have shown in Chapter 3, has
only recently gotten into R & D in the first place, and, bar the odd exception, really is not into
aggressive sales and marketing (the latter itself being an outcome of a certain sort of brand
valuation that emerges most evidently from patented rather than generic drugs, and therefore not
so central to the Indian pharmaceutical industry pre-WTO). What this misses, then, is
manufacturing.
This rather profound blind-spot is not limited to outside analysts of the industry. Indeed,
G.K. Raju (1998) cites the following quotes from people within the pharmaceutical industry on
the (perceivedly limited) role of manufacturing in pharmaceutical company strategy:
"Manufacturing is basically costs of goods sold. That is insignificant."
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"Manufacturing is really not that important in the organization. How many people from
manufacturing are on the board? I haven't seen any. Manufacturing is simply not one of the top
five things a CEO has to worry about. It's very difficult to get his attention".
"Manufacturing does not determine time-to-market. It is usually R & D, validation and the
clinical trials that do".
First of all, however, clinical trials have to operate in parallel with scaled up manufacture.
Phase III trials, for instance, require large quantities of drug, that can only be made in a scaled-up
plant constructed to (for marketing in the US) FDA specifications. Further, FDA approval
depends not just on the review of safety and efficacy of the products, but also on a review of the
data relating to manufacturing processes. In India, pre-WTO, of course, the process has even
more significance, since the Indian Patent Act of 1970 grants process, but not product, patents.
Further, the "product" of a manufacturing process is not simply a drug, but a huge amount of
information, known as batch records, that are central to the regulatory process. Much of the
current industry documentation process is entirely manual (see Sander 2000).
On the one hand, then, is the fact that much high-technoscience in the (especially
upstream, drug discovery components of the) biotech / pharmaceutical industry proceeds
alongside much manual documentation work that is central to the production of essential bodies
of information accompanying a therapeutic product. On the other hand is the possibility of
manufacturing becoming a bottleneck in the generation of therapeutic product itself, which could
especially be a problem for smaller biotech companies as compared to big pharma, and be an
acute problem if the drug in question is a blockbuster drug with a huge market. This point was
most dramatically made in the case of the blockbuster rheumatoid arthritis drug Enbrel, made by
the Seattle based biotech company Immunex, who haven't been able to make enough of the drug
to keep up with its demand.
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Let me start my vignettes, then, with an account of the manufacturing facilities of Dr.
Reddy's Laboratories (DRL), the Indian pharmaceutical company I described at some length in
Chapter 3. DRL has three plants. One, that is still not quite up and running, is for biotech research
and diagnostics. Then there is a plant for bulk drugs and formulations for a primarily domestic
market, and for exports to some non-US countries. The third is an acquisition, of an export-
oriented company called Cheminor, and is for the manufacture of bulk drugs and formulations for
export to the US, as the Cheminor plant manufactures to FDA requirements. The domestic plant,
which manufactures to the requirements of the South African medical council, is therefore much
cheaper to run and maintain. 97
As I argued in Chapter 3, therefore, just as FDA guidelines operate as a bigger barrier to
biotech companies than big pharmaceutical companies, they in this situation operate as barriers to
entry for "Third World" pharmaceutical companies into US marketplaces. In other words,
regulatory environments quite literally regulate capital flows, setting up a political economy of
drug - subject - capital circulation that is completely intertwined: the "Third World" becomes
porous, especially as a site for recruitment of subjects, while US borders become more rigid. It is
in such a political economic regime of differential circulation that the "homogenizing" effects of
global trade as instituted through multilateral fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
need to be situated and read.
Entering the (domestic) plant involves covering oneself from head to toe, in a lab coat,
overalls, cap and disposable shoes, because of course maintaining purity is of the essence in a
97 I was only given a tour of the domestic manufacturing facilities, so do not actually know how exactly it
differs from the Cheminor facilities in ways that make the latter more expensive to maintain. I was also
unable, for proprietary reasons, to get an actual estimate of the cost differential in maintaining the two
facilities. I did however get the following response from A. Venkateswarulu, one of DRL's corporate
managers (correspondence with the author, June 21 2002): "The Cheminor plant.. .is a 100% export
oriented unit that opeartes with rigorous SOPs [Standard Operating Procedures] conforming to cGMP
[current Good Manufacturing Practices] standards which are accepted and followed internationally
(especially, USA and other regulated markets). Although the manufacturing process and technical know-
how remain essentially the same, the documentation, validation protocols, quality systems and some
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pharmaceutical manufacturing plant. The structure of the plant sees the core manufacturing in the
core of the plant, surrounded by a corridor, outside of which, on either side, are respectively the
area where raw materials come in, and the area where the finished product is packaged and sent
out. The raw material comes in trucks, but there is no open access between the trucks and the
inside of the plant, so the material is delivered through a shaft. It goes through various quality
control checks, sifts and winowings, and is finally sorted into material that is accepted and that is
rejected at the outset. There are four core manufacturing facilities, which means that four batches
of drugs can be manufactured at any given time. If the volume of manufacturing needs to be
scaled up, therefore, more shifts will be run.
Each of the four parallel facilities is distinguished from the others in visibly marked
ways, so that there is no chance of any crossover of laborers or products between the facilities.
The color of the floor in each of the parallel facilities differs, as do the colors of the workers'
gowns. Also, the air pressure in the core facilities is highest, ensuring that there is no inflow of
impure air from outside. Indeed, the structuring of the air ducts is one of the most crucial aspects
in the maintenance of purity.
The most labor intensive part of the process is the last part, which is packaging. This is
not automated, and a large number of the packagers are women. Most of the workers have passed
tenth grade, after which they are sent to an industrial training institute. Their wages on an average
are about 5000 rupees a month.
The floor manager, Prahlad, who showed me around this plant had himself earlier worked
in a multi-national company, in the manufacturing plant of Pfizer in Bombay, and told me that
there were huge differences in the scale and work practices of the two places. Companies like
Pfizer, in countries like India, mainly concern themselves with massively parallel high quantity
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technical specs / operations required in a US FDA qualifed plant are much more rigorous than these
applicable to plants operating for non-regulated markets".
production, so there is a much larger plant, much more automation and a much greater
centralization of facilities. Prahlad felt that in a smaller environment like DRL, there was greater
room for maneuverability for people like himself. In other words, that managerial flexibility that
marks the upper management of DRL also translates down to the middle management on the shop
floor.
From a manufacturing plant alongside a highway outside Hyderabad, I move to a
company near a freeway in Palo Alto. Incyte Genomics, whose founder and CSO Randy Scott I
introduced in the previous section, has been one of the big corporate players of the genomics
"revolution".
Incyte was the first genome company to go public, in November 1993. At that time, their
short-term business strategy was "to commercialize our catalog of human genes and proteins,
transcript imaging analysis, and biology 'in silico' approach by creating a software / database
business targeted at pharmaceutical companies and eventually the scientific community" (!ncyte
Annual Report [henceforth IAR] 1993). The early trope they used was that of Gray's Anatomy,
the definitive textbook of human anatomy since 1858. While in 1993 Incyte was trumpeting the
experience of its team in both the new genome technologies and in biopharmaceutical
development, by 2000 the company's name had been changed to Incyte Genomics from Incyte
Pharmaceuticals, and it had become a full-fledged information provider.
Even in 1993, though, Incyte's explicit goals were still stated in terms of databases: the
biopharmaceutical discovery component seemed an almost obligatory descriptive category that
had to be included in a document for investors such as an annual report, at a time when "biology
in silico" was still a relatively novel and untested concept. Incyte got their first database
subscriber, Pfizer, in 1994. Their gene expression database, LifeSeqTM, turned into their core
technology platform for many years, and emerged as the industry standard gene expression
database. They entered into both exclusive satellite agreements and non-exclusive multiple
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licensing agreements to LifeSeqTM with many of the major pharmaceutical companies. By 1996,
Incyte recorded their first profitable quarter, and acquired two other companies as a sign of their
diversification. Combion, based in Pasadena, was a microarray company, while Genome Systems,
based in St. Louis, was a company offering customized genomics services. This latter function
becomes central to the vignette that I now hope to project.
Incyte's success with LifeSeqTM, while dramatic in the medium-term, has turned out not
to be a long term driver of the company's growth. This is firstly, as I explore in Chapter 8,
because of the success of genomics, a success that has very quickly shifted the bottleneck from
being one of inadequate information to being one of too much information. Databases that simply
identify potential targets are no longer useful for pharmaceutical companies, and the onus has
shifted towards strategies that can help characterize and validate the existing targets - effectively
strategies that can help sift through and make functional sense of the mass of genomic
information available rather than simply generate more. Secondly, having become the industry
standard, Incyte already had subscriptions to LifeSeqTM from most major pharmaceutical
companies, which meant that it had become hard for them to grow their market any further.
Thirdly, with the worihlg draft sequence of the human genome in the public domain, there was
less of an incentive for researchers and companies to buy an expensive database, when they could
get information, albeit perhaps of lower quality, for free in the public domain. At least some of
these reasons have fed into the trouble that Incyte's major rival Celera has faced in the last couple
of years as well.
Incyte and Celera however decided to respond to these similar troubles in opposite ways.
While Celera has decided to reinvent itself as a diagnostic and drug discovery company, Incyte
decided to stay upstream, and rename itself Incyte Genomics. The reason for this, according to
one of their senior managers whom I talked to, was that they wanted to give out a clear signal that
they weren't trying to get into a business situation where they would be seen as the potential
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competitors of their major customers, big pharmaceutical companies. Indeed, there is more than
an element of pragmatism in this move, and as I have indicated at a number of points in Chapter
3, the power differential between even relatively entrenched biotech companies such as Amgen
and a big pharmaceutical company is so great that it is very hard for biotech companies to sustain
themselves as competitors on the public markets, which after all judge the two sets of companies
by the same yardsticks and expectations. Indeed, there is every indication that the reinvention of
companies like Celera into drug discovery companies is going to be a painful and arduous
process, not least because such a reinvention basically boils down to the hiring of a virtually new
workforce, with employees exhibiting different skill-sets.
What this meant, however, was that by late 2000, an increasingly significant portion of
Incyte's revenues were coming not from their informatics work, but from the contract services
that they were offering other companies; services now that were being performed not just in St.
Louis, but in Palo Alto as well. One of the major services that they were performing was contract
sequencing, which meant that they had a whole laboratory full of automated sequencing machines
that would run 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The sequencing machines they ran were not
Applied Biosystems' 3700s, but MegaBace, made by Applied Biosystems' competitor
Amersham. While the reason I got for this was the predictable one that it was because MegaBace
performed better, I couldn't help but believe that the real reason was that they didn't want to buy
the machines manufactured by the sister company of their major competitor Celera.
What this further meant was that it was absolutely crucial for Incyte's revenue that their
automated sequencers worked all the time, and well. So that by the end of 2000, the key
employees at Incyte were not the programmers as much as they were the engineers who kept the
sequencing machines running. Indeed, the supervisor of the Licyte sequencing facility who
showed me around told me with pride that the engineers at Incyte who tended to the MegaBace
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machines were even better than Amersham's own engineers whose job was to service the
machines.
What the story of Incyte indicates, of course, is that the configurations of which sorts of
labor become dispensable and which indispensable in a particular company at a particular point in
time are intimately related to larger structural issues relating to the marketplace, but also to the
more contingent strategic choices that get made by a company. While Celera, in a bid to itself
become a drug discovery company, has had to retool its workforce away from programmers and
towards wet lab biologists, Incyte's contrary decision to stay an "informatics" company has seen
it rely more and more on providing customized services that themselves are not necessarily just
informatics based, making engineers the crucial cogs in the wheel.
Indeed, bioinformatics is the buzzword in India these days, and the bioinformatics facility
is the cornerstone of the activities and strategies of the Centre for Biochemical Technology
(CBT), India's flagship public sector genome lab. The Director of CBT, Sameer Brahmnachari,
indeed, sees bioinformatics as one of the routes to India becoming a global player in genomics.
This is a view echoed by the hype around bioinformatics in the Indian business press as well, and
is reflected in the entry of many major Indian software companies, such as Satyam and Tata
Consultancy Services (TCS), into bioinformatics in a big way, at least in name if not in substance.
The reason for that, unsurprisingly, is India's vast software potential, which it is assumed will
translate automatically into bioinformatic prowess. Such a view sees bioinformatics as just
another exercise in writing code.
And yet, almost without exception (and CBT is perhaps the closest there is to an
exception in this regard), bioinformatics in India is hampered by the absence of trained
humanpower. This is to some extent even the case still in the US, where graduate courses in
bioinformatics have just begun, but is particularly acute in India, where there is hardly any
training in bioinformatics. GVK Bio, which calls itself a bioinformatics company and which is
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based in Hyderabad, started offering three month courses in bioinformatics, both in Hyderabad
and in Delhi. This was modeled on similar extremely successful software courses that were
offered by companies such as the National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT), courses
that were both very lucrative for NIIT and that produced a generation of Indians trained in
software without a formal engineering degree, who ended up quite often getting employed in the
US on Y2K related problems. Perhaps predictably, many people who take such courses find three
months an impossibly short time in which to grasp something as complicated, and indeed as
mutable, as bioinformatics, and GVK Bio has already shut down a center in Delhi that was
offering such courses.
Even at CBT, the training of bioinformaticists becomes the key issue, a training, further,
that has to happen in ways that enable programmers quite often to work with wet lab researchers
to tackle complex genomic problems. The person who is most responsible for this training at CBT
is Debashis Das.
Like many of the young scientists at CBT, Das comes from small-town India (in this
case, from Orissa), testifying to the sorts of access for people from all over the country to work in
the most cutting-edge institutions that only the scientific disciplines in India really provide. His
background was in chemistry, testifying to the range of inter-disciplinarities that often go, into the
making of a "bioinformaticist": that she be a programmer is by no means a given, as I am sure
many Indian companies who are pinning their faith on bioinformatics as the next logical step in
the evolution of the software industry will discover. As a graduate student, Das found that he was
much more interested in physical rather than organic chemistry, because the former involved
more computational activities. At this point (mid-1990s), there was no such thing as formal
bioinformatics in India, and even the computers available at Delhi University, where Das had
started his Ph.D. work in biophysical chemistry, were low end 386s. Das was often asked to help
a number of people who were having computing problems, as his skills with computers started
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getting recognized and acknowledged. His supervisor suggested that he join Brahmachari, who
had just moved to head CBT from the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, and was looking
for post-docs. This provided Das with a chance to do bioinformatics, and he was given the task of
setting up CBT's bioinformatics facility.
Das points to the difficulties inherent in the interaction of bioinformaticists with those
who work in wet labs. According to him, wet lab researchers have a problem, in his opinion, with
knowing what questions to ask, and how to ask them. There are, he says, differences in language
between the two groups of people. What the wet lab person says has to be converted into a tool,
and then into a statistically significant figure. He feels, therefore, that generally wet labs create
problems, and informatics solves them, rather than the other way around.
The biggest bottleneck, according to Das, is that all the smart IT people went into solving
the Y2K problem and other such things that were not of interest to bioinformaticians. Therefore,
the availability of really good students is a problem. It is only now that Das feels CBT is
beginning to get students with a domain knowledge of high end IT. The need, according to Das, is
for people who can translate scientific problems into puzzles. Getting biology students to
approach problems in this manner, he feels, is quite hard. He would like to get biologists to learn
how to "spell out" their problems, in algorithmic form.
I mention Das here not just to point to his specific diagnoses regarding bioinformatics
humanpower in India, but also to point to his place in the scientific hierarchy of CBT. As I will
explain in greater detail in Chapter 5, CBT was for many years a delapidated center selling
biochemical reagents. When the Indian government decided in the mid-1990s that it wanted to
"do" genomics, it asked Brahmachari, India's best known genome scientist, to head up the public
genomics initiative. The government's idea was that Brahmachari would build a new genome
center. Brahmachari however felt that India was already far behind the genomics curve compared
to the West, and that by the time a new genome center was built, the human genome would
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already be sequenced. He instead chose to retool CBT into a cutting-edge genome lab. The reason
why he chose CBT, at least partly, was its location in Delhi, close to the corridors of power, but
also perhaps because it wasn 't already a cutting-edge lab. What this meant was that Brahmachari '
had a free hand to restructure the center, and imprint it with his direction, in a way that he just
wouldn't have had at a center that was already performing cutting-edge science.
As Brahmachari candidly admits: "In India, the new never replaces the old, it just adds on
to it".98 In terms of CBT, what this means is that there are still a host of scientists who do very
different work, with very different priorities, to Brahamchari's scientific agenda (genomics) and
his strategic agenda (becoming a global player). For Brahmachari to enforce his strategic will on
CBT, he has had to do exactly what Celera has to do in a similar situation: hire a whole host of
people who have skills compatible with his vision. Young scientists like Das are a consequence.
There are, however, many other hires that need to be made other than scientists running
labs, and a major lab that is at the interface of bioinformatics and wet lab facilities at CBT is their
genotyping center, where they sequence clones for themselves, and (on a limited non-commercial
basis) for their collaborators.
Brahmachari only hires women for the genotyping facility, and this, according to Mitali
Mukerji, the scientist in charge of the facility's operation, is a conscious decision, since according
to her: "We have not taken any guy over there.... You know in India, boys want to move on
faster, look for more prospects, because for them, this would be a very stagnant kind of a job. It is
very routine, everyday. But for girls, it is an experience. The moment we put a guy in any of the
facilities, he would decide to go abroad and then quit".99
Of course, the "fact" that boys "go abroad" while girls don't hasn't prevented CBT from
hiring many men in the bioinformatics facility, which has a fair share of women as well, though
98 S.K. Brahmachari, interview with the author, 3 January 2002.
99 Mitali Mukerji, interview with the author, 7 January 2002.
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fewer (approximately 30-35% of the bioinformaticists at CBT are women). Nonetheless, the
gendering that underlies the decision to hire labor, whether of the graduate student variety or to
staff various facilities, is evident and barely disguised. Indeed, Brahmachari at one point quite
explicitly told me that it is a fact that men are genetically suited to be better informaticists,
because they are more analytical than women, while women are genetically suited to be better
wet lab researchers, as they are more careful and precise than men.
Another example of an inter-disciplinary workspace that sees changing configurations of
labor practices and values attached to different forms of work comes from the e-learning
company in San Francisco where I did some of my fieldwork, GeneEd. While GeneEd is not a
bioinformatics / biotech / pharmaceutical company in its own right, it is worth telling their story
at some length, because the structural causes underlying their changing priorities, as indeed has
been the case with Incyte, has everything to do with their changing customer base, that is rooted
in the political terrain of drug development as it manifests between biotech and big
pharmaceutical companies.
There are two "labor" stories I want to tell about GeneEd. The first has to do with the
management structure of the company, which, when I first spent time there in 2001, had only one
woman in the management team. The second has to do with the graphic designers who design
GeneEd's e-learning courses, the "workers" of the company.
The management team of GeneEd, as of mid-2001, was pretty much its founding
management team. Its co-founders, Sunil Maulik and Salil Patel, were the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) and Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) respectively. Paul Eisele, a more senior person
with years of experience in the entertainment industry, was the Chief Operating Officer (COO),
while Barry Giordano, an old friend and once boss of Maulik's, was both an investor in the
company and its Vice-President of Sales.
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Directly reporting to Patel was Cynthia Kilroy, who had joined a few months after
GeneEd had started operations, and who was in charge of product development. While Patel's job
was to actually develop course content, Kilroy's job was to co-ordinate the development of that
content into a visual, online e-learning course by the graphic designers, in consultation with the
client if the course in question was a custom course. Kilroy had started her career as a software
developer, went on to manage projects for health care organizations, and then spent five years
doing consulting at Arthur Andersen.
Being a project manager at GeneEd in 2001, of course, was very different from
consulting in one of the "big six" firms, because one of the defining features of working in a start-
up is that it is impossible to rigidly enforce a strict division of labor: it is often essential for
everyone in the company to multi-task. In these early days of GeneEd, therefore, Kilroy saw
herself as a "chameleon", doing whatever needed to be done on a particular day: a job description
that fitted most of the GeneEd employees, from Maulik downwards.
The fact that Kilroy was the only woman on the management team, of course, was quite
significant for her work situation at GeneEd. Most difficult for her at the time was her
relationship with the two sales people, Giordano and Mark Greenbaum, both experienced at sales
and feeling that Kilroy needed to prove herself. Of course, there was a certain amount of
territoriality involved, in the very way GeneEd strategized selling its product. GeneEd constantly
makes "sales and science" pitches. Their idea is that one of the salespeople always be
accompanied by either Maulik, Patel or Kilroy, both to lend a certain amount of gravitas to the
impression they convey, as a "serious", "scientifically oriented" company, and also because their
products are technically quite complicated, making it useful to have someone who is involved in
product development explain it. Follow up with the client also involves a delicate division of
labor, where it's the product developers who have to interact with the client to ensure that the
courses (especially if they are customized to the client's requirements) are developed to their
210
specification and satisfaction, while the sales people have to stay attentive to closing the deal, and
opening up other possible deals with the same clients and with others. The potential for one group
of people stepping on the others' toes is significant, especially if issues of seniority, experience
and gender are superimposed.
Kilroy was very attentive to the gender dynamics in her interaction with the sales force,
as she said:
This is the first place I have ever worked where Salil and Sunil came to me and said we
don't like the way X is treating you and we're going to take care of it. I don't want it to
sound the way it's going to, but it's probably because I'm the only woman on the
management team and I think some of the sales guys probably get away with things and
treat me like crap, and i just have no respect for that.... And I think I played into some of
that because I let those guys fight for me. I'm pretty outspoken and stuff but I can go
nervous and sit at the back, and when I get more nervous, I get more spelling mistakes in
my e-mail and I wasn't taking the time and then they didn't have the respect.'°
Nonetheless, there was no doubt in Kilroy's mind that a start-up still provided a more
egalitarian system that what normally prevails in big companies like Andersen in the American
corporate world:
Like I said, I come from a huge consulting house that was very male-dominated. It was
plain they strategically picked all women to in, ,rview me and had a partner that I was
reporting to that was a woman. The problem is that for me when I look back now, while I
had made the decision to go there because there were a lot of women, it's definitely still
an old school, old boys network, and the fact was that the women that were in the
management positions were like the woman that heads H[ewlett]-P[ackard]. The fact is
that she's not a woman that I want to be like or emulate because she doesn't have a
family. She got married later in life, her husband is a stay-home husband who hasn't
'00 Cynthia Kilroy, interview with the author, 24 May 2001.
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worked. He's 20 years older than her. She's not dealing with the issue that a woman that
potentially wants a family, that doesn't feel that she needs to act like a man to be in a
man's world. And I think that we look at these women and say, "Wow! Look at where
they've got!" But in reality, they are really just men dressed as women. Look at the
Massachusetts governor [Jane Swift]. She just happened to have twins, but her husband is
a stay-home husband. They have already determined that the governorship is not a fll-
time job, and people want her to quit because they think she can't do it. What's the
rationale of that? I mean, someone's staying at home to take care of your kids. Why is it
that it's the woman that has to quit the job? As someone said the other day, nobody said
anything when Bush was out campagning, no one told him he's not taking care of his
kids. ''
Kilroy's opinions are hardly atypical, and they have recently become the sorts of opinions
that have been the center of conversation in corporate America, consequent to the publication of
economist Sylvia Ann Hewlett's (2002) survey Creating a Life, which argues for the
incompatibility, for women, of having a high-powered corporate career with having a family.
Kilroy's own way of dealing with this situation is to:
[J]ust prove myself and simply claim I've been smart enough that I've always wound up
being able to do a good job. And then sometimes there is an opportunity, where you're
kind of joking around the table and you can make a joke of what people know, that you
know what they are about and then hopefully then they will look at their behavior and
then realize.'0 2
Of course, as a manager, Kilroy has to herself be sensitive to people-management issues,
especially since she, more than anyone else, forms a direct bridge between the management and
'°' Ibid. Sure enough, Jane Swift has decided that she won't run for governor in 2002 because of the
pressures of family.
102 Ibid.
212
the designers who design the courses. And here too, the situation at GeneEd has undergone a
change as the company's clientele has changed.
GeneEd, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, started off primarily as a company that would offer
online e-learning courses on various life science related topics to people in the industry. They
designed a series of what were called catalog courses, that were basically generic textbook
courses on a number of aspects of emergent life science, such as, for instance, bioinformatics or
microarrays. They also designed custom courses to meet specific needs for specific companies.
Initially, these custom courses were often animated presentations that would go onto the
company's web site, such as Celera's genomics "tutorial", which was designed by GeneEd to
highlight Celera's achievements for its website. Predictably, custom courses were proving to be
more of a revenue earner than catalog courses, when the target market was largely people who
were in the industry already, and GeneEd spent most of its time designing these customized
courses. It was Kilroy's job to allocate responsibility for the courses to the designers, and to
ensure proper execution.
By mid-2001, it was clear that the designers were the indispensable labor force for the
company. Indeed, there wasn't a group of what could be called "workers" independent of them.
All the content was provided almost single-handedly by Patel, Kilroy's job was to ensure follow
through on projects, there were two sales people who handled the West Coast and the East Coast
respectively, there was one systems administrator who made sure the computers were working
properly, Eisele ran the nitty-gritty operational aspects of the company, there was an office
manager who would assist with whatever tasks needed help, and Maulik went out and sold the
vision of the company to prospective investors and customers. It was the group of (at the time)
four designers who really executed on the creation of the courses.
Kilroy, indeed, felt that her job at the time was very much that of a mentor to the design
team. Further, whole courses were allocated to specific designers, which meant that each designer
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was able to imprint his or her artistic style on the course. Course allocation was indeed a strategic
exercise for Kilroy, as she tried to match each designer's artistic temperament to the requirements
of the client. This meant that there was lots of room for artistic creativity. For instance, one of the
graphic designers, Cyane Rollins, described her work, and the division of labor, to me in the
following terms in mid-2001:
We have a project manager who keeps an eye on of all our schedules and an eye on
projects down the line and then she'll allocate these projects to us and watch our
schedules and keep tabs on our progress. We as developers work under her and work for
Sunil, and because we're so small, it's not obviously very hierarchical. We have me
down here and Salil and Sunil up there and which is great because I have plenty of room
for feedback and they listen to our feedback which I think is great on their part. It's great
because I feel they listen to us and then make changes or whatever or help us out but also
it's good for them too because we have ideas. They are sort of looking at the more
business and marketing side and we are looking at the more technological side - what's
out there, how can we improve, what we're doing, that sort of thing. So that we have this
little ecology. That's why I think this is a little ecological system. And that's pretty much
the main thing - there's the management and then there's the project manager and then
there's developers and then there's the IT Department and then Robin and I think that
we're also working side by side.
[W]e [developers] critique each other and rely on each other for feedback, but
when we get a project, we pretty much work on that from start to finish ourselves and its
good because it's good to know... you know you're beginning to know this stuff from the
top, you're beginning to learn and we know how to do animation and how to load it, what
flaws and bugs might happen. The downside of that is that I know a lot about bio-
informatics and drug-design but I know nothing about microarrays or the other courses
that other developers are doing and it takes a while to learn those courses. So that's one
downside and I don't know, I mean, it seems like...we're all seeing I think in the future
we'll see our goal because we all have different strengths which is great...you know like
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Jill has her 3D modelling and Jerry and Jill are very into the action scripting and Tara has
traditional animation which she brings to the table and I have the educational background
and then I have video stuff, so that's something that I could use. So we all have the
different things that we're interested in and we can bring them together to the table. And
between us...maybe it'll be in the future that I don't know...I'm thinking that it could be
really cool if one of us becomes a real expert in one area and then we start dividing up in
that way.
But right now its working perfectly well the way we have it.
KS:
So do you see a more defined sense of rules and responsibilities since you have joined?
CR:
I think it's very defined now. I think it is very defined now. 103
In other words, even in 2001, a year and a bit into the functioning of GeneEd as a fully
operational company, the designers were beginning to see a certain amount of streamlining in the
company's operations, but it was a streamlining that still left considerable agency to each
designer to design their course. There was also a perceived sense of collegiality, what Rollins
referred to as an "ecology", whereby, let alone the middle, even the upper management was
accessible not just to mentor the designers but to actually receive feedback from them that could
drive the company's decisions.
A number of things have changed for GeneEd structurally since then. The biggest event
that signalled this change was their signing on as a customer the big pharmaceutical company
Astra Zeneca in the summer of 2001, for a series of courses for in-house use (such as sales force
training). Astra Zeneca is a company of 55,000 people, orders of magnitude larger than any of the
biotech companies they had developed courses for until that time. This meant three things for
GeneEd.
103 Cyane Rollins, interview with the author, May 14 2001.
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First, that there was the possibility of a sustained buy in. A successful execution on their
initial assignments, they knew, could lead to GeneEd being given other assignments by other
divisions of the company. There was a chance to grow their market even within a single
company, in a way that had never existed when GeneEd was developing courses for their biotech
clients. Second, that there was a possibility of gaining brand recognition within the
pharmaceutical industry. Even though the GeneEd brand was visible on many biotech web sites,
for instance, that was hardly enough of a selling point to ensure that big pharmaceutical
companies would be interested in giving them business. As Maulik always liked to point out, the
difficulty - and the challenge - of selling a company like GeneEd's products is that one has to not
just convince the customer that GeneEd offers the best product on the market, one has to
convince them that it's a product that they need in the first place. Getting the Astra Zeneca project
gave GeneEd a toe-hold into the big pharma market. Third, the quantity of work that would have
to be done, to do the Astra Zeneca courses, continue their custom courses for existing clients, and
come out with improvements to their existing courses, meant that it became essential to further
streamline the process of course creation.
The way they did this was to develop what they called "learning objects": modules or
vignettes of courses that might already have appeared in their other courses, that could exist as
independent objects in a searchable database, that could then be pulled out and inserted into a
new course. In other words, GeneEd was shifting away from being a design company that would
craft individual customized courses as if each was the creative product of a single graphic
designer, to being a knowledge management company that would generate courses by an
assembly line cutting and pasting of existing course modules (with, of course, the development of
new course vignettes or modules as and when necessary).
Once a course becomes a collection of independent assembled objects, of course, it
becomes vitally important to standardize those objects. One just couldn't have a course that was
put together by objects from previously designed courses that each had a distinct artistic
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signature. Very quickly, therefore, the role of the graphic designer stopped being one of artistic
creation, and became one of industrialized assembly. This didn't even need a conscious strategic
change of direction: it was simply the consequence of scaling up the enterprise and growing the
company.
In the process, however, Maulik realized that the very assemblage of learning objects,
and the software infrastructure needed to support them and make them searchable was,
independent of the content of the objects, itself a set of software applications that had value. In
other words, while GeneEd, as an e-learning company, could sell courses to clients, it could also,
as a knowledge management company, sell software applications to other e-learning companies.
What this led to was an increased dependence on programmers.
Therefore, largely as a consequence of selling courses to downstream big pharma
companies instead of upstream biotech companies (who, as more big pharmaceutical companies
indeed became interested in GeneEd, became less and less a source of significant value), the
entire work structure changed within a year. Suddenly it was the programmers who were doing
the glamorous work, while the designers were merely assembling content.
Robin Lindheimer, who had been hired as a systems administrator in 2001, had by 2002
been promoted to being manager of IT. Just the challenge of automating processes as the
company grew was for him a major programming challenge. While earlier, Lindheimer felt his
role was "just that of a plumber", he felt he was now "dealing with the technology of GeneEd
rather than with the technology of the world that helps you run an office".'04 He sees the company
moving in a direction where the selling of courses becomes incidental to the development of
saleable software.
Indeed, GeneEd in 2002 had the sort of glamor - of doing something "cool" while doing
something "good" - for programmers, that it had held for graphic designers in 2001. Chris
Palmer, a programmer who chose to come to GeneEd ahead of two other job offers, compared it
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to choosing to work at Apple rather than at Microsoft, where "Microsoft is just another job.
Whereas Apple is a mission that people believe in, a community of far-thinking researchers that
are a part of the business culture. That means a much better product - a product in which the
labor of love has been put into it. It's a product that's better than good enough, it's actually great,
that has an economic effect and a personal effect".'05
Conversely, and unsurprisingly, the graphic designers by 2002 felt increasingly stifled
and unenthused, as evidenced from the following quotes (all kept anonymous):
1. It's harder now for each designer to express herself. There are tensions between the
individual creativity of graphic designers and the requirements of a corporate
structure. Therefore, working here is not that creatively fulfilling.... I rarely see
Cynthia on a day-to-day basis.
2. The content is much more modular. We are more conscious of the process now. It
takes a lot of energy to keep people interested and motivated. From the developers'
side, our creative license as artists is missing. Earlier, we could create entire projects
ourselves.... I don't know what Cynthia does.
3. A change to bigger projects has meant a more streamlined process. We're not
responsible for whole courses now. Streamlining and efficiency means less creativity
for the artist. It's not good for the artists because the job isn't artistic anymore. I
think most of the artists would have left if the economy was better. The company has
become more hierarchical. Earlier, there was a pancake structure, anyone who had an
idea got listened to. Now that's not the case anymore.... We'll probably get funding,
get bigger, and have more growing pains.
4. There is considerable freedom in terms of how I want things to look in terms of
graphics themselves. But in terms of the interface, templates have been created
which can't be redesigned. As an artist, I get bored really easily. I'm a graphic
designer rather than an instructional designer. I try not to let the boredom show but it
'04 Robin Lindheimer, interview with the author, 28 March 2002.
218
does. There's not a lot of interaction with the other developers. I miss that.... There's
no communication with management, and rare interactions with Cynthia. The
instructional designers are the bottom of the totem pole. We were really important
when the company was a start-up. [The designers] pretty much made or broke the
project. I enjoyed smaller scale projects more, because I had more freedom, I could
bring more design sense to bear.... The biggest frustration is being held down by
management. 06
In other words, the loss of artistic license, felt unanimously and without exception
amongst the graphic designers at GeneEd, was accompanied by the loss of a non-hierachical
involvement and contribution to the management structure of the company. It was also
accompanied, not surprisingly, by an increased dispensability of individual designers. Indeed, this
was almost logical. As one designer told me, almost the only way the company could have
motivated designers was by constantly hiring new and inexperienced designers who would be
motivated because they would be learning how to design on the job. Of course, that would
compromise the quality of design, a quality that itself was becoming increasingly incidental and
pre-packaged. Sure enough, in May 2002, the company laid off two of its designers, one of whom
had been with the company since its inception.
This dispensability was not just felt by the designers, it was echoed by the management.
Therefore, Kilroy, who in 2001 was explicit about the importance of mentoring the designers, and
about her own central role in that mentoring process, was by 2002 admitting that there was now a
line between management and "staff' (in 2001, she was still referring to them as "designers").
But then, she felt: "That's not a bad thing. I don't think I have to be friends with the staff. Getting
rid of people is not a bad thing.... I don't miss anything about the start-up phase. Now it's not just
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105 Chris Palmer, interview with the author, 28 March 2002.
106 Each of these was told to me by a different graphic designer, in a series of interviews conducted between
28 March and 2 April 2002.
about creativity but about software development. Possibly a lot of the present people won't work
in the new model".10 7
There have been necessary changes in the management structure as well, as GeneEd has
grown out of being a start-up and into being a "real corporation". What earlier used to be termed
"sales" is now the much more grandiose sounding "business development". Heading that is a new
middle manager, Glenn O'Classidy, who comes from a family steeped in the pharmaceutical
industry (his grandfather had built a pharmaceutical business), which means he has many contacts
in the big pharma world. In the process, GeneEd had to lay off their VP of sales, Barry Giordano.
This was probably one of the most painful moments for GeneEd as a company, not least
because Giordano was part of the founding management team and an early investor. Perhaps even
more, he was Maulik's old friend, a close friendship that has probably terminally ruptured as a
consequence of the lay off, which Giordano took very badly. Maulik, who is very good at
wearing the CEO mask when he needs to, expectedly rationalized the decision as inevitable, since
GeneEd wasn't getting the customers it needed to stay afloat. Indeed, even after the Astra Zeneca
deal, GeneEd's revenue situation stayed extremely precarious for much of Fall 2001 and early
2002, since they never had reserves of venture capital money to fall back on. Indeed, a number of
people in the company feel that the exit of Giordano, who had difficult relationships with both
Kilroy and Eisele, was both necessary and good for the company.
This was not, however, a uniform sentiment in the least. While Giordano had certainly
not shown much sensitivity in dealing with fellow women managers, as in Kilroy's case, there
were many others in the company, men and women, who felt that he was precisely the sort of
mentor that they just didn't have anymore. They felt that O'Classidy was too immersed in
business development to bother about fostering mentoring relationships with those who reported
to him, and in any case, those were relationships that could best be developed by someone senior
who had been in the company from the beginning.
'
07 Cynthia Kilroy, interview with the author, I April 2002.
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Meanwhile, Patel had moved from San Francisco to start a new GeneEd office in New
Jersey. This was necessitated by the fact that GeneEd was fundamentally involved in shifting its
clientele away from biotechs towards big pharma, and the corporate headquarters of almost all the
big pharmaceutical companies are on the East Coast. If the place of being in San Francisco
mattered immensely to GeneEd's existence and identity as a start-up, as I argue it did in Chapter
2, then that too was completely at stake once big pharmaceutical companies became the major
customers.
If Giordano's mentoring is missed by some, then that is nothing compared to the way
Patel is missed. I did not speak to a single employee who, without being asked the question,
didn't tell me that they missed having him around.
I talk about certain aspects of Patel's character as a manager in greater detail in Chapter
6. Suffice to say at this point that he is a corporate anomaly, driven by a system of personal
values that refuses to lend itself to the sorts of hard-headed cynicism - what might politely be
called "flexibility" - that is almost constitutive of what might be essentialized as corporate
American "culture". This does not mean that Patel is romantic or naive - far from it. What it does
mean is that, firstly, as I explain at greater length in Chapter 6, he has a commitment to truth
(which makes him uncomfortable even with sales forecasts and investor pitches, that by definition
can't possibly be "truthful" events); secondly, he is deeply commited to teaching; and thirdly, he
is deeply commited to fostering an ethical relationship with his employees. While this doesn't
stop him from supporting management decisions to, for instance, lay off certain employees, it
also means that he would never be caught talking about their dispensability as part of the
changing priorities for the company. It is his position of pragmatic principle that has earned him
such respect in the company.
This means, on the one hand, that he spent a lot of time mentoring the graphic designers.
This wasn't simply because he felt that was important for their well being, or that of the
company, but because, at the end of the day, the reason why he agreed to take the risk of leaving
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a secure job to start this company with Maulik was because he loved teaching. Rollins, for
instance, had this to say about Maulik's and Patel's teaching skills:
Salil and Sunil are talented in that they know this science and can explain it and I didn't
appreciate how much this talent was until I went to a custom client in San Diego and one
of the scientists was explaining what they did and he made no sense whatsoever. He was
using words that I could recognize, but the way he was explaining was just poor....I
mean he just assumed that someone would understand crystallization. And of course
when Salil explained it to me, it made perfect senoe. I think that's the talent. And also the
fact that they can story-board it out. Actually they are very creative and I think science is
ultimately creative. It doesn't seem that way but they both have this creative way and
then they would have interesting ways of showing us how it should be shown and how
much should be shown. 108
While Maulik was equally respected as a teacher, his job description as CEO ensured,
even before GeneEd shifted its client focus, that he was more absent than present in the everyday
running of the company. His job has always been to sell the idea of the company outside,
especially to potential investors, and Patel, for as long as he was in San Francisco, complemented
him perfectly by being the "resident" founder, translating the corporate vision into everyday work
practices, providing precisely the inspiration and motivation that so many of the employees felt
was lacking once he moved East.
But he also provided a certain managerial stability, often being the mediator in diffuclt
relationships such as Giordano's with Kilroy or Eisele. He showed both sensitivity and even-
handedness, and was a stickler for procedure. This made him easier for the middle management
to relate to than Maulik, whose ability to sell the company outside the company came precisely
from an absence of these qualities, came from his ability to think on his feet, act on the spur on
the moment, make off the cuff remarks, take risks. As Eisele says: "Sunil jumps the chain of
l08 Cyane Rollins, interview with the author, 14 May 2001.
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command all the time, which drives his managers crazy. It's a challenge not having Salil here.
Sunil's mercurial; Salil's the Rock of Gibraltar".'0 9
In other words, shifting their client base from small biotech to big pharma companies has
had profound consequences for GeneEd as a company. It has changed the company from a
content provider to a software company; from a "start-up" that was constantly bootstrapping to a
"real company" that has more stable revenue flows; from a company with a bunch of gifted artists
with a room for self-expression to one with a group of dispensable designers and excited
programmers. It has changed the very critical mass of the company, which will increasingly have
to depend on its New Jersey operation to leverage big pharma sales. It has changed the
management structure of the company, and the way management interacts with employees.
Indeed, in April 2002 I spent an afternoon at GeneEd where I read out some of my accounts of
GeneEd's emergence from Chapter 2. After my talk, one of the employees told me: "I didn't
recognize what you were talking about. I was saying to myself, this isn't GeneEd. And then I
thought, maybe that was GeneEd a year ago. It seems so long ago, I've forgotten it now"."°
What I want to emphasize, constantly, however, is not just an attribution of credit or
blame to individual people or circumstances that have made GeneEd evolve in certain ways, but
rather to a deeper structural logic, of a start-up "growing up" into a corporation, that leads to
certain tendential outcomes. This is not to say that there this evolutionary path for GeneEd was in
any way necessary, or not the outcome of strategic, contingent, occassionally even lucky, events.
It is to say that had those contingencies not occurred, the "alternative" GeneEd would not have
remained a happy-go-lucky, selling-to-biotech, artistically expressive start-up, but would have
run out of funds and ceased to exist. There is a logic of capitalism that pushes towards growth in
certain ways, that necessitates streamlining, dispensability and standardization, and that pushes
against all those qualities of exuberance, innovation and risk-taking that allow start-ups to start-up
'09 Paul Eisele, interview with the author, 1 April 2002.
I" I keep this employee anonymous. Interview with the author, 2 April 2002.
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in the first place, and also to create a certain type of community that everyone, management and
employees alike, can buy into and feel a part of. It is this logic, perhaps, that explains the
managerial inertia of big pharmaceutical relative to small biotech companies, an inertia that is
often hugely profitable, and that also perhaps explains why successful entrepreneurs, such as,
most famously, Jim Clark (the founder of Silicon Graphics and Netscape), become "serial"
entrepreneurs instead of staying on to manage and grow the company they have founded. It is,
most starkly, a logic that in its acting out shows the alienation of the worker from the products of
her labor, as Marx diagnosed as fundamentally symptomatic of capitalism a century and a half
ago.
A crucial labor question, especially as companies grow, then becomes the question of loyalty. If
employees in a start-up are able to ubuy in" to a start-up vision (especially if, like Apple, it attracts a certain
amount of symbolic capital along with it- GeneEd for instance certainly does because of it being an
"education" company, and therefore in a "worthwhile" business), then why is it that employees who are part
of a corporate structure that strives to increasingly grow out that adolescent idealism as they become 'real"
corporations often equally express certain forms of alliegance to their companies, in certain ways, at certain
sites of speech?
In order to explore this question somewhat, I turn to one such site of speech, the industrial genome
conference organized by The Institute of Genomic Research (TIGR) in Miami in 1999. In the process, I want
to hint not just at affective manifestations of corporate loyalty (and lack thereof), but also, some more, at the
role of performance and excess in fashioning certain sorts of corporate presence, and corporate presents.
If the show was stolen by any company in 1999, it was Incyte (whose presence I referred to earlier
in the chapter in my reference to Randy Scott, and will refer to again in the context of this conference in
Chapter 6). For starters, they were platinum co-sponsors of this conference, equal status with Celera
(which, at the time, was run by Craig Venter, who had founded TIGR; and which was also Incyte's major
and most direct genomics company rival). And they were the visible co-sponsors, having sent out letters and
pamphlets beforehand and having gone to great lengths to make that status apparent. Incyte TV, which was
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a closed circuit TV channel that the company had arranged in the rooms of all the conference attendees,
was giving them added visibility.
In terms of actual products, I think it bears emphasizing here that, as mentioned earlier, Incyte at
this time was generating a range of products - it is a genomics company, in that it is one of the major
companies involved in high-throughput sequencing; and it is a bioinformatics company. So they produced
and sold databases, did sequencing for themselves as well as contract sequencing for other companies, did
microarray and SNP work and developed software. Again, speed is very much a central theme here. A lot of
Incyte's consumers (like with many other genomics / bioinformatics companies) are other companies, and
Incyte's claim is that they uspeed your genomic research". And their motto, I think, is interesting to mention
again: Genomics for Life.
A central event at which this conference crystallized as an 'Incyte' conference was at the
concluding party. I was with Puneet,"' who was an Indian graduating with a Master's degree in computer
science, and who had spent much of this conference looking for jobs in a bioinformatics / genomics /
pharmaceutical company. At the party, he was in his final frenzy of collecting and collating job offers. Earlier
in the day, he had been offered a job by Pangea, and over that evening Pangea's main rival Neomorphic
had come up with an offer too. Puneet had actually done an internship with Neomorphic earlier in the year,
and had many friends and attachments there, which made him ambivalent about going to work about
Neomorphic's direct competitors. Nonetheless, he was now saying that he would rather join Pangea
because they're a bigger company."2
But further conversation had to be restricted as this extremely loud brass band started playing, and
the festivities really began. We met James Kirk, an employee at locyte, and Puneet endeared both of us to
him by telling him with unabashed enthusiasm how Incyte had completely stolen the thunder at the
conference. This was clearly a feeling that the Incyte people shared, and it was evident from the multitude of
"' Not his real name.
112 Look at the early part of this chapter for the starkly differential eventual stories of the two companies,
with Neomorphic getting acquired by Affymetrix in a deal widely understood to have very lucrative for the
former, and Pangea (later renamed Doubletwist) going out of business after running through all its money.
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cheerful light blue t-shirts (it's very easy in these settings to tell who's from which company) that they were
feeling extremely cocky about the way things had gone. Indeed, the relative performances (in both senses
of the word) of Incyte and Celera at the conference was evident just from their relative presences at the
party. At this point, there were hardly any Celera dark blues to be seen against the Incyte light blues. And
Venter didn't even stay till the end, having been "called away to the White House".
The rest of the evening was dance, music, spectacle - and what a lot of it! This really was a big
party, and there was clearly a sense of celebration, abandon, confidence, aggression about this group of
people. These were powerful and happy people, and they knew it. In the middle of an extremely crowded
dance floor, Puneet met the one Incyte person he'd been looking for throughout the conference: a friend of
his brother's, Sid ("Squid") Collins. And for all his efforts, all his anxieties, all his attempts to woo the Incyte
people with his accomplishments and his background, all he really needed to do was meet Squid - the
minute Squid realized that Puneet was his friend's brother, he offered him a job at Incyte.
Was Puneet happy. This was what he'd been waiting for. Neomorphic and Pangea and Curagen
are all very well, Roche and Millennium are enticing and worth thinking over, but this moment was all about
Incyte, and Squid's offer had made Puneet a part of that moment. And indeed, the party seemed
increasingly to be about Incyte - they were the ones present and taking over.
So there's my little sub-story of Puneet, new friend and graduating student. He'd come here and
met up with his of Neomorphic friends, a group of friends who'd become so close to him when he was
interning with them that they let him stay in their rooms and sit in on their meetings; he'd impressed others
into friendship, and in some cases case even a certain degree of fondness; his qualifications were good
enough that he'd had a couple of other offers purely on professional merit; but with Incyte stealing the show,
none of that mattered anymore, not even that he hadn't managed to make contact with the Celera people
(who would probably have been his dream choice coming into Miami). But that brings me to the issue of
brands: how is it that a company's name can be so attractive that it makes people forget individual
relationships and principles just to be a part of that name? How is it that people can be so completely a part
of a name that they can mold their actions and characters into the actions and characters signified by that
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name (and here the question of these multiple corporate "cultures", at once individual and yet totalizing,
comes up)? And yet shift allegiances so easily that when they get a better offer from a better name they shift
not themselves not just physically but in so many other intangible ways as well? How is it that Puneet could
change sides so many times, in two days, between companies that were mutual rivals, just at the prospect
of belonging to one side or the other? So somehow, in some intangible way, value had been added to the
Incyte brand In pure Marxian terms, this is surplus value of a sort, but it's not easy to completely capture in
simple Marxian categories of value either. What is this value, that is bome of the fetishization of intangibles,
of excess, of visions, of futures, that is located neither in persons nor in things, but in trademarks and
company names? 13
The final set of announcements was a public acknowledgment of the shadow boxing between
Celera and Incyte throughout the conference, as a woman representing the absent Venter took digs at
Scott, which Scott, now in complete control, rebutted with ease. Now the finale was clearly Randy Scott's
moment of triumph, and the moment when he could strut his triumph. As he walked onto the stage the air
was filled with chants of "Randy! Randy!" On the other side, the few brave darker blue shirts were mustering
a few half-hearted taunts and jibes. Puneet was by now very much a part of the light blues, swept away by
the Incyte frenzy, a chanting and completely homogenous fragment of the corporate collectivity that Incyte
at this moment, in this place, was...
Scott gave a toast. To the genomics community. Because, as he said, "There is not a single person
in this room who's in genomics for themselves. They're in genomics for Life". Mirroring, indeed, Incyte's
logo, Genomics for Life™.
As I walked away, I passed Scott, being led out onto the dance floor by a young blonde woman, a
floor that was now almost exclusively packed with light blue Incyte t-shirts. My last glimpse was of Scott's
113 Bataille would argue that this mode of excess is a fundamental playing out of what he calls "general
economy", which he argues is marked by expenditure as a sign of the surplus consumption that is the
fundamental logic and driving force of capitalism. See Bataille 1988 (1967). See also Coombe 1997 for the
ways in which corporate brand names, trademarks and similar images create certain types of popular
imaginaries as a consequence of their lack of place, that often mirrors the diffuse, despatialized
territorialization that epitomizes (at least big, multi-national) corporations.
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ginger dance steps, hands clasped behind his back, a light blue handkerchief sticking out of his back
pocket. A happy, powerful and triumphant man.
There was, however, also a very different sort of relationship of employee to corporation that I
witnessed at this conference, and that had to do with another informant (kept anonymous), who was working
at the New Haven based company CuraGen. CuraGen was in the business of bioinformatics and data
mining, making it a competitor of other genome companies such as Celera, Incyte, Millennium and Hu man
Genome Sciences. One way in which they emphatically marked themselves out as being different, in terms
of their labor practices, was in forcing their employees to sign a non-compete agreement, which would
contractually ensure that no employee could after leaving CuraGen work for one of its direct competitors for
a stipulated period of time.
Non-competes are agreements that base their rationale in the fact that employees might take with
them proprietary knowledge to a direct competitor to the detriment of the original company. And yet they are
agreements that, while possible to enforce on the East Coast, are virtually impossible to enforce in
California, simply because of the profusion of high-tech jobs in close physical proximity to one another, and
the competitiveness of the job market. There is hardly any lawyer at a California-based high-tech company
who will draw up a non-compete agreement as a part of the employee's working contract with the company.
This means, of course, that proprietary knowledge is constantly moving from company to company as
employees shift jobs. Not only has it not decimated the high-tech industry in places like Silicon Valley (far
from it), it has, according to a number of people I have talked to there, fostered greater innovation because it
has enabled a more rapid diffusion of ideas. Whether it has actually done so or not, it has undeniably
fostered a more open corporate culture, by and large, than there is in at least biotech companies on the
East Coast, as I indicated in Chapter 2. Here is one way in which "corporate cultures", which are, after all,
forms of accepted and normative behavior that are sanctioned and / or encouraged in specific workplace
contexts, get co-produced by legal constraints or their absence.
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My informant, another Indian whom I shall call Vipender, was extremely unhappy at CuraGen,
which he felt was a company with little direction and an unhappy work environment. He had done everything
he could to avoid signing his non-compete, though he couldn't get away with his avoidance beyond a certain
point. And yet now, he had received a job offer from Millennium. The only way he could make the transition
without getting into a lot of trouble was by completely keeping his move secret from CuraGen, to the point
where he proceeded, over the next few months, to even cut off contact with those of his acquaintances
whom he knew had friends at CuraGen. Apparently, CuraGen was in the process at that point of taking
action against another former employee who had left them to work for Celera, and he didn't want to face the
same fate.
CHAPTER 5: OWNERSHIP AND ETHICS
The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values.... [I]t may
be doubted, firstly whether there exist any antitheses at all, and secondly whether these
popular evaulations and value-antitheses, on which the metaphysicians have set their seal,
are not perhaps merely foreground valuations, merely provisional perspectives, perhaps
moreover the perspectives of a hole-and-corner, perhaps from below, as it were frog-
perspectives. '14
Ethics has become the dominant mode of public conversation about emergent biosocial
situations."5
5.1: Banking (on) Biologicals
I have already touched upon some of the ownership issues that arise out of genomics in
the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will expand upon some of those issues. In the process, I
will also ponder the role of institutionalized bioethics as an increasingly legitimate arbiter of
disputes surrounding the ownership of biologicals.
-I will use two controversies as starting points for this analysis. The first is a court case,
Moore v. the Regents of the University of California (1990; henceforth the Moore case), and the
second is the controversy surrounding the patenting of DNA sequences. In the former case, John
Moore, a patient afflicted with hairy celled leukemia, had his spleen cells excised. The
researchers belonging to the University of California were able to convert these cells into a
unique cell line (which they named Mo, after Moore) and were able to patent the cell line. When
Moore found out that derivatives of his spleen cells had been made without his knowledge and
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114 Nietzsche (1973 [1886]): 16.
."5 Cohen (1999): 146.
consent and had been patented, he demanded a share in the property rights. The case was finally
decided in the California Supreme Court, which while upholding Moore's claim that the UC
researchers had shown a breach of fiduciary duty and had not obtained proper informed consent,
denied him any property rights in the cell line, which it was claimed was the researchers'
"invention". In other words, in the words of critical legal theorist James Boyle, Moore was "the
author of his destiny, but not of his spleen" (Boyle, 1997: 107).
In the DNA patenting controversy, however, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the
exalted status )f intellectual property law has looked slightly more crumbly, and many groups
with specific interests are trying to devise strategies to get around IP in these areas.
Both of these controversies surround the ownership of human biologicals, in an era in
which "biological" increasingly functions as a noun. The general moral tone that inflects these
controversies -- and that is particularly stark in institutionalized bioethics discourse -- is that the
human biological should be "respected" by being kept outside the realm of commodification.
There is, however, a key difference between the moment of Moore (1990), and the
current controversies around DNA patenting a decade later, because, as described in the previous
chapter, it has in the intervening years become increasingly easy to informationalize human
biologicals. Therefore, the controversy surrounding the patenting of DNA sequence information
is essentially about the ownership of genetic information. Now why is this significant?
Actually, this difference is often not seen as significant, and sliding over this difference is
not without consequence. A recent 60 Minutes show on American TV for instance explored DNA
patenting and critiqued it as something that horrible biotech companies were doing in order to
stake property claims on something that is supremely human and for that reason outside the realm
of commodity circulation. Now, if genes are information -- which is what molecular biologists
and bioinformaticians tells us -- then patenting information about our genes is equivalent to
patenting our genes. But is it really? It is important, I will argue, to tease out the difference
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between the patenting of human biological materials and human biological information. In other
words:
Human genetic information is a new type of human biological material that the genomic
revolution has made increasingly accessible to annotation and analysis.
Let me tease out further the different social lives of material and informational biological.
Even though these are different "things", a continued relationship exists between them. This
relationship is primarily one of temporality. Biological information helps to rationalize wet lab
experiments. Therefore, one can use bioinformatics in sequence homology searches in order to
determine the probable function of a protein encoded by that particular sequence. The tissue from
which information has been extracted then has two functions: it could serve as a continued
"repository" of future information whose extraction isn't even anticipated at the time of the initial
experiments. Further, there is often a need to go back and do wet lab experiments on these tissues
to actually validate what the information from the tissue suggests about molecular activities
within the tissue. In other words, information is detached from its biological material originator to
the extent that it does have a separate social life, but the "knowledge" provided by the
information is constantly relating back to the material biological sample. The database plays a
key intermediary role in the transition of "information" to "knowledge": in this case specifically
knowledge that is of relevance to therapy. It is knowledge that is always relating back to the
material biological that is the source of the information; but it is also knowledge that can only be
obtained, in the first place, through the extraction of information from the material biological.
The abstraction of information away from the material biological has a very specific function in
making therapeutically relevant knowledge. This is also why it is so easy to intuitively
conceptualize the generation of information as "inventive", and therefore ownable.
Therefore, it is important not to collapse analyses of human biologicals into one category
without teasing out the different (if related) social lives of material and informational biological.
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What is really new here is less the fact of human genetic information as something that
can be obtained, accessed and made "thingly", as much as it is the sheer volume of information
that is now available. At the same time, this is also not something that is synonymous with other
types of human biological material, such as the cell lines that were patented in Moore. The
question to be asked is how different forms of biological -- material .nd informational -- interact,
and how overlapping or different the politics around their respective ownership is.
The nature of interaction depends on the type of work that is performed in different cases.
The working draft sequence of the human genome that was published in June 2000, for instance,
does not document genetic variability between individuals and populations, which is of
increasing importance in generating information relevant for diagnostic and therapeutic
development. For that, one needs DNA from different individual, patient or population groups.
The development of, for instance, pharmacogenomics or personalized medicine, which many
people claim is the ultimate aim of genomics, is vitally dependent on getting large collections of
DNA samples (usually obtained as blood samples, occasionally as tissue samples depending on
the disease being focused on). The market terrain that manifests this logic is represented in Figure
5.1.
Now in this model of genetic research, you obtain human biological material from
different, often clearly identified, patient or population groups that are strategically selected and
then genotype them (i.e. find out their genetic sequence). Through such large-scale analysis,
especially when situated across multiple populations or patient groups, it is possible to obtain
information on that genetic variability that centrally underlies specific traits or diseases of
interest. The human biological material -- not information -- is usually obtained from hospitals
with which researchers draw up specific agreements, though other sources are also occasionally
tapped. The Iceland-based genomics company DeCode Genetics, for instance, obtains material
from the general population. That material is stored in a tissue repository of some sort. These
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repositories could be within the company that is planning to perform subsequent research (as it is
in the case of DeCode), or in a public domain tissue collection, or, with increasing frequency, in
specific companies who base their entire business models on serving as such repositories. The
information that is generated from this material is often converted into databases. These databases
are (or so it is hoped by the companies developing them) the precursors of therapy. In an ideal
world, the company that generates the database would like to hold the information and use it in its
own drug discovery program. In reality, taking drugs to market is so heavily capital intensive that
most database companies license their information to big pharmaceutical companies (again, in the
case of the Icelandic example, you see that DeCode has licensed its database to the multinational
pharmaceutical giant Hoffmann-la Roche). In this way they try to ensure that information pays
off. Now the key footnote in Figure 5.1, which I will get back to later, is that genotyping alone is
not enough to generate meaningful information about the genetic basis of disease: there is an
absolute importance of medical history that can be correlated with the genotype. It's only in the
correlation of the two types of information that true meaning can be extracted. 6 Having in
addition information about family medical history is even more valuable, but is very rare except
in cases like Iceland. Now the dream for any company that is indulging in this business is that
they can do all three of the above steps: collect the DNA, generate valuable information and then
develop a drug. In reality, as I've already mentioned, different companies end up concentrating
their business models on specific points of this value chain. Some examples of this are shown in
Figure 5.2.
Therefore, you have companies like Genomics Collaborative and First Genetic Trust,
which are (at this point at least) primarily DNA repositories. You have DeCode, that is a DNA
repository but is using that repository very much as a means to develop its own database
reflecting the genetic information of the Icelandic people. Then you have the archetypal database
116 One could conceptualize this by the relationship: Rx Genomic Info = genetic material + genotype
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companies, what I call "first-generation" genome companies that sprung up in the heart of the
race to sequence the human genome. Incyte Genomics continues to firmly resist the market
pressures to become a drug development company and is remaining a database company." 7
Various other database companies have moved to a greater or lesser degree towards drug
development."8 Therapy is still very much the domain of big pharmaceutical companies, though
there are some older biotech companies such as Genentech who have developed drugs that might
be called "genomic", though these companies were not making databases as part of their business
model as Incyte or Celera were.
Controversy around DNA patenting has really only involved the part of the value chain
that leads from database downstream to therapy. However as I hope is clear, issues surrounding
ownership that most closely resemble the Moore controversy have more to do with the part of the
chain between repository and database. The field upon which intellectual property debates in
biotechnology take place is framed by these two sets of debates. Before I move onto the latter set
of issues, I would once again like to go over the actors in the DNA patenting controversy and
mention what each actor's stakes are.
As suggested in Chapter 4, there are broadly speaking three groups that oppose DNA
patenting. The first are public researchers, who believe that information should be in the public
domain. This is both for reasons of logic (generating sequence, they say, is not particularly
inventive) and of ideals (an adherence to a certain Mertonian ideal of communism, as reflected in
conventions that involve depositing sequence information into a public repository before it can be
published by a journal). It must also be remembered that the American state through the National
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information + medical information.
117 Though like any other struggling company, Incyte's business model has been oscillating rapidly in the
past few months.
Institutes of Health (NIH) has been a major enabler of private research. Further, the NIH itself has
a historical relationship to gene patenting that it would rather forget, having burnt its fingers
trying to patent DNA sequences from brain tissue in 1991 (see Cook-Deegan 1994: 311-325)."9
Then there is the general public, at least that section that is agitated about DNA
sequences getting patented, and who get represented through media interventions like the 60
Minutes show I mentioned earlier. This type of opposition seems to stem mostly from a gut
ethical or moral opposition to the idea of human genetic information being in the realm of
commodification. Such a position, as I've tried to argue until this point, does not make much
distinction between material and informational biological -- human DNA information, in this
point of view, becomes "living matter" in the same way that cell lines do.
The third group that is opposed to patenting DNA sequence information however is in my
opinion the most intriguing, and those are pharmaceutical companies. As is evident from the
value chain that I outlined earlier, database companies are the ones who try and patent DNA
sequence information so that they can sell / license it. Pharmaceutical companies usually have to
pay upstream licensing fees and subsequent royalties on any therapy they may discover to these
database companies. They would, therefore, much prefer information to be accessible in the
public domain. Therefore, even public / private debates are over-coded by corporate fights. In
other words, and this is crucial:
What distinguishes the genomics /I drug development marketplacefrom, say, the software industry
is its peculiar upstream - downstream terrain. Drug development is such a capital-intensive
process that there are veryfew companies with the muscle to actually take drug to market.'20
"8 Celera, perhaps the best known of these "first generation" companies, is actually much more tentative in
its movement towards drug development than rivals such as CuraGen, Millennium and especially Human
Genome Sciences.
9 The person who filed that patent application was actually J. Craig Venter, CEO of Celera, which
controversially raced the public Human Genome Project to sequence the human genome.
120 One might think, however, that the state, were it so willing, might have the muscle to bring drugs to
market. Historically however the state, and not just in the United States, has been very good at initial
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Remember, also, that none of the DNA sequence patent debate touches upon the
desirability or otherwise of 20-year drug patents, which are still unthreatened. Therefore The SNP
consortium (which, as described in the previous chapter, is an alliance of public researchers and
ten of the world's biggest multinational pharmaceutical companies to keep information of
nucleotide-level genetic variation in the public domain), is very much in the interests of the big
pharma partners as well. (Of course, it is often projected that big pharmaceutical companies are
entering into willing alliances with public researchers and relinquishing patent rights on DNA
sequences in order to facilitate cheap, fast and easy flow of information towards therapy. This is
not untrue; what gets hidden from such rhetoric is that is isn't these guys who're in the business of
leveraging sequence patents for profit in the first place. See Chapter 4 for an elaboration of this
argument). What I want to emphasize at this point is that the different approaches to DNA
patenting between, say, Hoffman-la Roche and Celera is not because Celera is inherently evil or a
nasty little spoiler while Roche realizes the benefits of free downstream flow of information. It is
because pharma companies and database companies occupy fundamentally different market
niches that dictate how they approach DNA patenting. All companies are aggressive protectors of
intellectual property when it benefits them.' It is this particular upstream - downstream terrain
that distinguishes the drug development industry from, say, the internet or finance industries.22
capital outlay that enables the development of private industry, but has been very bad at successful long-
term execution on capital-intensive projects. Therefore, while the idea of a "public-sector" pharmaceutical
company might be tempting to those who believe that the state should invest heavily in the development of
accessible therapeutics, this is likely to remain out of even the spectrum of options that states generally
explore. Further, in the United States, there exists an extremely strong pharmaceutical company lobby in
Congress. Therefore, the US state has very close relationships with big pharma.
121 It is important here to keep in mind, as suggested in the previous chapter, the parallels between property
(as, in this case, enshrined in intellectual property rights) and territoriality, both of which are based on the
right to exclude. This becomes relevant in the context of the Indian state's efforts to negotiate themselves
into intellectual property agreements, that I discuss later in the chapter.
122 The analogy of the upstream-downstream terrain of drug development with the software market is
interesting for me to think through further. I have suggested that the capital intensitivity of drug
development makes it very unlikely that small biotech companies will ever really compete with and
displace big pharmaceutical companies. Such a capital intensive environment as a competitive advantage
for large companies doesn't really exist in industries like the software industry. In other words, I have
suggested that the very nature of drug development makes it that much harder to alter the fundamental
power relations between small and big companies. Having said this, the fact remains that in the software
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For the rest of this part of the chapter, I want to focus on ownership issues that arise when
one deals with the first half of the value chain I showed earlier: the bit concerning itself with
creating databases from corporate DNA repositories. What sorts of ownership barriers underlie
the business models of the companies that concentrate on this part of the value chain? I will
specifically talk about one company, a commercial DNA repository based in the Northeastern
United States that I shall refer to as Repository X (Rep-X).'23
industry, few organizations hav6 seriously tried to go up against Microsoft's core business. There have been
many that have tried to compete with one or two products or services that Microsoft has offered, but the
only significant challenges have come from those companies that have fundamentally tried to change the
rules of the game (such as Netscape or AOL). The costs of bringing any big product to market, regardless
of industry, are likely to keep the number of competitors low. Nonetheless, the time the biotech industry
was just beginning (in the late 70s) was the time a little start-up called Microsoft was challenging such
established computing giants such as IBM and Wang. Even if Microsoft has an impenetrable hold on the
software market today, there has historically (as seen in Microsoft's own case) been the room for the sort of
emergence of a small company into a giant corporation that has just never happened in biotech. I am
grateful to Alexander Brown for conversations that have helped me think through these parallels.
I have wrestled with the issue of whether to name this company or not, and am still not sure that my
decision to keep it anonymous is the correct one. However, there are a number of reasons why I have
chosen to do so, and I think this extended footnote is of some consequence in thinking through
methodological questions surrounding the ethical choices that one makes while doing corporate
ethnographies.
Joseph Dumit ponders these questions very seriously in his recent work on venture science (still
unpublished), where he names two biotechnology companies and has therefore consciously decided to
avoid interviewing people at these companies. In this case, however, I had already interviewed two people
at Rep-X (one employee and one manager, one on-tape and one off-tape) before I learnt of the company's
controversial situation in India that I discuss in this chapter. At no point in this chapter do I draw upon
these conversations. As Dumit has shown, it is both legitimate and a challenge to do corporate ethnography
by working from the public record in order to reserve the right to "tackle" certain actors. While that is
precisely what I have done in this chapter (using not just the public record, but public documents that Rep-
X has had a significant hand in "spinning" to its own advantage), the problem of how to "forget" my
conversations at Rep-X is a lingering one. I have decided to keep Rep-X anonymous until I have resolved it
for myself.
This is, as much as anything, an acknowledgement that anthropology is different from journalism,
and one of the lines of difference is the relationship with informants. Journalism is adversarial by nature:
the work is to "get" a story out of a subject, even if there is a long-term relationship involved. The
challenge for an anthropology such as this is to be ethical and non-adversarial, which is not to say non-
critical. At the end of the day, anthropologists write, in part, to their subjects, not just to their colleagues
and beyond.
Corporate ethnography involves writing about what is fundamentally a culture of secrecy. It is
possible to be fascinated by how and why things get made secret, without necessarily feeling the obligation
to make public what the subjects want kept secret. This is precisely the opposite of the investigative
journalist. On a basic level, the journalist wants the "truth" that is "out there", while the anthropologist
wants, at least as one set of perspectives without, which one cannot understand the motivational or
intentional side of social action, something like the subject's truth, or truth in Foucault's sense of "the
system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of
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In its corporate description, Rep-X calls itself "a functional genomics company with a
comprehensive, clinical approach to discovery, focused on developing high value, proprietary
intellectual property for its own account and in collaboration with major biopharmaceutical
companies. Rep-X maintains the [Rep-X proprietary repository]'24 , an unparalleled, large-scale
resource of clinical research material, including human DNA, serum and snap-frozen tissue
samples, linked to detailed medical information collected from patients worldwide. To date, Rep-
X has recruited more than 100,000 patients in its effort to build the [Rep-X proprietary
repository], and collections continue".'25 In other words, what Rep-X wants to become is the
world's largest commercial DNA repository, collecting DNA samples from a!l over the world,
genotyping them and then leveraging them for profit.
Now obviously a business model such as this can be deemed by many as ethically
somewhat fraught, as indeed the controversies over DeCode and the Icelandic genomic database
have shown (though the key differences have to be borne in mind here: two of the major reasons
why DeCode is so controversial is because they presume consent rather than obtain informed
consent to use medical information; and secondly, because they have been given exclusive rights
statements.. .linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it" (Foucault 1980:
133).
One strategy I considered was going to Rep-X's Investor Relations department to ask for their
comments on what I heard in India, but I decided against that journalistic tactic as well. My sense is that if
this really is a public relations disaster that is waiting to happen for Rep-X, then there are strategies that can
be employed in conversation with the involved representatives of the Indian state -- who are, after all,
extremely articulate and media savvy -- in making that happen.
Finally, I believe that a number of people invested (in all senses of the word) in the world I am
studying will read this chapter with an eye that will see through most anonymizations. Also, any
agreements I have with companies that I have done longer-term work with (this not applying to Rep-X,
where I only had a couple of conversations, and no long-term agreements) make it clear that I have the
option of using the companies' names unless they would explicitly prefer me not to. Until shown otherwise,
I adopt the methodological rule that the anthropologically interesting issues do not resolve into "dirty
secrets" but are structurally interesting dilemmas.
I feel, in spite of that discomfort, that the story of Rep-X will be illustrative of situations I want to
explain even if I don't directly locate it. This is a common dilemma for medical anthropologists working in
hospital settings, who often choose to report medical mistakes with clinical consequences that they observe
through official channels which are not public. When they write about such situations, they tend to severely
anonymize them so that the account can't be pointed back at all.
124 Name of repository anonymized.
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for their database by the Icelandic parliament. Rep-X does adopt an informed consent procedure,
and in theory at least any company could base itself on Rep-X's business model and compete
with them for sample collection). So clearly bioethics is a key area in which Rep-X takes an
interest, which is not unusual for a biotech company these days. Indeed, Rep-X has its own in-
house bioethicist, a bioethicist being a peculiar breed of individual who professes "expertise" in
the ethical issues that surround new biotechnologies.'26 In fact the CEO of Rep-X says of hiring
bioethicists: "I'm surprised more companies don't do it. It doesn't cost us anything, and in the
end it may save us [money, time or reputation]. I mean, the whole idea of it is so reasonable.
We've always said that if we are going to be on the front page of the New York Times we'd better
make sure we get it right". 27
Rep-X haven't yet made it to the front page of the Times, but they have made it to the
business page of the Boston Globe, testifying to the enormous amount of generally favorable
publicity they have been getting in business and investor circles in the US. The Globe article is
typically celebratory, and paints a picture of dynamism, speed and incessant progress, none of
which is an unusual character sketch of a young biotech company. Let me quote a little from this
article:
"When the FedEx driver rings the bell on the loading dock at [Rep-X], it's a call to
action. The driver unloads bundles of special envelopes marked with the biohazard symbol: fresh
samples of tissue and blood from patients nationwide. Within minutes, technicians scurry to open
individual plastic kits. Glass vials of blood, each identified only by a bar code, are quickly
125 This quote is obtained from the Rep-X web page. However, in order to preserve anonymity, the exact
citation cannot be provided.
126 The fact that even the ethical questions are unclear seems to be lost on most bioethicists, who further
believe they have most of the answers to these unarticulated questions. But that is well in keeping with the
American institutional desire to have systems run by bodies of experts rather than through genuine public
participation, and that is a whole topic for another day. Nonetheless, see The Romance of American
Psychology (Herman 1996), a disciplinary study of the rise of "mind sciences", which becomes perceived
as officially an expert discourse. This is a general post - World War I development in the US. Thanks to
David Kaiser for pointing me to this reference.
242
scanned into the computer - like a giant grocery checkout in reverse. Processing the samples is a
carefully choreographed blend of tedious hard work and blazingly fast robotic automation".'28
And so it goes on: the combination of speed and genius combining to create value from a novel
business model, the seamless rhetoric reflecting the seamless operations of an aggressive young
company.129
Now the big "ethical" issue that Rep-X confronts, a la Moore, is not the fact that it can
own samples, but the fact that it should collect them properly - as their CEO suggested in the
quote I read out earlier, "doing it" isn't the question as much as "doing it right" is. In other
words, like the judges who constituted the majority opinion in Moore, Rep-X is most worried
about getting proper informed consent. It knows that in the US at least getting exclusive property
rights on the samples doesn't really constitute the bottleneck. This is reflected in Rep-X's
fascinating statement of what it calls "Rigorous Ethical Standards", which states:
"[Rep-X] is committed to maintaining the highest ethical standards possible, and to that
end, meets quarterly with a distinguished Bioethics Advisory Board that has been invaluable in
developing innovative solutions to the range of ethical problems posed by genetic research. In
addition, [Rep-X] has created a proprietary system for anonymizing collections while ensuring
data quality and protecting patient confidentiality. Informed consent and patient rights are key to
[Rep-X]'s operations, and ensure sample quality while maintaining pristine ethical standards.
Working with international leaders in the area of informed consent for genetic research, [Rep-X]
has developed consent procedures appropriate to the repository context". 30 Not only does Rep-X
in statements like this espouse itself as the embodiment of ethical practice, it also sets up the idea
127 This is also a quote linked to Rep-X's web page, and therefore will not be cited in order to preserve
anonymity.
128 Exact citation not provided to preserve anonymity.
129 I am particularly intrigued by the way in which this article makes DNA sample delivery sound like
groceries being delivered. This could, from the tone of the article, be a description of such online grocery
stores as homeruns.com or namaste.com. This is not merely an interesting discourse: it is, I believe, a
strategic one. After all, making controversial activities seem mundane is key to naturalizing them.
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that an institutionalized bioethics provides expertise that can transcend national boundaries and
contexts, in the same way that the genetic samples Rep-X collects do. Indeed, Rep-X's statement
is quite typical of the disclaimers that are central to many of the companies that occupy the part of
the value chain between repository and database, and concerns itself with proper informed
consent procedures for sample collection, privacy and confidentiality. Of course, what is notably
missing in this statement is anything to do with ownership rights, which, as in the case of Moore,
are deemed non-negotiable. This is because it is the company that's doing the genotyping that's
deemed to be the "inventive" work; where samples come from merely constitutes source, which
is always written out of intellectual property agreements.
Unfortunately for Rep-X and the retinue of "expert" bioethicists who profess
transnational and universal problem-solving capabilities, the expertise of institutionalized
bioethics, professing as it does primarily American (and sometimes European) codes for ethical
governance - such as we worry about informed consent and privacy, but sharing ownership is not
even an ethical question - doesn't translate very well into other socio-political and geographical
contexts.'3 ' My last set of points therefore is going to have to do with the friction that Rep-X's
1
30 Yet again, I will not provide the exact citation, which is taken from Rep-X's web page.
131 The question of why bioethics concerns itself so little with questions of ownership is an interesting and
important one to address. A major reason is disciplinary and pedagogical: institutionalized bioethics,
especially in the US, draws largely from analytic philosophy, which engages normative questions much
more readily than questions that are more explicitly "political". My suspicion, however, is that Moore has
served as more than just a legal precedent: it has further served as a normative precedent, that suggests
somehow that ownership issues are "settled". This is why challenges to intellectual property regimes come
much more often from that messy and unpredictable space of the public domain, and through the messy and
unpredictable routes of politics, than through institutionalized spaces that, at some level, do exist to channel
and regulate this messiness through the "sanity" of expert mediation. In other words, it isn't just the content
of bioethics that I find problematic. It is the bioethicists' mediation in such debates as experts, to the
exclusion of other participating voices, that makes institutionalized bioethics such an undemocratic
institution, even when it manages to be an "ethical" one. There is, however, a substantive underlying
conceptual question at stake here, which is that, firstly, bioethics therefore ends up representing particular
interests, and, secondly, sets itself up as a universal discourse. In other words, I do not argue here for a
relativist position that somehow reifies an "Indian" bioethical position that ought to be regarded as
pristinely distinct from a "Western" one, and therefore left untouched or unquestioned. What I do argue is
that this posing as universal what is in fact a reflection of very particular, situated interests makes
institutionalized bioethics a supremely ideological enterprise, in the sense in which Marx (1963 [1845])
critiqued ideology as being in opposition to materialist understandings of the world in The German
Ideology. Further, it must be remembered that bioethicists, when deployed in the corporate cause such as in
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seamless rhetoric encounters in the practical context of collecting genetic samples from India: a
friction of course that is completely left out of the narrative that institutionalized bioethics, the
business press and Rep-X's own public relations apparatus construct for it.
India occupies a particularly interesting and ambiguous space in global technoscience
writ large, a space that is particularly accentuated in areas relating to biotechnology and drug
development. At one level very much a Third World country with some of the lowest human
resource indices in the world, India has always privileged science and technology as levers into
globally competitive playing fields. Presently, India's technoscientific establishment is
undergoing a profound period of change, as the institutional socialist model of primarily state
sponsored R & D is giving way to a more market oriented approach. However, some of the most
aggressive market players in Indian biotech are not companies, which are still by and large
reticent and risk-averse, but Indian public sector labs.
Genomics is an area that the Indian government has been particularly interested in. India
did not get into the Human Genome Project in the early 90s, a fact that its scientific policy
establishment was rueing by the mid-90s when it became evident that genomics was where the
action -- and the fame and money -- were at. Therefore, the Centre for Biochemical Technology
(CBT), which for the past 30 years had been a dilapidated centre that has housed biochemical
reagents, became reinvented as India's cutting edge public genome lab. Typically for these new
market oriented public institutions, CBT is very interested in protecting its intellectual property.
the case of Rep-X, act not simply as what Donna Haraway calls "value clarifications specialists"; they also
serve as value creation specialists, creating value in all senses of the word. They both lend legitimacy to the
corporation and structure which questions get asked as ethical.
The question that is left hanging for me then is what a genuinely transnational bioethics would
look like, since I do believe that biotechnology as a global regime needs transnational, democratically
accountable systems of governance and regulation. I think one good place to start would be by
acknowledging, in what would be a classical Marxian fashion, that bioethics ought to be about social
relations rather than about morality. One direction to look for this is towards patient advocacy groups such
as PXE International, that I mention in a later footnote.
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CBT's primary research focus is population genetics, because India's population is one
that can be leveraged for genetic information in two ways. Firstly, there exist a number of
indigenous populations that are considered genetically homogenous, and that might therefore be
interesting groups upon which to perform the sorts of studies DeCode has in mind for the
Icelandic population. Secondly, even India's general heterogenous population is a very good
candidate population for genetic studies, because the prevalence of large families with very little
genetic counseling will allow the family genetics of disease to be traced in a way that's very
difficult to do in the West. 32 CBT therefore is aggressively involved in these studies, with patient
samples largely collected from public hospitals with which it enters into collaboration.
Public labs in India such as CBT, therefore, see Rep-X's sample acquisition in a very
different light from Rep-X.'33 They maintain that Rep-X's samples are worthless, even if
extensively genotyped, without detailed medical records. These medical records are collected
along with the samples from Indian hospitals. Therefore, this argument goes, the Indian hospitals
should have a share in the IP. Indeed, some American companies do draw up extensive legal
arrangements with the hospitals they obtain samples from, such as Ardais, which has an extensive
agreement with the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston. This argument therefore
says that if Rep-X shares IP with Indian hospitals, it can have all the samples it wants. But if it
doesn't, then it is theft. What complicates this analogy is that many of the best known research
hospitals in India are public institutions, whereas in the US, most such hospitals are private and
function as corporations. Therefore, this argument of the Indian state paradoxically frames the
state as itself a corporate entity. This is very much in keeping with a post-1990s ideology of
economic liberalization that has been prominent in Indian elite and policy circles and whose idea
132 Of course, neither of these are obvious or intuitive outside the constantly expanding rationality of
population genetics as a discipline and enterprise that discursively constructs populations as units that
"naturally" exist to be genetically studied.
133 This section is based on conversations with Indian scientists and policy makers. Instead of directly
quoting specific conversations, I have summarized their general content, and will keep specific informants
anonymous.
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of India is as India Inc. In fact, these are demands that have been codified in a set of ethical
policies relating to the human genome, genetic research and services put forth by the Department
of Biotechnology (DBT) of the Ministry of Science and Technology (DBT 2001).
The DBT guidelines explicitly mention intellectual property rights in an "ethics"
document, an incorporation of ownership as an ethical concern that I constantly point to in the
next section as well. It also claims that intellectual property rights are in the "national commercial
interest" (DBT 2001: 2), a rather odd combination of terms normally associated with clearly
demarcated "public" and "private" spheres. The various ways in which benefit sharing is
incorporated as ethical guidelines are enunciated in Article VIII.5 of the document (DBT 2001:
12, which says: "It will be obligatory for national / international profit making entities to dedicate
a percentage [eg. 1% - 3%] of their annual net profit arising out of the knowledge derived by use
of the human genetic material for the benefits of the community"); Article IX. 1 concerning DNA
banking (13: "If any commercial use is made of the samples in the Repository, appropriate
written benefit sharing agreements, consistent with the policies stated earlier, must be jointly
signed by the donor, sample collector and Repository Director"); Article X. 3 concerning
international collaborations (15: "In international collaborative research, when genetic material
from India forms the primary basis of such research, intellectual property rights should be
protected with a majority share of the patent, if any, being held by the collaborating Indian
institution / organization. At least 10% of the benefit accruing from such a patent should be used
by the individual institutions to develop better services for the population(s) that provided genetic
materials. A minimum of 10% of Intellectual Property Rights should be held by Indian institution
/ organization in any international collaborative research").
With Rep-X so far unwilling to draw up IP sharing agreements with Indian hospitals, all
the samples that they have collected from India since October 1999, under the authority of the
Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR), have been prevented from leaving India.
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Who could have guessed from the Globe that a significant outcome of Rep-X's "careful
choreography" involves rotting blood samples n a Third World customs shed?
To summarize this part of the chapter:
* Ownership debates relating to human biologicals tend to confuse the ownership of human
biological material and human biological information. The difference between these two forms of
ownership is not something that is in the intangible realm of bioethics, but is directly related to
different upstream business models that are trying to realize value off of different biological
things (that often, indeed, translate into different types of biological information).
* All of these issues must be situated in the understanding of the drug development marketplace,
which because of the capital-intensive nature of the enterprise, has a very few, very large
companies that are positioned to actually take drugs to market. Most of the upstream innovation
therefore leads ultimately to licensing agreements with big pharma companies. Therefore, it is
much harder to envision a situation in drug development where upstart companies take on the
Microsoft-like giants. What they can primarily do is encumber the marketplace for big pharma,
by developing proprietary knowledge that big pharma has to license.
* When the proprietary "stuff' that is at issue is genetic information that might otherwise have
been in the public domain, it is obviously as much in the interests of pharmaceutical companies as
it is of public researchers to remove the playing field of those patents. Also, the notion of the
"dubious" patent here is very much framed and limited by an ideological notion of research (drug
patents, and their advisability or otherwise, aren't even deemed an issue). Therefore you see
arrangements such as The SNP consortium, which sees the alliance of public researchers with big
pharmaceutical companies to facilitate unfettered release of genetic information into the public
domain.
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* Business models dealing with biologicals further up the value chain, between DNA repository
and database, however, have a different set of ethical issues and ownership politics tied around
them.
Bioethics, which is supposed to be providing the space for ethical and political discourse,
does not believe that central to these issues is ownership -- as an institution, it is more concerned
with informed consent and privacy issues, just like the judges in Moore were.'3 4 There is,
however, a lot of varied resistance to IP laws as they exist surrounding the ownership of human
genetic material, and this resistance takes various forms depending on the stake-holders
involved. 135
The resistance from the Indian state is of a particular order. It doesn't want IP because it
thinks source should be valued. It wants IP because it realizes that generating medical records is
part of the inventive procedure. In fact at first sight the argument that it is public hospitals and not
patients (which is what a model such as PXE International's might suggest) that should share in
IP might seem rather peculiar. Nor is it the Indian state as represented by the ICMR that wants to
share IP, as an institution that can distribute those rights through all hospitals, regardless of where
samples are obtained, as public good. All that the ICMR wants is that the same market principles
for licensing and ownership sharing that get applied in arrangements between hospitals and
1 34 This institutionalized bioethical position is not hugely different from the positions adopted by biotech
"activists" such as Jeremy Rifkin (see, for instance, Rifkin 1998), who fail just as spectacularly to situate
their critiques in any way. I am writing as much against this particular, unsituated mode of "activist"
antagonism towards biotech as I am against institutionalized bioethics, or certain biotech corporate
practices.
You have, for example, the Human Genome Diversity Project, a public project of the NIH, that has met
with fierce opposition from Native American groups, who simply do not want to participate in the genetics
revolution because they don't expect to be the beneficiaries of it. A very different stakeholder is PXE
International, a patient advocacy group founded by Pat and Sharon Terry, who believe they will be direct
beneficiaries of the genomics revolution if they can have some control over research agendas. So they have
negotiated IP agreements with companies in which they share in the IP -- a model that completely overturns
an IP rationale that has always valued "invention" while simultaneously devaluing "source". PXE
International, however, believes that PXE patients who donate their samples through the organization are
not merely "source", since the organization has significant control, through the use of the IP rights, in
charting the inventive agenda. See www.pxe.o for more information on PXE International, and the
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research institutions in the West be reapplied in the Indian context -- a position, as I mentioned
above, that can be deemed problematic both from the point of view of a distributive justice
argument and in the way a public institution frames itself as a corporate entity.'3 6 In the global
(South - North) travel of genetic material, the South / Third World gets framed as "source" --
and this is of course a framing with a colonial legacy, that even anti-imperialists in countries like
India buy into, often legitimately. The Indian argument here is that Rep-X taking samples from
India and patenting it is not colonial expropriation, but industrial theft.
There is a larger contradiction which is embodied in the stance of the Indian state, one
that is not merely conceptual but also strategic. As mentioned above, on the one hand, the Indian
state is framing itself as a market entity engaged in "corporate" fights with a Western corporation
over intellectual property rights. On the other hand, however, the impetus to do so comes largely
from a nationalist indignation about "neo-colonial" expropriation, that is not merely the position
of activists on what might broadly be called the Left, but is very much the motivation for
scientists involved in the science policy establishment in India who have some say in charting the
state's responses to situations such as the one that I have outlined here. This at a moment in
Indian history when nationalism as an unproblematically secular anti-imperialist gesture has been
seriously called into question by Hindu nationalist postures that script a much more aggressive
and exclusionary cultural nationalism. The fact that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the political
wing of the Hindu nationalist movement, is the party leading the coalition government that is
currently in power in India, is not insignificant for scientist policy makers such as S.K.
Brahmachari, Director of CBT, since that makes the BJP their political masters. Therefore, there
Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism web site, www.ipcb.org, for a Native American
organization's perspective.
136 The question of what constitutes "source" and what "invention" is, of course, a central one in IP debates
writ large, and isn't just confined to biotech. The question of what, if anything, is distinct in the blurring of
source and invention in biotech -- other than the obviously different and dramatic political contexts that
some of these biotech controversies operate within -- is of central importance, and something rm very
much grappling with.
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is always already inherent a tension in the articulation of a nationalist position as an anti-
imperialist gesture in a situation such as this.
Perhaps the more acute tension for the purposes of understanding biotechnology as an
integral part of phenomena of globalization, however, is that Indian state actors are, firstly, only
able to take recourse to anti-imperialist postures by coding them as "corporate" fights; and
secondly, that this posture, while effective to the extent of preventing Rep-X from exporting
samples from India, is still partial and fragmentary. While the Indian state, and certain Indian
state actors, are keen to negotiate IP sharing agreements with Western companies, there is a
reluctance to aggressively push for such models at international fora, because it is felt that such a
move might jeopardize foreign investment into India, which is eagerly sought after in the current
climate of economic liberalization, regardless of the ideological persuasions of the parties in
power.'37 In other words, nationalism is completely imbricated in the phenomenon of
globalization, both as a contradictory component, and indeed as an outcome as well.
It is, however, the corporate over-codings of "the nation" that are of particular interest to
me here, and I mention this because both later in this chapter and in Chapter 7 I look at the other
side of this dialectic, at the nationalist underpinnings of the Indian technoscientific endeavor.
Brahmachari, for instance, in a presentation to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), claims that natural resopurces are the property of the nation-
137 I make these claims, again, based on conversations with Indian scientists and policy makers that I feel
delicate about attributing directly to specific people. I do, however, wish to acknowledge one person by
name who has helped me greatly both as an informant and in helping me think through some of the
conceptual issues at stake here. Manjari Mahajan is a student of science policy, who was briefly employed
by S.K. Brahmachari at CBT in order to help him think through some of the science policy issues that
emerged from genomics as a global practice, particularly as they pertained to IP issues. Mahajan has been
particularly keen that the Indian state assert claims for intellectual property rights, rather than simply
request benefit sharing agreements with Western companies (which is the model adopted by most Latin
American companies, and which is a model that Brahmachari, regardless of his personal feelings on the
matter, feels might be the more strategic model to pursue because it risks antagonizing foreign investors
less), because, regardless of the possibly paradoxical framings of state-as-corporate entity that this might
lead to, intellectual property rights are precisely that: they confer proactive rights to exclude others from
using "Indian" genetic material as they please, and they protect against Western companies obtaining
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state, a framing that both denotes legal and contractual commodification of the resources in
question, and the nation-state itself as a quasi-corporate entity (Brahmachari 2001). Such
framings, therefore, raise fundamental theoretical questions regarding the relationship between
territoriality, citizenship and property.'3
As mentioned in the body of this chapter, one of the early and more controversial population
genetics companies is DeCode Genetics, based in Iceland. DeCode is already the subject of controversy
amongst American anthropologists (see Palsson and Rabinow 1999 and M. Fortun 1999a for opposing
positions in this controversy), and has been too extensively "fieldworked" for me to repeat the details too
extensively. Suffice to say at this point that DeCode has received exclusive rights from the Icelandic
Parliament to create a "national" (albeit privately owned) genomic database of the Icelandic population,
combining DeCode's genotyping of population samples with Iceland's national medical records, which are in
existence since 1915 and are amongst the best and most comprehensive public medical records anywhere
in the world. The ability to tap into these records, combined with Iceland's purported genetic 'homogeneity"
(a claim that is ironically already looking a little shaky as a consequence of DeCode's own genotyping work -
- clearly Icelanders are only as 'Icelandic" as DeCode is!), makes this a potentially extremely useful, and
perhaps uniquely comprehensive, population genetic database.
The CEO of DeCode is Kari Stefansson, and he was in Boston in March 1999 for a conference on
Genetic Technology and Society organized at MIT. This was an interesting and unusual conference, as i
got together a range of people who would normally not appear together - scientists, entrepreneurs,
bioethicists, religious leaders, Republican senators - on the same panel. This was clearly an uncomfortable
site of speech for many of the scientists who were invited to talk, as this wasn't the sort of group that they
were normally used to presenting to or with.
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precisely such rights. Benefit sharing agreements, on the other hand, engage a terrain of (usually Western)
corporate philanthropy rather than of rights. Many thanks to Mahajan for these insights.
138 See Sunder Rajan (2001b) for an exploration of some of these themes.
-
___
Before the conference, I had e-mailed Stefansson and asked if we might be able to meet, to which
unsurprisingly he had not responded. The day before his talk, I met him at a conference reception. He is an
extremely tall and stately man, his silver-gray beard matching his perfectly fitting Armani suit. I had told him
about my e-mail, and he was immediately apologetic about not responding, but said we must talk. He
suggested meeting for lunch the following day, which would be just after his talk.
At his panel, Stefansson gave his extremely sculpted presentation on DeCode's business model,
and took great pains to talk about how ethical it is, and how baseless the controversies surrounding it are.
He had clearly worked his pitch out to perfection. One of his co-panelists, a gentle and soft-spoken man
called Martin Teitel from the Council for Responsible Genetics, intervened and responded with the standard
criticisms that have been made of DeCode's business model. At this, Stefansson blew a fuse. He told Teitel
that as Teitel was not a scientist, he was not qualified to talk about DeCode's science, and since he was
American, he really had no authority to pass judgement on what is an Icelandic matter. Teitel gently
responded that if he can't talk about the science without being a scientist, or about Iceland without being
Icelandic, then Stefansson had no right talking about ethics, since Teitel was a trained ethicist and
Stefansson wasn't. Stefansson clearly realized he had made a faux pas, and dramatically shook his head,
buried his face in his hands, patted (rather patronizingly) Teitel on his back, and publicly apologized to
Teitel, admitting he had been way out of line in his outburst.
After the talk, I stood hovering in the vicinity for the promised lunch together, but Stefansson just
whizzed past me to a crony who was seated nearby, grabbed him by the arm, and whispered We need a
bioethicist!"
5.2: "Ethics" in Post-Colonial Context
I have argued in Section 5.1 both that a universalizing enterprise of "expert" bioethics,
that originates largely from American analytic philosophy, is poorly suited to negotiate the
ethical-political complexities of biocapitalism as a global system, and that there is nonetheless an
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urgent need to come up with trans-national, democratically accountable systems of bio-ethical
governance. In this part of the chapter, therefore, I attempt not to suggest how, but to provide a
situated perspective of genomics and biocapitalism as it plays out in India, in order to better
locate, in historically and ethnographically sensitive ways, the sorts of ethical-political
emergences that I hinted at in my analysis of the Rep-X controversy.
Let me start with two quotes. The first, from India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, speaking at the Indian Science Congress in 1938: "It is science alone that can solve these
problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening
custom and tradition, of vast resources running to waste of a rich country inhabited by starving
people." The second, from the manifesto of the Congress Party for the first national government,
as declared in 1945: "Science in its instrumental fields of activity, has played an ever-increasing
part in influencing and moulding human life.... Industrial, agricultural and cultural advance, as
well as national defence depend on it. Scientific research is, therefore, a basic and essential
activity of the State and should be organized and encouraged on the widest scale" (both cited in
Krishna 1997: 236-237).
As is quite clear from the above quotes, Nehru and the Indian National Congress, the
major nationalist party in the anti-imperialist struggle (and the party that has ruled post-colonial
India for 44 of the 55 years since India's independence), accorded a huge importance to science
and technology in India's development. Indeed, one of the central features of the Congress-led
struggle for independence had been that it was very much tied into an intellectual struggle for
independence against colonial science policies that stifled the growth of local technoscientific
institutions. V.V. Krishna explains colonial science in India as being a "planned activity from the
metropolis" (238), where "[t]he colonies were assigned the subordinate tasks of 'data exploration'
and application of existing technical knowledge, while the theoretical synthesis took place in the
metropolis. Devoid of its intellectual essence, the goal of scientific practice in the colony was not
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the advancement of science.. .but the exploration of natural resources, flora and fauna to feed to
intellectual and industrial 'revolution' in the metropolis".
Two things emerge from this: the first, that the "ethical" concerns of the Indian state over
what it sees as expropriation of genetic resources from India for commercialization in the West,
which I describe in section 5. 1, is not simply the reframing of ethics in a local Indian context in
order to somehow "incorporate" ownership and intellectual property as an "ethical" concern, but
is, rather, an ethical-political issue of sensitivity that has its basis in firm historical, material
colonial relationships. It is a historical materialism that must be acknowledged if one is to
understand at least one facet of the nature of the Indian response to companies like Rep-X.
Second, that another part of the colonial political terrain that re-manifests itself in post-1 990s
India with its accent on economic liberalization and globalization, is the emergence of India as a
major contract research site for Western corporations, especially in software, data mining and
back-end corporate activities - a labor dimension to global ethical-political questions that exists
beyond simply biocapitalism, but that is a central part of contemporary global relations between
the industrialized West and rapidly industrializing "Third World" countries like India and China.
These are not just issues that manifest themselves in structural relations of production,
but also do so in the everyday lives of scientists in Indian molecular biology labs, who still feel
slighted that only "me-too" work that reproduces conceptual advances already made in the West
gets accepted for publication in top Western journals, with novel conceptual work invariably
getting looked upon with suspicion. A scientist at the Centre for Biochemical Technology (CBT),
where I did some of my fieldwork, for instance, has this to say:
Getting things accepted in the international community is a problem.... Anything new, I
think they feel we are not competent to propose a hypothesis or...they would be more
demanding in terms of data, in terms of amount of work done.... It is very disheartening
actually.
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[W]e had a person...who works abroad on schizophrenia and he works with a professor
who I think is from South Campus.... He came to our lab and he was trying to find out
whether we could work together with them. He comes to our lab, he sits over here and he
says, "Whatever you are doing, you give us your samples, we will reproduce the same
work abroad and then you will have an easier way of communicating your paper because
nobody will aceept any of the data that you send from here". And he is taking samples
from India and doing the same analysis abroad. He has a cheek to come in our lab and tell
that we will not believe your data unless we produce the same thing abroad. 13 9
The perceived bias doesn't just have to do with the acceptance of cutting-edge results in
academic publications abroad. It also has to do with the quality of materials and reagents that
Western companies supply Indian researchers, thereby setting up a vicious cycle, whereby Indian
labs produce less legitimate results partly because they (at least sometimes) have reagents and kits
of spurious quality sold to them, and become a dumping ground for such kits because the work is
less legitimate and powerful than work emanating from Western labs. The same researcher at
CBT, which is engaged in the sorts of high-throughput genome research that many Western labs
perform, had the following disclosure to make:
[W]e went for a kit that Amersham had come up with..., which was a resin-based kit, and
what we were finding was that for four months we struggled and we were thinking...and
at that time our sequencing facility was also getting set up and every time we would set
up the reaction, we found that their results were very inconsistent. That at times the
system worked, at times half of it worked and at times nothing worked. Then one day we
did it with Qiagen and we found that whenever we were using Qiagen columns, it was
much better than the Amersham column. Then we found that the Amersham kit actually
kills the sequencing reactions and Amersham people knew about this and they were not
selling this in UK and they sold it to us here.' 140
139 Interview with a scientist (kept anonymous), Centre for Biochemical Technology, January 7 2002.
140 Ibid.
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In other words, getting work evaluated in objective, unbiased ways, and being sold
reagents of the same quality that get sold to researchers in the West, are, quite explicitly, "ethical"
questions from the get-go for work that gets done in a post-colonial molecular biology lab in a
country like India.
At one level, then, are ethical articulations as they emanate from and manifest themselves
in everyday work practices; at another level are the ethical-political articulations of the post-
colonial Indian state, often manifested through policy statements and initiatives. Some context on
the framing of science policy in post-colonial India, albeit very brief and sketchy, would be
informative in shedding light on the ways in which biotechnology policy today gets shaped by
institutional actors such as CBT, and scientific-political actors such as CBT's Director, S.K.
Brahmachari.
Science policy in post-independence India was initially an outcome of close personal
relationships between Nehru and some of India's premier scientists of the time.'4 ' Under Indira
Gandhi (who ruled India from 1965 to 1984, except for the period from 1977-1980), science
policy became more institutionalized. However, the importance of tacit relationships between
scientific and political leaders, established during Nehruvian times, remains important to the
present day. Further, political "push" can be an important driver of science policy and
institutional change, and the setting up of the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) in the mid-
1980s was itself a consequence of the political interest taken in it by Indira Gandhi and her son
and successor Rajiv. This leads to a constrained playing field for the head of a public institution
like Brahmachari, who needs to depend at least partly on forging such tacit relationships with
politicians in power to get his agenda heard at a larger policy level. It also means that it is
impossible to understand the actions of actors like Brahmachari as isolated from political contexts
or currents.
'4' This summary draws largely upon Krishna's (1997) account.
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One of those political currents, that has been explicitly prevalent since 1991, has been the
faith placed by the Indian state in economic liberalization and globalization, in which
protectionist policies that depended largely on import substitution and focused largely on
attaining self-reliance for industry have pretty much been abandoned in favor of an aggressive
embrace of the global market. This has not been the prerogative of one political party or ideology.
The 1990s, in fact, has seen three different political fronts rule India for significant periods of
time, and each one of these fronts had significant ideological tensions it had to contend with in
order to sustain and forge ahead with liberalization policies. The Congress, which under P.V.
Narasimha Rao ruled India from 1991 to 1996, was the prime initiator of neo-liberal economic
reform, and thereby explicitly jettisoned the socialist ideology of a "mixed" economy that was
one of the founding ideologies of independent India as envisioned by Nehru. The United Front, a
coalition of federalist parties with predominantly local areas of support in specific regions of
India and the Indian Communist parties, ruled from 1996 to 1998, and continued liberalization
policies in spite of the fact that the Indian left saw economic liberalization as a part of a neo-
colonial world order - a discomfort that kept the Communist parties on the fringe of the coalition,
but that nonetheless saw them provide consistent "issue-based" support to precisely the sorts of
policies that they claimed ideological opposition to. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) has led a coalition government since 1998, and has continued on the economic course
charted by the Congress and the United Front, even though the ideological wing of the BJP, the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has openly and on many occasions adopted a virulent
posture against multi-national corporations (the RSS has, however, been much more supportive of
Indian private industry than the Left claims to be).
Actors like Brahmachari, therefore, would have had to chart a course that contended with
the reality of India as a global player, regardless of what their own position on the issue might
have been. It certainly makes it easier for Brahmachari that he is enthusiastic about India going
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global, though this is not an unreflexive faith in global markets per se, or a desire to apishly
imitate the West, as much as it is a strategic belief that the interests of Indian science, and Indian
life sciences in particular, would at the present historical moment be best served by India
becoming a global player.
Brahmachari's history at CBT, however, is a relatively recent history. As outlined in
Chapter 2, Brahmachari was until 1997 a researcher at Bangalore's prestigious Indian Institute of
Science (IISc), and was asked to take over India's until then relatively non-existent genomics
initiative. The suggestion of the Indian state at that time was that Brahmachari start a new
genome center. Brahmachari, however, felt that India was already way behind genomics
initiatives in other parts of the world, and spending four to five years building a new center would
ensure that India would never catch up. He preferred, therefore, to take over an existing center
and retool it into India's flagship public sector genome lab.
One could conjecture two reasons why Brahmachari chose CBT as the center to retool,
when at the time it was simply a dilapidated biochemical reagents distribution center. The first is
its location in Delhi, close to the corridors of policy-making power. The second is precisely the
fact that it was so dilapidated, that it wasn 't already a cutting-edge lab doing cutting-edge
molecular biology research. This meant that Brahmachari could pretty much chart his own
course, without seriously disrupting what might be regarded as "competitive" research.
Of course, the reality is never so simple. On the one hand, the way Indian research
institutions work, which, barring a few notable exceptions, is largely hierarchical and top-down,
means that nobody can seriously express reservations about somebody in a position of direct
power and authority over them. Therefore, even though Brahmachari was initiating changes that
seriously altered existing power structures in ways unfavorable to the older scientists at the
center, there was very little open dissent that could safely be expressed. On the other hand, it is
true that Brahmachari's "retooling" brought in not just younger researchers and a desire for
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efficient and cutting-edge science that was often lacking at CBT before 1997, but also a vision of
Indian science as globally competitive that was significantly at odds with a very different vision,
of Indian science as the means to self-reliance, and as a means to solve local problems at a
national level, that many of the older scientists at CBT still believe in. This is then a fundamental
tension within CBT, between those who see science as a tool to solve local problems, and those
who see it as a tool to leverage global playing fields. And yet the latter is also envisioned by the
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) as occurring through "applied" as opposed
to "basic" research, in a policy environment where whether the distinction between the two is
acutely kept alive or is collapsed matters immensely (as I will argue later in the section).
"Applied", in the way that the current Director General of the CSIR Ramesh Mashelkar frames it,
implies "industrially oriented". Therefore, on the one hand, scientists at CBT, Brahmachari
included, chafe at "global" practices that often translate on the ground into expropriation,
discrimination and dumping of sub-standard materials onto Indian labs. On the other hand, they
are very much a part of the enterprise of becoming one of Them, Them being the powerful
Western Other, a desire to be a global player that is at some level imposed by the current
direction of the CSIR as well as by the larger political direction adopted by the Indian state, but
also at some level embraced by Brahmachari, if not uniformly by all the scientists working for
him.
Ethics and ownership in post-colonial context, therefore, is about empire. As Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri show (Hardt and Negri 2000), empire is not the same as imperialism.
Rather, empire, as a diagnosis of the present state of the world system, asks the question of what
sort of being imperialism is in the contemporary world. Biocapitalism is one frame, or vantage
point, through which such questions might be asked.
Another part of the historical context that bears keeping in mind is that in Nehruvian,
post-independence India, it was physics that was the most glamorous science, and it was the
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atomic physicist Homi Bhabha who was the scientist most directly involved in general policy
formulation.'42 But India also does have a history and tradition of molecular biology work,
especially in biophysical chemistry.'43 India's relative powerlessness in genomics, therefore, can
be traced not simply to an absence of conceptual rigor or of facilities, but at least partly to the fact
that since the early 1 990s the disciplinary power center of genomics in the West has shifted away
from biophysical chemistry and towards genetics, where India has not been a traditional power-
house.
The fourth historical frame in which to locate Indian genomics, especially at CBT, in
addition to the institutional history of CBT itself, the history of Indian molecular biology and the
larger political contexts that have co-produced Indian technoscience writ large, is the history of
the CSIR, CBT's parent body. Much of the history of the CSIR has been a failed one, at least in
terms of R & D productivity, and in terms of fulfilling its mandate, which really is the facilitation
of technoscientific commercialization. Established in the 1940s, CSIR is a heterogenous
behemoth of 40 research laboratories and institutes spread all over India. While federally funded,
these laboratories constitute an autonomous structure, whose governance is under the Director-
General of the Council, of individual Directors of each institute, and which is supervised by the
Ministries of Science and Technology, Finance and Human Resource Development.
The CSIR has been a major vehicle for the transformation of Indian science and
technology since 1990 into a body that is in tune with India's new project of economic
liberalization and globalization (see Turaga 2000 for an overview of these changes). The
142 Indeed, India is still highly reputed in theoretical physics. For instance, my roommate, an American who
is finishing a Ph.D. dissertation in string theory at Harvard, is going to do a post-doctoral fellowship at the
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay. While his move is at least partly motivated by a desire
to live in another country that he hasn't experienced before, he also sees it as a sound career move.
According to him, some of the best string theorists in the world are at TIR, and at Harishchandra
University in Allahabad.
143 Perhaps the most famous early molecular biophysicist in India was G.N. Ramachandran, who worked on
triple helical structures of collagen, and eventually came up with Ramachandran's -q(p lots, that indicate
the limits of three-dimensional conformations that different polypeptide structures can fold into. This work
is considered fundamental textbook knowledge in molecular biophysics.
261
transformation of the CSIR began with the recommendations of a committee chaired by the
current CSIR Director-General, and then Director of the National Chemical Laboratories (NCL),
Ramesh Mashelkar (see Mashelkar et al 1993). A major change was the creation of independent
marketing and financial management divisions within each CSIR institute. Of course, how these
envisioned changes actually work on the ground is fragmented and context-specific. Thus on the
one hand there is the NCL, which has been a pioneer in "going global", while on the other there
are centers like CBT, which are still, as mentioned above, reflective of a certain amount of
conflict and contradiction when it comes to aggressive globalization. The Mashelkar Committee
also suggested changes in the incentive structure for CSIR scientists to provide them with explicit
economic incentives that until the 1990s have been largely lacking.
Mashelkar's "global" vision for CSIR, then, involves generating external, non-federal
revenue, increased annual earnings from overseas R & D, the development of licensable
technologies (of which there were none in 1994), and an increased focus on getting foreign
patents and using them to generate operational expenditures. Indeed, Mashelkar's mantra for the
CSIR is an explicit replacement of "Publish or Perish" with "Patent, Publish and Prosper" (see
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 1996).
Uday Turaga, in his enthusiastic overview of the globalizing changes sweeping the CSIR
through the 1990s, refers to its earlier, pre-Mashelkar Committee, avatar as a "wastrel", because
it didn't link its research proactively to the marketplace. However, as I have mentioned earlier,
this hides the still live tension between the Mashelkar orientiation (that Turaga subscribes to, and
that Brahmachari at CBT follows) and another orientation that links research to "national needs"
that explicitly get framed in more local terms.
Mashelkar's vision is not just criticized by those who would oppose the global to the
national / local. Manjari Mahajan, for instance, is a science policy expert who was hired by
Brahmachari to help him with the policy initiatives that he was involved in - the sort of
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deregulated and imaginative hiring that indeed would not have been possible in a pre-Mashelkar
era. Mahajan's criticism of Brahmachari is not a criticism of globalization per se, but a criticism
of a mode of globalization that she feels will in fact lead to less effective global
competitiveness.44 Mahajan feels that Mashelkar is too focused on applied research without
appreciating enough the value of basic research as it translates into applications (something that,
in the case of drug development, is absolutely foundational, as I show in Chapter 3). Indeed,
Mashelkar wishes to change the very name of CSIR, from the Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research to the Council for Scientific Industrial Research. And yet, says Mahajan, the
latter has always at some level been a better reflection of CSIR's mandate (rather than a new
visionary articulation), and also the cause of CSIR's failures, because Indian industry has
traditionally never been willing to take up the technologies CSIR institutes have provided them.
What this accent on application at the cost of basic research has led to, according to Mahajan, is
an ossified CSIR, with labs doing old work and not keeping up with advancements in the field.
For example, many CSIR labs are still doing classical breeding experiments while the rest of the
world has started doing molecular breeding. Mahajan thinks that this will be the disrepair that
CSIR will continue to be if its focus doesn't shift on to basic research. Of course, institutes like
CBT are not so ossified precisely because the CSIR is too heterogenous a body for any "vision"
to apply uniformly across all its institutes. Therefore, even though Brahmachari believes quite
strongly in Mashelkar's vision, CBT is one of the CSIR labs whose individual mandate is basic
research, and which therefore is trying - perhaps almost too hard for some of its scientists - to
keep up with the latest global advancements in molecular genetics and genomics.
Mashelkar himself sees his use of the "and" in a slightly different light from Mahajan
(though she is correct in her diagnosis that what Mashelkar hopes to do is collapse the distinction
between basic and applied research in ways that basic research always already translates into
14 Based on conversations with the author, January 2002.
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applied priorities - thereby putting under erasure the notion of basic research itself - and that
those applied priorities are naturally assumed as being commercial priorities). He sees his
erasure in the following terms:
This name of Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. I do believe that it's got this
message incorporated, that we're supposed to do scientific research, we're supposed to do
industrial research. The only problem is of that "and". So we did pure scientific research
which has no industrial relevance, or we did industrial research which had pretty little
scientific base, because we were doing in a reverse engineering mode in a protected
environment. So the other thing that I have tried to do is to remove that "and", by saying
"scientific industrial research", where industrial research is done at cutting-edge science,
and remove that confusion. Because I believe in what Louis Pasteur says, that there is
science, and its application, there is nothing like "basic science" and "applied science". 45
Mapping on to this collapse between "basic" and "applied" science is the collapse
between "science" and "technology", which are often considered corresponding dichotomies to
the "basic" / "applied" dichotomy mentioned above. While Mashelkar's collapse resonates with
the STS coinage of the word "technoscience", Mahajan argues for the strategic importance of
keeping that distinction alive. Indeed, the distinction between science and technology is very
clearly articulated in India's 1958 Science Policy Resolution (Government of India 1958), which
I talk about at greater length in Chapter 7, and which certainly sees the potentials for application
of science, but also sees "technology" as something temporally distinct and following from basic
"scientific" activity. What is at stake in this semantic game is not just a conceptual false
dichotomy between science and technology that needs to be collapsed (which is the STS motive
in troubling this binary), but also the fact that this dichotomy ties in to a host of others that arise
from the perception of this dichotomy, and operate in certain ways as a consequence. Therefore,
the way Mashelkar collapses science and technology, basic and applied, is a way that collapses
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institutional demarcation as well, and suggests (as got suggested implicitly in the 1980 Bayh-Dole
Act passed by the US Congress, thereby laying the grounds for venture science in the US) that the
purpose and rationale for academic research is to generate knowledge that can be
commercialized.
The case model of the Mashelkar approach as criticized by Mahajan, indeed, is not CBT
but Mashelkar's own former institute, NCL, and its alliance with General Electric (GE) to provide
contract research services: an arrangement that GE has declared as a model for its external R & D
alliances (Mashelkar 1999). And yet, it is precisely this model, of doing contract work for foreign
companies without sharing in their intellectual property, that mirrors Krishna's assessment of
colonial science cited earlier in the section, whereby Indian labs exist primarily to perform work
that has been designed in the metropolis, which again is where the maximum value gets realized.
In other words, there is a fundamental contradiction between the Mashelkar Committee vision to
generate external, non-federal revenue (which often gets generated through contract work) and its
vision to generate intellectual property (which can only happen through work for which
ownership resides with the Indian institute).
Some of these tensions are articulated by the current Director of NCL, S. Sivaram, who I
interviewed in 2001 when he was still Deputy Director of the institute. Sivaram himself sees
contract work not as an end in itself, but as a means, firstly, to get initiated into standards and
work practices - such as, for instance, workplace safety conditions - that are established in other
parts of the world; and secondly, as a means to enter into tacit networks that can subsequently be
formalized into strategic alliances and collaborations. He is, nonetheless, acutely aware of the
assymetries embodied in relationships such as NCL's with GE's, assymetries that have
everything to do with conditions of post-coloniality, but also with the ways states chart their
45 Ramesh Mashelkar, interview with the author, 20 July 2001.
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strategic involvement in global commercial politics, strategies that have profound impacts on the
manouverabilities of public institutions such as NCL. Therefore, Sivaram says:
See, today, GE comes here, walks in and works with me. I cannot come and work with
just anyone.... It's a question of assymetric axis. It's basically all about the
competitiveness of nations. Today we are not bothering in this country, but US surely
bothers about it. Europe bothers about it, Japan bothers about it.' 46
The challenge, therefore, becomes for Sivaram explicitly one of moving beyond a
dependence on contract work for revenue generation towards a culture of indigenous innovation
(it is precisely this move, I argue in Chapter 7, that is not paid adequate attention to by many
other Indian state and private actors, located in India and in Silicon Valley, who believe that
"globalization" is simply about increasing foreign direct investment in India, as an end in itself,
rather than as a means to effect certain types of technoscientific advances and social
developments). It is in this context that arrangements such as CBT's with the Indian
pharmaceutical company Nicholas Piramal India Limited (NPIL) to seed the genomics start-up
Genomed become interesting and relevant. Sivaram distinguishes contract research from
entrepreneurial science thus (and this is a distinction that I return to and analyze more closely in
Chapter 7):
Contract research is to solve somebody else's problem. So you get paid for it. It's a
service. It is like a consulting service. Contract research is nothing but a kind of
consulting service, except that it is somewhat higher valued.... But when you do contract
research the ownership rests with the contractor, the ownership does not rest with you, so
you really have no stake in that development. You get current income, but you don't get
future income.... I will be dealing in both. I can't be only surviving on future promises, I
need to have current resources at the same time. But to depend only on current resources
46 S. Sivaram, interview with the author, June 13 2001.
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is also not fair. We need to have some eggs in the basket for the future.... And I think the
rate of entrepreneurship generation in science today is insignificantly low.'4 7
And of course, contract research has its own set of challenges:
The difficult thing is to sustain the relationship. To get a contract is not difficult but to
sustain the relationship is quite difficult. Even with the multi-national contracts. Yes, yes,
sustaining is difficult. The leadership changes are very frequent. And there are
philosophical differences between people as to what can be done and what should be
done. And therefore as the leadership changes the philosophy changes.' 148
Sivaram, therefore, explicitly sees NCL as reaching a phase change, where the phase of
contract research needs to give way to a phase of entrepreneurial research. He sees that not
because of any ideological angst about doing work for Western multi-national corporations, but
because of the structural reasons that pressure a shift away from contract work: reasons that have
to do with the tensions inherent to a dependence on economic forces elsewhere, and strategic
decisions made elsewhere, for continued revenue generation. The move beyond contract research,
for Sivaram, is dictated by the very exigencies of the contract research relationship.
According to the Director-General of the CSIR, Ramesh Mashelkar, there are two aspects to the
essence of CSIR: to 'advance knowledge, and to use it for the good of the people'. Further: "[How do you
relate to the good of the people? Through economic and social development. And how do you contribute to
that economic development? By contributing to industrial research'.14 9
In this account, I indicate how "the good of the people" might otherwise be conceived, and indeed
how it is otherwise conceived, by a scientist at Hyderabad's Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology
(CCMB), in ways that still pin huge faith on the emancipatory potential of science, but see that potential
being realized by ways other than through a simple faith in market mechanisms.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
49 Ramesh Mashelkar, interview with the author, 20 July 2001.
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First of all, it must be emphasized that like CBT, and unlike NCL, CCMB is an academic sector
specific lab of the CSIR. Therefore, its mandate is considerably different from that of the NCL mandate that
forms the most immediate basis for Mashelkar's prescriptions, and yet it is a mandate that is given to it by
the CSIR itself.
Satish Kumar is the archetypal classical Marxist scientist, part of a dying breed that makes some
very old points that are vital to be reminded of in this very new moment.
Kumar holds on to the fact that India has been unique in applying science policy with very specific
public objectives in mind, and those needs haven't vanished yet - indeed, far from it (see also Chapter 7 for
this dissonance between basic human resource needs in India and the drive to do 'global" science). These
are objectives that are very different from the market-driven Mashelkar objectives, and indeed are perhaps
not even entirely resonant with Nehruvian objectives (though they have been pursued in what might be
called the Nehruvian era" of Indian science policy). Kumar sees the confusion between the pressure to do
science with social values and the pressures of the marketplace. He feels there is no need to play the game
of the West, because India still needs to focus on food security and health.
If the first myth is the myth of the technoscientific marketplace as in itself and unaided the panacea
to the country's developmental ills, then the second myth, according to Kumar, is that technology will solve
all of India's problems, since, as he says, 'technology is not politically neutral".'50 Clearly having read his
Langdon Winner, Kumar feels India's priorities should be in solving problems like provision of drinking water,
and improving investment in and quality of food crops, animals and healthcare. He sees in the current
regime of biotechnology a continuation of colonization by remote control. This is because India still "buys
their biochemicals, follows the agenda set by them, and our best scientists immediately publish in those
journals that most Indian universities can't afford to buy".151 He emphasizes the importance of publicly
funded healthcare and agriculture systems. In the case of the latter, for instance, he feels Indian scientists
s15 Satish Kumar, interview with the author, 6 August 2001.
i51 Ibid. Meanwhile, Brahmachari sees East-West inequity in the fact that Indian researchers are unable to
immediately publish in those journals that Indian universities can't afford.
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could focus on generating drought resistant crops rather than creating pesticide resistant crops. Kumar feels
there has been total confusion over what India should be doing with regard to genomics, which of course
means that he is directly at odds in his thinking on the matter with Brahmachari, who believes that he knows
exactly what India should be doing as far as genomics is concerned.
When I pointed out that the thrust of India's science policy has changed from one focusing on self-
reliance to one focused on innovation, he wondered why innovation and self-reliance cannot both be
attained simultaneously. He sees innovation as a tool to attain self-reliance, and doesn't see why one has to
choose between the two. What he is against, therefore, is not innovation or development of 'global" science
per se, but an unreflexive mimesis that stems from a reverse Orientalism. He strongly feels that government
agencies should not change their focus from the fact that they exist for the people.
Kumar's own work in tune with this is to create a genetic map of the buffalo. Even though this is in
his own words an 'unglamorous' project, he thinks it is important as a scientist to start with the.thought,
'what if I'm successful with what I'm doing?" It's only when one becomes successful that the real question of
the worth of one's research starts getting addressed. Keeping that in mind, Kumar feels that research efforts
in genomics should concentrate on mapping and sequencing pathogens (which the Institute of Microbial
Technology in Chandigarh does), rather than playing around with population genetics (which is the
buzzword for people like Brahmachari and the Director of CCMB, Lalji Singh). Indeed, this is particularly
ironical, since Brahmachari started his own demand for India to enter the genomics fray in the late 1980s
and early 1990s with the suggestion that the ideal project to initiate India's genome efforts would be to
generate a map of Mycobacterium tuberculosis - intentions that have now been sacrificed by Brahmachari
himself at the altar of human population genetics.
I then asked Kumar for actual mechanisms that he proposed to bridge the gap between scientific
priorities and social needs. His answer was that scientists have always blamed the politicians, but that this
was unfair, since politicians have actually left issues of science policy to scientists themselves, which means
that it is scientists who should take the blame for a failure to come up with mechanisms to bridge this gap.
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However, Kumar feels that it is the politicians who need to help provide solutions by setting target areas and
research priorities.
The fundamentals, according to Kumar, aren't going to change, and those fundamentals are that
over the next 50 years, you can't take people off the land (also see Chapter 7 for my analysis of the central
role that land plays in technoscientific politics in especially Andhra Pradesh, the state of which Hyderabad is
the capital). Even wealth creation, he argues, ultimately has to be addressed in terms of the people on the
land. Scientists in the lure of the market however pretend that only one section of the population exists.
Whatever your politics, says Kumar, you can't divorce your work from the fact of the existence of your
people.
His own research, as mentioned above, involves firstly creating a genetic map of the buffalo, which
apparently took three years to persuade the funding bodies to fund. This is unique work because
conventional knowledge of animal population genetics has not found application in India. The second strand
of his work involves documenting buffalo biodiversity at the DNA level, with the objective of actually knowing
the existing genetic resources in order to prioritize conservation of diverse resources. His idea is to feed his
results back through co-operatives to landless peasants who depend upon livestock for their livelihood.
One would think that this is the sort of research that would have been done in a lab of the Indian
Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), and apparently the reason why it hasn't is because of problems
with ICAR. Kumar feels that the problem with ICAR is that it has basked for too long in the glory of the
Green Revolution. The problem with the Green Revolution was that the animal sector was completely
ignored. The ICAR, further, has been completely untouched by the biotech revolution. Therefore, the ICAR
is not in a position of biotech leadership, particularly in the agricultural sector.
Doing buffalo genomics is in some ways easier than human genomics because of the different
priorities in animal genomics compared to human. With animals, knowing the whole genome isn't essential:
one only needs to target specific traits such as milk production.
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5.3: Ethical Plateaux as Political Terrains
One of the fundamental points I have been trying to make throughout this chapter is that
ethics is not simply about universalizing postures of morality, but that doesn't mean that it is
simply about situated and relativist moral positions either. Rather, ethics is from the get-go
strategic and tactical, and it is in this tactical rather than relativist sense that I map out what
Adriana Petryna calls "ethical variability" across situations in the US and India in this chapter. I
argue that the question of ethical principles per se is far less interesting and relevant than the
question of how scientists, businesspeople and policymakers deploy ethics, thereby remapping
practices of knowledge production, corporate strategy or governance. The institutionalized
152 See also Monahan 2001 for his notion of the "analog divide", as the sets of infrastructural, conceptual
and socio-cultural inequities that persist in spite of the "bridging" of the digital divide in the Los Angeles
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Therefore, Kumar is attentive to the mechanics of how to get scientific advances down to places
where they can help marginal people (I suspect this might partly be reflective of an earlier founding
instituitional ethos for CCMB, whose first Director, Pushpa Bhargava, has been actively involved for many
years with peoples' science movements). On the other hand, people such as the Chief Minister of Andhra
Pradesh, Chandrababu Naidu, or the Silicon Valley Indian entrepreneurs who are trying to establish an
'entrepreneurial culture" in India (see Chapter 7 for an elaboration of both), or Mashelkar himself, all believe
that scientific advance will somehow 'trickle down" on its own if the market is allowed free rein.
Brahmachari, the Director of the CBT, slightly differs from these positions in believing that science should be
in the hands of the state (while himself claiming to be 'for" globalization), as resource for the public good.
There are parallels, of course, in all of these latter positions to the glorious rhetoric of "bridging the digital
divide", which animates much technoscientific policy in India today, and which has been deconstructed by
people like Kenneth Keniston as something that is a much more complicated process than simply
introducing technology.'5 2 Kumar clearly understands this.
- -
bioethical concern with challenging individual violations leaves unpoliticized the question of how
populations (themselves often constructed categories, as I explore in Chapter 8) get brought into
the sphere of corporate-governmental calculation through science.
This is, explicitly, the question of what biopower is, a question that is, equally explicitly,
an ethical one as much as it is theoretical. And that is because, as the work of people who do
explore this space of ethics-as-politics, such as Adriana Petryna and Joao Biehl, so powerfully
shows, questions of the incorporation of populations through various forms of biotechnical
governance quite literally determine in what forms life gets nourished and supported, and in what
forms it is allowed to die.
The other related problem with institutionalized bioethical framings of ethical-political
questions of biopower is that they tend to set up, both through their own framings and through the
oppositional readings that they prompt, a series of binaries, between property and humanism,
ownership and ethics, always taking recourse to one at the expense of the other, which, while
sometimes strategically vital to do, completely misses the question of how these apparently
binary sets of categories are often co-produced. Therefore, the titles of each of my chapters -
discovery and revolution, biotech and pharma, speed and information, ownership and ethics,
vision and hype, nation and salvation, risk and subjectivity, ideology and praxis, even theory and
methodology - intentionally uses the conjunction "and" not as an oppositional tool to pit two
binary categories up against each other, but rather as an articulatory tool, that constantly questions
the ways categories that produce, live with and indeed exist in dialectic relationship to one
another, are in fact made to exist in such complicated relationships that cannot be easily reduced
to simple oppositional categories.
To the extent that I use ethnography as a "method", then, it is as a constant and implicit
critique of bioethics, as a counter to a philosophical mode of intervention that is essentially
public school system.
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Platonic, as in serving to judge who gets to adjudicate on ethical matters (it does) as it itself does
the adjudicating. It therefore cannot but help construct the world in the image of its own
foundational categories, a construction that can't but be at odds with the various situated
perspectives that life-worlds actually do provide. It is throwing light on these multiple
perspectives, as illustrations rather than as evidence of this or that, that ethnography serves as a
powerful alternative and political voice to institutionalized bioethics. Bioethics tends to reduce
itself to rationally elucidating the grounds of ethics, without adequately scrutinizing what ethics
itselfis, how it plays out, how it gets constructed as a category in different situations. What
bioethics leaves out, for prescription, is description. What this leads to, as I have argued in the
first part of this chapter, is the reinscription and reification of certain ethical concerns, as having
its basis in certain normative systems and, related to that, in rational action (and, specifically,
rational action that can opposed in easy binary formulations to irrational action, and the
subsequent universalizing exportation of this faith as a globalized package). As I have shown, this
often fails poorly in situations on the ground where ethics gets read and deployed differently to
such faithful and naive beliefs in a universal rationality.
In terms specifically of understanding intellectual property, then, what I am trying to
argue is that intellectual property cannot be understood simply in terms of inventiveness, but has
to be understood in terms of materiality, and even those, such as Paul Rabinow (1997) and James
Boyle (1997), who seek to decenter the notion of the solitary romantic inventor that underlies IP
rationales do so by showing how the process of invention is decentered from that of a single
inventor to a much more nebulous assemblage of human actors and non-human actants. I am,
instead, seeking to decenter the very notion of invention as the definitive notion that underlies the
playing out of IP agreements on the ground. In this sense, I am reading IP disputes much more in
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the sense that Rosemary Coombe does as she traces what she calls the "cultural life" of
intellectual properties (Coombe 1998).'53
Coombe sees intellectual property not simply as a set of rights or as (reductionist)
attribuitions of inventive genius, but as constitutive objects in commercial and popular life-
worlds, as sources and sinks of social power, as mediators of such fundamental notions of identity
as citizenship in contexts of national imagination that are always already, as shown earlier,
overcoded by corporate specters, as both symptoms and diagnostic markers of colonial histories
and presents. Perhaps most in consonance with my own sensibility is her call for what she calls an
"ethics of contingency with respect to the use of commodified social texts" (5). What gets
encoded in the law, she shows, is not just a set of significations that suggest a certain ideological
conception of invention, but the materiality of such signification.
Sunil Maulik, the co-founder and CEO of the e-learning start-up GeneEd, whose
emergence I described in Chapter 2, has a similar conception of intellectual property. I quote
extensively from an interview with him to provide a sense of this conception:
The economy of the United States, and particularly the economy of Silicon Valley, has
transformed in the last 15 years from an analog economy to a digital economy. And what
I've been doing for the last 15 years is...[realizing] that you can now create widgets out
of ones and zeros, out of the bits and bytes of information, and these widgets have value,
they have a tremendous value.... As the Oracles and Apples and Intels and Microsofts
and all of these companies have proven, it is a huge business selling essentially
information and the ways to store, package and manage and transform information. So
153 I think Coombe's notion of a "cultural life" rather than a "social life" is of utmost importance, because,
as I argue in later chapters, understanding the lives of commodities cannot simply be an attempt to
understand the circuits they travel as they get produced, circulate and get consumed, which is the
unfortunately limited (and limiting) trajectory that is increasingly getting charted by those who claim to
follow the likes of Appadurai and Kopytoff in tracing the "social life of things" (see Appadurai 1986).
Commodities, by definition, aie mystical things, and it is impossible to divorce their social life from an
analysis of the imaginaries that they create, sustain and traverse. Hence the salience of the notion of
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essentially just moving ones and zeros around. So the business of moving ones and zeros
around is a huge business in the United States.... I think that has informed me over the
last 15 years, that you can build a business that's essentially based on repurposing
existing ones and zeros. I sometimes joke that I wrote a great memo back in 1986 and
I've been cutting and pasting it ever since, but I've never actually had an original idea
since then. But the very fact that I can cut and paste that original memo, right, the fact
that I can manipulate the ones and zeros that represented the original content in that
memo, and I've continued to be able to do it moving forward, has value. And if you see
what GeneEd does, all we are doing is repurposing other peoples' ones and zeros, but the
way in which we do it adds value, and people are at least beginning to show that they are
willing to place a fairly substantial premium on the value that we add. So I'd say building
something out of nothing, in a very strict sense, that's true, because there's no factory
here, there's no inventory, there's nothing tangible, but it's the intellectual property, and
the way our intellectual property modifies existing intellectual property and then
packages it and resells it, that has value.
KS: So you're really arguing for a slightly different definition of intellectual property. It's
not something that's just an inventive act of genius but something that is as tangible as
property, except that the property in question is information?
SM: Absolutely. Absolutely; and that is not a static thing. It's like a river which flows
over time and spreads out tributaries, some of them end up drying out...yeah,
absolutely.' 54
Maulik goes on to develop the theme of thefluidity of intellectual property:
I think the idea of intellectual property and intellectual property ownership, it's sort of
become a moot point. I mean people joke in Silicon Valley that nobody is allowed to take
any property. But it happens all the time. People walk off with the intellectual property of
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"cultural life". Coombe indeed is intimately concerned with the imaginaries associated with intellectual
property.
54 Sunil Maulik, interview with the author, 15 May 2001.
the company they were working for and start a new company, sometimes with the
company's permission, sometimes with the company's tacit permission, sometimes
because the company didn't want to seal that intellectual property or they didn't think it
had any business value. But for whatever reason, it happens all the time. And so this idea
of intellectual property as this...like you say, this one moment of genius, this point of
time, contained, I think is sort of bogus. 155
Perhaps nothing illustrates this point as well as the DNA chip company Affymetrix,
whom I have talked about in the Prologue and again at some length in Chapter 4. Affymetrix has
extended patents protecting their chip technology, including patents that cover the underlying
principle on which the chip is based, methods of manufacture, specific applications of the chip,
and so on. DNA chips, however, are also very easy to engineer, especially ones that are more
rudimentary than the Affymetrix chips, but that might yet suffice for simple experiments to look
at differential gene expression. After involving itself in elaborate, multiple and not always
successful litigation, Affymetrix has now "open-sourced" its chip, suggesting not only a less
aggressive attitude towards the protection of its intellectual property, but also showing how,
firstly, a situation where protecting intellectual property is untenable can be strategically
reconfigured as a move that has attached to it significant symbolic capital (that accrues from the
apparent "openness" that Affymetrix can project itself as embracing), and secondly, how this
"openness" is not just an acknowledgment of the untenability of enforcing intellectual property
on the chip, but also an acknowledgment of the brand value the chip has accrued. Therefore, now
that the Affymetrix DNA chips have becomes established as the industry standard for high
throughput differential gene expression analysis, it doesn't matter to the same extent that others
without the same brand loyalty might in some way copy the chips.
The question then becomes how this fluidity of intellectual property translates into
ethical-political complexities, especially in regimes of globalized information flow, where the
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15s Ibid.
information in question has to do with life itself (itself an ideological conception), and where the
information often does travel, as shown in Section 5.1, along with tangible material objects such
as blood and tissue samples. John Frow, for instance, echoes an argument made by many in the
Third World who oppose global intellectual property regimes such as they get encoded in
agreements such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), that such regimes directly disadvantage Third World countries (Frow
1996). While I am broadly in agreement with such sentiments, I am also keen to tease out the
constantly contradictory morphings that take place in politics on the ground that problematize
such easy political positions, especially in countries like India that refuses to take its "Third
World" status for granted.
Therefore, at one level, bioinformatics in India would to a considerable degree just not be
possible without sequence information and other bioinformatic resources that get generated in the
West being accessible in the public domain, since private databases are often too expensive to
afford for most Indian research centers. However, as indicated in Section 5.1, a number of
"disenfranchised" groups, such as patient advocacy groups in the West, and indeed even CBT in
India (which is precisely one such institution that depends upon public domain bioinformatic
resources to do much of its bioinformatic research) are involved in leveraging intellectual
property arrangements in strategic ways for their own benefit - which might be, in the former
case, to ensure that rare genetic disorders that would otherwise never get researched do get
research attention; in the latter case, as a mechanism to ensure a certain return in revenue for what
gets framed as the "Indian" public good. Indeed, it is hard to take an excessively comfortable
position on intellectual property issues in biotech and drug development writ large when, to take
one example (as I have mentioned before), major proponents of DNA sequence patents are
patient advocacy groups such as PXE International, and major opponents are big multinational
pharmaceutical companies.
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One of the by now classic examples that get invoked to point to the "biopiracy" that takes
place, with Western corporations patenting "Third World" natural resources, is indeed the case of
the patenting of neem, which has been traditionally been used in India for its medicinal properties
for centuries. Again, paradoxically, it is not India's CSIR that i crying foul over this issue of
piracy, even though it was CSIR that had to fight the case in global intellectual property courts (a
case that CSIR won, thereby enabling the neem patent to be overturned). The CSIR, however,
points to the instance of the attempted piracy of neem not as the case in point of biopiracy and
biocolonialism, but rather as the ultimate proof of the fairness of global multilateral trade
arrangements such as WTO, that provide organizations like the CSIR with the mechanisms to
overturn blatant attempts at piracy. This is not to argue that I either agree with CSIR's position or
disagree with it, but to point out, once again, that "politically correct" positions that are in fact
probably better informed by the inequities of global trade systems than CSIR's (which after all is
operating on politically constrained terrain, much as it is an enthusiast for globalization itself), are
almost invariably infinitely more complicated on the ground, with organizations that are
supposed, from their structural positioning, to have a certain "Third World" consciousness often
resolutely failing to do so - and further, not simply failing to do on account of ignorance or
coercion, but rather as a consciously strategic decision. Therefore, even acknowledging an
intellectual property system as being stratified is often not sufficient to enable one to understand
its effects, unless one is attentive to its (often unpredictable) political manifestations.
Indeed, the CSIR's embrace of globalization as signified by WTO is not just at odds with
its structural position as a governing body of"Third World" public research institutions, but is
even at odds with pre-1990 political currents in India. I have suggested (and detail in greater
detail in Chapter 7) that the 1990s have seen a profound shift in the economic ideology of the
Indian state, away from the Nehruvian state socialist agenda and towards aggressive market-
oriented policies of liberalization, changes that have very much been central to the direction
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charted by India's technoscientific establishment as well. Of course, while 1991 did represent a
watershed of sorts, being the time when India proclaimed through a series of visible measures its
intentions to open its markets, India's global leanings were already in evidence in the 1980s, as
both Indira Gandhi and her successor Rajiv initiated economic liberalization in more modest but
very definite ways. And yet, Indira Gandhi addressed the World Health Assembly in 1982 with
the following words: "The idea of a better-ordered world is one in which medical discoveries will
be free of patents and there will be no profiteering from life and death" (cited in Braga 1990:
253). The extent to which CSIR's current views on global trade regimes, that include WTO
provisions on biotechnology and drug development, with even Indira Gandhi's 20 years ago (let
alone Nehru's 50 years ago), of course, suggest changes in ideological direction. But they also
suggest the various co-productions of law and corporate ethos with prevailing political ideology,
which of course is itself influenced by structural constraints (such as the huge balance of
payments crisis in 1991, that was the immediate impetus for massive liberalization policies to be
implemented; or the Uruguay Round of GATT and the pressure brought to bear by the West on
the Indian government to be a signatory) and the agency of individual actors (such as Ramesh
Mashelkar), who chart seemingly irrevocable courses.
Michael Fischer, adapting an imaginary from Deleuze, proposes the terms "ethical
plateaux" as a means of thinking about the intersections and interactions of different technologies
and / ethical-political emergences in ways that are always already stratified (Fischer 2001). The
grounds for ethics then are topologies or terrains, rather than the unarticulated (and implicitly,
therefore, level) playing field that is assumed by much institutionalized bioethics.
One lens through which the tactical emergence of ethical-political terrains can be traced
is that of clinical trials, which I have briefly talked about in Chapter 3 as being sets of techniques
within which values, in all senses of the term, get incorporated. The logic, rationality and what
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she calls "ethical variability" of clinical trials in the US are being studied by Adriana Petryna. I
wish here to talk about clinical trials in an Indian context, by drawing upon some of my fieldwork
at CBT and its associated start-up, Genomed.
As described in Chapter 2, Genomed is a start-up that has been seeded by CBT in
partnership with the Indian pharmaceutical company Nicholas Piramal India Limited (NPIL).
There are two physical lab spaces in which Genomed is housed, that are very different from one
another. There is one Genomed on the premises of CBT in Delhi, and another in a private hospital
owned by NPIL, Wellspring Hospital, in Bombay.
The two Genomeds quite literally represent different worlds and different forms of life,
and indicate vividly how place matters in understanding technoscientific production in situated
and complex ways. On the one hand, there is the evidently different environment in which the
two Genomeds are located: one drawing directly upon all the academic researchers, facilities and
work happening in CBT, the other not, for instance. But there is also a difference in the types of
work being performed at the two CBTs. In addition to doing population genomic research on
schizophrenia (which parallels similar projects being done on asthma and Type II diabetes in
Delhi), Genomed Bombay also studies pharmacogenomic drug response in clinical trials.5 6 In
many ways, the hospital is primarily an experimental site rather than a therapeutic one. It is,
indeed, a "Five-Star" hospital in appearance: glittering marble floors, comfortable sofas littered
around the hallways, hospital beds with bright yellow bed-covers, all make Wellspring Hospital
seem more like a hotel than a hospital, and very different from, say, the All Indian Institute of
Medical Sciences, India's premier referral hospital in Delhi with which CBT Delhi has
collaborative projects underway. What makes Wellspring even more unlike anything resembling
"normal" Indian hospitals is the striking and almost complete absence of patients.
156 These are projects that the Director of CBT, S.K. Brahmachari, has a significant hand in designing.
Indeed, moving clinical trials to India is a central part of Brahmachari's agenda of taking Indian corporate
technoscience "global".
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As I mentioned above, this is because the major interventions that take place at
Wellspring are clinical trials. The idea that a local pharmaceutical company would invest in
building a state-of-the-art hospital almost solely as an experimental site in itself makes
Wellspring an interesting institutional component of a pharmacogenomic assemblage. What
makes it even more interesting, and pertinent in terms of my arguments for situating ethical
understandings in political economic contexts, is the larger urban ecology that Wellspring is
situated within.
Wellspring is located in Parel, in the heart of downtown Bombay, but also in the heart of
the part of Bombay that houses the textile industry. Bombay's economy largely grew on the
strength of a textile industry that rapidly disintegrated through the 1980s and 1990s, leaving
visible from the windows of Wellspring the empty shells of once prosperous mills. Parel,
therefore, is teeming with unemployed mill-workers, who have gone through periodic cycles of
unionization over the last decade, but whose struggles to reoccupy and reopen the failing mills
have probably, once and for all, ended in defeat. Hospitals like Wellspring now abut both the
poverty of recent deindustrialization (a very different space of poverty to that of, for instance,
Daravi, widely regarded as Asia's largest slum) and the new wealth that is displayed through
other monstrously glamorous erections, such as a nearby shopping mall that sells a range of
foreign brand-name consumables that can only be afforded by the rapidly ascendant middle class
consumer population. Such shopping malls are clearly, at least partly, built in anticipation of the
mills finally being torn down and replaced by high-rise apartment blocks, since Parel represents
prime real estate in a city with the most expensive real estate prices in the world.
In other words, Wellspring's location in Parel is almost certainly not accidental, as there
lies available to the researchers a huge unemployed local population which ends up being easily
recruited into clinical trials, which do after all compensate their volunteers. The ethics of such
trials can only be understood and evaluated if situated within the local ecologies of their conduct,
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ecologies that problematize t&e very notion of a trial "volunteer" in ways that are not relativist,
but rather situated and historically, materially produced. Just as Marx describes the forced
proletarianization of the working class during the Industrial Revolution in Volume I of Capital
(Marx 1976 [1867]: 873-942), one can see how forced deproletarianization as a consequence of
the crippling contradictions of capitalism leading to the virtual death of an entire industry in
Bombay, leads in Parel to the creation of a new population of subjects that are created as sites of
experimental therapeutic intervention. 15 7 What is at stake here is not simply a judgment of the
dubiousness or otherwise of clinical trials recruitment strategies on their own terms, but rather the
question of how para-regulatory and para-ethical regimes of pharmaceutical governance happen.
Specifically, what is at stake is an understanding of the relationship between national - global
enterprises of clinical trials and local forms of indebtedness.'58 In this process, biosociality itself
gets configured as a relationship between vendors and clients, just as globalization is.
What, then, are ethics, and what are the grounds for ethics, and how does ethics manifest
itself as politics, and indeed, politics as ethics, and what space with respect to and responsibility
towards ethics does the theorist occupy or have if she is to avoid falling into the same discursive
and political traps that institutionalized bioethics falls prey to? What sorts of vigilance get called
for, and called into account? What, especially, is the consequence of being an "ethicist" (of sorts),
and "ethical" (only sometimes the same thing) in a regime of speed, where the only way to
intervene in a timely manner is by subordinating oneself to the very same constraints of
157 My suspicion that what I describe is far from unique to Parel, even though Parel's political ecology
might be unique, is suggested from conversations with Joao Biehl, who has for a number of years
ethnographically studied an HIV testing center in the Northern Brazilian province of Bahia. This is a center
set up by the Brazilian state, and is part of the widely hailed Brazilian state intervention in the diagnosis
and treatment of AIDS, that has often been referred to as a model for other states to follow. On a recent
visit back to the center, Biehl found that adjoining the center was a huge five-star hospital, set up by a
major multi-national pharmaceutical company, that primarily served as an experimental site for clinical
trials. In this case, it was the people getting tested for HIV who served as the potentially recruitable
population for the trials in this hospital.
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commodified time that one seeks to critique in the first place? I try to think about some of these
issues - of strategy and responsibility, dare I say, of praxis. In the process, I will try and elaborate
upon what I suggested earlier in this section, about the role ethnography can play as a colmter to
institutionalized bioethics if it is understood as illustrative rather than evidentiary, and if it is
further understood that illustration is not "mere" embellishment, a superstructural "artistry" that
adorns but cannot substitute for an objectively determined, view-from-nowehere, enterprise of
fact production. Effectively, what I am arguing for is for the importance of using ethnography to
generate situated perspectives, as Haraway would argue for, while always being attentive to the
dangers of that situatedness sliding into a functionalist relativism, and thereby surrendering its
power to be illustrative of specific situations in larger contexts - for one cannot be situated
without larger structural conexts to situate oneself within.
Derrida tells us that "since we cannot wait for these operations to be analyzed, for these
levels to be distinguished, for the discussion to be over and for satisfactory conditions to be found
to act and make decisions, given that urgency and precipitation are part of the very essence of the
decision, our duty here is to discover and to invent, each and every time, in singular situations,
that is to say, without a given rule" (Derrida 2002a: 214). Ethics and politics, ethics as politics,
are acts that require the utmost urgency, because a failure to act urgently, an inaction, is always
already an action. And as Derrida says, ethics and politics both demand actions, actions that are
both responsible - a responsibility that can only come from deep reflexivity, about the action, its
contexts, consequences and constraints - and urgent. How to be both quick and careful? And as
an ethnographer, an even further question, explicit in my interactions with Rep-X outlined in the
first section of this chapter: how to not compromise oneself (by failing to write about an ethically
compromising situation, by inacting), and yet not compromise the informant that has allowed me
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158 The relationship of bodies as sites of medical intervention to local forms of indebtedness is beautifully
illustrated in Lawrence Cohen's (1999) account of organ transplantation in South India.
access, an allowance made with the implicit (if perhaps naive) assumption of generally positive
publicity?
How much one should reveal about situations one is, by virtue of being an ethnographer
(and if bioethicists too are not ethnographers, of a sort and to the extent of their participation in
and observation of the bio-technologies they adjudicate upon, then what business do they have
being there?), complicit in the ethnographic encounter, but also in the moment of the encounter?
Access to corporate biotechnical worlds has everything to do with temporality: time-frames are
measured, pondered and strategized to an extreme degree. A major tool to get access to sites for
this study was to emphasize its own time-frame - that it is part of a doctoral dissertation, and
therefore will not be finished until what most informants automatically assume is an endlessly
deferred time; that it will certainly not be likely published in the immediate enough future for it to
be extremely compromising of such insights as informants might want to reveal.
And yet, time is also deployed strategically by scientists and corporations to create
inarticulation on the part of those that might call themselves ethicists. In 1999, for instance, I
heard a talk by Ian Wilmut, cloner of the sheep Dolly, who expressed perplexity about the fear-
mongering over the temporally distant and therefore completely hypothetical possibility of cloned
human beings. Even if such eventualities were to occur, he implied, they are so far in the future as
to be beyond the realm of current feasible imagination - and therefore, presumably, adjudication.
And yet there are many, ranging from James Watson to Lee Silver, who argue that it is pointless
to stop potentially eugenic (or at least determinist) enterprises of fact and technology production,
because they are already here, and being obstructionist, even if successful, can but be a
momentary reprieve. An important component of the materiality of speed in biotechnologies is
that it effects a complete temporal collapse between that which is too distant to legitimately
judge, and that which is too late to effectively judge. Too often, then, the space that gets left for
bioethics to adjudicate from is the retrospective space of"unintended consequences". The
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challenge for an ethnographic intervention from amidst the unstable strata of ethical plateaux, as
Fischer too explicitly reminds us, is to come up with words, and actions, and words as actions,
that can proactively help shape these terrains towards whatever "progressive" political goals -
goals themselves, probably, on which there cannot be complete consensus - might be at stake.
Ethics, therefore, is completely tangled in the political - there is no way an "ethical"
intervention, of any sort, be it ethnography or institutionalized bioethics - can fail to be a political
act. One of the acts of purification and absolution bioethics often tries to effect for itself, which is
completely related to its conception of providing "objective" (and therefore necessarily apolitical)
adjudication, is precisely this claim to not be subject to politics - a claim that is even more
audacious when made by that section of institutionalized bioethicists, such as, most (in)famously.
at the University of Pennsylvania, who spend a significant part of their time studying "bioethical"
problems for biotechnology companies.
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CHAPTER 6: VISION AND HYPE
These seismic events come from the future, they are given from out of the unstable, chaotic, and dis-
located ground of the times. A dis-jointed or dis-adjusted time without which there would be neither
history, nor event, nor promise of justice. 5 9
If you're a reasonably well adjusted, fairly happy individual, you would never start a company and you
should never start a company. You have to be maladjusted in some pretty defined way to create a
company. 160
6.1: Future Perfect, Present Tense
In this chapter, I am going to try and work through an argument dealing with futures and
visions as nodes in tactical articulation as well as defining features of an emergent industry at an
emergent moment in capitalism.
To begin with, it must be acknowledged that a project that traces regimes of what might
be called "post-genomic" drug development in the United States and India is fundamentally a
project that traces emergence in the midst of what is clearly an inaugural moment that is being
brought about as a consequence of life sciences constructing and articulating different forms of
meaning and value in the realms of political economy and subjectivity. The notion of emergence
is from the get-go a temporal notion: it relates that which is to that which will be. This is often a
contingent and unpredictable relationship, but it is nonetheless a relationship of a present to its
future. My argument here is that studying emergence of the sort that corporate life sciences
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'59 Derrida (1994: 170).
presents to us involves necessarily inverting the temporal orders that go into understanding the
relationship of presents to futures: it isn't just the present that determines the future, it is quite
often the future that determines the present and thereby shapes certain types of tendential
emergences.
As mentioned above, there are two fundamental systems of meaning and practice whose
interrelationship is vital to understand in order to make sense of the emergences that I am trying
to trace. One relates to subjectivities, of both corporate-scientific actors and of consumers -- Paul
Rabinow's notion of biosociality is the key heuristic hat presents itself for unpacking here. The
second relates to speed and tactics, and involves mapping the terrain of strategic praxis within
which emergent commodification and subjectivities are instantiated, negotiated and contested.
Ethics, as I have argued in the previous chapter, becomes a crucial node in tactical articulation.
The shifting notions of promise and vision link subjectivity and sociality to speed and
tactics. The former are two related terms that themselves relate to the dual subject that is the
consumer who invests and / or the investor who consumes. Therefore, there is a subjective
relationship between investor and consumer, and a theoretical relationship between vision and
promise, that needs to be mapped.
Vision is central to the functioning of investors and entrepreneurs, but also of countries.
Chapter 7 contains the story of an emergent genomics marketplace in India that is situated in a
larger context of an emergent innovative culture there of market-savvy technoscience as an
explicitly envisioned means of becoming a global player. Therefore, there are different ways in
which vision functions or operates: it could be missionary, nationalist, scientific or
entrepreneurial. Each of these could in turn function as a call to action, as a Utopian promise or as
a cynical calculation. The question is how these different forms of envisioning are articulated.
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160 Sunil Maulik, co-founder and CEO of GeneEd, interview with the author, May 15 2001.
What I am interested in, to start with, is the question of how companies create promissory
visions of futures in order to enable their existence in the present. This rests not merely on a
particular mode of calculation (though such a calculus is essential), but also depends upon
material, discursive and semiotic practices and strategies.
The condition of possibility of the presence of corporate biotechnology is enabled by a
spectrality, in as much as corporate biotechnology is inherently a speculative venture.
Speculation, as Jacques Derrida points out, is always fascinated and bewitched by the specter.
Let me back away then from the specifics of biotechnology to talk for a minute about
speculation writ large. Speculation has a dynamic and fundamental relationship to capital. To
quote Derrida: "Speculation always speculates on some specter, it speculates in the mirror of what
it produces, on the spectacle that it gives itself and that it gives itself to see. It believes in what it
believes itself to see: in representations.... In this sense, speculation is always theoretical and
theological" (Derrida 1994: 146).
There are two things that get referred to here, one of which is fundamental to my
argument and the other of which I will briefly touch upon towards the end of this section. The
first is that speculation is not simply a manifestation of a certain phase of what might be called
"speculative" capitalism, that is distinct from industrial capitalism. In this version of often
accepted common-sense, industrial capitalism busied itself with things -- commodities -- while
speculative capitalism deals with the realm of the more intangible, the visions and futures that I
talk of in this chapter, risks, probabilities, investments in decisions and events that may L;ever
happen. The understanding of capitalism that posits tangible industrial thingly capitalism in
opposition to ephemeral virtual speculative capitalism however misses the fact that the centrality
of speculation in "speculative" capital merely relates to "thingly" capitalism by the degree to
which the act of speculation is made manifest. An integral component of temporality does indeed
exist in what we call speculative capitalism -- and biotech is definitely speculative capitalism --
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but this concept of temporality, of deferral, and therefore of all the attendant baggage of risk and
promise, hides the fundamental element of speculation that underlies all capital, and has indeed,
as Marx shows in the Grundrisse, been a part of capitalism since long before industrial
capitalism, being part of the circulation of cycles of money and capital that Marx analyzes at the
very beginning of his logic of contradictions in the forms of value.
The power of capital, says Marx, lies not in the tangible processes of use, exchange and
generation of surplus, but rather in the intangibles that provide capitalism with its mysticism and
secret, with its magic. It is these intangibles -- abstractions, if you like -- that simultaneously
mystify things with utility as commodities while na-:ralizing those mystifications as anything but
mystical. The central mode of abstraction that Marx alludes to, of course, is commodity fetishism
(Marx 1976 [1867]): 163-177). The commodity, as Marx points out, is lively from the get-go,
because the fetish is by definition lively. "Lively capital", a phrase that might be used to describe
the objects of study in projects such as this that look at the corporatization of biotechnology and
the biotechnicalization of the corporate world, is virtually an oxymoron. There is an importance
of temporality, and an idealization of time, in the very creation of fetishization.
Use-value itself is an advance promise, which leads to the existence of an object as
commodity even before it exists itself as use-value: the rationality of the use-value of a thing in
capitalism predates its existence as use-value. Things like pharmacogenomics and personalized
medicine (that I describe in greater detail in the Chapter 8), that are dismissed by skeptics as
simply being "hype", are therefore things that are much more serious and tangible. While I talk
below about these specific biocapitalist manifestations about speculation and visionary
articulation, it is perhaps important to fuirther emphasize how the bio in this section merely serves
as an example to throw some light upon what are, in all probability, features that are more
generally fundamental to capitalism writ large.
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Anna Tsing, for instance, shows the operation of speculation in a realm of capitalism that
does not even deal explicitly with technoscience in her analysis of the Bre-X corporation, whose
prospecting for gold in Busang, Indonesia ended in spectacular failure (Tsing 2000). Tsing is less
interested in the actual event of failure than she is in the way Bre-X as a company was performed:
the very existence of the company was, as she says, "always a performance, a drama, a conjuring
trick, an illusion, regardless of whether real gold or only dreams of gold ever existed at Busang"
(1 18). The ultimate outcome as measured in binaries of success or failure, whether for gold
mining companies or biotechnology companies, matters little to the anatomy of conjuration, and
the inherent temporal logic that underlies that anatomy, and it is that anatomy that I wish to
dissect in this argument.
What Tsing further alludes to, that I take up in the next chapter, is the significance of
Bre-X as a Canadian company, and the way, therefore, the conjuration of the prospect of gold in
Indonesia, ready to be mined by Bre-X, as lucre for its investors, is always already articulated
with / as Canadian national dreams of global corporate expansion. Of course, ideas of national
strength and prowess always underlie any venture of global resource expropriation and capital
expansion when the company doing the expropriating and the expanding can in any tangible way
be identified with its originary country, and this imbrication of nation and capital is as old as the
early period of colonial expansion as represented by companies such as the East India Company. I
read Tsing's analysis of the way the Canadian nation is imagined through exploits such as that of
Bre-X as being slightly more complicated and complicating, however, than a simple diagnosis of
colonial imaginaries would allow. Bre-X, as explicitly a Canadian company, is not just
significant in Tsing's argument because of the age-old identifications that brings with other
Western colonial powers prospecting for natural resources in the "Third World", but also because
it marks the site of an unfulfilled desire, a recognition of the inability to easily identify with,
especially, the United States, as a country with the strength and global reach to generate value
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through effortless transnational ventures that mark such latter countries out as being true global
players. It is this national imaginary, marked by a certain ambivalent desire to be a global player,
rather than by an automatic assumption of global might and transnational right, that manifests
itself quite acutely in India, as I have hinted at various points in Chapters 3 and 5, and as I will
develop in Chapter 7. It is the automatic conjuration of a certain, historically and temporally
specific, national(ist) imaginary as always already an outcome ofa potential global corporate
endeavor, an imaginary further that is based in a longing for a future global strength rather than in
the smugness of past imperial glory, that marks out aspiring global players such as Canada and
India as distinct from the United States. Millennium Pharmaceuticals collecting DNA from
Chinese populations and thereby speculating on massive returns for its investors simply does not
conjure a similar national imaginary of the United States.
So what is personalized medicine? In scientific - corporate terms, it is the creation of
drugs tailored to individual genetic profiles. It is at this point in its existence largely (though not
entirely) a discursive entity: it is hype. But it is also, if we read our Marx right, a thing-in-waiting,
where the thing in question is medicine -- as both therapeutic object and set of material-semiotic
practices. It is a use value that is waiting to happen, and that has already been inserted into
processes of exchange and capitalization, with corporate valuations dependent on it. Yes, we can
dismiss it as hype, but how different in its social life -- as exchange-value preceding use-value --
is personalized medicine to Marx's comrnmodified table? If we can accept then that hype is not
merely the dismissable act of unrealizable cynicism -- which is not to say that hype isn't often
cynical -- then it becomes clear that hype is part of a political economy that is as old as the
Industrial Revolution, even if the conditions that have made its explicit manifestation a central
part of corporate strategy are relatively new.
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The point I'm trying to make above therefore relates to the affects of personalized
medicine that precede its existence, affects that have to do with creating capital flows, corporate
identities and strategies. But there is a second affective dimension involved, and that relates to the
building of social identities. How does biosociality manifest itself through personalized medicine
(a question I continue to explore in greater detail in the Chapter 8)?
Of course, there are multiple communities of practice that personalized medicine, and
indeed genomics and biotechnology writ large, impinge upon, and in this chapter I restrict myself
primarily to talking about scientists, scientist-entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and policy
makers. My argument here is that personalized medicine is not a form of life (as in sociality of
action, as Michael Fischer outlines it) that is created by pre-existing disciplinary communities as
much as it is a form of life that creates these new scientific communities that could be called "the
genomics community". And once again, this argument emerges from following what Marx says
about the social life of commodities.
Commodities do not simply confer properties of anticipated use subsequent to a process
of exchange on objects that would otherwise have existed to anyway be used. They also play with
social bonds, which exist both amongst people and amongst commodities themselves. These
bonds on the one hand bind people to each other, people who are inter-related in various ways
through processes of labor, exchange and capitalization (all of which are inherently temporal
processes), and on the other hand bind commodities to each other. The question that Marx
implicitly asks, but which actually gets articulated by Derrida, is: "How is what takes place on the
one hand among men, in their apprehension of time, explain what takes place on the other hand
among those specters that are commodities? How do those whom one calls 'men', living men,
temporal and finite existences, become subjected, in their social relations, to these specters that
are relations, equally social relations among commodities?" (Derrida 1994: 154).
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Such a question is a fundamental question to ask if one is to understand the complicated
set of social bonds that one sees throughout genomics: bonds that tie the corporate genome
community together, bonds that create sports team like alliances amongst workers of particular
companies, bonds that tie companies together with their customers (who are often other
companies), bonds that tie together investors and entrepreneurs. And so onto a little ethnography.
The stage that I now move to is at the Hilton resort in Miami. The time, 1999. The
occasion, an industrial genome conference organised by The Institute of Genomic Research, the
non-profit organization headed by J. Craig Venter of Celera Genomics fame. As described in
Chapter 4, 1999 was a particularly interesting year for genomics, as the "genomics community"
was on the verge of generating a working draft sequence of the human genome. It was also a year
when the "genomics community" was particularly fractured between the public-funded Human
Genome Project and a number of private sector genome companies (of which Venter's Celera was
simply the most visible). The Miami conference was a site of gathering for the latter.
The company that really stole the show in Miami in 1999 was not Celera as much as it
was its rival, Incyte Pharmaceuticals (now Incyte Genomics, and there's a tale in the change in
name as well that I won't go into here). In the context of the 1999 Miami conference, Incyte CSO
Randy Scott's keynote address was important as the turning point of the proceedings into an
Incyte conference. The visibility had been there, the publicity had been there, but it had been built
up for a purpose: Scott knew his business, and he executed it well.
A lot of his talk was biology, about the various projects underway at Incyte. What was
important about the biology, that made this more than, or at least different from, a Latourian
scientific presentation, was its visionary nature - Scott was selling a vision for the future. So that
what was really interesting was a timed series of projections, through 2010, by which time,
according to Scott, would be achieved a real understanding of biological pathways - and a
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systematic, annotated, accessible informatics understanding of it, with Incyte as the major creator
of that understanding.
The beauty of a futuristic vision, of course, is that it doesn't have to be true. Legally, for
instance, many futuristic pronouncements are qualified with disclaimers disowning the
responsibility of the visionary to actualize the vision.'61
Let alone legally, visions don't even have to be true to sell - Scott's talk was addressing
simultaneously another audience, as much as or more than the strictly scientific audience: the
audience of investors, who were clearly going to form their business judgments through events
like this talk. For investors, of course, the sinking of money into such visions is risky. With
genomics even more so, because it doesn't yet have many tangible drug products to show. But by
selling his vision for the future, Scott can be assured of having money to go into that future,
irrespective of what might actually be produced. If, as Johannes Fabian (1983) argues in Time
and the Other, the anthropological study of spatial peripheries has tended to situate the subjects of
such studies either explicitly or implicitly in a temporal past, then the study of spatial "super-
centers" like genome conferences sees the subjects situating themselves in a temporal future.
I make two arguments that relate the generation of commercial value from genomics to
necessary temporal lags. Firstly, in order to generate value in the present to make a certain kind of
future possible, a vision of that future has to be sold, even if it is a vision that will never be
realized. But simultaneously, in order to extend the life of that value into that relatively distant
future of therapeutic product development, either ownership or publicness must be sought for the
161 Disclaimers such as this one that was put out by Incyte while announcing a collaboration with the
Huntsman Cancer Institute to study the role of genes in the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of cancer,
which says: "Except for the historical information contained herein, the matters set forth in this press
release, are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the "safe harbor" provisions of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and
uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially. For a discussion of factors that may cause
results to differ, see Incyte's SEC reports, including its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended June 30, 1999. Iucyte disclaims any intent or obligation to update these forward-looking statements".
See www.incyte.com/news/1999/huntsman.html.
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information in the present, and in the former case further tied in to the possible product of the
future by asking for patent rights on the downstream products that might emerge from the
information. The promises of genomics are statements of that which is yet-to-come, as opposed to
that which will be; it is by virtue of creating such spectral futures that the reality of the present is
created.
There is a tension between the notions of vision and promise, and the promissory visions
of genomics straddle an uncomfortable dialectic between the two. A vision is participatory, a
promise contractual. In other words, a vision is an exhortation on the part of the visionary to the
listeners to participate in the realization of that vision (visions for newly independent countries,
visions for self-reliant economies, visions for a world without war and so on). A promise on the
other hand is an undertaking on the part of the speaker to a listener to perform certain activities
and / or produce certain results - it is the speaker's duty to realize her promise. The realization of
both promises and visions, however, is posited in terms of the act / outcome itself. Genomics
however is peculiarly located. Its "ultimate" realization, personalized medicine, is purely in the
realm of feasible imagination; the promise of genomics is not the creation of an improved version
of an existing product, but of a revolutionary form of medicine, a revolution that extends not just
to medicines (as products) but to the entire practice of medicine.'6 It is quite possible, therefore,
for the realization of promissory visions as effects in general to function completely
independently of their realization as effects for the speaker (in this case, the genome company).
The product of a genome company is the creation of (some form of) information that is in
turn a condition of possibility for the creation of a drug. The conditions of its own possibility (and
thereby the actual conditions of possibility of the drug) can only be created by theperformative
creation of the conditions of possibility of the drug i.e. through a vision. This is however a vision
162 Which will even lead to a Foucauldian epistemic break in the way patients are categorized as medical
subjects, in terms of variability rather than normality and pathology. See Chapter 8 for an elaboration of
this argument.
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whose realization is not communal, but is, in the first instance at least, the responsibility of the
company. Further, while not contractual in a legal sense, this is a vision that functions as a direct
plea to the investor to make possible its (possible) realization by investing capital in the company.
This is why the promissory vision of the future creates the conditions of possibility for the
existence of the company in the present. While this does not guarantee the realization of the
vision in the future, it is a necessary condition for such a realization.
A guarantee is a vexed word as well. While the implicit guarantee of the promissory
vision of the genome company is towards the investor investing capital in it ("we will realize your
investment by enabling the creation of this product"), the performative of the vision is directed to
a number of listeners and functions differently for each of them. The primary audience in the
conference whom Randy Scott was addressing, for instance, was of scientists, who are interested
in his visions from the perspective of enablement of their own research. The pharmaceutical
companies, which are downstream to the genomics company, are particularly interested parties,
since they are the actual realizers of the drug. For the general public, this is a vision in a much
less immediately interested manner; for policymakers this interest manifests differently. The
performative of the future, therefore, functions to create very different futures for the different
concerned actors, irrespective of the actual future product that may (not) be produced.
There is also a slight but tangible difference that depends on whether the company
making the investor pitch is a public or a private company. In the latter case (for instance, in the
case of GeneEd, the e-learning start-up that was one of my ethnographic field-sites), the investors
in question are often venture capitalists or cther private investors; in the former case, it is Wall
Street, and the public stock market, that is listening. The explicitly speculative nature of recent,
especially technoscientific, capitalism, is indeed a function of the acknowledgement by Wall
Street of the nature of the performative operation of the promissory statement: those public
companies that are still years away from making a tangible product (usually biotech companies),
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but that are driving their stock prices by virtue of promise alone (something that was particularly
marked with genomics companies in 1999-2000) are referred to on Wall Street as story stocks.
But there was something else that was going on in Scott's talk, and that had to do with the
symbolic capital of genomic information as information that is a precursor to therapy. There was
this wonderful moment at the end of the Miami conference (in a party organized by Incyte) when
Scott raised a toast, to "the genomic community. Because they aren't in genomics for themselves,
they are in it for Life". Mirroring, indeed, Incyte's own logo, which is Genomics for LifeTM.
It is very evident that the production of value in genomics is to a large extent a discursive
act, whether it be through advertising, the selling of futures or the rhetorical creation of a
genomic community committed to Health. Even if it is indeed a single genomic community has as
internal to its logic the existence of multiple competing actors all of whom try to propagate their
particular brand and product at the expense of their competitors'.
What is evident is that active work gets performed, work that is variously discursive and
performative, in the process of which the genomic community is created as a homogenous entity,
but one that is simultaneously an ethical entity, an entity represented (and encompassed) by the
Incyte logo, Genomics for LifeTM. It isn't just the subject within the genomics profession who
gets in-formed at this moment; equally in-formed is the subject (as in discipline / endeavor /
venture) ofgenomics and the corporate subject such as Incyte, as ethical subjects that are in the
business of saving lives. Scott, in his many flashes of brilliant performance, establishes that the
real goal that is at issue is saving lives; that genomics is the vehicle through which lives can be
saved; and that the genomics community, led by the vanguard scientists at Incyte, merely exist for
the purpose of fulfilling that vision. Genomics, in this performative, is not vocation, but calling.
Scott's employees are not scientists but missionaries.
Further, the missionary zeal, at least in Scott's case, is not tied into some abstract utopian
desire for Health, but is embedded and embodied by real stories of suffering. So that Scott
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finished his talk with the perfect poignant story that speaks to the motto and vision of Genomics
for LifeTM: a story of Scott's friend, recently diagnosed with cancer, who 10 years into the future
could have been saved by genomics.
And at this perfectly poignant, perfectly appropriate moment, after a talk that was
perfectly orchestrated, Randy Scott, Chairman and Chief Scientific Officer of Incyte
Pharmaceuticals, broke down and cried.
Once again, making sense of this sort of performativity involves both suspending one's
sense of cynicism and being wary of buying completely into the performance, of retaining,
without being disrespectful, one's ability to be cynical. I do not want to be dismissive of Scott's
pain here, but do want to emphasize the importance that Barry Werth places, in his story of
Joshua Boger, on "strenuously rehearsed spontaneity" (98), a spontaneity that is central, in
Werth's rendering, to the performativity of promissory story-telling by biotech entrepreneurs,
even if it is a spontaneity that was perhaps, in this case, painfully unnecessary for Scott to
rehearse.
"Ethics" in corporations, therefore, depends on social and rhetorical apparati, but also on
individual figures and self-images. The ethical corporation is both a legal entity and a cultural
ideal, and frequently an important idea for the participants in the corporation as much as the
public at large. So to understand the idea of "ethical" corporations it is too simplistic to assume
that "ethics" is only a badge of cultural legitimacy that the corporation manipulates: it also
functions at the level of core beliefs and relationships for the participants in the corporation. We
have to remember that "ethics" is always a way of naming or designating types of social and
material relationships by the actors themselves, and to think that this is always done cynically is
to blind ourselves to a lot of important ways that social power functions.
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I have talked so far of the promise(s) of genomics, as being the condition of enablement
of a certain type of present. What however actually happens in the present, and how does the
promise by its very nature create contradictions that make the present untenable simultaneously to
making the present possible? There is a more directly historical way of posing the questions that I
have already been trying to ask in this chapter: how does one explain stock prices in the hundreds
of dollars for companies less than a decade old with no tangible therapeutic product even on the
horizon in the dot com heydays of 1999-2000, and how does one explain the equally dramatic
slump that sees those same stock prices operating sometimes in single digits today? The simple
answer, of course, it to take recourse to that ultimnate Agency, the market, and attribute the fall in
biotech stocks to the general slump in the market. There is, I argue, a more complicated set of
answers. The answer to the former question is what I have been trying to get at so far in the
chapter, and is related to the political economy that hype works within and creates. Before
moving on to the latter question, a little more history is needed to actually explain why it is that I
feel that hand-waving "market" non-explanations are insufficient to understand the dynamics of
the biotech industry between 1998 and 2001.
The simple fact is that the biotech industry has been experiencing cycles of boom and
bust pretty much since its inception in the mid-to-late 70s, and these cycles of boom and bust
have been morphologically highly akin to the dot corn boom - reality check bust of the last three
years. This similarity has much to do with the fact that biotech has played to highly inflated
stocks in the past with no sign of a tangible product to show pretty much from the get-go, in the
context of a larger economy that was much more conservative and that was much less willing to
go along with the Silicon Valley mode of (apparent) high risk investment that has marked the dot
corn economy. The apparently irrational response to promise has in fact been the single factor that
has enabled the existence and growth of an industry that would otherwise just not have been able
to survive the extremely long periods of time and high amounts of investment required to bring
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drugs to market. The realization that promise rather than pipelines could create enduring value
started dawning as early as October 14, 1980, the day Genentech went public.
Genentech was not the first biotech company (Cetus Corporation was formed before it, so
it was the second), but it was the first to go public. Founded in 1976, it spent its early years
focusing on interferon research, as interferons were considered to be major candidates as anti-
cancer drugs. The popular and business press at the time all regarded interferon research as one of
the great hopes for cancer therapy.
The Genentech IPO was closed with 1 million shares at $35 each, an amount that
exceeded all expectations, and an incredible amount for a company whose first product (insulin)
didn't appear on the horizon until 1984. In the next 6 years after the Genentech IPO, another 19
biotech companies went public, and together raised $542.3 million through their IPOs (Cetus,
which was the second biotech company to go public, alone raised $107 million). Clearly,
therefore, promissory visions have been much more than just a feature of the biotech industry:
they have enabled it to exist.
There is, however, a gap that is opened up at the very heart of this promise, and that is the
gap between infinite promise and what has to be necessarily measured as inadequate in relation to
the promise. So while the promise creates the conditions of possibility for the present, it also,
necessarily, creates the conditions for its own unfulfilment, and the consequences of that. This
gap mentioned above is the place of spectrality -- and of marketing / PR. In other words, really
successful long tern; marketing / PR is not the articulation of vision, but the closure of the gap
between what is envisioned and what is (inadequately) achieved. The economic bust in biotech
(and its periodic cycles) have to be thus understood. There is a difference between a promise and
a teleological design, and this difference is the gap opened up between promise and its
realization. This is the gap where events occur, and where politics -- speed and tactics -- take
over. If promissory visions have made the biotech industry possible, then they have also placed
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the risk that attends all drug development -- in this case, the risk of not acting through on one's
promise -- at the heart of the calculus of biotech. Werner Hamacher, in a brilliant reading of
Derrida's reading of Marx (Hamacher 1999), points to this distinction between structures of
messianic promissory articulation (and I will explore this messianism in greater detail later in the
chapter) and teleological design. Reading the articulation of the former as the latter is a
misreading, because telos has an end, whereas messianism is without horizon (see especially
Hamacher 1999: 201 for an elaboration of this distinction). Even personalized medicine, that I
have referred to, consciously in quotes, as an envisioned "end" of genomics, is in fact not an end
at all but a strategic promissory horizon, just as the sequencing of the human genome was until
the working draft sequence was generated in June 2000.
What I have described so far is what Hamacher refers to as "spectreality", which is a
gesture towards the impossibility of separating the "real" from the "conjured", when the "real" is
both conjured, and the "conjuration" is the condition of unfulfillment of the "real".
Let me return at this point to Anna Tsing's (2000) analysis of Bre-X and my analysis of
vision in, especially, biotechnology, to see if it is possible to tease out subtle differences in which
to begin to look for specific dynamics of biocapital. Tsing sees enterprises such as that of Bre-X
as the confluence of three sets of scale-making projects: "the globe-making aspirations of finance
capital, the nation-making coercions of franchise cronyism, and the region-making claims of
frontier culture" (141). Indeed, "revolutions" in biotechnology, such as genomics, are precisely
such scale-making projects, and include further the knowledge-making aspirations of
technoscience, which is a significant scale-making project with profound consequences for what
gets accepted as "fact". However, when biotechnologies such as, but not limited to, genomics, are
situated in the context of a larger drug development marketplace that is, if enthusiastic, then
certainly so with a certain amount of inertia and skepticism about modes of therapeutic
development that are relatively untested and that compete with traditional (and traditionally
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extremely successful) organic chemical synthetic methods, then one comes up against what I have
already argued is the fundamental market terrain of drug development, which is the relatively
vulnerable position that biotechnology companies are in with respect to big pharmaceutical
companies. Therefore, while on the one hand, the conjuration of new revolutionary
biotechnologies such as genomics is all about scale-making, on the other hand, it is, for the
concerned actors, often so when what is at stake, otherwise, is their own survival. The structural
contradictions inherent to the biocapitalist marketplace ensure that the only way to exist, as a
biotechnology company, is to conjure scale-making revolutionaryfutures. There is no alternative,
for a biotechnology company (as opposed to a big pharmaceutical company), to what Tsing calls
"spectacular accumulation" (which she defines [141] as that which "occurs when investors
speculate on a product that may or may not exist").
Let me then ask three sets of questions that I have alluded to in this chapter so far.
The first has to do with a statement by Derrida that speculation is always theoretical and
theological. It is perhaps not insignificant to the story of Randy Scott that he is an evangelical
Christian. But I am not indicating this with a wish to attribute motives -- I am not saying that
Scott is a good genome entrepreneur because he is a good Christian. Rather, I am arguing for a
natural co-habitation of discourses, the visionary discourses of corporate bioscience being from
the get-go morphologically akin to messianic discourses (for the operation of discourse in
messianic movements, see Susan Harding's [2000] work on born-again Christians). Scott's ability
to co-habit the two worlds of science and religion clearly allow him to use the discourse
particularly well. Biotechnology, therefore, occupies a messianic space, of technology and of Life
linked through capital, which becomes, naturally, the object mediating fetishization (and I will
explore this space in greater detail in the next chapter).
302
Indeed, this messianic space is a structural part of the biotech industry, and has to do with
much more than Scott's Christianity or lack thereof. This is evidenced in Barry Werth's
description of Joshua Boger, founder of Vertex Pharmaceuticals and Jewish, in his history of that
company The Billion Dollar Molecule. Below is an extract from Werth's account of Boger's pitch
to investors, and how that pitch is always already positioned from the get-go as a religious and
salvationary project:
Boger knew that stories have to be accessible and that what investors want most from
them is affirmation, so he molded Vertex's slide show not as a disquisition on science or
business strategy, but as a quest. The grail - the object of the quest - was structure-based
design and its transcendent prize of safer, smarter, more profitable drugs. The impetus, as
always in such stories, was a combination of righteousness and greed. (Werth 1994: 96).
Nonetheless, the salvationary-cum-profitable stricture of this performative discourse was
undergirded and overdetermined by Boger's own background and attributes, just as Scott's
Christianity is not determining, but definitely significant, for the types of stories he tells and the
ways in which he conjures up futures as scripted by Incyte. As Werth proceeds:
That was the text. There were also subtexts that Boger didn't mention, the most intriguing
being about himself. Boger never referred in his slides to his relationship with Merck
[where he had formerly been an employee before starting up Vertex], but he was seldom
introduced anywhere without it being mentioned. To listeners with a knowledge of the
drug industry, his defection was the most tantalizing part of Vertex's story, introducing,
as it did, a whiff of patricidal intent, of vengeance. Here was Boger, a scion of America's
Most Admired Corporation, the most productive drug company in history, Wall Street's
gold standard, rejecting all that it had to offer because he thought he could do better. It
didn't take a rereading of Genesis: Boger's saga of defiant departure was as old as Adam.
(96-97).
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The second question has to do with risk. Personalized medicine, more explicitly than
other type of biotechnology, sees the intertwining of two notions of risk, one put forward by
Francois Ewald (who sees risk as capital) and the other put forward by Robert Castel (who looks
at patient subjectivities as they get molded by risk profiling). Individualized therapy is inherently
about individual risk profiles of future illness and therapeutic intervention. Therefore the biotech /
pharma company's risk of huge capital investment towards a product that might not be realized is
directly in play with the ultimate patient-consumer's risk of future probable illness. The rationale
of personalized medicine - indeed, of biocapital -- is fundamentally an outcome of this
intertwining (I explore this in greater detail in the Chapter 8). Indeed, risk is, as Pat O'Malley
argues, a way of governing through the future (O'Malley 2000).
The third has to do with credibility. I have argued elsewhere how in genomics the
"classical" scientific binaries of truth and falsity are articulated with those of efficiency and
inefficiency, justice and injustice - articulations of non-economic forms of socio-moral values
that the sociology of science in its earlier Mertonian guise regarded as separate. But it could
indeed be argued that in the rhetoric of biocapital, truth and falsity themselves have no meaning --
even if science is about truth and falsity, corporate PR is rather about credibility and incredibility.
A triangulation could therefore be made for the contemporary biotechnology corporation, in
which speed still mediates the linkage of efficiency and inefficiency to virtue or its lack, but it is
credibility rather than truth that is the "ultimate" aim to start with. At some fundamental level, it
doesn't matter whether the promissory visions of genomics are true or not, as long as they are
credible.
The relationship between credibility and truth, and the place this relationship occupies in
biocapitalist visionary practices, is important to explore further. Visionary technoscientific
practice is the act of fabricating the truth, which does not equate to fabricating a lie. In order to
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understand this point further, it is worthwhile to focus on one of the classic discursive apparati of
contemporary capitalism, the forward-looking statement.
A forward-looking statement is defined as:
A. a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss),
earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital
structure, or other financial items;
B. a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations,
including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer;
C. a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement contained
in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management or in the
results of operations included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the
Commission;
D. any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
E. any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent that the
report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
F. a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be
specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.'6 3
Under Section 27A of the US Securities Act of 1933, there is a provision of a "safe
harbor" for forward-looking statements, which means that the issuers of such statements (usually
corporate investor relations departments) are not liable in case of the failure to fulfill any
promises or predictions made within the statement. It is immediately evident from the Act
however that a failure to fulfill a promise or prediction does not constitute a lie, to the extent that
a lie, indicating intent, might be indicative of fraudulent behavior. Indeed, the safe harbor
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provision is not available to issuers who have committed certain felonies or misdemeanors such
as false reports, bribery, perjury, burglary, forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent concealment,
embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of funds or securities:'64 all of which
might be said to be acts of lying. What sort of not-truth (as opposed to untruth), then, is a
forward-looking statement? For that, I will turn to an example of such a statement, that I quoted
in an earlier footnote, which was put out by Incyte while announcing a collaboration with the
Huntsman Cancer Institute to study the role of genes in the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of
cancer. This says: "Except for the historical information contained herein, the matters set forth in
this press release, are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the 'safe harbor'
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking
statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially.
For a discussion of factors that may cause results to differ, see Incyte's SEC reports, including its
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 1999. Incyte disclaims any intent
or obligation to update these forward-looking statements".'65
The truth ingrained within the forward-looking statement is the implicit statement on the
part of the issuer that "I will not have lied, and that is the truth". In other words, regardless of the
outcome of Incyte's collaboration with the Huntsman Cancer Institute, Incyte would not have
defrauded its readers with its promises - even if some of those readers might have invested in
Incyte as a consequence of expectations raised by those very promises. And yet, making a
promise that one does not fulfill would, in a general cultural conception, constitute a lie. What the
forward-looking statement formalizes is the fact that, as Derrida points out, it is impossible to
locate an unfulfilled promise as a lie even as it is always perceived - even perhaps accepted - as a
non-truth. In that sense, a forward-looking statement quite nicely fits in with Derrida's
163 As per Section 27A of the US Securities Act of 1933, available online at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/33act/sect27a.htm
164 As per Section 15B of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934, available online at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/34act/sect 15.htm#b
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formalization of the popular cultural conception of the lie. He says, "for structural reasons.. .it
will always be impossible to prove, in the strict sense, that someone has lied even if one can
prove that he or she did not tell the truth" (Derrida 2001 [1995]: 68).
The tension of venture science, then, is the tension between the "lie" of corporate PR and
the "truth" of science; where corporate PR "will not have been a lie", and science is authoritative
as truth when its statement attains facticity. This tension becomes even more acute when facticity
is accorded inherent truth (inherent both as in essential to the statement, but also, when the
facticity concerned has to do with knowledge about "life itself', then inherent as in essential to
the self that gets constituted by the "true" fact). This is of particular importance in understanding
the constitution of subjectivity by genomics (as always already venture science), that I explore in
Chapter 8.
What then is the truth of venture science, as opposed to the truth of Mertonian science? It
is that the truth lies somewhere, "lying" here meaning both existing and being the thing that is not
the truth: the truth of venture science, from the get-go, is under erasure, it is :a4h. But this ruth,
which is not a lie, is also not an error.'6 If a lie could be said to be an intentional falsehood, then
an error might be said to be an unintentional mistake, a failure to calculate adequately the
uncertain circumstances that might lead a promissory statement to "not pan out". A forward-
looking venture-scientific statement cannot be a failure to calculate correctly, because the futures
it promises are precisely incalculable (and therefore it becomes even more important to calculate
them). Neither is this tauth an error in the Canguilhemian sense, as pathological (in the sense of
being in opposition to the norm. (See Canguilhem 1989 [1966]), in this case as deviant from the
Mertonian norm: because, in venture science, the Mertonian norms are not violated, they simply
are not.'67
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165 Available online at www.incyte.com/news/1999/huntsman.html.
'66 Derrida talks about the lie as distinct from error in "History of the Lie". See Derrida 2001 (1995).
167 See Merton (1942) for his exposition of the normative structure of science.
What constitutes a venture-scientific statement is itself a question, since it is not the
formalized scientific statement that goes on to constitute "fact": indeed, it could be argued that
scientific facts do remain the same, regardless of where they are produced. I am not arguing that
corporations produce different scientific facts from academic labs; I am arguing that the sorts of
scientific ventures that get undertaken in the first place change, that the agenda of scientific
practice changes as it becomes venture science, and this changed agenda has everything to do
with the sorts of non-scientific trthclaims that constitute corporate public relations and investor
relations. Therefore, corporations, like academic labs, can produce erroneous scientific "facts"
(those that get falsified subsequently and at that point stop operating as facts), independent of the
context of the production of tuh -claims through which they operate.
There is a question of temporality that resides in the relationship of a lie, or of a kth, to
error. In the case of the truth the statement precedes, and indeed often performs or conjures, the
event (or fails to do so); in the case of the error, the event (such as, for instance, the result of a
genetic test) leads to a statement that then assumes facticity. While in this chapter I am
predominantly concerned with the former, in Chapter 8 I1 concern myself with the latter. As I have
been arguing until this point, venture science is constituted by the dialectic between the trth -
truth that is always under erasure, and that pertains primarily to formally non-scientific
articulations that create the conditions of possibility for science to occur (such as the existence of
the company, and capital, in the first place) - and fact, which may be erroneous (in this case,
erroneous refers to incorrectness, as opposed to abnormal deviance - so that a genetic test that
shows error: abnormal deviance: need not be erroneous, though it might be [the false positive]) on
occasion, but doesn't have to be. Regardless of the particular error that may or may not occur,
however, fact operates on the fact that it is, authoritatively, true.
In other words, in venture science, the operation of t1t provides the grounds for the
production and operation of facts. This former operation - which is basically the act of selling
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promissory futures in order to create the present that enables one to go into those futures - does
not need to take place in Mertonian science. This is the distinctiveness of venture science, and the
politics - utopian, dystopian, productive, regressive, liberatory, repressive - that may or may not
stem from venture science, and that I engage with at different moments in this thesis, are a
consequence of this distinctiveness. The facts produced may be erroneous (as in incorrect), and
they may correctly point to error (as in deviance); they may, indeed, erroneously point to error
(the false positive). But it is the operation of Mth, not the operation of facts, that conjures the
biocapitalist political terrain within which facts operate.
Why, then, is tith saying important beyond performativity? I turn here once again to
some ethnography to begin an answer to this question.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the co-founder of GeneEd and its Chief Scientific Officer
(CSO), Salil Patel, shows an almost naively Mertonian adherence to and belief in the truth of
science, a belief that sits in some tension with his role as manager of a start-up company that has
to improvise and be flexible with its discourses, albeit without ever explicitly lying. This tension,
however, is not as acute as the tension Patel felt in his earlier company, in which he was an
employee who managed some of that company's gene therapy projects. One of the reasons Patel
decided to take the risk of leaving a secure corporate job to found a start-up was indeed because
of the disillusionment he felt with his former company's mode of functioning. He recounted the
causes of this disillusionment to me twice, on different occasions, and each of those renderings
was slightly, and interestingly, different from the other.
The first time Patel told me about his disillusionment, he mentioned how he was asked to
manage one of the company's flagship gene therapy projects with a meager staff and few
resources. After a number of attempts, it was clear to Patel that the project was floundering, and
he suggested to the company that they drop it. The company listened to his recommendation, but
shortly therafter put out a press release detailing their rapid advancements towards gene therapy,
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using as examples the types of seriously troubled projects such as Patel's that they were actually
deciding not to pursue further. Expectedly, the company's stock prices soared as a consequence
of their promising statements. Patel, however, felt, at least in this rendering, that the company was
lying, and he was deeply troubled by this. Indeed, that he couldn't quite escape this mode of
"lying" (in Patel's sense; uth as I have been arguing for it) at GeneEd, in spite of his own best
intentions to be "honest" (thereby also suggesting how this form of tfuthtelling is a structural
part of contemporary high-tech capitalism), was made quite clear on at least a couple of instances:
once, when Patel admitted that he knew that at least one of the custom e-learning courses GeneEd
was building for one of their clients (a course that as chief content editor in the company he had a
significant hand in designing) had "lies" in it; and again, on the occasion of a six-monthly
reception that GeneEd threw for its investors, where, they made a pitch about their current
situation and promised an exciting future, and where again Patel felt squeamish about the fact that
such pitches weren't entirely "truthful". In fact, Patel felt uncomfortable about aspects of the
pitch that couldn't possibly be truthful, such as sales forecasts, which are precisely that: forecasts,
based on reasonable intuition, necessarily subjective and subject to all sorts of contingencies that
could lead to outcomes radically different from those forecast. In other words, even calculating
what is essentially incalculable had, for Patel, the manifestations of a "lie", with the same moral
connotations that lying intentionally in a scientific paper would have.
And yet, the second time he told me about his disillusionment with his former company,
he easily slipped into a more pragmatic, and typical, mode, saying that he had no problems with
untrue press releases, as long as companies don't publish false data in scientific papers. In this
rendering, Patel was acknowledging that even intentional and deliberate untruths (since a press
release of the nature Patel was referring to referred to past events rather than to future
incalculable events) in certain discursive spaces that accepted those untruths within certain limits
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as a part of the rules of the game could not be equated with a lie, which is what scientific fraud
would constitute.
This is precisely the conflict between Patel the "scientist" and Patel the "business-
person", subjectivities that increasingly get conflated as venture science gets naturalized, but that
are not at all unique to Patel. Indeed, Barry Werth recounts in great detail precisely such conflicts
amongst many of the early management of Vertex Pharmaceuticals in The Billion Dollar
Molecule. Therefore, on the one hand, it is important to tease out the different categories of the
performative discourse of the truth, which is what Derrida does in "History of the Lie" (Derrida
2001 [1995]). On the other hand, it is important to simultaneously stay attentive to the
institutional groundings from which such discourses emanate and within which they operate,
especially when, as in the case of venture science, the germ of conflicts of interest are inherent in
them from the get-go. The notion of conflict of interest, a normative notion that draws attention to
the possibility of non-truth emanating as a consequence of the institutional space from which
statements might emanate, is indeed one that has for many years, as a good Mertonian watchdog,
been a wedge that has allowed a certain mode of truth accountability to operate in
technocorporate discourse. It is one of the norms that are at stake as venture science gets
naturalized.' 6 8
I am, therefore, specifying the importance of staying attentive to conflicts of interest as an
ethical notion, not in the terms of ethics as moral discourse, but in terms of specific contradictions
within the social relations of production that produce these discourses. In this sense, I am echoing
the position that Marx adopts in The German Ideology (Marx 1963 [1845]), where he argues that
168 Indeed, as I argued while talking about estimates for clinical trials costs in Chapter 3, the failure to take
DiMasi et al. to task for the obvious conflict of interest in generating figures regarding the cost of drug
development solely figures provided by the industry, which has an interest in over-reporting these costs,
has significant consequences for the naturalization of the "fact" that bringing a new drug to market costs
between $500-800 million.
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ethical political positions - positions that regard philosophy as praxis - must emanate not from
the realm of ideology, but from the material relations of production that shape political terrains.
The next question to ask is: what, if anything, is specific to biocapitalism in my analysis
of promise thus far? I think this is where a distinction between technology and science becomes
important, a distinction that has famously, and for generally good reasons, been imploded by
Bruno Latour in his coining of the phrase technoscience. The fact however is that science, at least
in a Mertonian conception that now, because of its normative content as it pertains to specific
relations of production, suddenly seems important to hold onto even as its existence seems an
impossibility, is explicitly about the production of facts. What is specific then is that biotech /
drug development depends, in its very structure, upon some notion of (presently unpredictable)
discovery in the future. Drug development is an enterprise, industrialized and corporatized, that
necessarily depends upon activities of fact production, and depends upon activities offact
production: for successful drug development ventures to happen, effective discovery is critical
(see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the clear distinction between drug discovery and drug
development phases in bringing a therapeutic molecule to market). The phase during which the
discovery process is industrialized and made into a technology (and again, I use technology here
not in the rigid positivist sense that STS authors such as Latour or Haraway would reject, but as
something that is qualitatively distinct from the fact producing enterprise of drug discovery) is the
clinical trial. Clinical trials operate in a realm of industrial calculation that is quite distinct from
the much more intuitive and unpredictable, yet more factual, phase of discovery.
In terms then of working towards a typology of truth-like statements in drug discovery
and development, one could talk about promise, that operates both in the interactions of
companies with investors and in the public relations apparatus of companies; about fact, that
operates during discovery; and about evidence, which is what clinical trials produce, and which
necessarily has associated with it notions of regulation and expert mediation (in the case of US-
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based clinical trials, by regulators at the Food and Drug Administration [FDA]). Each of these
constitute a different type of akth producing enterprise that collectively constitute biocapitalist
corporate envisioning. Further, the enterprises that produce fact, evidence and PR are completely
intertwined. One could quote Nietzsche as being remarkably prescient when he says "It might
even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and honored things [could we here
think of Mertonian science as one such good and honored thing?] resides precisely in their being
artfully related, knotted and crocheted to these wicked, apparently antithetical things [the "lie" of
PR, in this case?], perhaps even in their being essentially identical with them" (Nietzsche 1973
[1886]: 16). This is why dismissing hype as "simply cynical", a mode of dismissal that is
fundamentally what I am writing against in this chapter, is not a fruitful way of understanding the
mechanisms of its operation: attributions of cynicism serve to erect a simple binary between the
truth and the lie (hype always being somehow associated, not just typologically but normatively
with the latter), a binary that just does not serve to understand the ways in which the truth and the
lie are co-constituted, as different types of it.
There is another reason why dismissing hype, or corporate PR, or corporate PR as hype,
as simply being cynical, effects erasures in understanding the terrains from which statements,
actions, ethics, effects and affects get produced. And that is that while the uth of PR might be
cynically manipulated from the get-go (one cannot say that hype is not cynical when one says that
hype is notjust about cynicism), it might equally be a sign of innocence, a faith in other systems
of ethical evaluation that don't simply operate in terms of the truthfulness of statements. As
Nietzsche says, "There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a cause"
(Nietzsche 1973 [1886]: 88).
Therefore, one could understand Patel's uths / "lies" as CSO of GeneEd in terms not of
cynicism but of an innocent adherence to ethical frameworks that sometimes operate
antithetically to frameworks that simply legitimate and normativize truth. In the case of the
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company for which Patel produced a course knowing that it had what he called "lies" (what
might perhaps more accurately termed factual inaccuracies?) in it, what Patel was actually doing
was providing a service: his mandate to his customer was to design a custom course to the
customer's specifications, and he felt obliged, even to the point of countenancing "lies" in the
content that he created, of not ruling in the content. In this case, he was reflecting GeneEd's role
as a custom content provider, where the focus is on providing customized (and customer-focused)
solutions rather than on the scientific content, which becomes much more central in the in-house
catalog courses that GeneEd develops, that are more strictly "educational", "factual" and
"scientific". The fact that these catalog courses are not the source of sustainable business value
for GeneEd in the way that custom courses are, of course, is a fact worth noting. This is at the
heart of the tension, introduced in Chapter 2 when I first wrote about GeneEd, of its contradictory
roles as an "education" versus an "advertising" company - it has found that it is hard for it be
purely in the business of education and still be a company.
Further, in the case of the investor pitch, riddled with sales forecasts that troubled Patel as
not being truthful (even though they couldn't possibly be), the fact that he still was part of the
team that constructed and articulated the pitch - that he completely inhabits and is productive
from within the structures of contradiction that he feels so ambivalent about - is not just a
reflection of pragmatism, but also a reflection of his commitment to the GeneEd cause, of his
willingness to be a "team player", even at the expense of some moral squeamishness. I am not
saying here that it is more important to be loyal to one's company than to tell the truth; what I do
want to mention, however, is that what is at stake is not just competing normativities or
moralities, but completing moralities that are completely conditioned by the situation within
which they are evaluated. Therefore, the investors to which Patel was pitching the ti~ah were
fundamentally, at that moment, evaluating the cohesion of GeneEd's management team (I learnt
this from subsequent conversations with the investors, so this isn't merely conjecture), which
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means Patel's willingness to make a pitch that he might be squeamish about is precisely what
would reassure his investors that their money was being soundly invested. A more "honest"
willingness on Patel's part to admit to doubt and uncertainty, on the other hand, would have
troubled the investors that their investments were not just errors of their judgement, but a
misplaced faith in the management team in whom they had reposed their trust to work for a
common cause. Telling the "truth" (and what, indeed, could the truth have been, except an
admission of a fact known to everybody, that sales cannot be forecast in any completely objective
manner?), in such a situation, would not just have been poor pragmatics on Patel's part, it would
have been an abdication of the investors' trust in him as an entrepreneur and manager they have
invested in.
When the "lie" comes from a larger company with enough of a division of labor to have
its own truth-producing divisions (such as public relations or investor relations), of course,
cynicism becomes a more explicit part of the calculation. Such departments, as in Patel's old
company, are after all in the business not just of projections, and certainly not of designing
customer solutions, but also of writing up past and present events, into documents such as press
releases or annual reports. Therefore along with a typology of the tawtful statement needs always
to be a typology of the institutional groundings from which such statements emanate.
The company that perhaps most epitomizes a venture science approach to its business, and
therefore epitomizes the constant game of future perfect / present tense that I discuss in this chapter is
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, which indeed calls itself the Biopharmaceutical Company of the Future'. An
example of their promissory envisioning can be seen in the pitches they make for one of their major
subsidiaries, Millennium Predictive Medicine (MPMx). Millennium's predictive medicine strategy consists of
pharmacogenomics and what it calls DiagnomicsTM (which is basically genomic-based diagnostic testing),
about both of which I will elaborate upon in Chapter 8. MPMx's major initial therapeutic focus is in oncology,
and their oncology promises fit perfectly into the promissory rhetoric of venture science. Reading Millennium
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web sites, press releases and annual reports, one could be excused for thinking that they are the
revolutionary force in predictive medicine, that no one really does what they do to such an ambitious extent,
and that they are at the very least the upstream market leaders in oncology. Whether these are "true" or not
(or even whether the "truth" of such statements that are always-already forward-looking as they are boasts
about current or past achievements is relevant) is, as I have argued above, not the point. Indeed, it is
certainly true that Millennium is amongst the most ambitious of the biotech companies that have at one point
or ar other' ised (or continue to use) genomics as the center-piece of their R & D and business efforts. And
yet, thr'.e c, the major upstream advances in the field of cancer therapeutics - all of which, at some level,
are based in genomics - have come from companies that have not classified themselves as explicitly as
"genome" companies (I refer here to herceptin [Genentech], gleevec [Novartis] and the tailoring of tamoxifen
because of the discovery of the BRCA genes by Myriad). Millennium, in its ability to sell itself as a market
leader in spite of not having such spectacular diagnostic or therapeutic products on the market, epitomizes
how promise alone, if made strategically, can be driver of (at least provisional) success.
6.2: Entrepreneurial and Investor Envisioning
In the first part of this chapter, I have talked about the broader structural terrain of
envisioning within which biocapital operates. In the process, I have drawn upon stories of Randy
Scott and Joshua Boger, both founders of start-up biotechnology companies that have now
become relatively established biotech players. As companies grow, of course, the identity of the
company starts asserting itself independently of the identity of its founder, identities that are often
collapsed during the earliest stages of the start-up. In this section, I hone in on the particular start-
up dynamics in which the founder-entrepreneur, and often the venture capitalist, play key roles, in
order to articulate the types of envisioning that operate in this key sub-terrain of the biocapitalist
enterprise.
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I will start doing so by focusing on the story of a start-up company that is neither a
genomics company, nor a venture capital funded one, GeneEd. I had outlined a brief history of
the emergence of GeneEd in Chapter 2, and talked about them in greater detail in context of
changing labor practices and relationships in Chapter 4. Without therefore going into those stories
in great detail again, I will move towards a deeper analysis of starting up a company, and a role
that vision plays in such a venture. GeneEd, in spite of itself not being a genomics / biotech
company, is absolutely central to the stories of biocapitalism that I tell, because their customers
are both upstream biotech and downstream pharmaceutical companies, and this differentiated
customer base that is based on the market terrain of drug development is definitely significant to
the story of GeneEd as a company.
The CEO of GeneFe, Sunil Maulik, has many things to say about vision, and one of the
first is that being visionary is being inter-disciplinary in a profound sense, of not just allowing
different disciplines and perspectives to cohabit in some bland acknowledgment of mutual
tolerance, but in the sense of actually putting what might be considered incompatible regimes of
knowledge, and their practitioners, into the same enterprise, where the very success of that
enterprise depends on these various forms of knowledge articulating in productive, and often
unpredictable, new ways.' 69 Secondly, for Maulik being visionary involves not recharting paths
that have already been tread. He says: "As a person, the type of company I would want to start
169 Needless to say, I feel there are profound lessons here for purported inter-disciplines like STS, which
often ends up, in academic spaces such as STS Departments, being a carefully negotiated multi-discipline,
with great care taken not to brainstorm across disciplinary preserves so that each component discipline's
"sanctity" can be "respected", and a certain amount of peaceful co-existence maintained. The productivity
of corporate spaces such as start-ups, and new technoscientific endeavors, such as bioinformatics, comes
precisely from the willingness to take the risk of encroaching upon another's disciplinary turf, and thereby
creating the conditions of possibility for new forms of knowledge, strategy and co-habitation to emerge.
The parallels of multi-disciplinarity to the now highly problematized notion and practice of multi-
culturalism, that allows, in the name of political correctness, an unreflexive co-existence of different
cultural and religious beliefs and practices and their institutionalization, without adequately posing the
"thick" questions of the historical genesis and political embeddedness of these "cultural forms", and further
reifying the individual "cultural" components of a multi-cultural assemblage into homogenous entities,
need to be further paid attention to. Perhaps corporate technoscience can provide some salutary lessons for
progressive praxis after all.
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wouldn't have been a nuts-and-bolts company, it wouldn't have been a 'they are making clones,
let's make clones. They're sequencing the genome, let's sequence the genome'. It was a company
that was going to do what nobody had done before".170
On the one hand, this points to a contrast with, for instance, many big pharmaceutical
companies that increasingly are in the business of generating "me-too" drugs (either new versions
of drugs that are already on the market, or drugs for indications that are already treatable by
existing drugs), that precisely do not operate the same visionary terrain as smaller more supple
companies do, and avoid doing so at least partly, as I have argued in Chapter 3, because of their
size, and a consequent division of labor that leads to a certain constitutive management inertia.
On the other hand, this points to a certain recognition of what Deleuze might call a line of flight,
that is not just reflective of start-ups compared to big corporations, but also of scientists who
choose their research projects for specific reasons. This question of vision, as articulated as a
certain kind of risk taking in search of a new frontier or horizon, which is actually, in an ironic
sense, a form of risk minimization by finding a niche that isn't already encroached upon by much
more powerful competitors, is equally central to the calculus of S.K. Brahmachari, the head of
India's flagship public genome center, the Centre for Biochemical Technology (CBT), that I have
discussed at some length in Chapter 5. Indeed, this particular form of almost forced envisioning,
as a way of dealing with a distinctly marginal and vulnerable position in a hugely stratified
political terrain, has to do with, in Maulik's case, negotiating a space of sustainable operation for
a start-up that avoids having to compete with well entrenched and more powerful existing
corporations, and in Brahmachari's case, of negotiation of a global power terrain where it is
extremely hard for an Indian basic research laboratory to do cutting-edge science without thereby
coming into direct competition with more networked, resource-rich, Western labs. Brahmachari,
therefore, echoes Maulik's sentiments above, but in a way that is more reflective of the
170 Sunil Maulik, interview with the author, 15 May 2001.
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constraints of power inequities that drive certain visionary articulations, that force a kind of
strategic creativity that perhaps isn't necessary for those who do not occupy positions of such
strategic vulnerability. So on the one hand, like Maulik, Brahmachari articulates his desire to
study areas that aren't heavily researched already in terms of a certain inherent drive to be on the
frontiers of knowledge production rather than simply be mimetic of others' efforts: "So my early
learning was, think of research problems in this way - don't go to the library, read others' work,
and start thinking what can I do? Think, what can be done? What resources you have? Then go
and check in the library whether already sonicbody has done it or not. You follow? Scientists will
rush to the libraries on Thursdays. So we said new ideas used to come Thursday evenings. Which
means all new ideas must generate after reading somebody else's article".''
On the other hand, there is a strategic rationale that stems from a position of marginality
that underlies this desire to do visionary, cutting-edge science that no one has done before. In
Brahnachari's case, this uncharted work has been to study the functional significance of
repetitive DNA sequences, and other unusual DNA structures, with the former at least being
written off, with little evidence, by even respected Western scientists as being part of "junk"
DNA because they don't occur in regions that code for proteins. Brahmachari: "I was already
looking for opportunities where a niche can be created.... Now, Francis Crick and all those had
published papers saying [DNA] repeat [sequence] has no function, that no American funds will
be available for repetitive sequence. So no publication. If I can do, I publish. So I have a niche cut
out to work on repeats. And this was a wonderful niche till 2000 genome showed repeat is more
important. Repeats are useful as markers, and functional understanding of repeats becomes very
challenging".'7 2 Of course, the contradiction of this type of frontier visionary practice is that,
while on the one hand, it provides an uncharted and therefore less competitive niche, on the other
it makes such enterprises extremely risky. Further, the "success", in some way, of a visionary
'7" S.K. Brahmachari, interview with the author, 19 January 2002.
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hunch such as this virtually ensures that stronger competitors will eventually come to share the
vision, which means that the niche gets lost. Effectively, selecting an uncharted market niche or
an uncharted scientific route, when successful, affords to the visionary what, in venture capital
parlance, gets referred to as "first mover advantage". But the sign of a successful creation of a
visionary niche is that it will remain a niche no longer. While Brahmachari can feel justified
when the working draft sequence of the human genome starts showing the functional importance
of repeat sequences that he has argued for for so long, it also signifies, in some sense, the nd of
his competitive advantage in that area of research.
Therefore, having the vision to do something that hasn't been attempted before is not
sufficient to ensure a successful enterprise. Maulik goes on to argue for evangelism as a third
component of vision (and I talk about this at greater length in Chapter 7):
Because a company is visionary...it does not make a business a success. In fact some
people are going to argue that it almost ensures business failure because it is hoisting
something new into a business climate. So not only do you have to convince people to
buy your product, you have to convince people that the product is worth buying in the
first place. So in a sense you're attempting to answer a question that nobody has thought
of asking you. So first you have to convince them that there is a question worthy of
answering, and then you have to convince them that you're worthy of answering it using
your particular product or service. And in that sense, what GeneEd is doing, e-learning, is
I think a bit of evangelism and missionary selling. First you have to convince them that
they have the problem and then you have to convince them that you are the only company
who can solve their problem. That leads to the other side of vision which is that visionary
companies have a certain cult-like image attached to them, and there's a certain degree of
brainwashing attached to the idea of vision, and it is that you create the market by
basically...by not just the force of one person's personality but by the force of a group
1
7 2 Ibid.
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personality which you try to foster and create and build, and then you find the champions
of the industry and people who can mouth the same words. So after a while it becomes a
self-sustaining entity and then you've got this culture, this sort of drum beating of people,
"this is the next way", "this is the next way", "this is the next way". 73
Vision, in this third conception of Maulik's, is ideology, in a manner very similar to that
in which Marx's conceives of religion as ideology in The German Ideology. But fourthly, Maulik
compares it to a set of guiding principles, "a set of principles that are far-fetched but not too far-
fetched that people can't believe in them if they stretched their minds sufficiently". 74 Vision,
then, serves simultaneously as imagination and as prescription, as an ambitious statement that
says, "we're going to draw a line in the sand, we're going to do something nobody has ever done
before, it's going to be a mission, it would be crossing the Sahara with one bag of water",'75 but
that implicitly indicates to those who have a stake in the realization of the vision how it might be
that this improbable goal will be reached. It is in this sense that vision, in the way Maulik
articulates it, is different from hype.
Integral to such an understanding of vision, of course, is vanguard leadership that is
charismatic in the Weberian sense, and that is, further, embedded in life stories. It is in this
context that the stories of Randy Scott and Joshua Boger that I recounted in the previous section
are absolutely vital to generating thick understandings of the functioning of vision.
The question of the distinction of vision from hype is one that I have problematized in the
previous section, by referring to hype as a type of promissory visionary articulation that allows
the conjuration of certain types of futures in order to create the conditions of possibility of
presents that allow those futures to materialize. And yet, in Silicon Valley, in 2001 and 2002, the
distinction between hype and vision is acutely made manifest by entrepreneurs like Maulik,
173 Sunil Maulik, interview with the author, 15 May 2001.
'
74 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
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where the former refers to that unsubtantiated, dematerialized and somehow false conjuration that
was epitomized by the dot corn era - an "era" that is now, already, spoken of in firm historical
terms as an "aberration" by the same people who, no doubt, were extolling its invincible capacity
for continued growth, revolution, creating paradigm shifts and so on just a couple of years
previously.1 7 6
There is no question, however, that this is a distinction that is of some importance to
GeneEd, which resisted calling itself GeneEd.com, a resistance which probably protected against
its obsolescence with the receding dot corn wave. At least a part of the reason , hy GeneEd
wasn't caught in the dot corn frenzy was that it really was conceived of in a pre-dot .Om era,
having been incorporated in 1997. It effectively therefore incubated through the dot corn years,
lacking, as I outlined in Chapter 2, sufficient "activation energy" to transform into a real
company, but also somewhat befuddled by the dot corn goings on around it. As Maulik says:
Part of the reason GeneEd had such a long incubation period was that none of us was
really comfortable to really take that leap. The other part of it was [19]98-99 were two
years when this extraordinary ferment was going on all around us, this internet boom, dot
corn hysteria, and it did have an effect on us in the sense that we were no longer sure if
having this hard, well thought out, well defined business plan that called for so much
market penetration and so much revenues and so much time with so many products with
so many people made sense anymore. A lot of supposedly very smart people were telling
us it made no sense. They said why are you setting this up, create a large database
instead...you know, things like that, like do not worry about revenues, use advertising
176 The question of whether the dot com era was indeed something that can so easily be dismissed away as
an "aberration" is, of course, an important one to ask. For indeed, such a dismissal stems from a deeply
ahistoric supposition that the dot corn era marks, for the first time, a manifestation of capitalism in such an
explicitly "excessive" mode. And yet, one in fact sees the same forms of excess, albeit concentrated in
different institutions (primarily Wall Street and investment banks rather than in Silicon Valley and high-
tech venture-capital funded industry), in the 1980s. Michael Lewis's accounts of both, in Liar's Poker and
The New, New Thing respectively, in spite of a certain unreflexive enthusiasm for Silicon Valley over Wall
Street, provide a wonderful perspective from which to comparatively situate key institutional sites of excess
in these two historical moments (see Lewis 1989, 2000).
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and this.. .all kinds of things. And all that went against all that I had learnt in the prior 15
years, so it was a very strange time to be considering starting a company. If you were a
Harvard MBA who was 24 years old who didn't have those previous 15 years of working
experience, you might go, this is a great time to be starting a company, but having learnt
the careful business models of how to build.... I'd worked for companies all my life, for a
variety of small companies, and here, there were plans on the back of a napkin and now
you get a company the moment you see it, it was actually disconcerting.' 7 7
In this portrayal then, GeneEd is almost like a caterpillar in a time-warped coccoon,
insulated by its own pedagogical background against the "realities" that were now propounded as
fundamental to start-ui, corporate dynamics. It was a period where Maulik felt GeneEd's vision
was being incubated, suggesting that vision isn't just a one-time articulation, but rather an entire
discursive and material apparatus that needs nurturing, and that needs to be articulated with
strategies and tactics in many ways. Indeed, Maulik's explicit assertion that vision is not vision
until it's articulated "in the way that people see that, oh yes, I can see how this is going","" is an
understanding of entrepreneurship as explicitly hegemonic in the way that Stuart Hall understands
hegemony (see for instance Grossberg 1996). Maulik's idea of a visionary is someone who is
involved in cutting, pasting and synthesis; as I mentioned in Chapter 5, he thinks that tropes of
romantic genius inventors, that underlie intellectual property rationales but also the gloriously
sycophantic narratives of genomics as linear progress brought about by vanguard knights in
shining armor as propounded by authors such as Kevin Davies (2001), are somewhat bogus.
An important part of the entrepreneurial process is the relationship of the start-up to
venture capital funding. GeneEd was able to get companies such as Incyte and Alza on board as
early investors, instead of venture capitalists, though not for want of effort at attracting the latter.
In fact, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Maulik actually had promises for VC funding, on the basis of
177 Sunil Maulik, interview with the author, 15 May 2001.
178 Ibid.
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which he had made eight initial job offers in late 1999. He had even thrown a party for his new
employees on December 22, 1999, a day before his promised benefactors called him up and
decided that they had decided not to invest after all. Maulik, therefore, had been let down badly
by venture capitalists, but it was a let down that he felt ultimately made the company possible,
made it come out of its incubation period and gave it the activation energy necessary to become a
real company. It was an activation energy borne of a desperate situation, of eight promised jobs,
four maxed out credit cards, a child to provide for as a single parent, and a mother whose medical
expenses Maulik was bearing, that, paradoxically, fuelled in him the desire not to go back to the
relative security of the job he had given up at Pangea. It was the failure of venture capitalists to
invest in Maulik after indicating initial interest that hardened his belief that his was a vision that
he was determined would come to fruition.
The first company to invest in GeneEd was the major Silicon Valley genome company,
Incyte, whose founder Randy Scott has himself figured prominently in this chapter. Typically,
like almost any investment in high-tech capitalism, this was made possible not by the superiority
of GeneEd's business plan as much as it was by Maulik's personal contacts at Incyte. It was,
however, a fraught investment on both sides, given Incyte's own history of ups and downs with
Pangea, which was always a company that might have been Incyte's competitor (see Chapter 4
for the story of Pangea's glorious slide into oblivion as DoubleTwist). Maulik feels that what
eventually carried the day at Incyte was the personal credibility he had there, even though he had
worked for a competitor. Trust and credibility are subjective judgement calls that are absolutely
central to the dynamics of start-up worlds.
Getting Incyte as an investor however was always potentially a double-edged sword,
because there was the danger of GeneEd being seen as a company seeded by Incyte, which
Maulik knew could have huge consequences for the trust and credibility GeneEd might or might
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not have amongst potential customers, many of whom would have to be Incyte's competitors if
GeneEd was to succeed as a company. Maulik expresses his ambivalence thus:
A part of me didn't want to take the investment because I was concerned that if we were
seen to be in Incyte's pocket, nobody will accept our products. And the other part of me
wanted to take the investment from Incyte because I didn't get an investment from
Pangea and I probably just wanted to thumb my nose at Pangea, say to them that your
biggest competitors are investing in me, why aren't you, and there was definitely some of
that. And I think, again, the rationalization for the investment - and it is a rationalization
- is that we will take the investments from a large variety of companies, and not be
beholden to any one of them. Now that's easy to say and much harder to do. I mean the
fact is that there is always a little bit of string that they can pull with us. 79
In fact, however, GeneEd managed to sign up Celera Genomics, Incyte's biggest
competitor, as one of their first customers, and it was Incyte, not their customer, who was put into
a position of having to show trust. Maulik's account of the moment when Incyte learnt of
GeneEd's sale to Celera:
The day we were going to close our investment with Incyte...this was the day the Celera
Genomics website went live [with GeneEd courses on it], which we had conveniently
forgotten to tell Incyte about. So it's five o'clock on a Friday afternoon, it was a classic
afternoon. Marion [Marra, VP of corporate development at Incyte], and Randy Scott and
the two of us [Maulik and Barry Giordano, GeneEd's VP Sales at the time]. They said
there were two things we needed to discuss, there were some issues with this contract we
needed to get clearance on. And the second thing is - what the hell is going on with your
being on Celera's website? What we said was, take off your Incyte cap for a moment, put
on your investor cap. You should be glad we're getting Celera Genomics as a customer,
just as we intend every other genomics company to be our customer. And as an investor,
that only enhances our value, and gives you return on your investment. We're doing
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business with companies of the stature of Celera Genomics, and just from a monetary
standpoint, every dollar that Celera Genomics pays us is indirectly going back to you. So
I think they do look at that rationally. 8 0
Trust and credibility, of course, has everything to do with understanding the work done
by truths, lies and ruths, as discussed in Section 6.1. These are subjective judgements, of course,
that also have everything to do with the networks and connections that actors in an entrepreneur /
investment deal bring to the table, as I will argue for further when I talk a little later in this
section about some of the rationalities that go into venture capital investment.'8 Trust is also
inversely related to secrecy. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, I found companies in Silicon Valley
much more open and willing to talk to me than East Coast companies, and this is an openness that
marks Maulik's interactions with everyone he meets. It is an openness that is very much at odds
with a defensive corporate pedagogy that deems any conversation that could imply a potential
flow of "company" information to "outside" ears as potentially devastating for the company in
question. Indeed, such defensive secrecy is less manifest in Silicon Valley not just because of a
more "laid-back" or "open" corporate culture, but because such secrecy is simply untenable.
Maulik himself feels that what he calls the innovation barrier is so low that such defensiveness in
high-tech worlds just does not confer the sort of significant advantage that some people think it
does. Of course, the fact that openness or secrecy is not simply structural, but also, for want of a
better word, "cultural", is still very evident by the tight-lipped attitude of companies like
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, as I suggested in Chapter 2.
Openness and secrecy, of course, are also a function of a company's size, and GeneEd's
relatively open culture will undoubtedly be at least somewhat at stake as it grows into a larger,
179 Ibid.
180Ibid.
181 It would be interesting to rigorously compare the networks of trust and credibility, and the social
exclusions that they effect, in venture science worlds to the operations of such "values" in early modem
science, which Shapin (1994) has written about. Indeed, Shapin's current project does look at the role of
trust and credibility in interactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
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venture capital funded entity, a "full-grown" corporation, as I describe in greater detail a little
later. This was very evident to me in my interactions with the bioinformatics start-up
Neomorphic, whom I introduced in Chapter 4, and who have since been acquired by Affymetrix.
Neomorphic was initially a company I was hoping to do participant observation at, and when I
first met them, at The Institute of Genornic Research (TIGR) genome conference in Miami in
1999, they were an extremely young, laid-back group of people who were very willing to talk and
have me in their midst. Of course, once they were acquired by Affymetrix, they didn't have the
agency to grant or deny me any access; but their move towards "seriousness" was evidenced even
in the days leading up to the acquisition. By the time the TIGR conference in 2000 came about,
they were already deep in conversation with Affymetrix about the merger (a fact, of course, that
neither I nor many of their employees knew about at the time), and in order to indicate their
seriousness, had hired a senior, rather dour executive vice-president, David Pritchard, who lent
their young jovial image appropriate gravitas. That Pritchard's outlook was significantly at odds
with the Neomorphic team's much more open outlook of a year previously was clearly in
evidence to me, as, even as members of the Neomorphic management team spent time with me
during the conference, at least one of them advised me quite explicitly to not show myself
interacting with them in Pritchard's presence, as he would frown upon such "outsider"
interactions whose context he didn't know.
Even Incyte, whose management and employees were much more open to talking to me
and showing me around than those of, for instance, Millennium, had a retinue of 60 lawyers to
negotiate once they had grown into a "full-fledged" corporation, making long-term access there
virtually impossible.
GeneEd's failure to attract venture capital funding has had certain positive consequences
for the company. Firstly, it has forced a certain fiscal discipline on the company that many richly
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funded start-ups in the dot corn era simply did not have, to their eventual detriment. Secondly, it
has allowed Maulik to stay in control of the company's ision and execution in a way that would
have been hard to maintain had the founders' ownership been significantly diluted by venture
capitalists at the start.
These are, however, fraught positives, and there have been a number of times when it has
seemed almost certain that GeneEd would run out of funds, and out of business. It is impossible
to get out of a bootstrapping mode through sales alone, and a certain significant amount of capital
as cushion is probably essential for most companies. In addition, one of GeneEd's initial investors
had invested in them through a bridge loan, which meant that the "investment" was made on the
condition that a further significant financing event (such as venture capital funding) would occur
within a stipulated period of time, which was by September 2002. 82 If that financing event were
to not take place by then, then the "investment" would be treated as a loan, which would mean
that GeneEd would have to pay back as loan a significant sum of money: significant enough to
bankrupt them. In other words, if the drive for big pharmaceutical clients (that I mention in
Chapter 4) was constrained by the need for stable revenue, then the drive for venture capital
funding was dictated by the terms and conditions of previous investment agreements.
Perversely, but not surprisingly, venture capitalists refused to invest in GeneEd when
they really needed funds, before they got their big pharmaceutical clients. Now that they have the
big pharma clients that ensure a certain amount of stability in revenue flows, the VCs are much
more enthusiastic about investing. This points to a certain venture capitalist logic, contrary to
intuitive perception, that suggests an enterprise of risk minimization rather than risk taking.
Indeed, Pat O'Malley (2000), reading the work of the 1920s economist Frank Knight, makes the
distinction between risk and uncertainty, the latter being the statistically non-calculable "risk"
that is the source of entrepreneurial creativity. One could, indeed, see the interaction of
entrepreneurs and VCs as being one in which entrepreneurs are involved with uncertainty, while
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VCs calculate risks. While calculating risk is most certainly taking a gamble, it is in order that
risk can be minimized.
Nonetheless, even though VC money is less of an urgent need for GeneEd in 2002 than it
was in 2001, the terms of GeneEd's early bridge loan, combined with a risk minimization logic
that operates in the entrepreneurial world as well (which states, emphatically, that you never turn
down investment when you get it, because you never know when or if you'll get some later),
ensure that GeneEd is aggressively pursuing VC funding.
The person whose job it is to explore that funding is Maulik, both because that is part of
his job description as CEO, and because as founder, GeneEd is a product of his vision more than
anyone else's. Ironically, the person whose job is most on the line if he succeeds in his job of
getting funding is Maulik's. And for a number of reasons.
The first is an almost pedagogical insistence by venture capitalists that founders shouldn't
be CEOs, a line that is constantly reiterated in, for instance, business school classes on how to
start new companies, in spite of many successful examples of founder-CEOs. The reason for this,
largely, is that venture capitalists like to have, on the one hand, a "professional" CEO: founders
are often the visionaries who get companies going, but, as argued in Chapter 4, one of the
transitions a start-up has to make as it grows into a "real" company is precisely a shedding of its
mercuriality that made it a successful start-up in the first place. While Maulik's creative
unpredictability could be an asset in a start-up with a small management team, it could make for
an increasingly volatile situation in a larger management team, spread across two coasts, with a
number of managers more senior and experienced at managing than Maulik himself. The
transition that VCs like to see is one from an idea-driven company to a procedure-driven
company, the latter often being precisely what successful entrepreneurs run away from in order to
start their own companies in the first place. On the other hand, VCs also like to have a
dispensable CEO, someone who can be blamed and scapegoated if things go wrong, and thereby
182 I am writing these words in June 2002.
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replaced. From the point of view of the structure, capitalist - worker, the CEO is very much also
a "worker" once the company gets venture capital investment. At that point, the CEO is
effectively an executor of a whole range of wills to increase return on investment (Rol). While
the company is still private, VCs look ideally for a 60-70% return on their investment in the
company, so that they in turn can generate 20-30% Rol for the investment funds that have
invested money in the VC fund and still make a profit. Once the company (ideally) goes public
(this constitutes for the VCs one of their ideal "exit strategies), the CEO has a fiduciary
responsibility to her stockholders, which makes her answerable to Wall Street.
I am not, here, trying to portray CEOs as weak victims of a greedy capitalist system,
especially since the incentive structures for CEOs are often grotesquely attractive. What I am
trying to indicate is a certain constrained field of action that CEOs have to operate within once
they become answerable to other investors, private or public, in a way that they don't have to be
accountable if they are a non-VC funded start-up like GeneEd has been. It is often difficult to be
both visionary and constrained tactician / manager, and VCs therefore often like those roles to be
filled by two different people. Often getting rid of a flailing CEO, if she is also the founder, is, for
the VC, throwing out the baby with the bathwater: they are reluctant to put the prime visionary of
the company in such a constrained position.
Indeed, Maulik himself reflects on this position of venture capitalists, and their potential
relationship to GeneEd, as follows (and these are characterizations that are relevant to my further
discussion of VCs later in the section):
There is a clear "formula" to VC success, based around a "tried-and-true" management
team, usually of the VCs' own choosing, and one that has succeeded before. There is also
a clear formula for the profile of company that they will fund, typically one base around a
well-developed U"niversity project, preferably from a researcher that is well known [sic]
and with a proven track-record of success. In this way, all the "risk" and early
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groundbreaking hard work is done in an academic environment under (usually)
government funding and the VCs are simply funding the commercialization.
Neither of these models apply to GeneEd. In some way, we may be "unfundable" from a
VC perspective, simply because we don't fit these pigeon-holes. I believe GeneEd could
be a very profitable company generating nice returns for its investors, but I think this is
irrelevant from a VC perspective (!). If the deal does not fit the profile, they simply pass
on the deal (they have hundreds more to review, after all).
What does this mean for GeneEd's culture? Obviously it is very different from Pangea /
Doubletwist, which was the most VC-influenced company I have experienced. But
better? More successful? All I can say is that we are having lots of fun, a talented and
motivated workforce, and compelling and exciting products. Doubletwist may go out of
business too,'83 so there are no guarantees. Millennium is interesting, their CEO, Mark
Levin, comes from Mayfield Fund, but they clearly are a deal-making machine....[M]y
contact raves about Levin as a CEO she would follow to the ends of the earth.
So what is my point? A big part of the corporate culture (for better or worse) is dependent
on the founders / CEO. If they are in sync, the culture is strong, if there is conflict, this
will be reflected in the organizational values.' 4
In the case of GeneEd, Maulik's position is further made vulnerable because of the
changing client base towards big pharma, and the consequent change in what becomes GeneEd's
critical operational locale, to the East Coast. Here, all the attributes that made Maulik so attractive
to his initial angel investors and his initial management and employee team, that make him so
much apart of the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial stereotype of not fitting a corporate American
stereotype, become potential liabilities. East Coast business, goes the normative belief, is run by
serious, grey-haired, tight-lipped, white men in pin-striped suits, not by a young Indian immigrant
who makes it a point to start up a conversation with anyone whom he sets next to on an airplane
(he actually once managed to talk someone next to him on a flight into a small investment in
183 As mentioned earlier, Doubletwist has since gone out of business.
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GeneEd before the plane landed), and whose invariably bare-chested presence at parties was what
gave one of his early angel investors in Silicon Valley the confidence that his money was being
soundly wagered.
Everyone at GeneEd, at some level Maulik included, does believe that in the long run,
GeneEd will have to be run by that industry caricature, the "grey-haired pharma manager",
someone who has worked for years in a big pharmaceutical company, who is keen in his later
years do something more "risky" and "exciting", and who therefore brings his staid management
style to a younger company, and thereby gives the latter legitimacy and an apparent seriousness
of purpose when it presents itself to its big pharmaceutical customers. Indeed, Maulik himself
claims that it isn't his long-term ambition to run a nuts-and-bolts company, that what he really
wants to do is to take GeneEd to a point where he feels that whoever runs it will have to run it on
the terms set by Maulik's initial vision. What Maulik aspires to is not management power as
much as a legacy, at which point he claims that he wants to retire on his stock options, sit on a
beach and write a novel.
Nonetheless, it is clear that it is not clear to anyone, least of all Maulik, when that point
will come when Maulik will willingly hand off to experienced management, and indeed a crucial
determinant of how painful GeneEd's growth will be is going to be whether that point of handing
off that Maulik desires is concurrent with what his investors desire. As of June 2002, Maulik's
potential investors (and the managers of two companies that GeneEd, at this point, is potentially
planning to merge with), do want Maulik to continue running the company, a point in which, in
spite of his carefully stated indifference to being a long-term CEO, Maulik clearly finds huge
amounts of affirmation. It is a continued affirmation that is very much at stake as GeneEd
undertakes its next period of growth, which is likely to be even more dramatic and painful than
the transition from biotech to big pharma clients in 2001-2002 has been for it (see Chapter 4 for
an account of this period of growth). The apparent irrationality of the entrepreneur, as (in this
'4 Sunil Maulik, correspondence with the author, 20 November 2001.
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case) he starts up a company in the first place, and then, once started and somewhat stable,
proceeds to search for venture capital funding that will almost certainly dilute him out of the
position of control he holds over the company, is itself grounded by a fetish - the very condition
of possibility of the interaction of an entrepreneur with a venture capitalist is fetishistic and
libidinal.
If all goes according to plan, GeneEd will, over the next year, become a venture-capital
funded entity, merged with two other companies, with a presence in six cities spread across three
countries, and an at least four-to-five-fold increase in number of employees. Such dramatic
growth, which again is almost pre-ordained by initial investment demands and is not much of a
choice for anyone in the company (though it is something that the management is aggressively
pushing for, and are hardly reluctant about), puts everyone's job on the line, makes everyone's
labor potentially redundant - from the increasingly unhappy graphic designers, through the
middle management (who will be competing for their positions with sometimes more experienced
middle managers in a more streamlined management structure, where everyone will need to have
a clear rationale for their continued existence), all the way up to Maulik himself.
I want to move on now to talk a little bit about venture capitalism, which is after all quite
defining of, and to a large extent also defined by, high-technology industries. As shown above,
venture capitalism is always a double-edged sword, but it is often not a choice that can be
evaluated with considerable freedom by the entrepreneur, who invariably needs to take whatever
funding she can get, when she can get it. VC funds also often specialize in particular types of
companies to invest in, and in particular stages of a company's development (seed - when the
company is just starting up; early stage; later stage; or mezzanine - a financing round just before
an initial public offering [IPO]). The interactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists
are all about introductions, networking, and an elaborate period of what gets called "courtship",
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though it's a constantly uneven courtship, with the entrepreneur invariably in an extremely
constrained position (unless it's a very well known serial entrepreneur whom many VCs are
interested in investing in, or in the dot cornm heydey, when VCs were tripping over their shoelaces
to invest in just about anything).
The important thing to re-emphasize, as I've mentioned before, is that venture capitalists
(or indeed, investors of any sort) pay much more attention to people than to the business plan
itself. Arthur Rock, an experienced VC, sees the plan as strategic and the execution of the plan as
tactical, and believes from his experience that there are many people who have good strategies
but far fewer who have the people to execute on those strategies successfully (Rock 1987). While
Rock enumerates these qualities, quite predictably, as intensity, self-belief, honesty and so on,
effectively these are qualities that invariably crystallize around known contacts, and are much
harder for VCs to see in anybody who presents a plan to them without such personal networks
that they can situate them in.
I would like to talk further about entrepreneurship and venture capitalism by telling the
story of a person who has traversed both worlds. Noubar Afeyan is a Candian-Iranian, who
founded his first company, Perspective Biosystems, in 1987. The company had an IPO in 1992, at
which point it had 45 employees, and less than $1 million in product sales. It was a company that
made instruments and reagents for genomics and proteomics applications. The first business plan
for the company was written in October 1987, it was incorporated in November 1987, it received
angel investment in May 1988, got its round of VC investment in March 1989, and its second
round of VC investment in December 1989. Its first product sales occurred in 1990, and it had a
third VC round in 1991 before its 1992 IPO.
The challenges, as Afeyan recounts them, are quite typical of the challenges budding
entrepreneurs are taught to face in business school, and effectively encompass the entire range of
activities the entrepreneur undertakes. Raising the seed round and hiring the early team are
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predictably difficult, and it is often important for the entrepreneur to go after well known VCs in
order to establish credibility. Deciding on the CEO is also a difficulty, as mentioned above in my
account of GeneEd on the verge of its financing. Then, a herd of VCs has to be managed on the
board of directors. The first products have to be made, the first sales closed, and customers have
to be happy with the products and services on offer. The IPO is itself a challenge, after which
comes negotiating the life of a public company, managing the company's growth as dictated by
Wall Street, dealing with issues such as patent litigation and forging strategic alliances.
Perseptive eventually grew to become an 800 person company in six countries, with $100 million
in sales. The company was finally bought by Perkin-Elmer (PE) at around the time the latter was
seeding Celera.
Celera started up on $350 million capital, seeded by PE (see chapter 4 for an account of
PE). 300 people were hired during the first year. At that point, according to Afeyan, Celera's
business model was not clear, but it didn't matter, because the only thing which was deemed
important was that people would buy many more sequencing machines (made primarily, as
mentioned earlier, by another PE acquisition, Applied Biosystems) after the "genomics
-revolution" was well underway than before. (Of course, this absence of clarity on Celera's long-
term business model is proving to be a hindrance for the company now, as being a database
provider has clearly not manifested itself as a source of long-term value for the company. The
biggest problem with this in hindsight, according to Afeyan, was that by not knowing the
business model, Celera didn't know the right type of people to hire for the long-term). Celera's
market capitalization rose dramatically from $3.5 million to $11 billion by February 2000 (it is
currently about $1.5 billion).
Celera's case is much less typical than that of a more "conventional" company like
Perseptive, since the former was seeded at a particular conjunctural moment to fulfil a particular
strategic objective, and had as central to its strategy the personality of Craig Venter, who was
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hired to head it, and whose ego had to be constantly contended with. There were the inevitable
culture clashes between PE, a rather staid conservative parent company, and an aggressive start-
up that was running to Venter's ambitions as much as it was to PE's long-term strategy (once
again, see Chapter 4 for the role of PE and Celera in the "race" to sequence the human genome).
Celera had to become very big very fast, and in the process had to eschew building consensus
with academic researchers and other potential customers. It was very rapidly thrust into public
company status, showing how early success for start-ups can be a curse. Since the relative failure
of its informatics business, Celera has been facing pressure to turn into a drug discovery
company, which is hardly an easy transition.
Afeyan presently runs a group of companies called the Newcogen group, which
comprises of Newcogen, and a VC fund called Applied Genomic Technology Capital (AGTC)
Funds. Newcogen is a start-up incubator, that not only seeds companies but also provides hands-
on mentoring.
Afeyan is also on the faculty of MIT's Sloan School of Management, and teaches a
yearly course, highly popular, called "New Enterprises", which is full of wannabe high-tech
entrepreneurs trying to "learn" how to start companies. As I argue in Chapter 7, this is a mode of
pedagogy that is important to be attentive to, because it often gets imported and imitated in places
like India as actors there decide they want to create an "entrepreneurial culture". A very rough
overview of the pedagogical lessons provided in spaces like entrepreneurship classes in business
school can be provided by Afeyan's own messages.
Afeyan starts his classes with a fundamental contradiction: that on the one hand, starting
up a company is "start-upology" and not "start-uponomy" (meaning that there is no exact science
to starting up a company that can be taught); and yet, on the other hand, that one can be given
"lessons" on starting up a company that are in fact faithfully replicated in business school
pedagogy and writings. Therefore, there is a set of codified reasons that get taught, on why start-
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ups fail, what the important attributes of entrepreneurship are, what the elements of a business
idea should be, what sources of capital can be explored and so on.
Jeffry Timmons, in his entrepreneurial "textbook" New Venture Creation:
Entrepreneurship for the 2 15t Century, also, like Maulik, decenters the notion of the idea as being
the driving force for entrepreneurship, but, unlike Maulik, does so at the altar of the market
(Timmons 1999). Timmons, therefore, distinguishes between ideas and opportunities, where
opportunities are measured by market demand, market structure and size. Ultimately, says
Timmons, the entrepreneurial process is opportunity driven.
And here lies the problems with such modes of pedagogy. On the one hand, decentering
the notion of the idea as the sole motive force for a venture is precisely being attentive to
structural factors that go beyond entrepreneurial "genius" to make a start-up possible. On the
other hand, such decenterings don't work particularly well when they are posited in terms of
binaries, and when agency is handed over entirely to "the market". Because of course, such
"lessons" constantly come up against the exception to these lessons, "exceptions" that in fact
form the rule. As mentioned earlier, for instance, Maulik believes that a truly visionary start-up,
one that isn't simply a "nuts-and-bolts" company, is precisely one for which there isn't already an
existing market demand, but which is able to create such a demand - and it does so, of course, not
simply on the strength of its idea, but on the strength of a whole range of articulatory hegemonic
manouevers that, if successful, are in a position to reshape market terrains, though of course not
in completely unconstrained ways.
Another standard start-up lesson regards the importance of a "sustainable competitive
advantage", which usually involves intellectual property protection. While GeneEd is building a
patent portfolio for itself, its competitive advantage lies primarily with the brand value that it has
managed to generate for itself through providing consistent quality service, rather than through
intellectual property protection.
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From the point of view of the evaluator of a financial opportunity, such as a VC, then, we
are taught that the attractive aspects of a company are those that suggest it can create or add
significant value to a customer or end user; that it can solve a significant problem or meet a
significant need for which a premium will be paid; that it looks financially attractive (a criterion,
presumably, that cannot be independent of the previous two attributes); and that there is a fit with
the founder, the team and the timing. The business plan, therefore, needs to indicate the
breakthrough idea that a particular group claims to have; an assessment of the market; an
execution plan (that includes plans for product development, and for sales and marketing); a
description of the team; and an indication of the competitive advantage.
And yet, as I mentioned earlier, and as Rock suggests, many of the more "objective"
attributes such as the financials are ultimately evaluated at the altar of the final point, as to
whether the VC ultimately feels he can do business with the specific set of individuals founding
and running the company.
William Sahlman, a professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School,
for instance, indicates that there are 15 personal questions that a business plan should answer.
These are enumerated by him as follows:
* Who are the founders?
* What have they accomplished in the past?
* What directly relevant experience do they have for the opportunity they are
pursuing?
* What skills do they have?
* Whom do they know and who knows them?
* What is their reputation?
* How realistic are they?
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· Can they adapt as circumstances warrant?
* Who else needs to be on the team? Are the founders prepared to recruit high-quality
people?
* How will the team respond to adversity?
* Can they make the inevitable hard choices that have to be made?
* What are their motivations?
o How committed are they to this venture?
* How can I gain objective information about each member of the team including how
they will work together?
· What are the possible consequences if one or more of the team members leaves?"'5
On the one hand, of course, there are "objective" and meritocratic criteria that Sahlman is
evaluating, such as experience, skill, likely response in adversity and so on. And yet, he too
acknowledges quite explicitly that networks and reputations count, and indeed VCs are much
more comfortable investing in someone who has a proven track record of starting successful
companies to someone who might have a terrific idea but be a newcomer or an "outsider".
Investment is all about these tacit evaluations and relationships, and about personal
comfort levels; which means, of course, that it is exponentially harder for "outsiders", whether
they be women, racial minorities, or from small mid-west towns rather than from Silicon Valley,
Boston or New York, to be a part of the venture financed entrepreneurial world. Indeed, this
mode of closed networking, that ultimately serves to perpetuate forms of racial-ethnic and
gendered discrimination, is what has led a group of Indian entrepreneurs to form The IndUS
entrepreneurs (TiE) in 1994, in order to provide a similar networking forum for South Asian
entrepreneurs. I discuss TiE in detail in Chapter 7.
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'85 Sahlman 1999: 142-143.
CHAPTER 7: NATION AND SALVATION
7.1: The Born-Again Ethic and the Spirit of Biocapitalism?
Capitalism is not just a formation that is conditioned by religion, but is essentially a
religious phenomenon. This is why I used Geertz on religion in my introduction to the
dissertation. But science too is a religious phenomenon, in terms of the belief structures within
which it operates, and in terms of its structural messianism. The question for biocapitalism is one
of the mechanisms of articulation of the various religious manifestations of life sciences with
capitalism.
In this part of the chapter, I wish to explore at greater length the theological and
messianic embeddedness of biocapitalist discourse and practice. In order to do so, I must begin by
indicating how the conception of drug development as a miraculous enterprise pervades its
stories; and how stories of the miracles of pharmaceutical development constantly crop up at each
"revolutionary" moment in the industry's history. These stories, as I suggested in section 6.1, are
not abstract and disembodied structural figures, but have to do with real lives that new miracle
cures (that of course, in the linear progressive historical renderings of science, are always
subsequently deemed as having been always inadequate) have saved. Consider, then, the
following three stories, the first two recounted by Barry Werth in The Billion Dollar Molecule,
and the third by Cynthia Robbins-Roth (2000) in From Alchemy to IPO.
The miraculous story of the use of penicillin in the World War II effort had as its key
moment its administration in 1942 to Anne Miller, who was dying of streptococcal fever and not
responding to sulpha drugs. But, says Werth (1994: 123-124): "At 3.30 Saturday afternoon, when
she received her first shot of Merck's penicillin, her fever was 105 and she had 'well over' fifty
bacteria per cubic centimeter of blood. By 4 the following morning, her temperature was normal.
By Monday, her blood was sterile. She was still alive in 1990 and living in Connecticut".
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Later in that decade, it was cortisone that was the miracle drug. Says Werth (1994: 129):
"In September 1948, Merck shipped six of its ten grams of cortisone to the Mayo Clinic for the
treatment of a twenty-nine-year-old woman so crippled with rheumatoid arthritis that she couldn't
roll over in bed. The woman had already received massive doses of penicillin, streptomycin, gold
salts, and sera with no improvement. Three days after her first injection, she was able to raise her
hands above her head. Four days later, she went shopping, declaring, 'I have never felt better in
my life"'.
Robbins-Roth starts From Alchemy to IPO with the story of Betsy Patterson, diagnosed
with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL), who was suffering as much, if not more, from her
chemotherapy regimen as from the disease itself. Consequences of the chemotherapy, which did
succeed in pushing her cancer into remission, included a premature menopause, diabetes, severe
folic acid deficiency leading to anemia and peripheral nerve damage. Eighteen months later,
another spot showed up on a chest scan, threatening yet another battle with chemotherapy. It was
at this point that she decided she wanted to try Rituxan, a new monoclonal antibody treatment for
NHL that had been developed by IDEC Pharmaceuticals. As a consequence of the Rituxan
treatment, according to Robbins-Roth (2000: 6-7):
The nodes in her neck were completely gone, and those in her back and groin were
disappearing and were no longer painful. CT scans in June prior to her second dose
continued to show a substantial reduction in her tumors.
This great response was not accompanied by toxicity. And there were few side effects....
Biotechnology has completely changed to way we discover and develop new drugs and
has allowed us to help patients with previously untreatable diseases. Stories like Betsy's
are one reason so many people have invested their time, money and careers in biotech.
As mentioned before, the purpose of these renderings is neither to pour scorn on nor
express cynicism towards these stories, but rather to point to their constant miraculous structure, a
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structure, further, that is founded on the inadequacy of previous therapies (even though they too
were once miracles). It is a structure of linear progress that is embedded and embodied in specific
salvationary stories, heroic rescues of individual extremely sick patients (that all the "rescued"
patients in these stories are women is a further feature worth noting).'86 It is a structure of the type
"If you relent and submit to penicillin / cortisone / Rituxan (each at the time of these stories
relatively experimental therapies), then you will be saved". It is not the trope of public health in
which therapy intervenes to prevent the spread of plagues or epidemics: even though penicillin, in
particular, was used precisely in the always potentially plague ridden situation of World War II,
its origin story still remains that of the solitary dying woman rescued by the miracle cure. In other
words, the symbolic capital for the drug development industry doesn 't come from the story of
ridding Africa of AIDS. Further, these stories that I recount do not simply describe cures, but
resurrections; what is at stake in these stories is not just survival, or getting better, but about
living life to the full, again.
If drugs as instruments of salvation echo one structure of biocapitalism as reflected in the
three origin stories I outline above, then markets as instruments of moral purpose are equally
articulated as part of the missionary enterprise since the 19h century. Around the time that Marx
was writing about the theological nature of the commodity, for instance, David Livingstone was
undertaking his expeditions in Africa with the firm belief that commerce and Christianity went
hand in hand. The mid-i 9 h century, indeed, marked the co-production of a metropolitan
imaginary of Africa as a site for both evangelization and raw materials to feed the productive
demands of the Industrial Revolution. The triad of media, religion and markets, which Arvind
Rajagopal (2001) explores in his book Politics After Television in relation to the rise of Hindu
nationalism in India, is explicitly reproduced today in Africa as well, with the Christian
186 For longer accounts of the pharmaceutical industry that equally subscribe to this idea of the history of
drug development as being one of linear progress, see Mahoney 1959, Mann 1999.
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Coalition's media magnate Pat Robertson evangelising and mining in Western Africa (see Roth
2002).
Let me then refer back to Randy Scott's speech that I described in Chapter 6 in the
context of each of the stories of miracle recounted above. Like these stories, Scott's pitch for
Incyte, couched as a pitch for genomics, where genomics meshes into Genomics for LifeM, is
originary, revolutionary and paternalistic, all attributes that go hand-in-hand with a performative
of futurity.
The paternalism that inhabits these miraculous tales is not simply a part of their rhetorical
structure. Sometimes, as I realized during the course of my fieldwork, that rhetorical structure can
get embodied in specific corporate ventures that are explicitly, sometimes painfully, salvationary.
The story of Patrick and Sharon Terry, PXE International and Genomic Health, in which one of
the co-stars is Randy Scott, is indicative of this. The story of PXE International is a story of many
things: of biosocial communities, of intellectual property, and of the effect of the internet. Here, I
tell it as a story of the salvationary promise of biocapital.
Patrick Terry used to be in the construction business, and got involved in biomedicine
when he and his wife discovered that their two children had pseudoxanthoma elasticurn (PXE), a
rare genetic pigmentation disorder that usually leads to blindness by the mid-20s. Terry,
therefore, got into science not through the normal routes of formal training, but as a lay person
who was forced to take an interest in it. He calls his a "perspective informed by experience". The
Terrys found out as much as they could about PXE, networked with other parents of PXE-
afflicted children in both the US and Europe, and started a patient advocacy group, PXE
International. In addition, Pat Terry is one of the co-founders, along with Randy Scott, of a
biotech company called Genomic Health, whose vision, according to Scott, is "to build a new arm
to the healthcare system. New genomic technologies will enable the world to characterize every
patient's disease and health status as a complete genomic package. Every disease has a molecular
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basis and some level of genetic-encoded response. Individuals respond to therapy based on the
molecular alterations of their disease and their own genetic code. Genomic Health's mission is to
one day provide physicians and patients with an individualized molecular analysis that enables
the treatment team to utilize relevant treatment guides for all diseases. Our ultimate goal is to
make personalized medicine a reality and to dramatically improve patient care."'87 One of the
things the Terrys have done, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is negotiate agreements with
companies like Genomic Health that PXE International members donate DNA samples to for
research, whereby the patient advocacy group shares in the intellectual property that the company
generates.
Terry starts his talks by laying out all the things that he is - parent, PXE International
administrator, Genomic Health co-founder, researcher. It is a style that completely mirrors
Scott's, who often starts his own presentations with a similar outline of his multifaceted set of
involvements, responsibilities and motivations. As a part of his work, Terry is both a typical and a
unique example of a venture scientist. He is involved heavily in policy activities, through an
alliance of genetic disease patient advocacy groups called the Genetic Alliance. Through PXE
International, he is involved in a worldwide effort to initiate, conduct and fund PXE research.
Much of that is through the establishment of research collaborations, such as mentioned above,
which involves the need to negotiate intricate contracts, alliances and understandings. The
organization has now succeeded in setting up 59 support offices worldwide, and, as of November
2001, had 1200 samples, 160 tissue samples and cell lines and extensive epidemiological data in
their registry.
All of this stems from Terry the parent. PXE International is a paternalistic venture, not
in an abstract discursive sense, but in terms of its actual genesis. In addition, Terry claims that his
alliance with Scott has everything to do with their shared beliefs, in terms of their libertarian bend
187 Stated on Genomic Health's webpage, at http://www.genomichealth.com/message.htm.
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towards the free market and conversant religious beliefs (Scott, as mentioned earlier, is an
evangelical Christian, like Terry). Scott is, according to Terry, "a regular guy, a super guy, a nice
guy, a family guy". It forms the basis of a trust that Terry does not necessarily feel towards other
businesspeople, and there are those whom he feels have betrayed PXE's cause after indicating
interest.
Like good evangelists, then, Terry and Scott merge their belief in Christianity merges
with their belief in the market. Terry strongly believes in the market not just as the route to
therapeutic production, but as the route to therapeutic knowledge and dispensation. What
Genomic Health is about, as much as or more than a wet-lab research based company, is
empowering consumers by providing them with "actionable therapeutic information".'88 The goal
is nothing less than to foster what Terry calls a "consumer genomic revolution". Terry thinks in
terms of "consumers" and "targeted therapeutic interventions" rather than "patients" and "cures":
he doesn't like the normativity embedded in the latter word. What he also doesn't like is the role
of the physician as expert gatekeeper, which he feels hinders the patient-consumers' ideally
indivualized quest for self-knowledge. He thinks, therefore, of medicine in salvationary terms, but
also thinks that the market has to intervene for medicine to change in ways that can enable it to
attain its promise of salvation. Further, PXE International doesn't just operate as an institutional
structure that acts as a formal negotiating party: it acts quite literally as a networked biosocial
community, with all the peer pressures attendant on small intimate communities. Terry, for
instance, says that the community uses peer pressure to "push good habits", such as getting
members to stop smoking. PXE International is much more, clearly, than an advocacy group: it is
a religious movement. Terry's biography is an exploration of the disjunctured relationship
between commodification and subjectivity, as the grieving father becomes an entrepreneur, who
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is also a political figure and a religious figure, forcing us, therefore, also to ask what concepts of
family are embedded in these entrepreneurial / religious / political / capitalist lifeworlds.
It isn't just entrepreneurs like Scott and Terry who bring their Christian beliefs to bear on
their conduct of life science as salvationary enterprise. Francis Collins, the head of the public
Human Genome Project (HGP) is also a Born-Again Christian, who has worked in a missionary
hospital in Nigeria. He says that his passion for tracing disease genes is like "appreciating
something that up until then, no human had known, but God knew it.... In a way, perhaps, those
moments of discovery also become moments of worship" (quoted in Davies 2001: 72).
For actors like Scott, Terry and Collins, then, biotech has that element of calling that
Weber points out was introduced by the Reformation (Weber 2001 [1930]). But this is a calling
that is not coupled to asceticism, but rather, as evidenced from scenes such as that of the Incyte-
sponsored party that I described in Chapter 4, to a Bataillian expenditure, to worldly pleasure.
Even if such excess is not practised by Born-Again figures like Scott and Collins themselves, it is
a part of a certain ritual structure of corporate biotech. Arid yet, it is a ritual structure of excess
that is hardly irreligious, if one if to understand religion, in the sense that Geertz (1973)
articulates it, as a source of authority that derives its authority from the enactment of ritual.
An example of this, not dissimilar to the Incyte party story I recounted in Chapter 4, and
which like that story ties in to question of corporate loyalty that stems from a certain structure of
belief, is a story of Genentech. For after all, the question that has to be asked, especially of
corporate biotech actors, is not simply about their adherence to their profession (which, in
Robbins-Roth's understanding, is a consequence of the virtue attendant on the profession, but is
also, clearly, a consequence of pedagogical trajectories and career opportunities), but of their
loyalty to specific companies within the profession, and the willingness, necessarily, to couple
that loyalty to a certain level of antagonism towards such companies' direct competitors. This of
course is especially marked in the American situation, and reflects an allegiance similar to that of
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allegiance to sports teams, but it is an allegiance that involves not just a certain degree of time,
and emotional or monetary expenditure, but a devotion of labor to the corporate cause. Further,
there are certain companies that are able to build what I quoted Maulik in the previous chapter as
calling "cult-like" images around themselves, a consequence both of their visionary status and of
the way in which that visionary status is articulated in hegemonic ways to foster loyalty.
The following story of Genentech was told to me by a former employee, whom I shall
keep anonymous. I do not transcribe it verbatim, but rather recount the gist.
Genentech had just won a patent infringement case, and in order to celebrate they called
all of their 2000 employees into a makeshift tent constructed on the premises in order to make the
announcement. As soon as the announcement was made, according to my informa'nt, the entire
tent broke out into a standing ovation (which my informant couldn't understand, since as she said
most of them had pretty crummy jobs), after which the company threw a party, with lots of food,
music, drink and rose petals being strewn from the makeshift stage. After an adequate amount of
revelry, the employees were all called out of the tent to witness a fireworks display put on by the
company. Since Genentech is in South San Fransisco, just north of San Fransisco International
Airport, it became an urban myth in the company that Genentech was able to stop flights into and
out of the airport for 15 minutes while it put on its own fireworks display. My informant herself
would not have been surprised if that had been the case; what she was more impressed by was the
ostentatious display, of extravagance on the part of the company, and invincibility on the part of
its employees, who of course completely bought into the company's extravagance as a matter of
course. In the process, of course, a corporate aura and a sense of belonging to a larger cause, that
wasn't simply the cause of eradicating disease, but was also the cause, in itself, of committing
oneself to Genentech, was reinscribed. The calling, in biocapitalism, thereby both comes from the
symbolic capital accruing from being in the business of "life itself', and from being part of a
specific, embodied, corporate ethos that itself gets constructed through ritual excess, thereby
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leading to a therapeutic salvationary discourse that gets completely entwined with faith both in
the market writ large and in specific market entities.
Indeed, as I mentioned in my story of Incyte's party at the end of the 1999 Institute of
Genomic Research (TIGR) conference in Miami, a performance marked by excess is a ritual
mode of inscription of a corporate presence in the lives of-its workforce. It was the labor angle,
the question of loyalty to the employer, which was the frame through which I most immediately
told my story of that party in Chapter 4. There was, however, a larger question of branding at
stake. Indeed, the backdrop to the Incyte party at TIGR 1999 was a party thrown by Celera at the
same venue in 1998, which was on Miami beach, and signified the 1998 conference (which
occurred in the aftermath of Craig Venter's announcement that he would sequence the human
genome before the public researchers) as a Celera conference. Indeed, it was Celera's first act of
public display since its formation earlier in 1998, and it was the TIGR party, as much as Venter's
announcement regarding the genome sequence in May 1998, that in some material, embodied
sense, catapulted Celera into a certain sort of public vision as the company that was racing to
sequence the human genome.
That the 1999 party had managed to turn that year's proceedings into an Incyte
conference was clearly not lost on TIGR, which after all is an organization which had close links
to Celera at the time (as mentioned in Chapter 4, Venter was heading TIGR at the time that
Perkin-Elmer approached him to run Celera; TIGR was still being headed in 1998-99 by Venter's
wife and fellow genomicist Claire Fraser). Sure enough, at the TIGR conference in 2000, Incyte
was conspicious by its absence from the organizational scene of such revelry. This was because,
as I learnt from an annoyed Incyte employee, TIGR had not allowed them to stage any of the
major conference parties, and had not allowed them to advertise as easily as they had done the
previous year. For much of the 2000 conference, Incyte was reduced to advertising its presence
through giant blimps flying overhead.
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Celera, meanwhile, needed not just to register its presence, but to do so in a manner more
audacious and spectacular than Incyte had the previous year; and preventing Incyte's spectacular
publicity from having an easy outlet, through the organizational agency of TIGR, was clearly
only half the battle won. Therefore, Celera, who organized the 2000 TIGR party, did so at the
Villa Vizcaya, an Italian renaissance style villa and gardens, filled with art and antiques, which
was built as a winter estate of the industrialist James Deering in 1916. Included as part of the
evening's festivities were a live band, and plenty of food and alcohol.
If on the one hand, then, reducing the "religious" aspects of capitalism to a dour
Weberian asceticism completely fails to take into account the actual and excessive forms through
which capitalism operates, then on the other hand, it is too simple to reduce this excess to an
"irrationality", that is all too easily done, especially today (2001-2), especially in places like
Silicon Valley, where such exuberance is disdainfully marked off as an "aberration" of the dot
com boom, as somehow only spectacle, from which we have returned to the "reality" of rational
accumulation. And yet, such forms of excess are always undergirded by forms of rational
calculation, just as rational accumulation in capitalism is always undergirded by excess - excess
and rational accumulation are dialectically intertwined components of capitalism. Therefore, the
head of sales of a bioinformatics company, with me at the 2000 TIGR party, was completely
unimpressed with its extravagance, to the extent that he saw it as a perfectly sound and fiscally
conservative sales and marketing decision. After all, he told me, it's much cheaper to advertise
one's presence in dramatic fashion to many potential investors and customers at one place,
especially if it's a place they have happy memories of and at which they are not explicitly being
sold something, than it is to make individual sales calls across the world to each one of them.
The other question to ask in the context of excess, at the risk of an apparent and
temporary digression, is its relationship to scandal. The 1980s, for instance, also saw capitalism in
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its explicit excessive ebullience,'89 an excess that spilt over not uncommonly into scandalous
manifestations. The biggest scandal in American corporate history related to the collapse of the
savings and loan industries in the 1980s, and happened precisely through such excess
consumption (for an account of this scandal, see J. Adams 1990). The deregulation of this once
staid and conservative industry saw its eventual collapse, through spectacular burn-out and a
possible loss of up to a trillion dollars. Men who were caught in its midst included such moral
crusaders as Charles Keating.
Parties, incidentally, are not incidental to this story. Stephen Pizzo, Mary Fricket and
Paul Muolo (1989), in their expose of the scandal Inside Job, tell the story of Sunbelt Savings'
Edwin McBimey, who, in an infamous party thrown for his friends and customers with company
money, had four showgirls strip, have lesbian sex with one another and proceed to perform
fellatio of some of the guests, four months before he left Sunbelt and the company went out of
business.
How such modes of explicit consumption are different from the excess seen, for instance,
in Miami, is a serious question, especially in the context of the re-emergence of scandal as central
to the dynamics of contemporary corporate America (Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and the like). After
all, excess consumption is a central part of sites of speech such as industrial biotech conferences,
and in addition to the "major" conference party such as those sponsored by Incyte and Celera are
other "smaller" parties that occur every evening in what is, primarily, an industrial trade show.
Perkin-Elmer, for instance, had organized a casino for conference participants at the 1999 TIGR
conference, and these are sites not just of corporate excess, consumption, but also quite explicitly
libidinal sites. I am reminded, for instance, of one inebriated Perkin-Elmer employee I met at the
casino-party, who, in the midst of a series of advances to the various women at the party, found
189 This is a fact that most people in Silicon Valley seem inattentive to in their ahistoric periodization of the
dot corn boom as the foundational act of capitalist excess, and also, perhaps therefore, an aberration that
can be dismissed thus as we return to the "realities" of the capitalist enterprise.
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the time to confide to me that his company's real aim was to take over the world. Instead of
dismissing such statements as sozzled gibberish, I would like to point, again, to the sense of
invincibility that such modes of ritual performativity foster amongst its participants, an
invincibility that translates into the making sacred of the source of such power, the corporation.
Of course, scandals such as the 1980s savings and loan scandal, or the recent Enron and
subsequent scandals, are always framed in terms of delinquent morality, and therefore as
aberration. Such a framing, thereby, allows the everyday business of excess to continue,
unscathed and unstopped. The dialectic relationship of the sacred is not to its binary opposite the
profane, but to its dialectic counterpart, the scandalous. Sacred power can only arise from the
constantly deferred but always present risk of scandalous misappropriation - the very excess that
lends sacred power to the corporation / enterprise at sites and moments of surplus consumption
carried within it the risk of the recognition of that excess as somehow aberrant, abhorent,
immoral, scandalous. By deferring such recognition, of course, the corporation / enterprise in
question doesn't just gain an aura of power and invincibility, but also gains ethical legitimacy, as
not therefore immoral or scandalous - simply powerful, the cult that demands to be bought into.
Performativity both provides material force, that gets consecrated in the body of the corporation
(which itself is simultaneously material and dematerial), but especially in its name, brand. Hence
the relevance of Derrida's questions, regarding what is in the name, what is it we do when we act
in the name of (religion, for instance, but here also, of science, of nation, of capitalism, of specific
corporations) (see Derrida 1995, 2002b). And further, says Derrida, the very possibility of such
faith that we can act in the name of (religion, or, I add, science, nation, capitalism, corporation)
has (today at least, and in the ways that faith gets media-ted through performativity and ritual, for
which also see Rajagopal 2001), as its condition of possibility, the technical. And hence:
[The technical is the possibility of faith, indeed its very chance. A chance that entails the
greatest risk, even the menace of radical evil. Otherwise, that of which it is the chance
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would not be faith but rather program or proof, predictability or providence, pure
knowledge and pure know-how, which is to say annulment of the future. Instead of
opposing them, as is almost always done, they ought to be thought together, as one and
the same possibility: the machine-like and faith, and the same holds for the machinal and
all the values entailed in the sacrosanct (heilig, holy, safe and sound, unscathed, intact,
immune, free, vital, fecund, fertile, strong, and above all, as we will soon see, "swollen")
- more precisely in the sacrosanctity of the phallic effect. 190
Therefore, on the one hand, there are messianic actors, such as Scott, Terry and Collins,
as well as the corporate messiahs such as Incyte and Genentech, who are forging one set of
visionary biocapitalist agendas. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, however, the
commodity itself is theological: it is imbued with mystical and religious force. When that
commodity is a therapeutic, it becomes salvationary. The source of the magic of the drug does not
simply exist from its use-value as object that makes sick people better, but arises from the modes
of abstraction that allow drugs to be commodities. Further, the promise of medicine, as mediated
by the drug, does not need to be articulated: it is a promise that is inherent in the mundane
objects, that are, as Marx would acknowledge, full of "metaphysical subtleties and theological
niceties" (Marx 1976 [1867]: 163). This is why understanding the social life of drugs as simply
being a call to map their sites of production, circulation and consumption is wholly inadequate.
Drugs, as commodities, have as integral to their social life their imaginary life, an imaginary life
that is definitional of their social life.
Therefore, the fetishism of the drug arises, as Marx outlines for the fetishism of any
commodity (Marx 1976 [1867]: 163-177), by alienation. I will argue in Chapter 8, however, that
the fetishism of scientificfact operates instead by interpellation i.e. by the intense association of
such facticity (which is often information about individual genetic profiles) with individual
'90 Derrida 2002b: 83 (emphases in original).
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subjectivities. It is this dialectic between alienating and interpellative fetishisms that needs to be
made sense of if one is to understand emergent regimes of post-genomic personalized medicine,
where diagnostics - scientificfacts about future probable illness - become an integral material-
semiotic part of the structure and practice of medicine.
In further addition to messianic actors and theological commodities is what Derrida calls
a structural messianism - "a messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism,
an idea of justice" (Derrida 1994: 59), which is the emancipatory promise of science. Derrida
talks of this structural messianism in relation to Marxism, but then Marxism itself was explicitly
regarded by its practitioners as scientific, and much of emancipatory potential of Marxism did
indeed stem for Marx from its scientificity. This is a structural messianism that is as much a part
of the foundational Nehruvian ideology for post-independence India, enshrined in his famous
description of science and technology as the "temples of modem India" (Nehru 1958), as it is a
part of Randy Scott's rhetoric. The questions for comparison, then, are questions of how such
structural technoscientific messianism articulates with / as other structures of promissory
imagination, such as nation or corporation.
The challenge then becomes to generate an understanding of the messianic embeddedness
of biocapitalism that is attentive both to religion as an anthropological phenomenon (Geertz), and
to religion as one causative influence (Weber), in other words a co-productionist and conjunctural
attentiveness.'9l I take inspiration here from Weber's demonstration in The Protestant Ethic that
the connection between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism occurred historically, and
at a place in the social structure that tends to hive off other forms.
191 Further, according to Walter Benjamin, there are three aspects to the religious structure of capitalism:
capitalism is cultic (things have meaning only in relation to the cult); there is a permanence of the cult
(naturalization on the one hand, but also an ahistoricity, which is precisely inscribed in the structure of the
salvationary narratives I recounted at the start of this chapter, on the other - the magic of capitalism is that
it manages to transcend temporality, even as it is completely determined in all its manifestations by
temporal logics); and the cult makes guilt pervasive (Benjamin 1996 [1922]). He refers to the relationship
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Weber does however set up a particular, contextually situated dichotomy between
asceticism and mysticism in Economy and Society (Weber 1978 [1968]: 541-556). It is the
subsequent collapse of this dichotomy which is important to trace - if mysticism is, in Weber's
terms, "world-fleeing" (might we say thus in the case of science in its Mertonian guise - abstract,
knowledge, truth?), and asceticism is "world-serving" (the symbolic capital of drug development,
as being in the business of saving lives), then the collapse of the mystical and ascetic aspects of
Mertonian science and Weberian capitalism respectively collapse most evidently in venture
science, just as, as I argue in Chapter 8, genomics and personalized medicine as corporate
endeavors see the collapse of pre-capitalist and commodity fetishisms.
Religion, then, cannot be reduced either to a Weberian binary of asceticism / mysticism,
or to a Geertzian generation of authority in ritual (though, as I've argued above, the latter
understanding is a vital one to take account of in explaining the source of religious authority).
Indeed, one is a diagnosis of religious phenomena, the other an attempt to trace its mechanisms of
operation, making them different explanatory operations that cannot be compared against one
another for their relative erudition, or explanatory capabilities.
I turn next to two categories ofperformative force that Derrida enunciates in his analysis
of religion to investigate the ways in which religious categories manifest and are important to
make sense of. I speak here of belief and sacredness (see Derrida 2002b). Belief has to do with
truth and therefore understanding (even in the absence of understanding - one has to believe in
the understandings provided by truth even if one does not understand them, or understand how
they are provided for by truth). Sacredness has to do with mysticism. Facticity has to do with
truth; the commodity is a mystical entity. When facts and commodities implode in / as venture
science, what results is the implosion of these two structures of being of religion.
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between Christianity and capitalism in parasitic terms: he sees capitalism as a parasite of Christanity until
the history of Christianity becomes essentially that of its parasite.
In order, then, to look at the sacred dimensions of venture science, especially as they
pertain to bios, I read Weber antagonistically again, this time in relation to Bataille (1988 [1967]).
For Bataille, the source of the sacred is reflected by the manner in which resources are consumed
extravagantly and unproductively, again in sharp contrast to Weber's ascetic Protestant. As Jean-
Joseph Goux puts it in his reading of Bataille: "Whereas the profane is the domain of utilitarian
consumption, the sacred is the domain of experience opened by the unproductive consumption of
the surplus" (Goux 1990: 207-208). It is such sacralization that forms the grounds for social
power.
7.2 Envisioning India Inc.
In this section, I think about nationalism's relationship to globalization and to capital, as
informed by Indian entrepreneurial and venture capitalist communities (many of whom operate /
network out of and into Silicon Valley), and by Indian public actors and institutions, such as the
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Centre for Biochemical
Technology (CBT), that I described in Chapter 5. In the process, I want to highlight how the
Indian nation, in the context of these actors, becomes one way (religion and capitalism being at
least two other, mutually implicated ways that I have discussed in this dissertation) of, in
Benedict Anderson's terms, "linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together"
(Anderson 1991 [1983]: 36). I further argue that in the context of biotechnological globalization,
the Gramscian distinction of strategy and tactics, in this case, can be further temporalized into
vision, strategy and tactics. Even if a range of actors whose views are broadly in consonance
might have similar underlying visions (that of India "going global", or developing an
"entrepreneurial culture", both of which, I argue, are sometimes, and sometimes not, the same
thing), their own strategic and tactical conceptions, combined with the institutional constraints
and formative pedagogies that provide them with their situated perspectives, serve to differentiate
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their modes of action, leading to a range of ways in which India in fact "goes global", or
"becomes entrepreneurial".
I begin by talking about two major non-resident Indian (NRI) organizations with
powerful presence in the United States, one of which has something to do with biotechnology, the
other apparently nothing at all. The former is The IndUS Entrepreneurs (TiE), and the latter the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Forum, or VHP).
TiE's mission is the "advancement and nurturing of entrepreneurship".j92 Established in
1994 in Silicon Valley, it now has a presence in North America, Europe and India. The story of
TiE, and of its related and younger offspring focusing on life science entrepreneurship, the
Entrepreneurial Pharmaceutical Partners of the Indian Continent (EPPIC), is, at one level, one of
a venture capital approach to governance, and I explore this evident story later in the section. A
thicker analysis of organizations such as TiE or EPPIC, of course, would have to confront them as
a part of the Indian diasporic assemblage, as part of Silicon Valley as a particular locale, and as
part of a certain sort of social movement that, like any governmentality, cannot bring about
formal political economic change without being driven, itself, by conceptions of broader social
change. The VHP, on the other hand, is a much older organization, founded in 1964, its purpose
being the global dissemination of Hindu values and the strengthening of Hindu networks around
the world. Not surprisingly, the VHP has risen to public prominence and grown in stature during
the 1990s, along with the rise of Hindu nationalism as a mainstream political force in India, but
also with the rise of NRI communities themselves becoming powerful and vocal political actors
in Indian affairs in their own right.
TiE's conception of change is very much based in its vanguard elite, men like Kanwal
Rekhi and Kailash Joshi who have made it big as Indians in American entrepreneurial worlds, and
192 According to their website, www.tie.org.
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who therefore act both as role models and as networking nodes for other aspiring sub-continental
entrepreneurs. TiE's objectives are threefold, to: "
* Foster entrepreneurship and nurture entrepreneurs
* Provide a networking platform for its members
* Help members integrate with the mainstream community."'93
At one level, these objectives, of nurturing what is simultaneously a community, a cause
and a way of life, eerily echoes the focus and activities of organizations like the VHP. Further,
both TiE and the VHP go beyond simply spreading ideology to actively participate in making
possible capital flows between the US and India, in circuits closely tied to India's ruling
corporate-political elites. The VHP in America, for instance, has been singularly involved in
channeling funds back to the Hindu nationalist movement in India, which is an assemblage of
socio-political actors of which the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is an integral part. TiE,
meanwhile, aims not just to foster an Indian entrepreneurial community in the US, but also to
transpose back to India the sorts of cultures and mechanisms of innovation that typify high-tech
entrepreurial capitalism in places like Silicon Valley. There are also uncanny similarities in the
way the two groups function organizationally, through seminars, lecture tours, mentoring /
counseling and operating projects back in India.
There is, however, a crucial difference between the value systems of the two
organizations. At the risk of an apparent digression, it is necessary to explore this difference a
little in order to lay the ground for further analysis of the way India gets envisioned by
entrepreneurial communities such as TiE, and how such envisionings tie in, or don't, to the way
science and technology get envisioned as a component of the nation, and the way nationalism gets
imbricated as a componenent of technoscience, on the ground, by various actors in India. This
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difference has to do with the fundamentally exclusionary ideology of organizations like the VHP,
which, as an ironical consequence, have, as Arvind Rajagopal (2001) shows, to be able to
innovate for themselves democratically accessible modes of grassroots functioning. TiE, on the
other hand, is ideologically inclusionary, and as part of its mission explicitly claims respect for
religious, ethnic and political diversity. Indeed, while most TiE management and members are
from India, there is a play on words in the name of the organization itself: IndUS represents not
just the confluence of India and the United States, but also the river that flows through Pakistan,
has tributaries in India, is considered the cradle of sub-continental pre-historic civilization and is
the basis for a water treaty between the two countries that is almost sacred in its symbolization of
the links between them even in times of great diplomatic stress. TiE indeed believes that its
success "stems from its single-minded focus on the mission of advancing entrepreneurship and on
its unrelenting value that successful entrepreneurship eschews all culture, religious, and political
boundaries".' 94
Leaving aside for the moment both the impossibility of an entrepreneurship without
culture and the contradiction of an organization that is explicitly formed on the basis of ethnic /
geographical identification as "eschewing" such boundaries (and presumably therefore the
identities that are formed precisely by such boundaries), I tell the story of Kanwal Rekhi, a
founder and former president of TiE, and arguably the best known Indian venture capitalist in the
world. Rekhi's biography is the classic one of the poor outsider who made good in the American
melting pot. Of Sikh parents, and born in Rawalpindi (current-day Pakistan), Rekhi moved to the
US in 1967 as an engineer, got laid off thrice in the early 70s, and finally moved to San Jose
where he realized the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial dream. He co-founded an extremely
successful computer company called Excelan, which merged with Novell in 1989, and then
moved on to become a highly successful venture capitalist and angel investor. Rekhi was one of
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the generation of early (1 980s) NRI entrepreneurs who learnt from experience that, while there
were an increasing number of Indian software professionals (usually highly educated and highly
qualified) coming to the Valley, there were very few who were actually in management positions
or starting their own companies. A major reason for that, of course, was the Catch-22 situation
that all entrepreneurs find themselves in when first trying to start a company with venture capital
money without significant entrepreneurial / VC contacts: Rekhi himself, for instance, was
constantly turned away by VCs while trying to start Excelan because he didn't have the "right
management team". Rekhi read that, probably accurately, as meaning to say that his problem was
that there was no white person on his team. This was the situation that he hoped to rectify, not by
fighting against the closed networks that served to, ultimately, perpetuate a form of racial-ethnic
discrimination, but by becoming "as white as the whites", by forming his own sets of networks
and mentoring relationships that would foster a community for the next generation of aspiring
Indian entrepreneurs that he himself did not have the luxury of tapping into.
Rekhi's ambitions, however, are far from merely local, and far from merely being about
enabling Indian professionals to be successful in the US. He dreams, indeed, of changing India, of
turning it into an innovative and entrepreneurial society. These are visions that are based firmly in
an idea of meritocracy and vanguard intellect. Himself a product of the Indian Institute of
Technology (UT), the prestigious set of institutions that are the training grounds for most of
Silicon Valley's Indian software professionals, he believes completely in the IIT self-belief that
this group is the best of the best. In other words, an organization like TiE, which is deeply
inflected by the views of Rekhi and those like him, is, in spite of its religious and cultural
inclusiveness, precisely not the sort of grassroots organic movement that the VHP is: these are
entrepreneurs who truly believe that change can come from the top, that they represent the top,
and that they can, therefore, change India on their own steam. In terms of strategies and tactics,
therefore, TiE and VHP believe in completely inverted Gramscian fields of hegemonic action.
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In addition to this strategic-tactical binary, of exclusive-grassroots versus inclusive-
vanguard, are related binaries in conceptions of community and family. The VHP, like any
fundamentalist religious movement, is deeply family-centric in its focus. The entrepreneurial
ideal type, however, is that of the Lone Ranger, and indeed the risks of starting a company are so
great that it is deemed exponentially harder to do so when the entrepreneur has other people to
provide for. Most male Indian professionals who come to places like Silicon Valley from
institutions like IIT, indeed, do come as bachelors, and invariably "make good" before they
return to India to get married. The mantra of entrepreneurialism that TiE espouses, and indeed
seeks to establish as a way of life in India, is intensely centered around a vision of a community
that is formed by a more American vision of networked individuals, not, as in the VHP's case, a
community of strong patriarchal families.
TiE transposes back to India, then, ways of starting companies that are normal in the US,
and the financial and institutional backing to follow those ways. Rekhi, for instance, has set up a
start-up incubator at IIT Bombay, a model of corporate incubation in university settings, where
the university provides entrepreneurs with subsidized space and some funding to see them
through their earliest stages of company formation, that is quite typical of models followed at a
number of US universities. As Rekhi says:
The people who are at UT Bombay, the professors and the students, they wouldn't have
thought of being start-ups, so we brought this notion in.... You know, just...bringing this
tradition of entrepreneurship - like they have at Stanford, like they have at MIT - to
Indian universities. The Indians...followed the British model, by and large [for
universities]. There is the notion of being very pure [and] non-commercial in your
studies. In the US there's a big notion of how do you use your knowledge very quickly to
create wealth, create jobs? So we're bringing this concept to India now.'95
195 In an interview to cnn.com, available at
www.cnn.comrn/SPECIALS/2000/virtualvi ages/story/india/interviews/rekhi.html
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Such a conception as Rekhi's doesn't see ideology as something that is spread or
diffused, but sees it literally as a thing, plant-like perhaps, that can packaged, physically
transported and deposited on new soil, where it will take root, spread and grow. Notions are
"brought in", like a laptop, and one can almost imagine Rekhi declaring his notions at customs as
he flies into Bombay.
Related to this faith in vanguard individualism as the engine for economic growth is, not
surprisingly, a disdain and contempt for the state:
India took a wrong, a left turn, about 50 years ago and became socialist. It was a tragic
mistake India made, and it's paying for that one.... One of the the messages that I deliver
when I travel there is [that] entrepreneurs are the only hope. They are the wealth creators,
job creators of the society. They are the locomotives which will pull the whole train
along, which is a new concept for India because the...the mindset under Nehru, Gandhi
was central ownership of industry.' 96
Indeed, at a meeting of EPPIC that I was attending, one member talked of a recent visit to
Bangalore where a high level state official asked him how the state government could be of help
in setting up entrepreneurial ventures, and he responded that the best way the government could
help would be by staying as far away from them as possible.
On the one hand, therefore, is an entrepreneurial community that professes a philosophy
that could be read as being stridently Thatcherite. On the other hand, it does so without having to
take into account the fundamental contradiction of Thatcherism, which is that it needed the state
to dismantle the state. Rekhi and the Silicon Valley NRI entrepreneurs think they can do it from
without (a belief, as I explain later, that is unable to escape the dependency that even these agents
have on the state).
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What drives these entrepreneurs then is of envisioning India Inc., and placing that mode
of nationalist envisioning both alongside other types of corporate / investor envisioning that I
have talked about so far, and also in the context of other nationalist imaginaries operating in India
today. For Rekhi, spreading the free market is no less a calling that it is for Randy Scott or Patrick
Terry, or indeed was for David Livingstone. However, this is a calling, explicitly, of nation rather
than religion, but a "national" calling that reflects what I had in the previous section, quoting
Derrida, called a "structural messianism". Rekhi talks about himself and his comrades thus:
We see ourselves as missionaries now. The Indian independence movement in the '20s
was led by the Indians who came back from England. They came to India [where there
was] no thought of lawful society, liberal society, and they applied those concepts, and
that was the basis of our freedom movement, in the '20s and '30s.
Essentially what we're doing [now] is the economic freedom movement for India.'97
Therefore, capital flows back to India from US-based NRI organizations focus,
depending on the organization, on entrepreneurship (TiE), religion (VHP) and disaster relief
(both). Indeed, a major mechanism by which Hindu nationalist organizations have gained
grassroots legitimacy in India has been through provision of relicf at sites of those disasters that
they haven't engineered themselves. The massive earthquake in Gujarat in early 2001 meanwhile
saw an outpouring of relief efforts on the part of entrepreneurial organizations such as TiE, who
further encouraged American companies to donate money for relief and reconstruction
(interestingly, the VHP has claimed credit for first drawing attention to the need for massive relief
funds in Gujarat after the earthquake, which they claim was responsible for creating the impetus
for organizations like TiE to get involved in the first place).
The question of the motivation for NRI groups to get involved in channeling capital back
to India isn't just one of ideology or philanthropy, and further cannot be explained simply by the
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"guilt" of NRIs who feel they "owe" something to their home country, as many Indians in
conversation often postulate. Rekhi, for instance, is quite contemptuous of explicitly
"philanthropic" entrepreneurs. For instance, a group of entrepreneurs pitched their business idea
to him, in which a part of their business plan promised to set aside 5% of their profits for the
development of science and technology in India - something that, one would imagine, would be
in consonance with Rekhi's own ambitions. Rekhi was openly disdainful of the idea, and chided
them that they were supposed to be starting a business, not a charity. Easy psychoanalytic
attributions of feelings of guilt as being the motive force for channeling capital back to the
country are likewise little more than conjecture, and fail to take into account the larger structural
forces that create such feelings of obligation to one's home country. My own sense of duty to
somehow reinvest matcrial or intellectual capital in India stems not from charity, guilt or a
nebulous and ill-defined "patriotism" (for it is, after all, that patriotism that one needs to explain
rather than use as explanation) as much as it does from the realization that I received, from the
Indian state, a virtually free college education that enabled me to move on to the most prestigious
centers of learning in the world (my total college fees for a three-year undergraduate degree,
inclusive of tuition, accommodation and utilities such as electricity, amounted to about 720
rupees, which, at the exchange rate of the time, would be roughly $25).'98 Rekhi himself
acknowledges the quality of education that IIT graduates receive, an education that is almost to
the same extent subsidized by the Indian state (which makes Rekhi's contempt for the state even
more ironical). These are obligations, stemming not merely from the psyche or from ideology,
that are, I argue, the obligations of citizenship.
The category NRI was officially coined by the Indian government in 1973 through the
Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, thereby recognizing Indians abroad, through formal systems
198 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2001 Human Development Report estimates that an
annual resource loss for India from software professionals who migrate to the US is $2 billion, if one
calculates the amount of state investment that is put into most of their (virtually free) higher education.
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of state classification, as a distinct group with a clear incentive structure set up for them to
reinvest capital back in India. Indeed, I argue that citizenship for NRIs is defined almost solely in
terms of their ability to repatriate capital. This is partly because the Indian government doesn't
allow dual citizenship. The 1973 Act, however, also recognizes a category called "person of
Indian origin", which is anyone who has at any time held an Indian passport, or is the female
spouse of such a person (male spouses of women of Indian origin are not considered to be of
Indian origin), and provides similar investment incentives for these people as it does for NRIs
who are Indian passport holders (Ramachandran 1992; see also Rajagopal 2001: 241-242).
Further, the formal citizenship for even those NRIs who possess Indian passports is somewhat
nominal, as they are, rather perversely, unable to vote in Indian elections unless they are
physically present in India at the time of elections, or government officials stationed in a foreign
embassy. Therefore, citizenship for NRIs gets defined solely in terms of their ability to repatriate
capital, and the Indian state has a quite conscious agency in shaping such a definition.
Conversely, the repatriation of capital, for NRIs, becomes the defining act of citizenship (whether
they are formally still NRIs, or have abdicated Indian citizenship to become merely "persons of
Indian origin"). Capital, quite literally, becomes the social bond that links Indians abroad to their
homeland, but it only works as such a bond because there are other, less structural, ties already in
place.
Of course, what is repatriated by members of organizations such as TiE is not simply
capital but also expertise, in an odd quasi-inversion of that oft-repeated malady of Indian
technoscience, "brain drain". There is, therefore, a confluence of repatriated capital, labor and
imaginaries. Labor, because there is an increased incidence of Indians who have gone abroad for
graduate or post-doctoral study or work returning to India to further their careers; imaginaries,
because the "expertise" that is repatriated is not simply formal technical expertise (which, after
all, is garnered in abundance and in quality by these professionals at institutions like the IIT
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before they leave India), but cultural ideals, such as of entrepreneurship, ideals that get reflected
in mimetic institutional structures, but also in larger urban landscapes. Hyderabad, which, along
with Bangalore, has been the favored city for the repatriation of capital and expertise to set up
high-technology industries in India (initially mainly information technology, but now
increasingly biotechnology as well), has a designated 600 acre area of land that is called
"Genome Valley", explicitly conjuring an image, and thereby, it is hoped, eventually a reality, of
an entrepreneurial technoscientific haven on the lines of Silicon Valley.
As my account of CBT in the Chapter 5 shows, though, it isn't just NRIs who have
technoscientific imaginaries about India. Such imagining is very much at the heart of the public
Indian scientific establishment as well, especially in cutting edge high-tech fields such as
genomics. The question then is how NRI (and reciprocal "local" Indian) technoscientific
imaginaries are at odds, or not, with NRI (and reciprocal "local" Indian) cultural -religious
imaginaries, such as those of the VHP and the ruling BJP, and how "nationalism" differentially
inflects these different sets of actors. Perhaps the emblematic representative of the VHP-BJP type
of cultural Hindu nationalism as it articulates between its US-based and Indian-based versions
(see Rajagopal 2001 for a comparison of these "versions") is their President, Ashok Singhal.
Similarly, the emblematic representative of a technoscientific nationalism as it articulates
between Silicon Valley and emergent Indian high-tech industries is the Chief Minister of the state
of Andhra Pradesh, and the man who "created" Genome Valley, Nara Chandrababu Naidu.
It is important at this point to emphasize that the Silicon Valley high-tech entrepreneur is
not the only type of expatriate Indian to the United States, and is certainly not the original one.
Karen Leonard (1997), for instance, talks about Punjabi (mainly Sikh) immigrants to California in
the early part of the 20t century, who were mainly involved in agricultural labor. These Sikh
communities, many of whom have moved to California as whole families, are still a significant
migrant community in the state, and their affective bonds with the homeland have both
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historically and in the present remained quite strong. It was these expatriates in the 1 920s who
founded the Gadar Party, a revolutionary party for India's liberation from the British that sent its
members back to India to get involved in armed struggle for freedom.
Today, in addition to the high-tech software and biotech professionals who are the most
powerful and visible part of the Silicon Valley Indian diaspora, there are still a large number of
Sikhs, signified by the fact that a road in Fremont is named Gurudwara Lane. Many of these
Sikhs are taxi drivers, and their fierce sense of nationalism was reflected in a conversation I had
with one of them as he drove me to a friend's house near Berkeley. As I spoke to him initially in
Hindi, his heart immediately warmed to me. I learnt that he had just moved from Amritsar three
years previously, and was pining for home. He asked me whether I planned to settle down in the
US, and I replied that while I would probably end up doing so, my heart was still in India. At this,
he turned around, smiled broadly, and said, "Han bhai. Is behanchod desh mein reh rehke khoon
bhi safed hojaata hai." ("Yes, brother. Staying in this sisterf***ing country too long turns even
one's blood white."). He refused to charge me for my ride, even though ferrying another Indian
around must hardly have been a novelty for him. And yet, as he said, "Apne mulk ke aadmi se
kaisepaise le sakte hain?" ("How can I take money from someone who is from my country?").
I am trying to emphasize through this digression firstly that nationalism is of many
different varieties - an obvious fact in itself, perhaps, but one that gets all too easily overlooked
when a particular brand of nationalism becomes the dominant discursive form through which one
is expected and allowed to express alliegance for the nation (and nationalism does, quite literally,
get branded and circulated as commodity, certainly in India, and through technologies like the
media, as Rajagopal [2001] shows). Secondly, these varieties don't simply polarize into an anti-
imperialist, secular, "Congress" nationalism and a culturally aggressive, Hindu, "BJP"
nationalism. In places like Silicon Valley, and for expatriates, in particular, nationalism is often
necessarily defined as an inchoate affective "love" for one's country and countrymen, but it is
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also defined in relation to the American Other. The modes of articulation of this relationship are
starkly different in the case of my cab driver on the one hand, and TiE on the other. Both
recognize themselves as racially marked, even in the absence of an explicit self-admitted racial
violence that is so much a feature of everyday life for South Asian expatriates in, for instance,
Britain. While the cab driver distances himself from the "white-blooded" American (under which
category he might include the Indian who doesn't speak to him in Hindi), TiE, as part of its
institutional mandate, seeks to identify with the Americans, play their game, be "whiter than the
whites". This is clearly stated in the organization's objectives, one of which, as mentioned above,
is to "help members integrate into the mainstream community". The way TiE seeks to deal with
minority status is by becoming such a model minority that they stop being recognized as
minorities anymore.
Not surprisingly, Rekhi has been an activist lobbying for the relaxation of US
immigration restrictions on Indian high-tech professionals. He has become actively involved with
the Immigrant Support Network (ISN) to help foreign high-tech workers lobby to change
immigration laws. But again, the way Rekhi involves himself is by projecting American interests,
and himself as an American, rather than by projecting issues such as racial disparity or
discrimination. For instance, he said: "My generation came here and became strong Americans.
We were productive citizens, creating wealth and jobs for society, everybody was a winner. This
whole new thing worries me because it ties people down, disenfranchises them
economically...and I am worried that this will not produce a strong American economy or help
entrepreneurship. So my point is to raise awareness that this situation is not very healthy for
society, and if the US needs engineers, it must step up and offer them a fairer deal" (quoted in
Din 2001 a).
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And of course, the cost of easing restrictions on high-tech model immigrants has to be a
tightening of restrictions on those who are not professionals. In the interview cited above, Rekhi
continues:
When immigrants were first allowed in the '60s, they were engineers and highly skilled
people. Then there was family reunification, and parents and brothers and sisters were
allowed in. All of a sudden, primary immigration of professionals became secondary
immigration of taxi-drivers.... That secondary immigration was of very poor quality, and
that caused a backlash. For one engineer, you'd get ten others. It's time to go back to the
original setup, where you allow professionals and only their spouses and children, not
one's brothers, sisters, parents...The US cannot take everyone in the world. I brought my
brother and sisters here, don't get me wrong, but none of them turned out...if you let
things continue, you get an endless loop of poor quality immnigration".'99
These remarks are well in keeping with the meritocratic, highly individualized visions of
India Inc. that TiE repatriates to India as its "entrepreneurial culture".
Joseph Dumit (1998) talks about the formation of identities by scientific fact through his
notion of "objective self-fashioning", a notion that I engage with in Chapter 8 as I talk about
genomic fetishism. Identity in technoscientific capitalism however is shaped not just by the
knowledge provided by technoscience, but by the hybrid de- and re-localizations that often
accompany globalized knowledge production enterprises. TiE entrepreneurs, therefore, engage in
a subjective self-fashioning, which is a mimetic American self-fashioning that doesn't just
'99 Expectedly, Rekhi's comments, made in April 2001, created quite a controversy, with heated debate
ensuing on online Indian newsgroups and discussion groups. In May, Rekhi issued the following
clarification on his remarks: "The raging debate about my views regarding secondary immigration were
taken out of context. I hold no views about who should be or who shouldn't be allowed in. I am too much
of a free marketer to worry about the quality of one profession over the other. I did make a distinction
between primary and secondary immigrants in that primary immigrants come on their own merit and
compete like hell to survive on their own. Secondary immigrants often were sponsored brothers and sisters
who were not qualified like primary immigrants and needed a lot of help to adjust here. Incidentally, I am
somewhat of an expert here [sic], having sponsored five brothers and their spouses over a 15 year period. I
am not against family re-unification at all. Is an endless loop of sponsored brothers and sisters family re-
unification?" (Quoted in Din 2001b).
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confine itself to "non-resident" locales, but gets repatriated in the form of such imagined
constructions as Hyderabad's Genome Valley. Further, it is a form of self-fashioning in the image
of the American Other that already exists, before the act of repatriation, in the Indian middle-class
consumer population, fed as it is on America in every form through satellite television and the
flooding of its markets with foreign consumer goods. At the level of the state, this
technoscientific subjective self-fashioning is epitomized by Chandrababu Naidu, the Chief
Minister of Andhra Pradesh.
This last point is particularly ironic, because Naidu himself, when he became Chief
Minister, inherited the mantle of a leader, N.T. Rama Rao (popularly called NTR), who most
explicitly self-fashioned his politics in terms of Telugu locality, as itself a form of nationality.200
This is indicated in the name of the political party that NTR founded in 1982, Telugu Desam
(literally meaning Telugu Nation), which Naidu now heads.
While objective self-fashioning is, at one level, a highly individuized and individualizing
form of identity formation, it is also a form of identity formation that often occurs, or
subsequently manifests itself, as collective social movements, such as patient advocacy groups.
Therefore, it is a mode of collective individualized identity formation that, on the one hand, often
propagates beyond the individual through media such as the internet. It is also, on the other hand,
often the preserve of those who have recourse to the "culture of no culture" - scientific fact
shapes identity not just because it is deemed supremely authoritative, but also because it is
deemed to be somehow acultural. Sharon Traweek, indeed, refers to the culture of high energy
physicists as being a "culture of no culture", which she describes as "an extreme culture of
objectivity...which longs passionately for a world without loose ends, without temperament,
gender, nationalism, or other sources of disorder - for a world outside human space and time"
(Traweek 1988: 162). By allowing the authority of science to mold one as consumer (rather than
2 00 Telugu is the state language of Andhra Pradesh, and the people of Andhra Pradesh are called Telugus.
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scientist), objectively self-fashioned subjects take on an identity that is perceived to be supremely
objective.
There is, however, a very different sense in which the notion of a "culture of no culture"
has been used, by Ruth Frankenburg (1993) in her analysis of racial-cultural self-identifications
of white women, done after interviewing a number of women in Northern California. The space
of no culture here is the privilege of unmarkedness that accrues to a dominant culture that does
not have to define its identity in relationship to an Other, but can assume itself as normative. If
the "culture of no culture" represents objectivity when the identity-forming agent is science, then
it represents normativity when the identity-forming agent is race.
The question for an analysis of biocapital, which is always already an analysis of forms
of biosociality, then becomes the following: given that there is no shortage of American
companies targetting the consumptive capabilities of the middle class in India, one would imagine
that the problematic, of understanding emergent forms of biosociality in comparative context,
should not be the question of how biosocial communities such as PXE International and Genomic
Health (discussed in the previous section) emerge as articulate(d) entities in the US. Rather, it
should be the question why such biosocial arrangements that depend on a consumptive market of
precisely the sorts of networked individuals envisaged by organizations such as TiE have not
emerged in India in spite of their mimetic efforts. In other words, why is it that the importation /
repatriation of corporate technoscientific cultures of production to India have not led (as yet, at
least) to the same kinds of biosocial emergences as these productions do in the US? Why is it that
the subjective self-fashioning of both the productive entrepreurial community (and its allied state
actors) and the consumptive middle class, as explicitly "Americanized", have not led to a
salvationary objective self-fashioning in the image of corresponding American identity-
formations through processes of production and circulation of facts, technologies and
commodities? It is in asking the question of afailure of homogenous emergence in spite of the
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explicit attempt by many actors to reproduce such homogeneity that one comes up against the
importance not just of nebulous attributions of cultural difference, but also of the different
salience of precisely those cultural and ideological categories, such as nation and salvation, that
completely imbricate, and thereby differentiate, "cultures of no culture" as "acultures" that can
only be understood and made sense of through cultural analysis.
In other words, entrepreneurial "cultures" do not simply emerge from capital,
infrastructure and ideology, though all three are undeniably essential. Rather, they emerge from
complex institutional, material and semiotic assemblages, that in the U", for instance, involved
the coming together, at a certain conjunctural moment, of legislative changes (such as the 1980
Bayh-Dole Act), legal precedents (such as Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that allowed patents on
genetically engineered micro-organisms; June 1980); technological advancements (recombinant
DNA technology); changing business terrains (the emergence of venture capital as a serious force
in enabling technoscientific research) and business events that either anticipate or respond
aggressively to these changing events (for instance, the hugely successful Genentech IPO in
October 1980). Therefore, the question of the failures of mimesis that I pose can be answered in
terms of the fact that while one can replicate components of an assemblage, it is not so easy to
replicate their strateified dynamics or their structural conjunctures. To assume that India in 2002
will replicate the US in 1980 is ultimately buying into an allochronistic discourse that is deeply
ahistorical, because the material relations of production, the institutional relations and the larger
socio-economic contexts are simply not comparable.
Let me move away from the specifics of the NRI entrepreneurial community, then, to
make some more generalized remarks about the conception of India Inc., before swinging back to
talk is greater detail about Chandrababu Naidu.
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I use, as the basis of this critique, a special (June 2001) issue of that bastion of British
Conservative capitalism, The Economist, titled "Unlocking India's growth". This issue, filled
with inescapably stereotypic capitalist rhetorical maneuvers, manages constantly, on the one
hand, to use historical evidence to denounce the multiple failures of the Indian state, while on the
other hand simultaneously denying the historical failures of economic liberalization in India over
the last decade, failures that it claims indicate insufficient liberalization. 2 0 ' Similarly, incidences
of market corruption are pointed to as individual aberrations that can be set right by more
privatization, while incidences of state corruption are revealed as a systemic, structural feature of
the state apparatus.
And so, therefore, The Economist survey proceeds on a tour deforce of systematic
contradiction, selective argument and logical inconsistency (Unger 2001). For instance, it points
to Maharashtra and Gujarat as the "successful" states upon which an Indian economic vision
ought to model itself, without at all mentioning that the undeniably impressive growth rate of
these two states has come with the price tag of massive closures of textile mills, leading to huge
unemployment, and violent communal tension, such as was witnessed in Bombay for weeks in
1993, and in many parts of Gujarat for months (still ongoing) in 2002. Further, mapping Indian
states by growth or liberalization alone fails to take into account the fact that the conditions of
possibility for such growth already existed in high growth states independent of privatization
policies. The agricultural economies of Gujarat and Maharashtra, for instance, depend upon
cotton, a cash crop that has always been a significant revenue-earner. Andhra Pradesh, Naidu's
home state, and Karnataka, the state of which Bangalore is the capital, meanwhile had net state
domestic products per person in 1998-99 that were significantly lower than even a relatively
"backward" state like Haryana, in spite of being the most aggressive economic liberalizers,
201 This is identical to the moves that Francis Fukuyama makes in his "end of history" thesis that Denida
(1994) deconstructs.
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because these are highly drought prone states that are not as agriculturally productive as
Maharashtra, Gujarat or Punjab (figures from Unger 2001).202
Wherever Unger sees "glory" for the Indian economy, it is invariably in a sector that
provides services for the West. And yet, ironically, by The Economist 's own logic (and certainly
by the logic of those it would most appreciate, such as members of TiE), the challenge for India
ought to be to develop an innovative technoscientific culture. How precisely one can make the
transition from back-end contract work for big Western corporations to innovative research that
can garner its own intellectual property is a question that is never even addressed by Unger's
survey, even though, as I outlined in Chapter 5, this is the key question that is vexing state
enthusiasts of the market in India such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR). Unger's conclusions, that becoming a "global" player are most gloriously achieved by
doing the sorts of work that need to be outsourced as cheap labor away from the West is well in
keeping with the survey's overall tone of crass paternalism and allochronism, indicated in
sentences such as the following: "The 1990s were Woodstock, a time of liberation and youthful
experimentation but not much discipline for Indian industry. Only now are the pressures of
adulthood being felt. Growing up is proving to be painful" (Unger 2001: ! 7). Such brazenly
Orientalist language of course is not just discursive, but also underlies the sorts of collaborative
ventures the West is willing to undertake with India, or the sorts of research and products
emanating from India that get accepted as being of "global standard" by the West. Especially in
reference to a country with a larger and more vibrant democratic structure than any that exists in
the West, that is a source of such pique for many of the researchers at the Centre for Biochemical
Technology (CBT), as I indicated in Chapter 5. This is because such researchers know from
painful experience that this particular mode of condescension ensures that the only research
202 Another example of a state that has done well, according to Unger, is Kerala. To quote: "Kerala has the
most impressive long-term record, with the highest levels of literacy and life expectancy, and one of the
lowest poverty rates in India" (Unger 2001: 20). An odd admission to make in a one-sided diatribe against
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performed at CBT that gets deemed legitimate to publish by top Western journals is research that
is repetitive or confirming of work already done in the West. Implicit in this condescending
glorification of India as a site for back-end cheap labor is the belief that India is also not the site
for cutting-edge innovation..
The most amazing part of The Economist survey, however, is its last section, which calls
itself "A management guide: How to run India Inc.". It starts by saying that "[I]f India were listed
on the stockmarket, it would be a juicy takeover target. A corporate raider would see an enterprise
that has raised its game in the past ten years but remains constrained by caution. Surely India's
assets could deliver higher returns under new management" (Unger 2001: 19).
It becomes evident that only certain prescriptions can flow from a framing of "India Inc."
as a "takeover target" for a "corporate raider", in need of"correction" so that it can achieve its
"full potential". The things that need "correcting", not surprisingly, are things like "wages and
salaries", that need, of course, to be corrected with that wonderful attribute of the Wall Street
trader, "draconian pragmatism" (ibid.).
"Draconian" is the key word here. For what Unger is doing, effectively, is promoting the
propagation of the "free" market through profoundly anti-democratic means. It is not surprising,
then, that the constant standard against which Unger measures India's "success" as a "global"
economy is not any of the Western economies, but China, which of course manages much of its
economic growth through a complete suspension of workers' rights. I shall ignore for the moment
the obvious ironies inherent in the fact that it is one of the three major surviving Communist
countries that should be held up as the model for economic liberalization and "growth" in the
global marketplace. For of course, China also gets its "glory", most notably, from the fact that it
does essential back-end work for Western corporations, primarily in manufacturing (rather than
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the state, because Kerala has of course gotten where it has through active state intervention, especially
during the tenures in power of its leftist governments.
services, which is India's primary back-end strength). In other words, the lorification of China
as the liberalized economy to emulate further emphasizes the fundamental fact that global
capitalism, as Spivak for instance constantly emphasizes in her work, can only survive by
exporting the draconian labor practices of the metropolitan Industrial Revolution into the
periphery.
This setting up of China as the liberalized economy to emulate is also central to Rekhi's
philosophy, thereby setting up, on the one hand, a desire that is firmly based in American
mimesis, and on the other hand, a strategy that is firmly based in following the Chinese. It is
particularly ironic that Rekhi, who, as quoted earlier, claims to be a "missionary" involved in the
"economic freedom movement of India" is so enamored of precisely such a model, of doing
contract work for foreign companies without sharing in their intellectual property, that nmrrors
V.V. Krishna's (1997) assessment of colonial science (discussed in Chapter 5), whereby Indian
labs exist primarily to perform work that has been designed in the metropolis, which again is
where the maximum value gets realized.
There is a fundamental contradiction then that Naidu faces in Andhra Pradesh, where he
is, on the one hand, a democratically elected chief minister, and on the other, sees governance as
something that needs to be undertaken on sound management principles. As the former, he cannot
afford to be draconian when he depends on re-election by the people of Andhra Pradesh for his
continued power. If the analogy has to be made to a company, then in a democracy (and certainly
in a parliamentary democracy such as India), it's the workers and not the stockholders who vote.
Naidu has been called, often derisively, the "laptop chief mininster". Were he the CEO of a
company with the attendant stakeholders that CEOs are answerable to, he would no doubt be a
very good one.
In other words, The Economist and TiE argue for a type of vanguard economic
restructuring that is reminiscent of totalitarian communism in the means of its implementation!
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This does not mean, however, that Naidu has not resorted to implementing some draconian labor
measures himself. The software industry, for instance, is exempted from the provisions of a series
of Acts such as the Factories Act, the Minimum Wages Act and the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and is further permitted to run a three-shift operation.
The fundamental contradiction that runs through The Economist's survey, of course, is
the fundamental contradiction of Thatcherism, that dismantling the state requires a huge amount
of state action, that is extremely evident when one looks at Naidu's strategies of governance. I
explore this point in greater detail as I talk at greater length about Naidu, and biotech in Andhra
Pradesh.
To talk about Naidu, one needs to start by talking about the political party that he heads,
the Telugu Desam. This is amongst the younger, and yet more powerful, of what are known as
"regional parties", parties that draw their political affiliation from a particular region (usually a
single state) in India. So on the one hand, these are parties whose ideologies and identities are
intensely shaped by a sense of locality, in opposition to the centralizing tendencies of the Indian
state that are most acutely upheld by the Congress party, which has ruled India for 44 of its 55
years of independence. On the other hand, these are parties that have become increasingly central
to national governance, as the erosion of the Congress's pan-national hegemony has seen the
emergence of coalition governments at the center, an emergence that is likely to persist as the
norm rather than the exception in the coming years of India's parliamentary democracy.203 What
is interesting for me here is how in many ways a regional party such as the Telugu Desam is
increasingly enrolling itself as a transnational facilitator of capital flows into India, as the
upholder of the "Telugu nation" turns out to be the most aggressive and sophisticated political
player in the game of globalization. At one level, of course, it isn't such a surprise that a political
376
party that depends on an ideology that is opposed to the centralizing tendency of the state should
find natural allies in entrepreneurs who are themselves opposed to such centralization. Political
decentralization and market decentralization seem to find common cause in movements such as
Naidu's Telugu Desam.
Speed, information and selling are the key modes of governmentality for Naidu: "[A]n
Indian chief minister in today's global economy has to be a salesman. If he rests on his pride
nothing will be achieved. He also has to be like a chief executive who makes things happen.
Speed is of the essence" (Naidu 2000: 9). And further: "The only course at that point was to go
out and market the state. That is what I set out to do. By going to every investors' forum,
domestic or foreign, making Power Point presentations on what Andhra Pradesh has to offer"
(134). Naidu has learnt much from management pedagogy, as any good chief executive should.
He says: "politicians must be acquainted with the managerial wisdom of Peter Drucker and Jack
Welch" (21). He is trying to turn governance, as the TiE people are, into an expert regime. It is an
expert regime, further, that is founded on mimesis. Therefore, in the time that I was in
Hyderabad, a weaver committed suicide under the burden of debt, and Naidu's response was that
there was a need to send psychiatrists out to the weavers. He thereby shows how things like
psychiatry, like and as a part of Western (especially American) management pedagogy, can be
exported in ways that have consequences, and erase a necessary attentiveness of the part of those
in power to the historical material causes and consequences of crises among their constituents.
This is a governmmentality, however, not of the nation-state but of the state-state: the
entity that Naidu seeks to manage is, quite explicitly, Andhra Pradesh, which after all is the
region that the Telugu Desam in its very inception claimed most directly to represent. Further,
Naidu constantly emphasizes the competition between states, for rapid economic growth and
attraction of foreign investment, as if each state was a corporate entity.
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203 A political reality that the Congress continues to wilfully turn a blind eye to.
But even the notion of Andhra Pradesh as a single state is a problematic one. There is an
increasingly strong movement for statehood for Telengana, which comprises the mostly interior
parts of Andhra Pradesh. This is a movement that has existed since India's independence, with
Andhra Pradesh, as a state, being the legislative conglomeration of three regions, Andhra, parts of
Madras state, and Telengana. It is a movement that has gained force recently because of the
continued deprivation of Telengana, and also because statehood has been given to four other
regions in India that have fought for statehood for many years. This is worrying to Naidu because
Telengana provides most of the minerals and raw materials that go into sustaining Hyderabad,
and the relationship between the center and the periphery of this state has very much been one of
pretty straightforward expropriation, with very little development being chanelled back to
Telengana. Indeed, Telengana has been the site for many farmer suicides over the last decade, as
a direct consequence of World Bank structural adjustment policies that ensured that most of
former Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao's populist measures were revoked.
Less disastrous proofs of World Bank intervention are seen in Hyderabad, which is now
dotted with many flyovers and impeccable roads that have all come out of World Bank loans, and
that are keeping the middle class happy. The problem with Naidu as far as Telengana is
concerned is that Hyderabad itself is a part of Telengana, though now 80% of its population is
migrant, largely Andhraite. This means that the resolution of the Telengana dispute - and there
are many "global" factors having to do with ease of management that are likely to lead to an
autonomous Telengana state sooner or later - is going to have direct repurcussions for Hyderabad
itself. Therefore on the one hand, Naidu's own managerial principles would push for statehood
for Telengana; on the other, what would then be at stake would be the control of the city that he
has most developed through those principles. The Telengana issue is central to a thick
understanding of Andhra Pradesh, Naidu, governmentality, globalization and India Inc.
378
Naidu has, as mentioned earlier, already effected a number of reversals of the founding
Telugu Desam ideology. While it received its discursive identity from the notion of a federally
strong Telugu statehood decentered from the Congress tendency to concentrate power in Delhi, it
received its popularity from the populist measures of its founder and former Chief Minister N.T.
Rama Rao (NTR), who was Naidu's father-in-law. Central to NTR's policy was providing cheap
rice and huge agricultural subsidies, and imposing prohibition, which had been the demand of
many women in urban and rural Andhra Pradesh. Naidu has brutally reversed all of these, at the
altar of fiscal management, structural adjustment and pragmatism. And yet, central to his art of
politics is his ability to project these brutal reversals, firstly, as policies that are not imposed by an
anti-populist state, and secondly, as policies that represent the continuation of NTR's legacy
while they reverse it.
Vision, then, is fundamental to Naidu's mode of governance: it allows him to project
attractive futures to investors and his electorate alike, to set milestones for himself and his
government to execute on, and it is precisely the mechanism that allows a silent reversal of
NTR's legacy, because it implies, rhetorically, a legacy in itself, that Naidu artfully takes credit
for, but always as an inheritor of a mantle, in a state where NTR's populism makes his legacy an
extremely useful one for electoral purposes. Naidu posits vision in explicit opposition to
planning, which has always been undertaken by the Indian state on Soviet lines, in terms of five-
year plans. "For a vision", says Naidu, "a reasonable time-span is 20 years" (Naidu 2000: 12). In
other words, in Gramscian terms, vision, for Naidu, is strategic, while speed is tactical: vision is
the distant promissory horizon to set for oneself, while speed is the means by which to narrow
that distance as energetically as possible. (The irony here is that Naidu himself can only be
elected as chief minister for five-year terms).
There are direct links - of ideology, capital and locality - between Naidu and the Silicon
Valley entrepreneurial community. One of the more perverse mimetic borrowings has been that
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of the ideology of venture capital. Naidu has seen that venture capital was the engine that has
fuelled entrepreneurialism in Silicon Valley. Ergo, he believes that Andhra Pradesh should have
lots of venture capitalism. The state, therefore, has itself decided to provide venture capital, by
setting up a fund to which the contributors are The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development
Corporation Ltd., the Small Industries Development Bank of India and the AP Industrial and
Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (see Naidu 2000: 139). In other words, Naidu has set up a system
of public investment as "venture capital" funds! This is a completely anachronistic conception of
venture capital, which by definition, comes out of huge private investment funds that expect an
extremely high return on investment. Naidu's "venture capitalism" is, effectively, a euphemism
for government subsidy for high-tech industry.04 The fostering of an "entrepreneurial culture" in
this way ultimately involves the removal of subsidies from one sector, agriculture,205 and the
concomitant provision of subsidies to another, high-tech - but primarily high-tech services rather
than high-tech innovation - where the services themselves are invariably performed for Western
corporations and exported.
Further, high technoscience doesn't occur in a vacuum on space shuttles. One of the most
critical points to be made when discussing the interventionist role of states such as Naidu's - and
might we call it an "intervention of no intervention", when premised on the ideology of minimal
state intervention, an ideology, that in order to be upheld, requires massive state intervention? - is
that things like information technology, biotechnology (together referred to in India quite
commonly as IT-BT) and tourism, which are all central to Naidu's strategy for attracting foreign
investment into Andhra Pradesh, all have land as critical to their operation. This land can only be
204 This is not to say that there isn't a growing venture capital industry in India. The amount of VC
investment in India increased from $3 million in 1995 to $342 million in 2000 (figures from United Nations
Development Program 2001: 38).
205 This has been the central dronal mantra of World Bank-IMF structural adjustment policies all over the
world.
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taken away from agriculture, and from peasants.2 6 Let me explore this further by talking about
one such state initiative to enable biotech "innovation" (I shall argue that that in itself is an
inappropriate word and an unstable category in this context) in the Hyderabad area.
This is the setting up of what is known as the ICICI knowledge park, which consi"s of a
set of infrastructure facilities developed by the state government in collaboration with the private
venture capital and financial services company ICICI. It consists of a set of laboratories that can
be leased out to companies who want to set up research facilities. The rationale for this, according
to Naidu, is that "a lot of multinationals are interested in doing research in India because of the
availability of high quality scientific manpower" (Naidu 2000: 147). This is a rationale, again,
that is at complete odds with a rationale of doing innovative technoscience and basic research by
local scientists. The knowledge park, indeed, is modeled on a similar software park set up near
Bangalore. The Bangalore park, however, has been "successful", to the extent that it has managed
to recuperate maintenance costs, because most of the office space has been bought by General
Electric. Similarly, the best route for the ICICI knowledge park to be successful would be if a
multinational pharmaceutical company such as Pfizer buys all the lab space. In other words, the
structure of something like the ICICI knowledge park is best suited, from the perspective of the
state's own investment in it, not to encourage basic, cutting-edge science locally, but to
encourage the setting up of research facilities by big multi-nationals to do research at a fraction of
the cost that it would take to do similar research in the West - research, of course, that will use
state-subsidized infrastructure, but that will quite probably translate into scientific and
commercial advances that get re-exported back to Western markets.
The ICICI knowledge park (referred to by the managers as simply The Park) is a good
40 kilometers outside Hyderabad. This part of the state, just north of Hyderabad, borders Medak
206 According to 1991 census data, the rural population of Andhra Pradesh comprises 73% of the state's
total population; there are 195.16 lakh (I lakh = 100,000) agricultural workers as opposed to 104.48 lakh
non-agricultural workers (a ratio of nearly 2: 1, with the latter category including marginal workers).
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district, which is amongst the less developed in India. It is also not far from the epicenter of
operation of the People's War Group (PWG), a far-left revolutionary movement that has
continued a violent struggle for land reform in northern Andhra Pradesh for close to 40 years.
The Park is clearly conceived as a kind of idyllic research environment. All the labs are
extremely open, and a lot of the space has been given over to terraces that look out over fields,
fountains and ponds, with a number of ducks thrown in for good measure. Indeed, this is an
aesthetic that ICICI is very consciously trying to cultivate, as was evident from my hostess's
constant and anxious questions to me throughout my visit as to whether everything looked scenic
enough. It certainly did.
ICICI's job isn't to do science. Rather, it is to act as an estate agent, and provide the
enabling conditions for companies to get together and do work in a workspace where a number of
labs are in close proximity to one another, thereby presumably encouraging collaboration. ICICI's
job is to ensure that everything these companies want is taken care of. While the job of ensuring
smooth execution is ICICI's, the land has been made available by the Andhra Pradesh
government (this area being very much a part of Genome Valley). The Park has its oewn sub-
station providing the labs with electricity, and it has created its own catchment area to hold rain
water, thereby taking care of the two big worries that plague any wet lab researcher in India.
Also, The Park is not meant for companies with manufacturing facilities, as manufacturing may
lead to pollution. The state government has declared a 25 kilometer zone around The Park as a no
pollution zone.
The built-up area when I visited in summer 2001 had space for 10 labs, and there were
plans to build more buildings in the future. One of the central features of The Park is a customs
shed. One of the major problems that Indian researchers have is the absence of a standardized
import policy for research materials, which means that quite often valuable and perishable
materials languish in the customs sheds in Bombay without ever reaching their intended recipient.
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ICICI however has ensured that any research materials coming to the companies housed in The
Park will be delivered straight to The Park, where the customs officials will come the next day
and clear the material. Another enabling feature that's "provided" by ICICI but is actually
enabled by the government.
Parks like these raise a number of questions, and in India the immediate one is whether
such ventures are huge steps towards becoming such things as a "developed country" or a "global
player", or whether they are simply white elephants. The answer, as mentioned earlier, may well
depend upon whether a big multi-national rents a significant amount of space in The Park, which
means, of course, that while the stated rationale of such parks is to enable start-ups and local
innovation, the route to success (or to an avoidance of a completely wasted enterprise) to to try
and lure a big multi-national in with enticements of an enabling environment combined with
cheap labor.
The second question has to do with start-ups themselves. If space in The Park isn't leased
by big multi-national companies, then the hope is that it will be leased by small start-up
companies hoping to start a biotech business. Indian industry has never been geared to take risks,
as it has grown up in a largely protectionist environment. The brief IT boom and the desire of
people at TiE notwithstanding, India is a long way off from having what might be called a "start-
up" culture, certainly not in biotech (except for the odd notable exception). ICICI believes that
providing the enabling infrastructure for starting up companies will change this, but an adequate
material environment alone does little for entrepreneurship unless it articulates in creative ways
with both long-term capital sources and with a certain sort of ideology of risk-taking that is
central to an entrepreneurial culture taking root.207 Another problem that industry has to tackle is
the question of how to leverage academe as an incubator (something that Rekhi and the people at
207 The role of pedagogy of course is central here, which is why initiatives of Naidu's such as setting up the
Indian Business School, modeled on the lines of American schools such as Wharton, become an integral
component of such emergent stratified assemblages.
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TiE are acutely aware of, but the managers of The Park and the state government apparently less
so). It is particularly ironic that a "start-up space" is being envisaged 40 kilometers outside
Hyderabad, when the city itself has some of the top academic life science research institutions in
the country, such as the Centre for Cell and Molecular Biology (CCMB). Indeed, Shanta Biotech,
perhaps India's one well-known wet lab biotech company, that has managed to develop an
indigenous hepatitis B vaccine, did so while it incubated at CCMB.
The third point of interest is the involvement of Silicon Valley NRI entrepreneurs.
Indeed, leading members of EPPIC have taken a very active interest in The Park. For instance,
EPPIC Global (headquartered in Silicon Valley) has started an Andhra Pradesh chapter, with
which it has entered into an agreement to promote The Park in the West. Of course, as I said
earlier, one of the things that is most marked among NRI entrepreneurs is the general contempt
they have for the state, making it particularly ironic that it is the activist Andhra Pradesh
government that has ultimately made The Park possible.
The biggest question however comes back to center on the role of the state government.
The irony of reservoirs of water being created and used for high-tech "global" research in what is
not a water-rich region is obvious enough. The bigger question is one of land, of the gifting of
agricultural land by the government free of charge for The Park. The only way to so nonchalantly
divesc people of their land is to somehow pretend they don't exist - a discursive erasure that has
,iaterial consequences, as the spate of farmers' suicides in Andhra Pradesh over the last decade
Jdfies to. These old and tenacious manifestations of capitalism have to be taken especially
seriously in Andhra Pradesh, with the fact of revolutionary peasant movements being so
completely inscribed in the state's history and present. That these gifts of land by the government
to private companies with NRI backing are not gleefully received in all quarters I think needs to
be taken as a given.
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What makes it so easy to conceive of land such as that which The Park is built on as
somehow "ideal" for the setting up of high-tech enterprises is a conception of these areas as
simply the extension of Hyderabad city - an extension of the city into its surrounding agricultural
environs that is particularly marked in Bangalore, which also has similar high-tech areas coming
up on the periphery of the city, and Delhi, which has many industrial "satellite" cities, and an
increased number of upper class residential colonies, coming up on its outskirts. The Park is itself
located close to Turkapalli village, which is officially a part of Rangareddy district. It is,
however, close to Medak district, and is roughly half-way in between Hyderabad and Medak, the
district headquarters of Medak district. A few figures from the 1991 Andhra Pradesh census
indicate what a stark difference there is between urban Hyderabad and its surrounding rural
districts that are being made into an extension of urban Hyderabad.
Hyderabad has a literacy rate of 71%, compared to 49% for Rangareddy district and 32%
for Medak district. In a 217 square kilometer area, Hyderabad has 177 hospitals and 1062 high
schools. In a nearly 7500 square kilometer area, Rangareddy district has only 45 hospitals and
1032 high schools. In a nearly 10,000 square kilometer area, Medak district has 49 hospitals and
1363 high schools. 208 21% of the population of Rangareddy district are cultivators and
agricultural laborers, as is 35% of the population of Medak district (compared to 1.4% of the
population of Hyderabad). In other words, there are stark difference in levels of development
208 All of these figures are obtained from the 1991 Andhra Pradesh census, available at
www.andhrapradesh.com, and also from Andhra Pradesh Government 1997. If these figures are adjusted
for the relative population densities of Hyderabad city and the adjoining rural districts, the disparities are
not quite as stark, and amount to a hospital ratio, for instance, of roughly 4:1 between the city and the rural
districts. Two things, however, problematize such an easy calculation. The first is that the utility of
hospitals is not simply related to the lumber of people that they serve, but also to their ease of access. It is
not sufficient to say that hospitals serving a less dense population area can thereby be concomitantly fewer
than one serving a denser population area, because in the former case the question of how sick patients in
parts of the rural countryside far away from hospitals access them becomes a central question for
development. Further, there is the question of the qualitative difference in hospitals and medical facilities in
Hyderabad compared to its surrounding districts, vital comparative parameters that census figures cannot
indicate. Indeed, hospitals in Hyderabad are seen by Naidu as an integral component of the state's tourism
strategy, as he hopes to set up a number of "five-star" hospitals in the city that can cater to rich patients
from various parts of the country (and perhaps also from other countries). He explicitly refers to the setting
up of hospitals as a form of "health tourism".
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between the city and the countryside, that are presumably to be bridged by some inchoate notion
of wealth trickling down. In many ways, the networks between Hyderabad and Silicon Valley are
stronger than those between Hyderabad and Medak. That many of the industries that get set up in
the area around The Park are likely to be servicing Western markets and at best a class-limited
sector of local economies is another factor that needs to be re-emphasized.
Having said all of this, I do not wish to attribute to either Naidu or TiE or ICICI any
cynical motives: the objective, as the former two have constantly reiterated, is development, and
the uplift of what gets unproblematica!ly referred to as "the poor" in India.209 It is important to
take these intentions seriously. It is also important to take seriously the claims that technoscience
can be a vehicle for such development, investigate those claims seriously and then identify what
(if any) logical lacunae, theoretical contradictions and strategic inconsistencies might exist in the
way such claims are envisioned as business practice or policy initiative when these visionings
naturally frame India as "India Inc." What the Andhra Pradesh government is definitely doing is
decentering simple notions of East-West / North-South / rich-poor / developing-developed. The
problem with visions such as Naidu's is their belief in technology as in itself capable of fixing
social problems. 2? 0
As a means, therefore, of taking claims such as Naidu's seriously, I analyze a document
that comes from the heart of the global development establishment, the United Nation's
Development Program (UNDP)'s 2001 Human Development Report (henceforth HDR). The
209 Having said this, the state of Madhya Pradesh, one of the poorest states in India, also has a
technologically savvy Chief Minister in Digvijay Singlh, but has been a leader amongst Indian states in
making human development an explicit part of policy discourse. Naidu, in spite of constantly mouthing the
mantra of development, has not even commissioned a human development report, something which has
already been commissioned by seven other states than Madhya Pradesh. Meanwhile, there is certainly no
shortage of reports relating to technological or market development coming out of the Andhra Pradesh
government.
The question of whether technology drives history, in the manner that Naidu apparently believes it does,
is explicitly treated in M.R. Smith and L. Marx (1994). See especially the articles by Merritt Roe Smith on
the history of technological determinism in American culture (1-36), Bruce Bimber ("Three Faces of
Technological Determinism": 79-100) and Peter Perdue on technological determinism in agrarian societies
(169-200).
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question that HDR poses that is different from that posed at any point by, for instance, The
Economist survey, is how technology can become not just a tool of economic growth, but one for
empowerment. The success of information technology in India, for instance, would in such a
framing shift from being measured by the number of call centers for American Express that exist
in Bangalore to the success of developments towards local language computing (which, to be fair,
Naidu has placed a fair emphasis on), as Kenneth Keniston constantly emphasizes (Keniston
forthcoming). In other words, new technologies can serve as new sources of exclusion and social
stratification if their benefits are merely left to "trickle down" with the assumption that such
trickling is some kind of natural phenomenon (or one guided by the market's invisible hand).
Technologies, quite evidently, can contribute to exacerbating divides more easily than they can to
bridging them, especially when delivered through market mechanisms that do not place a
premium on equitable distribution. The challenge of making technoscience a source of progress is
one that demands strategic capital repatriation and policy making. Therefore, HDR emphasizes
how "development" through technology cannot be successful if it is simply implemented through
a top-down approach without concomitant infrastructure creation on the ground to enable local
innovatory capabilities.2"
India's most dramatic example of a "technological fix" has undoubtedly been its Green
Revolution of the 1960s and 70s, which has certainly been a "success" by many parameters, such
as leading to decreased under-nutrition and, in large measure, to the eradication of famine. Yet,
firstly, as Amartya Sen (1981, 1999) shows, food security is intimately linked to democratization
and political mechanisms of popular empowerment, not simply to technological fixes. Secondly,
the Green Revolution has hardly solved the problems of equitable and timely access to food by
211 HDR explicitly uses the term "technology" through its report. When I use that term in this section, I
mean it to refer to technology in the more fluid and decentered STS parlance, as tcchnoscience. This is
especially because I go on to compare the largely technologically determinist vision of Naidu with those of
"basic" scientists such as S.K. Brahmachari at CBT, who also see technoscientific advances as routes to
national progress and human development, and who model their strategies quite explicitly on such beliefs.
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large sections of the Indian population, as India in the last few years has produced surpluses of
grain that are rotting in godowns.
As Kenistcil argues, however, information technology in particular has the potential to
increase popular participation in decision making, especially if barriers to local language
computing are lowered. This indeed is explicitly acknowledged by Naidu's government, which
has almost any public document easily accessible online, with Naidu himself accessible to lay
people by e-mail through his electronic management division. The contradictory pictures
provided by India in information technology are particularly stark: on the one hand, India's IT
industry has been a significant and growing revenue earner, regardless of the nature of services
performed, with $4 billion in revenues in 1999;212 on the other, only 0.4% of South Asians are
internet users. Further, 1.3 million of the 1.4 million intemet connections in India are
concentrated in the cities of Delhi and Bombay, and the states of Karnataka, Maharashtra (the
state that Bombay is the capital of) and Tamilnadu (HDR Feature 2.3: 40; no Andhra Pradesh or
Hyderabad in this list). And India is not even one of the 30 leading exporters of high-tech
products: in spite of its software exports, high-tech exports still constitute less than 5% of India's
total exports.
It is an oft remarked fact that these high technoscientific achievements have to be set in
the context of what are some of the lowest human resource indices in the world. In almost all
human resource indices, HDR shows that South Asia (which, of course, also includes Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Nepal, which are significantly less developed than India, and Sri Lanka, which
has been fighting a civil war for nearly two decades) lags behind Latin America, with adult
literacy rates lower than those of sub-Saharan Africa (see HDR Feature 1.2: 12), and GDP per
capita income only marginally higher than sub-Saharan Africa's. Further, adult literacy is marked
212 Most of this revenue comes from Western companies outsourcing their software requirements to India.
Indeed, only 0.6% of South Asia's GDP is invested in R & D (HDR: 39)
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by huge disparities between male and female literacy (the former being approximately 15%
higher than the latter).
Countering these are figures that show that inequality in India has been falling (HDR
Figure 1.7: 18). HDR also shows India as being on track to halving the number of people living in
extreme poverty by 2015. The question that then needs to be asked is how technological growth
hubs such as Bangalore and Hyderabad interact with the overall situation of national
development, and also, simultaneously, with "global" hubs such as Silicon Valley. Bangalore,
indeed, was rated by Wired magazine as the world's 11 largest technology hub,2 '3 begging the
question of what such a rating means in the context of national development. It seems possible to
suggest, from these disparities, that the nation as the territorial unit on the basis of which progress
is measured is being decentered (in spite of Bangalore being recognized thus, India ranks only
63rd in HDR's technology achievement index [TAI]). Certainly Naidu's politics, as mentioned
earlier, are all about marketing the state of Andhra Pradesh. Nationalism needs to be understood
in this context, of, as mentioned earlier, increased state-state competition for investment as if each
was a market entity, and of the fact that Naidu's state level development projects are always
already layered upon the fact that the Telugu Desam is the second largest constituent (after the
BJP) of the ruling coalition at the center. Politics that emphasize the development of cities, in the
name of enhancing the competitiveness of states with respect to one another, by state political
parties that are significant constituents of ruling national coalitions, beg for new theorizations of
democratic governmentality. These must be attentive to the stratifications among different levels
of government, stratifications that call into question a simple assumption of state as subset of
nation, but that rather point to the different assemblages that get constituted by each level of
213 The parameters that Wired used to evaluate these hubs were: the abilities of area universities and
research facilities to train skilled workers and develop new technologies; the presence of established
domestic and multi-national companies to provide expertise and economic stability; the population's
entrepreneurial drive, and the availability of venture capital. In this rating, Bangalore scored higher than
cities such as New York, Seattle, Los Angeles, Cambridge (UK), Tokyo, Chicago and Hong Kong. It had
the highest score amongst "developing country" cities along with Taipei.
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government, assemblages that might be reinforcing, might be at odds with one another, but that
are often constituted by the same actors playing different institutional and strategic roles. It is
only by understanding such differential assemblages that seemingly contradictory actions can
begin to be made sense of -- such as, for instance, Naidu being a part of a coalition government
led by a Hindu nationalist party, when Muslims have always been a significant vote bank for his
party; or his refusal to take the ruling party to task for its complicity in the recent violence in
Gujarat, in spite of his professed displeasure with those events.
The notion of making any sense of figures using the Indian nation as reference is further
problematized if one analyzes the question of explaining technology hubs in the context of
national development by looking at disparities between states. In Punjab, for instance, 83.5% of
households had access to electricity in 1994, whereas that figure is 20.1% in Uttar Pradesh,
18.8% in Orissa and 15.6% in West Bengal. 47 per 1000 people had telephones in Punjab in
1999, compared to 10 in Uttar Pradesh, 9 in Orissa and 16 in West Bengal. 8.21 per 1000 people
had internet connections in 1999 in Maharashtra, while 0.12 per 1000 did in Uttar Pradesh and
Orissa. (There were fewer people in Punjab - 1.24 per 1000 - with internet connections, a
reflection of the fact that much of Punjab's prosperity has come from agriculture rather than
services or high-tech commercial activities; Maharashtra's prosperity comes from a combination
of cash-crop agriculture in the rural areas, and its capital, Bombay, India's commercial nerve
center). In literacy, meanwhile, Kerala is way ahead of other Indian states, with 83% gross
attendance ratio in secondary education in 1996, compared to 43% in Uttar Pradesh, and 44% in
another bastion of communist party rule (like Kerala), West Bengal (all figures from HDR
Feature 2.3: 41). These figures suggest, quite evidently, the extent to which development in India
is uneven, an unevenness that can with some level of accuracy be reflected in state-wise analyses;
but also that it is impossible to discern any sort of simple causal pattern that links development to
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either technology, or agriculture, or certain sorts of ideology, without being attentive to the
historical, geographical and socio-political contexts within which different states develop.
As I had mentioned earlier while critiquing some of The Economist's state-wise
diagnoses, it is relatively banal to talk of states like Maharashtra and Gujarat as high-growth
states because of liberalization, when one equally has counter-examples like Kerala that have
high human resource indices in spite of not liberalizing aggressively, and states like Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh that are still relatively poor in spite of having hubs such as Bangalore and
Hyderabad. It is equally reductionist to counter such rhetoric with a simple attribution of state
investment as leading to human development by citing Kerala, which in spite of its high human
resource indices has not attracted the sort of growth or technological infrastructure that some of
its neighboring states have, and especially since West Bengal, which like Kerala has been ruled
by democratically elected Marxist governments for a number of years (in fact, uninterruptedly
since 1977, making Bengal's the longest continuously serving state government in the history of
India), has much poorer human resource indices. Further apparent contradictions abound simply
from a perusal of such statistics, such as, indeed, the longevity of Bengal's Marxist government,
compared to the relatively tenuous position of Naidu's (by all accounts, he is predicted to lose his
attempt at re-election for a third term in 2004) in spite of the former's poor development record,
which has been offset by the fact that the Marxists in Bengal have pushed along some of the most
aggressive land reform measures in the history of independent India, making them extremely
popular in rural Bengal. Quite simply, innovation and growth do not translate in any simple
measure into democratic popularity (which is why, of course, calls for aggressive market reform
have necessarily to be anti-democratic at some level), but neither does democratic popularity
translate in any simple way into high-technology investment or innovation.
Therefore, it is quite difficult to come to generalized conclusions about the "correctness"
or "incorrectness" of a certain form of envisioning India by a set of actors with related
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perspectives, such as TiE and Naidu (though their situated perspectives - the contexts from which
their respective perspectives emanate - are, as I've tried to explain, quite different from one
another). Indeed, making such a straightforward diagnosis would run counter to the very sorts of
deconstructive attention that I have been arguing for throughout this dissertation. This does not,
however, mean that one has to lapse into a complicated relativism that argues for "nuance" while
simply refusing to stake out an opinion on what are, after all, questions of development,
technology and democracy that have significant consequences for people depending on how their
interrelated politics get played out.
As mentioned earlier, India's contradiction is not just the low human resource indices it
has alongside technological hubs like Bangalore and Hyderabad, but the fact that its HDR
technology achievement index (TAI) is equally unimpressive. What the TAI shows most
powerfully is the problem of technology diffusion. Just as high foodgrain productivity without
adequate distributive mechanisms nullifies the effects of technological revolutions such as the
Green Revolution, so too does high productivity / growth of technology without its diffusion
hinder "revolutions" such as India's purported IT-BT revolution from actually empowering
people. What results from a mode of envisioning India as India Inc. - which is a mode of
envisioning India solely as an engine of production to generate revenues that are an end in itself-
is that a few very productive and increasingly powerful nodes, such as Bangalore and Hyderabad,
get created, but that doesn't translate into development for the rest of the country - let alone for
other "backward" states, even for those rural districts that abut such powerful nodes. This is what
anti-globalization activists point to, perhaps in a reductionist manner but certainly with a good
deal of diagnostic accuracy, as the "failure" of globalization, or its function to increase disparity
(see for instance Bircham 2001).
Indeed, even China, that The Economist and Rekhi alike want India Inc. to model itself
on, has a similarly dismal TAI, suggesting that the envisioned India Inc. is not one where the
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diffusion of technological capabilities is a part of the program. What is envisioned, rather, are
local concentrations of technoscientific power through "globalization" - for after all, Silicon
Valley is precisely such a local concentration of technoscientific power, and even in the US,
technological diffusion hasn't been accorded the highest priority, as is evidenced from the relative
neglect of rural areas in much of the American mid-west. These intensely networked, almost
anachronistically local, pockets then stand in for "the globe", as long as their productivity is
vibrant enough to generate statistics that suggest "progress".
This, then, is a certain envisioning, that is mired in good intentions, and what are
definitely certain (by no means invariant) forms of what might be called nationalism - forms that
in the process decenter the nation as the natural unit whose "development" is at stake. One would
imagine, however, that such decenterings would be much harder to effect if one was in fact an
agency of the central government, whose mandate is in fact national. Therefore, I talk in the next
section about the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and two of its constituent
laboratories, the Centre for Biochemical Technology (CBT) and the National Chemical
Laboratories (NCL), as precisely such national public actors, who are also extremely invested in
adopting market ideologies and becoming "globally competitive". How does such a "global"
vision articulate itself in relation to one espoused by Naidu or TiE?
Getting an appointment with Chandrababu Naidu had been quite a revelation, because all I had to
do was to e-mail him out of the blue. His office has an electronic cell, which forwarded my message to his
joint secretary, who told me that he would try and slot me in to meet Naidu, and sure enough he did once I
got into Hyderabad. Of course, this sort of thing is quite unheard of in Indian politics, but Naidu has a
reputation of responding to peoples' e-mails, especially if they are from outside Hyderabad, but even more
so if they are from outside the US, and / or have anything to do with science and technology.
Much of the "meeting" was, not surprisingly, waiting, but that too was quite an interesting
experience. It seems Naidu meets with people every evening, and there are two separate rooms outside his
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office where people wait: one for the "common man" and the other for "VIPs": I had been classified in the
latter category. It reminded me of the Mughal emperors court, with the separate Diwan-e-am and Diwan-e-
khas for public and special audiences respectively. My Diwan-e-khas companions were the sorts of people
whom I expected to see. One was a prosperous looking NRI from Washington DC who works for Sylvan
Learning Centers. The second was an even more prosperous looking NRI from Denver, who was
chaperoning an elderly, clearly "local", gentleman who was rehearsing his presentation to the Chief Minister
from a bright pink folder called "Tirumala: Vision 2020". Tirumala is the site of the Tirupati temple, arguably
the most sacred pilgrimage spot for South Indian Hindus. If, as I argued in Section 7.1, visions are religious,
then clearly religions and religious institutions have to be visionary too. No doubt the Prosperous Denver
Man was a major devotee and donor, and had used his NRI offices to get an audience with the Chief
Minister.
Not surprisingly, I only got a couple of minutes with Naidu, and not surprisingly, he didn't say very
much. At many levels, his giving me and appointment was mainly a managerial acknowledgement that he
had registered my existence and the existence of my interests in his biotech policy. At some level, that's all I
could and did expect.
In Chapter 5, I talked about CSIR labs such as CBT and NCL. The Director of NCL, S.
Sivaram, as I described in Chapter 5, is one such national public actor who is explicitly looking to
move his institution beyond a contract research mode into a mode of what he calls
"entrepreneurial" research. In other words, Sivaram is acutely aware of the fact that going
"global" is not simply measurable in quantitative terms by the amount of foreign direct
investment, or the amount of current revenues, but has to be measured by the amount of
intellectual property that can be locally acquired, and the amount of revenue that can be sustained
and grown over a period of time in a manner that isn't completely dependent on economic or
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strategic changes in other countries or companies. In other words, I have already argued how, on
the one hand, opposing "global" to "local" is not very useful when a certain predominant form of
globalization in Indian technoscientific worlds occurs precisely through the creation of networked
localities. On the other hand, the simple opposition of "global" to "national", made by proponents
and opponents of globalization alike, is not a very useful binary through which to understand the
strategic mechanisms by which global playing fields get enlvisioned as being in national interests.
Naidu in particular too quickly equates "successful" globalization with increased foreign
investment alone. TiE as well has similar tendencies, but adopts more contradictory positions: on
the one hand, for instance, Rekhi's setting up of China as a certain model to emulate does suggest
that his immediate interest is in revenue flow into India rather than the generation of local
entrepreneurship. On the other hand, he is also involved in setting up entrepreneurial incubators
in places like IIT Bombay, that are much more clearly modeled on American entrepreneurial
ideals.
The real issue in teasing these strategies out, I argue, lies in getting at the way vision
works in these different cases, in spite of their similar enunciations. Ironically, Rekhi and Naidu,
by placing an accent on immediate revenue generation in order to generate future growth, are in
fact inverting the rationale on which the biotechnology industry and Silicon Valley dot com boom
worked, which, as argued in Chapter 6, depended upon the conjuration of futures in order to
create the presents that enabled those futures to be realized (albeit in contingent and unpredictable
ways). While there is such an element of conjuration in Naidu's designation of Genome Valley,
for instance, it does not extend to the types of technoscientific endeavors that are ultimately
supported by such actors - endeavors, such as contract work, that are all about assured short-term
revenue, with long-term revenue therefore completely dependent on the contracting party and its
economic and strategic constraints and contingencies.
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Sivaram, on the other hand, espouses a mode of envisioning that is much more closely
akin to that of the US biotech industry, which suggests that the way to do entrepreneurial science
is to set far-fetched (but realizable) technoscientific goals, and then provide whatever incentives
are necessary to realize them. This in principle is not different from Naidu's strategy of
generating "20 year visions" as opposed to 5-year plans. The question then becomes one of
explaining the way apparently similar structures of envisioning manifest themselves in
contradictory and heterogenous ways on the ground, and also of staying attentive to the ways in
which the institutional spaces from which such structures of envisioning emanate influence these
contingent manifestations of visionary articulation.
When I asked Sivaram to articulate his vision, his response was almost entirely tactical,
not visionary, and I reproduce it at some length:
No, I don't have a particular, unique strategy except to keep challenging people all the
time, in different disciplines, asking what we can do.... And much of this is dependent on
human beings, individuals, well, willing to apply their mind. That's it. I asked someone
one day why we can't make optical fibers from polycarbonate. I asked him, you know,
GE is a manufacturer of polycarbonate. If I can open up a market like optical fibers, for
polycarbonates, that's a huge market. Each one of us in some domain in which we are
experts can surely come up with one of these "what if' scenarios. I think we need to
focus more on "what if' type of scenarios.
Probably one thing you want to know is what is our strategy to institutionalize such
things - like is it going to be individual driven or what?
See, I'll tell you what. As a publicly funded external R & D organization, we are not
targeted. Knowledge generation requires a combination of business acumen and
knowledge coming in partnership. Otherwise knowledge stays isolated, it doesn't find its
logical end-point. So you need a combination of some amount of business acumen plus
knowledge generation abilities. One of the problems which we have is that not many
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people have that strong business acumen, because they have come from universities and
they have just started research here. So I think that's a weakness we have. What I
basically do i pose questions in a broad way, and I think people should come up with
answers. I don't think there is a single method by which you can, there is no linear
method by which you can approach this problem. I haven't seen a linear method in
companies, it is an extremely tortuous method. And if success comes it is later on
converted into a linear article in Harvard Business Review.... Look up discoveries like
the discovery of nylon by Carruthers and Dupont. Do you think the process was linear?
Absolutely not. The idea was shot down for seven years by managers who thought it was
a useless idea, until one manager kept it going....
I think all you can do is make sure that you have people who are open-minded, and keep
their ears and eyes open. It's easy to kill something early. And very difficult to persist
with an idea whose future and promise you do not know and at the same time to have the
articulation to sustain it. Especially with companies it is a big problem.
I don't know what a lab like NCL can do. We are not a company. We are not drawn by
long-term business goals. We are basically a group of scientifically minded people who
can perform experimental research. So the first thing we do is to look at the people who
have high quality minds, I mean the highest quality minds. That's the only thing I can
assure upfront. Then of course we need to let them do good work, and if something
comes up, that's where somebody has to be able to pick up, hold hands, push. And all
that depends upon the people at that point of time.
People have to understand even how to present ideas to make them attractive enough so
that someone even listens to it. Sometimes our fellows have very good ideas, but they
don't know how to say it, and it probably misses everybody's attention. So that's lacking.
Something must be done to convert scientists into entrepreneurs. How to provide them
[with the] environment for entrepreneurship, that's a big thing.2 4
214 S. Sivaram, interview with the author, June 13 2001.
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Sivaram, in many ways, completely echoes people like Naidu and Rekhi in their
diagnosis of what is lacking, and in their vision of both what needs to be sets right, and, in broad
terms, how one can go about doing so. They all agree that there isn't enough of an interaction
between academe and industry, for instance; they all agree on the absence of an "entrepreneurial
culture"; they also all agree that stifling and excessive bureaucracy and regulation contribute to
the absence of such a culture; and they very much agree on the importance of training and
pedagogy, as ways of indoctrinating people into a culture where they believe, from the get-go,
that the "logical" end-point of scientific activity ought to be commercial benefit. Indeed, Sivaram
agrees with many of Naidu's initiatives, including the help provided in setting up the ICICI
knowledge park.
The difference, however, is that Sivaram explicitly sees these as problems of hegemonic
articulation, rather than simply problems of having the right prescriptions and the right material
and ideological conditions of possibility in place. The conception of leadership that he, as
Director of an institute has, is very different from especially Rekhi's belief in the non-resident
vanguard who can "import" an entrepreneurial culture through his personal message, his role in
networking, the repatriation of capital and the establishment of modes of pedagogy in consonance
with his own ideology. Naidu, in addition, is explicitly in a position to realize the importance of
legislative changes that can enable entrepreneurialism to take root, and is in a position to effect
those changes. Sivaram merely sees these as necessary, not sufficient, for a cultural
transformation. Ultimately, what he feels is necessary is hands-on leadership and mentoring
within organizations, that do not depend on mimetic institutional structures as much as they do
with individual leadership qualities, such as open-mindedness, or a Weberian charisma.
Indeed, parallels to Sivaram's mode of thinking are clearly shown to be necessary in Paul
Rabinow's (1997) history of the development of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in the labs of
Cetus Corporation, Making PCR. Rabinow shows how the development of PCR was not just the
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work of the solitary genius inventor, Kary Mullis (who won the Nobel Prize for "his" invention),
but needed a number of enabling contributions and factors, one of the major ones being
supportive management in the form of Mullis's manager, Tom White. While Rabinow's primary
attempt is to decenter the trope of romantic inventor, he also makes another suggestion which is
relevant in the context of the vanguard envisionings of the likes of Rekhi. PCR, he indicates,
would not have been developed even in the entrepreneurial culture of a biotechnology start-up in
1 980s America simply because adequate facilities, capital and a generalized culture that
naturalized and encouraged innovation prevailed in American society. All of those had to be
translated, specifically, into the habitus of Cetus, in particular labs, in particular ways, that were
conflictual, contradictory and could by no means have happened simply by following a
pedagogical program of"entrepreneurial advancement" designed by a vanguard leadership.
This once again points to the difference between a vision and a strategy, that is
enunciated quite clearly by the Director General of the CSIR, Ramesh Mashelkar. Mashelkar,
unlike Naidu, does not stake everything on vision, and says: "But vision is not that important, the
road map to achieve that vision becomes important. And the time that we've spent in the last five
years is in creating that roadmap". 2 '5
Mashelkar, therefore, uses a notion of mindset, which he describes as follows:
I believe there are two important things. One is mind, and second is the mindset. The two
are distinctly different, many people do not recognize the difference. As far as mind, I
think our Indian mind there was never a doubt, quality of Indian mind. I mean you
wouldn't have had mathematics without zero, and zero came from the Indian mind. Our
children win Mathematics Olympiads. Although we don't win gold medals in Olympics,
we do that. That means when it comes to Olympics of mind, we are superior. The nation
has shown what we can do. It is not that alone that is important, it is the mindset, which
describes the process, that becomes important. And there is a continued battle of Indian
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mind versus Indian mindset, where Indian mind is trying to take us to 2 1St century - you
and the several others who are in the Caltechs and the Harvards and the MITs and
Cambridge and Oxford, the people who make a difference in Silicon Valley are there, etc.
So there's mind. But when it comes to mindset, there is an issue. That mindset is typified
by hesitancy, by self-doubt, by pessimism, by negativism. A mindset which does not
allow you to make a leap. So what we've tried to do in the last five years, my major
interest is that we change the mindset.216
Mashelkar's notion is uncannily similar to the Marxist notion of consciousness. Indeed,
the parallels run slightly deeper, since the conditions of possibility for a "revolution" exist both in
Marxian communist manifestoes and the CSIR's desire to transform Indian technoscience into an
entrepreneurial endeavor. In both cases, a transformation in consciousness is still needed, which
is why both Rekhi and Naidu are also attentive to the importance of pedagogy (the setting up of
entrepreneurial incubators at lIT by the former, the setting up of a Wharton-style Indian Business
School by the latter). Mashelkar feels in addition that changes in mindset comes form changes in
incentive structures within organizations such as CSIR.
Perhaps the biggest difference between the CSIR on the one hand, and TiE and Naidu on
the other, is that at the end of the day the latter do not, directly, invest in science, but in business,
in the enabling infrastructure for science, in conditions that encourage people to think of science
as a means to a commercial end. While all of these are aims shared by the CSIR, they are, as
Sivaram says, basically scientific research institutions, and any institional investment that CSIR
as a governing body makes is into the research conducted by these institutions. Ironically, it is
business that has largely not become entrepreneurial in India, except for the odd glorious
exceptions such as Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services or
215 Ramesh Mashelkar, interview with the author, July 20 2001.2 16 Ibid.
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Reliance. It can be argued, then, that paying attention to basic science is also part of a necessary
mindset change. Indeed, nearly 80% of R & D money in India is still spent by public institutions.
Therefore, again, while there are broad similarities in diagnosis between the likes of
Mashelkar and Sivaram on the one hand, and TiE and Naidu on the other, there are different
causal explanations put forward by the two. Mashelkar, in an explanation that is quite typical of
most public scientists I have talked to in India, claims that the failure to develop entrepreneurial
science is not a failure of the state (as Rekhi sees it, and even Naidu subscribes to), but a failure
of Indian industry to network with the state. He points to the fact that some of the biggest multi-
nationals in the world are willing to do business with CSIR labs such as NCL - and indeed, the
client-list for CSIR labs includes companies such as GE, DuPont, Amoco and Boeing - but that
Indian companies, by and large, are not proactive in forming academic-industrial partnerships,
attributing this once again to a question of "mindset". Indeed, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, the
Director of Dr. Reddy's Foundation, R. Rajagopal, also said that the reason the Reddys have so
aggressively pursued an R & D focussed strategy is because their founder, Anji Reddy, is a
scientist, and not a businessperson (incidentally, Anji Reddy is also a scientist fiom NCL, which
is Mashelkar's parent institution). As shown in Chapter 3 in my discussion of drug discovery and
development in the United States, academic networking has everything to do with industrial R &
D.
I have, in the last two chapters, made arguments both for the importance of vision and for
its insufficiency, on its own, in shaping the outcomes envisaged by the vision. It is indeed in the
gap between vision and its unfulfilled realization that events take place, and politics manifests
itself. I wish to now spend some time on the structure of the visionary policy document itself in
the Indian technoscientific context.
401
The one Indian scientific policy resolution to date was drafted in 1958 (Government of
India 1958, henceforth Gol). There is a salience in the word "resolution" itself, which implies an
undertaking, in opposition to vision, which, as I have argued, is a conjuration of promissory
horizons. The Indian Government is currently working on another Science Policy Resolution,
which will be the first such document made since 1958, and is therefore a really interesting
marker of the vision of post-liberalization India Inc. The context of emergence of the current
science policy document has to be seen as not simply one of economic liberalization, but also of a
ruling political ideology of Hindu cultural nationalism.
The 1958 document was drafted entirely by Nehru and the atomic physicist Homi
Bhabha, and is quite different from anything that Mashelkar is likely to come up with. The focus
of the 1958 document is on basic research, and important components of it are what might now be
deemed to be completely arcane issues, such as the importance of doing science for pleasure. For
instance, it says: "[Science] has not only radically altered man's material environment, but, what
is of still deeper significance, it has provided new tools of thought and has extended man's mental
horizon. It has thus influenced even the basic values of life, and given to civilization a new
vitality and a new dynamism" (GoI: 1).
The 1958 document, then, saw the "scientific approach" as the pre-condition for the
welfare state; it did not assume the "development of the poor" by a trickle down from industrial
development to overall human resource development. This "scientific approach", then, involved
paying attention to aspects of the dimensions, effects and affects of science that don't merit
attention anymore when science is assumed always already to exist for an application that is
always already presumed to be commercial. The first aim of the Government's science policy as
enunciated by the 1958 document therefore is to "foster, promote, and sustain, by all appropriate
means, the cultivation of science, and scientific research in all its aspects - pure, applied and
educational" (GoI: 2). Paradoxically, such a statement seems more visionary and entrepreneurial
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than an approach that stresses increased revenue as the primary aim, and that therefore ends up
pursuing contract research often more aggressively than local innovative science.
The reason for the present science policy document is political, and is because the
Minister for Science and Technology, Murli Manohar Joshi, wants to leave his historical imprint
through this document. Therefore, this will eventually be publicized as Joshi's document. But
Brahmachari wants to have a hand in drafting it, and while various committees to draft the
document have been set up, the final version is likely to emerge through a couple of people like
Mashelkar and Brahmachari sitting in a room on their own and writing it up.
Joshi himself has been very controversial, being a leading Hindu nationalist ideologue in
the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). He has been particularly so among historians with his
blatant attempts to rewrite school history books in ways that portray Indian history as a history of
Hindu glory punctuated by Muslim and Christian invasion, but he has also been so among
scientists because of his push to introduce astrology into high school curricula. Many scientists
have indeed been openly critical of him, the most vocal being Pushpa Bhargava, the founder-
director of CCMB (who, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, has been actively involved in peoples'
science movements). Current directors, however, are in much more vulnerable positions than
retired ones, and can't openly voice any criticisms of him that they might feel. As mentioned in
Chapter 5, science policy in India has always operated through tacit relationships between
politicians and scientists.
Brahmachari at no point himself exhibits an explicit cultural nationalism. His brand of
nationalism, as described in Chapter 5, comes much more from an anger at the global inequities
in the conduct of science, but it is an anger tempered with both an institutional mandate and a
personal longing to be a "global player". In his presentations, for instance, he constantly focuses
on the range of institutions needed, including the state and western companies, in order for this to
happen (see for instance Brahmachari 2001). Perhaps most importantly, from the point of view of
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vision, he positions India as what he calls a "knowledge partner", in explicit opposition to either
service provider or source of "raw" material (which in his case, often refers to genetic resources).
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CHAPTER 8: RISK AND SUBJECTIVITY
One ought not to make 'cause' and 'effect' into material things, as natural scientists do...one ought to
employ 'cause' and 'effect' only as pure concepts, that is to say as conventional fictions for purposes of
designation, mutual understanding, not explanation.
Because no one knows which venture will succeed, which number will win the lottery, a society ruled by
risk and freedom rather than by rational calculus, a society open to the future rather than planning it, can
call forth an endless stream of invention, enterprise, and art.21 8
In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss the possibilities and potential difficulties
associated with personalized medicine, which in the hype of promissory life sciences is at some
level the "ultimate" dream of genomics (implicitly replacing, therefore, the genome sequence as
its Holy Grail). I will start the first part by providing an overview of personalized medicine. I will
discuss the various sorts of knowledge that are required to make personalized medicine a reality,
alongside the technologies that are being developed to generate that knowledge, and the upstream
business models that are based on providing different types of pharmacogenomic input into drug
development. I will study a couple of examples where personalized medicine has already been
developed for particular diseases. I will then discuss how personalized medicine is likely to effect
downstream drug development. The idea in this part of the chapter is to accentuate the differences
I have highlighted so far in this thesis between upstream and downstream terrains of drug
development, by trying to provide situated perspectives on an emergent form of life that is likely
2 1 7 Nietzsche 1973 (1886): 33 (emphases in original).
218 Gilder 1981: 296.
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to have revolutionary implications for both. In the process, I will continue to explore the
fragmented, contested and inherently contradictory nature of capitalism, and the imbrications of
such contradictory practice on the production of scientific knowledge as fact.
This will lead me to the second part of the chapter, where I will talk about genomics as
scientific fact, and argue for its ability to constitute subjectivity by virtue of the fetishism
attendant to its commodifiable facticity. I will conclude by reflecting upon what insights these
can provide into understanding relationships or production, consumption and subjectivity in
biocapitalism.
8.1: Pharmacogenomics and Personalized Medicine
The question of personalized medicine really does get to the heart of what exactly "post-
genomic" drug development is all about. Quite simply, the steps involved in what might be called
a "genetic approach" to the diagnosis and treatment of disease could be said to consist of the
following: first, the identification of a disease with a genetic component; second, the mapping of
the gene(s) involved in the disease to specific chromosomal regions; and third, the identification
of the involved gene(s). At this point, one could develop diagnostics to identify the presence or
expression of the involved gene(s) in patients to determine predisposition to the disease in
question; use the gene itself as a drug (gene therapy); or understand the underlying biology of the
disease to "rationally" develop therapeutics to target the molecular mechanisms of disease
etiology. The diagnostic tests could further be a precursor either to steps taken to prevent the
onset of disease (that could either be interventionist or involve lifestyle changes), or to what is
known as pharmacogenomics, which involves tailoring prescriptions and drug regimens to
individuals based on their likely, genetically determined, response to these drugs (these steps are
summarized from Collins and McCusick 2001). Of course, some of these advances are likely to
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be more easily realized than others. The development of diagnostic tests, for instance, is relatively
straightforward (and indeed, as I argue below, is likely to be the one realizable goal of "genomic"
or "personalized" medicine for some time to come). Targeted therapeutics based on
understandings of the underlying biology of disease is much more complicated, since diseases are
always complicated multi-factorial events that are difficult to understand at the molecular level,
and further not necessarily easy to target and set right even if ever properly understood. Gene
therapy, too, has been hindered by the lack of finding optimal methods of gene delivery, and was
further hindered by the death of a volunteer, Jesse Gelsinger, in a trial in 1999.
Most scientists, when they write or speak of "histories of' or "prospects for" genomics,
do admit that some of these advances are more immediately realizable than others. Francis
Collins and Victor MuCusick's way of summarizing this is that "[t]he rate of progress for
applying a genetic approach to the diagnosis and treatment of each disease will be different
depending on the research investment and the degree of biological complexity underlying the
disease.... Diagnostic opportunities may then come along rather quickly, but will be of greatest
clinical usefulness [sic] once prevention measures are developed that have proven benefit to those
at high risk.... In general, full-blown therapeutic benefits from identification of gene variants will
take longer to reach mainstream medicine" (Collins and McCusick 2001: 543). And yet I argue
that it is this temporality - the different likely rates of realization of each of these genomic
advances - that is the real issue, and that gets elided over as a relatively linear and equivalent set
of outcomes in accounts such as Collins'. It is this what might be called therapeutic lag that is
actually both the ethnographic window and the political terrain of"post-genomic" drug
development, and it is the ensemble of events in the world that happen during the therapeutic lag
that will determine whether, how and what "full-blown" therapeutic development actually takes
place, and when. Making what seem suspiciously like Soviet-style 5-year and 1 0-year predictive
plans, as Collins and McCusick do in their article, closes down this ethnographic window at the
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expense of relatively banal crystal-ball gazing (though, as I have argued in Chapter 6, such modes
of prediction themselves have powerful influences in creating ethnographic windows and political
terrains). 2 '9
Both intuitively, and from the hype that surrounds personalized medicine, it seems
evident that there are many potential benefits. There is the obvious potential benefit to patients if
drug treatment can be tailored to each one: more effective drugs, more precise prescriptions and
better therapeutic outcomes. But there are also benefits at various stages of drug development for
companies involved in the process. These include a higher success rate, faster time to market,
reduced costs and greater market share.
There are various stages of drug discovery and development at which pharmacogenomics
could have an impact; and for this, it is useful to recall from chapter 2 that drug discovery and
drug development are two distinct phases in the genesis and taking to market of a therapeutic
compound. The difference between the two phases is obvious from their nomenclature: drug
discovery is about the identification of compounds, and drug development is the ensemble of
research, testing and commercial activities attendant to taking the compound through clinical
trials and to market. A key problem during drug discovery is the prioritization of what might be a
number of promising compounds, whose therapeutic efficacy in humans can really at that stage
only be predicted intuitively, if at all. Genomics promises a way to rationalize lead compound
prioritization at early stages of discovery. Up till now, this has been the primary area in which the
benefits of genomics have been realized. This is the area of focus of what might be called "first-
generation" genome companies that have been focused on target identification (companies such
as Celera Genomics, Incyte Genomics, Human Genome Sciences and CuraGen).
2 19 Indeed, I consistently noted during my fieldwork that it was the corporate actors who had a better
conception of these ethnographic windows than public scientists, and who are often therefore forced to take
account, however problematically, of society.
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The effect of genomics on drug development, however, is likely to be quite distinct, and
the benefits of genomics on this process are only beginning to be recognized and realized (Ledley
1999). While drug discovery primarily focuses research on the mechanisms of disease, the
selection of biological targets and the identification of compounds that could modulate the
disease, drug development is focused on establishing safety and efficacy of existing compounds.
Therefore, during clinical trials, pharmacogenomic approaches could reduce costs by
genetically pre-selecting trial populations, which would lead to reduced sample size and a shorter
duration for the trials. Lowering adverse events during clinical trials improves the drug profile. At
launch, it can help market drug to ideal target populations. A higher efficacy in target populations
would lead to a marketing advantage over competing drugs whose lower response rates would
have been measured in traditional clinical trials conducted across broad populations. In addition,
it would be possible to launch pharmacogenomically based diagnostic tests, which are likely to
constitute a major component of personalized medicine.
There is a huge market opportunity for what might broadly be called "pharmacogenomic"
companies. This is because of a number of factors in the current drug development environment
that make the benefits of personalized medicine outlined above seem particularly attractive.
These factors include:
· The pipeline andprofit void: big pharmaceutical companies face a $20 billion void because
of the number of drugs going off patent in the next 5 years.
· The innovation deficit: in 1995, 75 of the top 100 drugs on the market targeted only 4
families of molecular targets: G-protein coupled receptors (60% of drugs on the market), ion
channels, nuclear hormone receptors and enzymes (Norton 2001). The number of targets
addressed today is less than 450, compared to the roughly 10000 targets that are estimated to
exist in the human genome. Further, these targets are not medically very diverse: excluding
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antibiotics, one-third of the drugs on the market address CNS disorders, while another third
address cancer and blood diseases.
· Time (12-15 years) and cost ($500 million) to bring drugs to market.220 The financial
community expects a pharmaceutical industry growth rate of 13% earnings per share (EPS)
annually. Using traditional methods of drug development, the industry growth rate is about
8% EPS. To reach even a 10% growth rate requires 3-5 new chemical entities (NCEs) to be
approved each year (figures from Norton 2001).
· Risk. Only 1 in 5 drugs that enters the clinic makes it to market. These could be due to
problems characterising dose-effect relationships; issues in experimental design and clinical
development plans; and difficulties in measuring risk: benefit endpoints.
Pharmacogenomics-enhanced therapeutics, goes the pitch, could benefit pharmaceutical
companies to the order of $200 million to $500 million in revenue for each drug by helping to
address some of the problems mentioned above. This section of the chapter investigates the hype
that proclaims these benefits, especially when set against the contradiction at the heart of the
pharmacogenomic promise, which is the fragmentation of pharmaceutical markets, that in an era
of personalized medicine would be defined not just by the disease but also by the target
population. What I want to emphasize at the outset, however, is that, as mentioned in Chapter 6,
an "investigation of hype" cannot simply be an expose of its hollow promises. Rather, it enables a
tracking of what is from the get-go an imbrication of possible therapeutic benefit with market
opportunity, as the "win-win" of biocapital. I will elaborate upon the argument for this
imbrication, its effects and affects, in the second part of this chapter while developing the notion
of genomic fetishism.
* *********
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It is important, even within the short life history of genomics, to locate this emergent
pharmacogenomic moment historically. One could argue for three reasons why this is a time
when many people in scientific-industrial communities are thinking about and turning to
pharmacogenomics and personalized medicine as possible solutions to knotty therapeutic
problems (Housman and Ledley 1998):
a. There is an increased recognition of the importance of systematic discovery of
genetic variation as a means to developing therapeutic and diagnostic products.
b. Appropriate methods for the discovery and analysis of genetic variation within the
timelines of drug discovery and development have emerged.
c. The emergence of managed care has provided an economic context within which
personalized medicine makes enormous sense.
It is important at this point to escape conflating pharmacogenomics and personalized
medicine (and I will argue later in the chapter that there are implications for such conflations in
understanding etiologies of genetic determinism as well). Personalized medicine is not equivalent
to pharmacogenomics, but is, rather, a combination of pharmacogenomics and predictive testing.
Pharmacogenomics does not aim to provide deep insights into proximal causes of disease: its
primary aim is to maximize the efficiency of therapeutic intervention, both at the level of
pharmacokinetics (what the body does to the drug) and pharmacodynamics (what the drug does to
the body). Nonetheless, pharmacogenomics is likely to be the most immediately realizable and
practical manifestation of personalized medicine for some time to come. The reason for this is
that there are important differences between genetic effects on diseases and on drug action. The
major difference has to do with the fact that the genetic etiologies of disease are often extremely
complex. The combination of this complexity with the extreme rarity with which disease-causing
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220 As mentioned in chapter 3, the figure of $500 million is a contentious one, but it is the figure that has
commonly been used in the industry to rationalize, and sell, approaches that might cut costs. I therefore use
mutations occur makes the therapeutic or predictive value of any single gene relatively limited.
Rather, arrays of potential disease markers have to be determined or studied in an integrative
fashion.
On the other hand, it has been realized that single-gene effects significantly modulate the
action of many common drugs. These include genetic effects on metabolism that alter
pharmacokinetics and effects on pathways of drug action that alter pharmacodynamics. Most of
the former can be localized to genes that code for drug metabolizing enzymes (DMEs), mainly
belonging to the cytochrome P450 (CYP450) class of oxidative enzymes (though there is a small
minority of drugs that do not undergo transformation by CYP450 prior to elimination). [See
Table 8.1 for percentages of drugs metabolized by different CYP450 isozymes].
Pharmacogenomics can be used to understand pharmacodynamics by enabling
associations between genetic polymorphisms in drug targets and disease pathways. Some
examples of these associations have already been discovered. For example, a polymorphism in
cholesteryl ester transfer protein (CETP) determines the efficacy of pravastatin in patients with
coronary atherosclerosis (Kuivenhoven et al 1998); polymorphisms in -adrenoreceptors affect
their sensitivity to albuterol (an association that is of consequence in the treatment of asthma)
(Martinez et al 1997); and polymorphisms in serotonin neurotransmitter receptors are related to
the efficacy of the anti-psychotic drug clozapine (Arranz et al 1998).
Therefore, genetic studies of drug action are likely to provide more therapeutic insights of
commercial value than similar genetic studies of the pathogenesis of disease.
Table 8.1: Drug metabolism by the major families of CYP450 enzymes (reproduced
from Norton 2001)
CYP 450 isoform Percentage of drugs metabolized
this figure in this portion of my argument.
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CYP3A4
CYP2D6
CYP2C19
CYP1A2
CYP2E1
Others
20
15
5
4
There is a second reason why pharmacogenomics is likely to emerge as a more attractive
strategy of personalizing medicine than target identification and discovery approaches. The
biggest current problem with clinical trials is their limited statistical power. The average number
of patients who receive a drug before a new drug application is less than 4000. However the
number of patients required for statistically meaningful clinical trials in a post-genomic era would
increase exponentially with the number of genes studied and the number of variations located
within each gene. In other words, genomic discovery can actually increase the time and cost of
conventional clinical trials. This suggests that there is even less of a commercial incentive for
discovery based genomic medicine compared to pharmacogenomics.
Therefore, while personalized medicine might be about the discovery of more disease
causing genes eventually, it is likely to be about the ability to use medicines more effectively in
the immediate future.
The study of molecular genetic variation and its relationship to drug response is not new.
There is, however, a historical shift from phannacogenetics, which is a basic study of genetic
variance, to pharmacogenomics, which is a commercially driven, industrialized, high-throughput
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science that has emerged consequent to the genomics revolution. Therefore the shift from
pharmacogenetics to pharmacogenomics is a shift to an approach that is driven by process from
one that was driven by observation. Once again, I emphasize the importance of high-
throughputness -- speed, its desire and actualization -- in industrializing life sciences such as
genomics, as changing not just the paradigms of knowledge production, but also, as I will
elaborate later in the chapter, the veryfacticity of the knowledge produced.
Pharmacogenetics as a concept was put forth as early as 1957 by Motulsky, the term was
coined in 1959 by Vogel and the first book on the subject was written as early as 1962 by Werner
Kalow, in which Kalow documented several examples of inherited traits that he confirmed as
affecting drug response or toxicity in human populations. Indeed, the very long entrenched notion
of taking a family history as part of a conventional medical examination is itself based on an
understanding that a patient's genetic make-up, however little known, has a bearing on decisions
regarding therapeutic intervention.
The shift to a process driven pharmacogenomic approach has the advantage of not
anymore requiring an a priori detection of an altered phenotype. In other words, one doesn't have
to have a pathology before studying the underlying genetic causes; one can study genetic
variability in order to predict future pathology (and I will elaborate upon this is the second part of
this chapter). The major driving force behind this shift is largely technological, with the
availability of high-throughput methods for genetic analysis.
There are two broad pharmacogenomic strategies that can be adopted (Pfost 2000). The
first strategy is to adopt a broad screening approach, which is adopted most notably by
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, whereas the second is to adopt a more focused hypothesis driven
approach, adopted by companies such as Variagenics, to correlate precisely defined phenotypes
with genetic variations in the genes most likely to produce them. The latter approach is less
random than a large-scale screening exercise, but might miss key elements in a complicated
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pathway that might not have been predicted in the hypothesis. A more comprehensive screening
approach is likely to leave more room fr unexpected findings, but will be technologically much
more challenging, requiring ultra-high throughputs for the discovery, scoring and processing of
genetic variants.
There are three steps to a pharmacogenomic process. The first step is the discovery and
definition of the multiple variations within genes. A powerful marker that enables such discovery
is the single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), which will be described below. SNPs after
discovery must be correlated with clinically documented variations in drug response. They can
then be used to develop diagnostic tests to determine whether or not a patient has a genetic profile
that is predicted to correlate to a specific drug response.
SNPs (as mentioned in chapter 4) are single base variations in the genetic code that occur
about once every 1000 bases along the 3 billion base human genome. Knowing the locations of
these closely spaced DNA landmarks both eases the sequencing of the human genome and aids in
the discovery of genes variably linked to different traits. A map of all the SNPs in the human
species would provide the basic database to perform association studies, which compare the
prevalence of particular genetic markers in individuals that possess a certain trait (which may be a
disease trait, a predisposition to a disease or side effects to certain drugs) to those who don't.
Association studies are a potential gold mine through the insights they might provide in
unearthing obscure disease-related genes or in helping preventive diagnosis. SNPs, therefore,
have a potential value as tools leading to therapy, in a more pinpointed and versatile way than a
random DNA sequence. Not surprisingly, SNPs are key informational artifacts that make the
realization of personalized medicine possible.
The steps leading from the analysis of genetic variations to the creation of the best drugs
as a consequence of that analysis has three steps: target identification, target characterization and
target validation (Jazwinska 2001). Each of these steps correlates to different technologies and
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business models. Most importantly for my larger arguments about biocapital, however, is the
manifestation of a basic contradiction of speed and information when one tracks these different
steps. This is that the bottleneck very quickly shifts away from being a problem of inadequate
information to being one of too much information.
Target identification is the conventional (one can almost now say "historical") conception
of the role of genomics, made famous by what I call "first-generation" genome companies, or
target ID companies. However, within a year after the generation of the working draft sequence
of the human genome, and 5-7 years into the lives of many of these companies, it became clear
that target identification had ceased to be the major bottleneck in drug discovery and development
through genomics. In fact, target identification has created with it a new host of problems, in
large measure because of its success: the problem now is not the generation of new targets as
much as it to trim early discovery portfolios to manageable proportions and to identify those
targets that have the largest probability of success. Further, the identification of molecular defects
is useful in early diagnosis of disease and gives clues as to the biochemical pathways through
which disease onset progresses. However, there is no guarantee that this information is useful in
any way in the development of therapy. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in a discussion of the
promise of pharmacogenomics, strategies that focus on target identification do not necessarily
make drug development easier. On the contrary, they can often make drug development harder by
demanding larger sample sizes in clinical trials in order to generate statistically meaningful
information. A brief list of some of the major target ID companies is given in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Representative Target ID companies
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Company Year Founded Major focus
Celera Genomics 1998 Generating and
(www.celera.com) commercializing genomic
Incyte Genomics
(www.incyte.com)
Human Genome Sciences
(www.hgsi.com)
CuraGen Corporation
(www.curagen.com)
1993
1992
1997
information to accelerate the
pace of drug discovery. Has
recently expanded its
informatics focused business
model to include diagnostics
and drug discovery programs.
Provider of an integrated
platform of genomic
technologies designed to aid in
the understanding of the
molecular basis of disease.
Uses genomic information to
develop its own in-house
genomic-based pharmaceutical
products.
Combines biology and
information technology to
systematically develop
genomic-derived
biopharmaceutical products
Of course, questioning the continued immediate scientific utility of target identification
approaches in venture science worlds immediately means asking whether target identification is
no longer a valid business model. Of the four companies mentioned in Table 8.2, Celera
Genomics and Incyte Genomics have focused primarily on being information providers for other
pharmaceutical companies. On the other hand, Human Genome Sciences and CuraGen
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Corporation, who have very similar business models, decided that in addition to strategic
alliances with pharmaceutical companies, they would set up in-house drug discovery capabilities
to channel their informatics efforts into biopharmaceutical development.
It is possible that a stage has been reached at which the success of target ID companies
might have signalled the beginning of their own irrelevance. Target identification is no longer the
bottleneck in genomic drug discovery efforts. On the contrary, the challenge has shifted to
making sense of the huge amount of target information that is available, and streamlining that
information into something that can be meaningful for drug development. This is not an
automatic or easy transition.
This is not to completely belittle the achievements of these companies. Human Genome
Sciences has been particularly successful amongst target ID companies in moving forward with
its own drug discovery programs, and currently has five products in clinical trials. CuraGen
meanwhile recently signed a $124 million pharmacogenomic and toxicogenomic alliance with
Bayer, indicating the strategic interest in the pharmaceutical industry for such types of target
identification and data mining tools as CuraGen has on offer. Nonetheless, it is clear that the
eventual pressure on these companies will be to shift their business models away from target
identification and towards in-house biopharmaceutical development, as is evidenced by Celera
opening a new branch of its company focusing on drug development called Celera Therapeutics.
Target characterization can be defined as the use of genetic analysis to define the degree
of variation within a gene encoding a potential drug target (Jazwinska 2001). Therefore, target
characterization involves firstly the definition of variants and secondly the definition of the
impacts of variants. A recent analysis of variation in 75 candidate genes involves in hypertension
identified SNPs in 74 of them (Halushka et al 1999). This study suggests that there is a high
likelihood of finding genetic variation in any gene selected as a potential drug target.
Understanding the impacts of variants becomes crucial, but is a highly predictive process for
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which very few business models exist. This is where structural genomics becomes important.
There are a number of possible structural genomics approaches that one could conceive of to
predict how variation in gene sequence might lead to variation in impact of the drug that is
targeted to that variation. Broadly however structural genomics involves the definition of protein
crystal structure as a means to predictively model the impact of variation within a protein.
Structural genomics is still in its infancy, and Table 8.3 identifies two of the most exciting
structural genomics companies.
Table 8.3: Emergent Structural Genomics Companies
Company Year Founded Focus
Syrrx 1999 A leader in the field of
structural proteomics, it is(www.syrrx.com)
involved in the high-
throughput generation of
protein structures from genetic
information.
Structural Bioinformatics Inc. 1997 Focus on computational
(www.strubix.com) proteomics, the large-scale
generation and use of protein
structural information.
Target validation can be defined as a process by which knowledge of genetic variation is
exploited to show an association between particular targets and disease processes (Jazwinska
2001). This is typically useful to save costs during clinical trials by predicting before the clinical
trials process whether the pharmaceutical intervention might have a desired therapeutic effect by
demonstrating the association between target gene variation and clinical process. Target
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validation steps are two-fold: first, the identification of well-characterized clinical populations of
specific relevance, and second, the identification of variants within or close to the test gene.
Unlike traditional clinical trials, target validation procedures do not require that patients
actually be treated with the compound. Therefore, these procedures are extremely useful at early
stages of discovery.
The technical challenge of pharmacogenomics is very different from genomic
sequencing. The focus here moves away from new gene discovery (which underlies the business
models of the target ID companies) and towards the elucidation of correlations and statistical
analyses between genetic variations and various types of response. In other words,
pharmnacogenomics and personalized medicine constitute a different scientific-corporate
enterprise from the "genomics" of 1999-2000.
SNP discovery strategies have generally involved the large-scale repetitive sequencing of
cloned DNA segments from defined subject pools followed by computer alignment of the
sequences to detect variation (Pfost 2000). It is important to subsequently confirm that the
variation is a genuine population variant and not a sequencing artifact. Sequencing approaches,
however, become extremely inefficient when large-scale confirmations are required. Further,
SNP discovery alone does not enable the correlation of genotypes with clinical phenotypes, a
process referred to as SNP scoring.
There are over 21 SNP technology providers of various sorts in addition to those offering
data and services. The question that faces this industry in terms of the development of
personalized medicine strategies is whether this explosion is sustainable, whether a consolidation
of the industry is likely in the near future, and what that consolidation might involve. As of now,
pharmaceutical companies still seem generally reluctant to utilize genotypic information in their
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drug discovery efforts. A major market driver of this reluctance is cost and time, and a
PriceWaterhouseCoopers study suggests that genotyping technologies are unlikely to be
wholeheartedly embraced by pharmaceutical companies until costs get down to a penny a SNP
and assays can be performed with a nanogram or less or DNA (cited in Burke 2001). What might
be bad news for SNP technology providers could be good news for SNP service providers, as it is
likely that pharmaceutical companies, even if they do include the use of genotypic information in
their drug discovery programs, are likely to outsource genotyping rather than perform them in-
house.2 2 '
So far in this section, I have talked about how the upstream scientific and corporate issue
for genomics, as genomics comes to be about personalizing medicine, shifts away from the
identification of targets to their characterization and validation. In the second part of this chapter,
as I have mentioned, I want to theoretically ponder some of the subjective consequences of these
emergent sorts of genomic knowledge operating as scientific fact. The ability to create diagnostic
tests based on information relating to genetic variability is a major part of this shift. I therefore
now move on to discussing how the impetus to further move towards a testing society originates
in upstream technoscientific and business genome worlds. This is, implicitly, an attempt to
engage ethnographically with the possibility of a genetically determinist society, as feared by
such ideologically distant biotech watchers as Jeremy Rifkin (1998) and Richard Lewontin
(1993).
Historically, as I have argued above, the success of breaking through a bottleneck in
genomic drug discovery can, by virtue of the amount of information generated by that very
success, provide a fresh bottleneck. This has been the case with target identification, which has
221 Some major SNP service providers that could be beneficiaries of this outsourcing include CuraGen,
DNA Sciences, Genaissance, Genometrix, Lark Technologies, Lynx, Orchid Biosciences, PolyGenyx,
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necessitated the need to move onto methods that can actually characterize the targets identified. A
major reason why target identification is only a very preliminary step towards personalized
medicine is that identifying a target provides no guarantee that it can be therapeutically targeted.
With the explosion of SNP identification technologies, a similar bottleneck is arising: a huge
volume of SNP information, with no guarantee that any particular SNP is going to be predictive
of an actual therapeutic target, or even therapeutic response at a chromosomal level. It is in this
context that haplotyping assumes increased importance.
A "haplotype" means a combination of SNPs on a particular chromosome, usually within
a particular gene. Common haplotypes exist because in most genes SNPs tend to be co-inherited.
While SNP genotyping, as outlined above, has many benefits in terms of generating information
that could be used towards personalized medicine, haplotyping has greater promise for two
reasons. Firstly, haplotype analysis greatly reduces the complexity of genetic analysis. Due to
linkage disequilibrium, only a small number of haplotypes are generally found in a population, in
contrast to the up to 10 million SNPs that are said to exist in the genome. For example, 13 SNPs
have been identified in the P2-adrenergic receptor. Theoretically, these could assort into 213, or
8192, haplotypes. However, the 32-adrenergic receptor has been found to have only 12
haplotypes, with only four of these found commonly in the population. More importantly,
haplotypes are thought to predict gene activity more precisely than genotypes. This is because
individual polymorphisms may have different effects on the functioning of a gene. Therefore, the
predictive therapeutic value of any single SNP within a gene is relatively limited. A haplotype
integrates these effects, and thereby provides the sum of the effects of all the polymorphisms. The
move from genotyping to haplotyping is a move away from assaying arrays of potential mutations
and towards generating integrative markers of disease (Housman and Ledley 1998).
Qiagen, Sequenom, Telechem / arrayit.com and Variagenics.
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The major challenge for haplotype prediction is the generation of bioinformatic tools that
can make sense of this extremely complex data in an accurate manner. Conventional genotyping
technologies are not applicable to haplotyping. So far, the accuracy of most computational
methods for haplotype analysis has not been very well established.
There are other challenges in addition to technological limitations that face haplotype
analysis in the context of actually developing personalized medicine (Jazwinska 2001). Some of
these challenges are:
1. Even if drug metabolism, as mentioned earlier, is often a monogenic response, the totality of
drug response is a complex phenotype. Identifying haplotypes merely reduces the complexity of
analysis. However, the relative value of multiple genetic and environmental factors and the
importance of their interaction is drug response is still largely unknown. The feasibility of
identifying genetic associations with complex phenotypes is still a matter of considerable debate.
2. There are issues affecting the practicality of integrating haplotype analysis into a program of
therapeutic development. Haplotypes are markers. They are closely linked to disorders, but that
does not mean that they contribute to them. Therefore, haplotype analysis is most likely to be
used as a diagnostic tool, as indeed it has been done in the past. The greatest application for
haplotype analysis is to define the risk of inheritance of a disorder such as haemachromatosis or
rheumatoid arthritis within a family unit.
Therefore, haplotypes could diagnose likely inheritance of a disease, but still be poorly
predictive of drug response. In other words, there is a logical move towards a diagnostic test as an
"end-point" of personalized medicine from an upstream perspective, as haplotypes emerge as
manageable scientific knowledge about genetic variability as it corresponds to chromosomal
location and co-inheritance.
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3. Cost. The acceptance of haplotype analysis will basically imply the need to routinize genetic
testing, which will have implications for healthcare delivery systems in terms of the cost that will
accrue from increased diagnostic load. This cost will have to be weighed against proposed
benefits by healthcare providers. These providers, given the increased load brought about by
wide-scale genetic testing, will expect a greater level of success in therapeutic delivery in order
for the entire personalized medicine process to be deemed cost-effective. Therefore, the irony
here is that it is health insurance companies that are least likely to be enamored of a testing
society, at least in the short term, ocause of the economics involved. This goes against the grain
of the intuitive institutionalized bioethics concern about genetic discrimination by insurance
companies, articulated most forcefully again by writers like Rifin. I am not saying here that
insurance companies are uninterested in the results of diagnostic tests. What I am suggesting is
that the political economic context in which diagnostic tests are emerging and likely to operate
will place an immediate economic burden on health management organizations (HMOs), whereby
the benefits of supporting large-scale diagnostic testing before the availability (or even the
likelihood of availability) of corresponding therapeutics will have to be weighed against the
immediate cost of having to financially support such large-scale testing.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, personalized medicine is likely to be extremely cost
effective for pharmaceutical companies because they can streamline their clinical trials process.
Pharmacogenomics can save substantial money for companies during the development phase of a
drug, particularly between phases II & II of development, in two ways:
Streamlining clinical trials: Clinical trials could be greatly reduced in size and cost by
identifying and excluding in advance those patients unlikely to respond to the candidate drug.
With a preselected patient population, the trials could assess a drug's positive therapeutic
effects far more effectively.
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Salvaging compounds that would have otherwise failed: Genetic analyses could identify and
exclude in advance those patients unlikely to respond to the drug, or likely to suffer from neg-
ative side effects.
However, personalized medicine will not necessarily be cost-effective for health management
organizations. In the long term, the promise of personalized medicine will lead to more effective
healthcare, which is good for HMOs. But in the short term, an increased diagnostic load without
concomitant therapeutic benefit could be a financial strain on the health management system.
Therefore, while the promise of personalized medicine, as mentioned earlier, makes perfect sense
in the managed care environment, the route to realizing that promise may not, especially when
there is no guarantee that the promise will actually be realized. This is a fundamental
contradiction of personalized medicine as promissory science.
What this contradiction does imply, in terms of medical practices upstream of therapeutic
development, is the shortening of the loop between diagnosis, prognosis, monitoring and
management of disease. Personalized medicine, as I explore in greater detail in the following
section, leads to a blurring between a number of oppositional categories, such as normal and
pathological, risk of disease and disease, and preventive medicine and curative medicine, that are
constitutive of the practice of medicine as it is understood today. It is the sort of blurring that,
were a Foucauldian genealogy to be written a century from now, would probably suggest itself as
an epistemic shift.
But what this contradiction does not necessarily imply is that HMOs will oppose genetic
testing, even though there might be short-tenn rationality as I outlined above that would make it
tempting for them to do so. There are, for instance, many other strategic recourses that one could
imagine HMOs adopting in order to have their cake - knowledge of predisposition amongst their
insurees to various diseases - and eat it - not having to pay for the generation of that knowledge.
One could, for instance, envision a tiering of the US health insurance system, whereby HMOs
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might pay for the cheapest tests but encourage people to pay themselves for more expensive tests
(such tiering is already beginning to be evidenced in terms of therapeutics, where HMOs are
starting to not pay for the most expensive treatments in some cases, and only providing more
basic coverage).2 22 Alternatively, HMOs might still insist on people taking diagnostic tests as a
pre-condition for providing coverage, but refuse to pay for the tests themselves.
I am, throughout this thesis, less explicitly interested in what will happen or not, and
when, which is the preferred concern of writers like Rifkin or Lee Silver (1999). Rather, I am
interested in tracing the forms that various emergences take. The promise of personalized
medicine, my topic for this chapter, isn't just a series of predictions about futures that will or
won't dawn. Indeed, a major problem with such prophecy as mode of critical analysis is that it
sets up the assumption of a temporal break between a present and a future -- it suggests that
certain things will happen in the manner of a singular event. Personalized medicine, however, is
already happening, and contradictions at the heart of promises do not preclude their realization,
even if (indeed, necessarily) such realization is contingent, partial and unpredictable. Below, I
will briefly mention a couple of examples of diseases towards which personalized medicine
approaches are already being adopted, before going on to look at personalized medicine from a
downstream perspective.
A striking and well-known example of personalized medicine is the breast cancer drug
Herceptin, developed by Genentech (which isn't even a conventional "genome" company, in that
its business isn't the mining of various sorts of genetic information) and approved by the FDA in
222 Of course, this is precisely the crisis of Britain's public National Health Service (NHS), that it is unable
to pay for anything but the more basic services and therapeutics, thereby encouraging those who can afford
it to go to private health services. It is ironical, though not at all surprising, that US HMOs might well
wittingly create precisely such a multiple tiered environment for healthcare access that they claim is a
failure of public supported healthcare (a claim that was so forcefully articulated in the US in 1994 that it
caused then President Bill Clinton to abandon his controversial health plan, and managed to win for the
opposition Republican Party a huge victory in that year's elections to the Senate).
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1998. Herceptin is designed to treat patients whose tumors over-express a protein called HER2.
However, for those patients with normal HER2 levels, Herceptin is completely useless.
A more interesting combination of strategies towards personalizing medicine is
evidenced in anti-HIV therapeutics, and indicates much better the complexity that can be faced in
devising such personalized strategies.
The basic rationale for personalizing anti-HIV therapy is as follows:
1. There is as yet no cure for HIV.
2. Most of the 15 available HIV medications were developed quickly and rushed to market.
Thus, many remain difficult to take and can be associated with serious short-term and long-
term side effects.
3. HIV is a challenging adversary that quickly develops resistance to medications.
Anti-HIV therapy is an interesting case, because individualization of therapeutic regimes
already occurs, as it does with other complex multi-drug regimes for diseases such as tuberculosis
or some forms of cancer. The shift that genomics marks is towards a certain rationality of
individualization, wherein genotypes become predictors of the bestform of individualization to
adopt.
There are a number of problems with individualizing anti-HIV therapy (also called anti-
retroviral therapy, or ARV) in practice. Many of these are based on the logistics of the regimen.
Current multi-drug regimens, especially in late-stage patients, may require the administration of
as many as 40 pills in one day. Some drugs require administration with food for optimal
absorption while others need to be taken on an empty stomach. Some agents require separation
from each other while others can be taken concomitantly. Additionally, there are some
combinations that result in drug interactions with serious toxicity. All of these issues, combined
with the large pill burden, can result in non-adherence. Constructing and managing drug regimens
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for HIV-infected patients can be overwhelming for clinicians. Therefore, a truly personalized
approach to treatment of patient, although currently appreciated as the best possible way to
manage the disease, is rarely accomplished in practice.
There are two major strategies that can be adopted to personalize anti-HIV therapy using
genomics. The first is by assessing HIV pathogenicity based on viral genotype (which might
involve assessing HIV virulence or HIV drug resistance); the second is by genotypic and
phenotypic evaluation of the patient. A number of possible ways of doing the latter exist: one can
assess possible HIV virulence based on individual genotype; evaluate drug dosage / metabolism /
toxicity based on the patient's genetic make-up; or optimize drug exposure in a manner fitted to
each individual (pharmacoenhancement).
A major problem with anti-HIV therapeutic regimes has to do with the development of
resistance of HIV strains to the drugs. This occurs through viral mutations that lead to variants
called quasi-species. The environmental pressures that lead to the generation of these variants
includes selective pressures created by drug therapy and the host's immune response. Therefore,
evaluating the genetic composition of HIV has become an important component of the clinical
management of HIV disease progression (Bean 2001). Such genotypic analysis can identify in
well characterized regions of the HIV-1 genome such as the reverse transcriptase and protease
genes that are likely to confer resistance to drug therapy, thereby helping in the identification
drugs less likely to be therapeutically effective. This enables the personalized customization of
anti-retroviral therapy.
A very common problem is the emergence of multiple-drug resistant strains. This
problem indicates the desirability of resistance testing in the initial selection and management of
ARV therapy in all newly infected patients. New technologies like DNA microarrays can
increase the sensitivity of strain characterization and address the concern of poor predictability of
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therapeutically success of initial genotype testing. A hypothetical benefit of a genotypic and
phenotypic analysis of HIV variant is the development of strain-specific drugs.
Personalized medicine can also go beyond the characterization of the virus to analyze the
genotype of the patient as well. The purpose of this different approach to the same problem is to
minimize adverse drug-drug interactions and enhance metabolism of the HIV drug. HIV is not
treated with just one drug, but a combination of several anti-retrovirals for the disease. The anti-
retroviral regimen may be accompanied by a long list of maintenance and prophylactic agents for
opportunistic diseases. These complex drug regimens are decreasing mortality and morbidity and
inducing favorable changes in surrogate markers such as viral load in plasma, but they may cause
other problems such as drug toxicity, difficulties with compliance, and pharmacological drug
interactions. Enormous numbers of drug interactions involving anti-retroviral agents have been
reported in both animal and human studies. Some of these interactions are clinically significant,
while the significance of others is unknown. Other potential interactions may be anticipated
because a potential mechanism of interaction is known.
Creating an integrated approach towards the effective treatment of HIV with
pharmacogenomics will be a daunting task. The first step, which is currently being practiced in
health care, is to characterize the nature of the virus and its potency. More virulent strains will
need different combinations of therapy relative to weaker strains. By analyzing the existing
mutations, the strain's resistance to a particular drug can be discovered making the creation of a
regimen more effective. After deciding what drugs to give to the patient, a genetic analysis can
subsequently give information concerning the metabolic state, thus determining how much of
each drug to give to each patient. This latter stage will be somewhat more complex, requiring
significant mathematical modeling to determine:
1. How the altered genetic profile affects rate of metabolism
2. How drug-drug interaction affect metabolism and
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3. The rate of release of the drugs administered.
Therefore, the case of personalized anti-HIV therapy highlights the scientific and
statistical complexity of a pharmacogenomic regime. Personalized medicine using genomic
rationales is not just about looking at a gene and predicting a response to it, or "taking action"
against it in any direct way.
Personalized medicine brings with it a whole host of ethical, legal and regulatory issues,
some of which, especially as it pertains to ownership and intellectual property, I have already
discussed at various points in this thesis. However, they bear being repeated, in the context
specifically of personalized medicine as a corporate technoscientific venture, and in the context of
some other issues that I haven't yet touched upon.
Sample collection
Two major genotyping strategies are likely to be employed in clinical trials: the first is
prospective genotyping, the second retrospective genotyping (Murphy 2000). Prospective
genotyping will be done on Phase I volunteers to ensure the inclusion of volunteers with poor or
ultra-rapid drug metabolizing enzyme (DME) phenotypes, and on Phase II and m subjects for
their stratification into different phenotypic sub-groups and possible exclusion from the trial.
Retrospective genotyping can be used both to match clinical outcomes of drugs already
taken with the patient's genotype (this is useful, for instance, in evaluating adverse drug
reactions), or as a research tool to identify new candidate genes. Retrospective genotyping,
however, brings with it a whole host of informed consent issues that need to be addressed at the
time of sample collection, which I have hinted at in Chapter 5. How can proper informed consent
procedures be designed that allow future use of the sample that may not even be envisaged in the
original experimental protocol? What sorts of sample anonymization procedures must be
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followed to adequately protect the donor's privacy? What sorts of scientific value are lost if
samples must be anonymized before storage and banking?2 23
Intellectual property issues
In addition to informed consent issues, a number of knotty intellectual property (IP)
issues surround sample collection, issues that could impact downstream economics and strategies
of drug development. This is because donors are often not averse to donating their genetic
samples for the cause of research, but are more averse to knowing that companies can take out
ownership rights on the donated samples. Therefore, there are a number of difficult political
issues that companies involved in genotyping are facing and will continue to face while collecting
samples. Again, these are discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
In addition to IP issues at the time of sample collection, significant controversies exist
over the strategies of upstream companies to patent various types of genetic information that
public researchers and pharmaceutical companies believe should be in the public domain in order
to facilitate downstream innovation. This is an area of particular concern with respect to SNPs,
since no proper guidelines for their public disclosure exist. One strategy that has been devised is
the formation of a public consortium in 1999 called The SNP consortium (see Chapter 4 for a
discussion of The SNP consortium). This consortium is an alliance of five major academic
sequencing centers with ten of the major multinational pharmaceutical companies, with the aim of
placing any SNPs generated by consortium members into the public domain. There do, however,
remain a number of upstream companies that continue to take patents out on SNPs.224 In other
words, issues of speed and information are completely tied in to the contexts in which
personalized medicine emerges.
223 The importance of privacy and informed consent issues is evidenced by the passing of the Genetic Non-
Discrimination in Health and Employment Act (S. 318) in early 2001 to prohibit discrimination in
healthcare services and employment on the basis of genetic information.
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA and other regulatory) guidelines
While the FDA has shown enthusiasm for genetic applications in drug development
(FDA 1997), it has issued no clear guidelines on the use of genetic data, nor are there any
genomics-specific rules or policies (Czaban 2001). It is likely that the FDA will adopt an
incremental, case-by-case approach rather than committing to a single broad policy. In some
cases, FDA's existing regulatory authority will suffice. For example, current investigational new
drug (IND) applications already require protocols specifying the criteria used for patient selection
and exclusion and the kinds of control groups to be used. Genetic criteria could easily be
incorporated into this protocol without requiring any change to the application procedure.
Also, there are already FDA approved products that have been the result of
pharmacogenomics (examples taken from Czaban 2001). Examples include Dako's HercepTest, a
breast cancer assay that tests for the over-expression of the HER-2/neu protein that can be treated
with herceptin. The approval of herceptin itself was based on pharmacogenomic factors, as only
HER-2/neu over-expressing patients were admitted to the study, and only these over-expressers
are eligible for treatment. Other drugs that incorporate pharmacogenomic considerations in their
approval and labeling include Prilosec (omeprozole), where dosing decisions are based on genetic
and racial factors, and BiDil, which has been found to be effective in African Americans but not
Caucasians.
Another challenge for the FDA will be intra-organizational reordering to tackle the
regulatory challenges posed by personalized medicine. Personalized medicine is likely to see not
just new drugs and diagnostic kits, but also new biologics and devices, which will involve
jurisdictional co-ordination between the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, the Center
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224 Some of the major private sellers of SNP data include Biobase, Celera Genomics, DNA Print, DeCode
Genetics, Genomics Collaborative / Netgenics, Gemini Genomics, Incyte Genomics, Orchid Biosciences,
Qiagen and Variagenics
for Devices and Radiological Health and the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (Czaban
2001).
Strategic Issues for the Pharmaceutical Industry
Without a doubt, the increased attention towards personalized medicine will confront the
downstream pharmaceutical industry, an industry that has generally known to be conservative in
adopting new management styles, with a whole array of strategic challenges. A few of these are
briefly summarized below.
Personalized medicine is a form of outcomes-based medicine, which brings into focus the
cost-effectiveness of healthcare delivery. This could have a huge impact on pharmaceutical R &
D, necessitating changes in pharmaceutical company processes, systems and organization
(Arlington and Peakman 2001). The bottom line is that the productivity of R & D will have to
increase, especially if therapeutic delivery is to match and offset the increased load on HMOs to
provide diagnostic services that pharmacogenomics makes possible. Productivity increase
demands the adoption of rational approaches for early target validation, which implies a further
industrialization of the early stages of drug development. In the clinical trials arena,
pharmacogenomics will drive increased patient stratification. Choosing the right clinical trials
centers to outsource trials to will become a crucial strategic decision for big pharmaceutical
companies. Even within the organization, however, the need for greater integration of R & D with
marketing will be felt as economic decisions drive portfolio considerations more and more.
There are likely to be larger market consequences of pharmacogenomics (Arlington and
Peakman 2001). It will be much harder for single companies to monopolize technologies and
disease areas. Strategic decisions will have to be made within each company about their core
skills and weaknesses in order to prioritize strategic foci. Entry barriers to smaller and newer
competitors may also be lowered, which is the reason for the confidence expressed by aggressive
young genomics based drug development companies such as Millennium Pharmaceuticals and
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Human Genome Sciences (the latter already with five products in various stages of clinical trials).
Therefore, big pharmaceutical companies will be driven to outsource their non-core competencies
and will need to adopt an extremely strategic approach to partnering and in-licensing. Increased
numbers of consortia (such as The SNP consortium, but set up to fulfill a much wider range of
strategic activities) are likely to emerge. Pharmaceutical companies will also have to confront
human resources issues, and make sure that they are able to hire and retain the best workers who
can compete in a post-genomic environment. This may involve changing the reward structure
within organizations to further incentives and attract the best humanpower available.
Another set of challenges will be to management systems. The standardization and
automization of R & D and manufacturing IT systems will need to become a high priority. IT
systems will also need to be designed that can cope with and make non-intuitive links across the
masses of data that R & D divisions will increasingly have to deal with and make sense of. The
integration of data into regulatory dossiers will also need to be streamlined.
In other words, personalized medicine is not simply about promise. The opportunities for
downstream companies to lower costs in clinical trials will be offset by market fragmentation,
lower barriers to entry for small competitors and decreased competitive advantage for the
pharmaceutical giants across whole disease areas.
To sum up this part of the chapter, then. What we have, on the one hand, is the
downstream therapeutic, therapeutic intervention often being viewed as the "end-point" of the
practice of medicine. On the other hand, there is an upstream ensemble of diagnosis, prognosis,
monitoring and management of disease, what might collectively be called preventive medicine. It
is in between these upstream and downstream assemblages of material-semiotic objects and
practices that historical and ethnographic windows open up to strategic praxis on the parts of the
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involved players, and analytic intervention on the parts of anthropologists, historians and social
theorists.
Meanwhile, both upstream and downstream assemblages have invested in them
significant corporate interests with considerable capital and political muscle. While the emergent
diagnostics industry is heavily invested in preventive medicine, downstream pharmaceutical
companies are heavily invested in therapeutic development. Where HMOs will heavily invest,
and how, remains one of the crucial empirical questions to ask in a tracing of these emergent sets
of practices. Equally important to ask is what will consequently happen to the patient / consumer-
in-waiting and her subjectivity.
One can see, however, that there is a pressure on pharmaceutical companies that stems
from a downstream logic to move therapeutic intervention to earlier and earlier stages of disease
manifestation, indeed towards a regime of therapeutic intervention at the suggestion rather than
explicit manifestation of disease, that has been seen particularly in the increased prescription and
use of psychotropic drugs such as Prozac for depression, or Ritalin for the recently constructed
"epidemic" of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (see for instance Kramer 1997,
Healy 1997, 2002). This move, I argue on the basis of my analysis of the emergence of the
upstream diagnostic ensemble as key corporate actors in the practice of medicine, stems not just
from a desire on the part of pharmaceutical companies to enlarge markets, but also from a
manifestation of the pharmaceutical industry acting as its own insurance industry. The only way
for big pharmaceutical companies to insure against diagnostic encroachment on the domain of
therapeutics is to shift that domain of what gets to count as disease into earlier and earlier stages
of its manifestation - to the point, of course, that new diseases often get created, and old ones get
significantly redefined on the basis of the shifting of the moment that demands therapeutic
intervention. This is a rationality of "self'-governance - a larger cultural shift in notions of when
it is desirable to care for the self, through diagnostic testing and therapeutic intervention - that in
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fact originates very much in a governance of selves by the complex of strategic actors that
constitute the emerging moment of "post"-genomic medicine: a rationality of pharmaceutical
governmentality that Foucault may well have called pharmamentality.
This part of the chapter has focused on the productive aspect of personalized medicine,
looking at what sort of technoscientific production it is, and what the various stakes are for the
producers. Indeed, production has been the focus of much of this thesis so far. In the second part
of the chapter, I will explore how genomics quite literally translates to consumers, as a set of
scientific-corporate practices and consumables, but also, more importantly, as scientific fact. I am
interested in concluding this thesis by looking at the affects of genomics, as corporate venture and
as science, and thereby highlighting the importance of understanding and theorizing risk as the
defining heuristic with which to make sense of the way biocapital constitutes both business
opportunity and subjectivity.
The company that perhaps epitomizes an ambitious, broad-spectrum approach towards the
development of personalized medicine is also the epitome of venture science writ large, and that is
Millennium Pharmaceuticals. Millennium has a three-pronged organizational strategy, based on a science
and technology platform, and working towards predictive medicine (largely diagnostic) and therapeutic
development. Millennium, like a good venture science company, realizes from the get-go that such science
is co-produced by a host of actors: corporate partners (both small and big), patients, doctors, managed care
systems, academia, healthcare providers, information technology systems and providers and tools
providers, to name but some. This explicit recognition of the co-production of science and business -
indeed, of science as business - as venture science is evident in their insistence that Millennium is about
the science of business, and the business of science.
Millennium is one of those companies that might be called genome companies", but that from the
very beginning have sought to identify themselves as being in the business of drug development. This is in
contrast to other well known genome companies like Celera Genomics or Incyte Genomics, that primarily
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identified themselves as genomic information providers (a strategy that is clearly back-firing on them in the
medium term, as Celera scrambles to reinvent itself as Celera Therapeutics). Millennium's approach more
closely mirrors that of the fourth big genome player, Human Genome Sciences (HGS), which has also very
successfully made moves from early on to get into the business of drug development rather than simply
remain an upstream information or service provider. Millennium's primary strategy to go downstream has
however been different from that of HGS, and has been driven by mergers and acquisitions rather than by
in-house therapeutic development. This has made Millennium's growth towards being a drug development
company seem much more rapid than that of the early biotech companies like Genentech, Amgen or
Biogen, that, in spite of successes in their early days, have really taken a couple of decades to establish
themselves as major players in the drug development marketplace. HGS, on the other hand, has gone
much further towards developing drugs on its own.
What is most relevant from the point of view of understanding personalized medicine as business
model is Millennium's predictive medicine strategy, which consists of pharmacogenomics on the one hand,
and what it calls DiagnomicsTM on the other. The former, as mentioned in the body of the chapter, correlates
genotype information with drug response, and Millennium, in a typical model, has tied up with big
pharmaceutical companies in pharmacogenomic alliances. An example of this model is Millennium's tie-up
with Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), the downstream market leader in oncology therapeutics and manufacturer
of the major anti-cancer drug Taxol. Millennium has also signed what is probably the largest
pharmacogenomic alliance in the industry in 1998 with Bayer AG, wherein Bayer will invest a total of $465
million (including a 14% equity investment) in Millennium in exchange for access to a broad range of
genomic technologies and genomic-based targets for drug development. The latter involves correlating
genes with particular stages of disease, which really is no different from other genomics-based diagnostic
platforms adopted by a number of companies, most famously Myriad Genetics, who have developed a
proprietary test for the detection of the brca genes, that are over-expressed in some breast cancers.
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Millennium's approach to personalized medicine, as mentioned in the body of the chapter, is
ambitious, large-scale and high throughput, in contrast to the approaches of companies like Variagenics and
Genaissance, who adopt more focused strategies. Millennium's science and technology platform for
personalized medicine is probably the most comprehensive in the industry, and attempts to do everything
from gene identification, functional elucidation of the identified genes, target validation and diagnostic and
therapeutic product development. Millennium's stated attempt, therefore, is to do everything, all the way to
drug development.
Indeed, Millennium and Variagenics offer contrasting perspectives on venture science, genomics
business models and on scientist-entrepreneurs in way that are almost a caricature of contrasts. As already
mentioned, Millennium's aggressive, large-scale, broad-platform approach contrasts with Variagenics' more
hypothesis driven approach. Both companies owe their allegiance to MIT. Millennium was co-founded by
Eric Lander of the Whitehead Center, while Variagenics' co-founder is David Housman of the MIT Biology
department. These are two of the most well known academic genome scientists. Lander has been both a
scientific and a political leader of the public genome sequencing effort, and the Whitehead sequencing
center has been the largest public sequencing center in the US. Housman, meanwhile, was one of the first
scientists to develop techniques for the positional cloning of disease genes, something that is particularly
important in haplotype analysis and association studies of complex genetic diseases.
Lander and Housman are almost anti-types. Lander is aggressive, brash, loud-spoken and a major
public figure and spokesman for genomics. He is a glamorous scientist. Housman, on the other hand, is
soft-spoken and mild mannered. It is almost impossible to have a conversation with Lander on one's own
terms, because it is evident that he constantly has another eighteen things on his mind at the same time,
and is very good therefore in reframing conversations in terms of his own thought processes. Housman, on
the other hand, is an extremely attentive listener, carefully frames everything that he says and conveys the
impression of being completely wrapped up in the conversation he is having. Lander's academic center is
almost by definition an industrial enterprise because of its location in the Genome Project. Housman is very
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careful to keep his academic work distinct from his company work, and takes great care to ensure that his
students aren't conflicted between the two in any way. The different images that Millennium and Variagenics
project - the former as the ambitious biopharmaceutical company of the future, the latter as a small biotech
company that focuses on specific problems that are likely to be of interest to drug development - uncannily
mirror not only the personalities of the respective founders, but also the respective status of the academic
centers that the founders are affiliated to. While MIT's Biology department is one of the most prestigious in
the world, it doesn't quite have the corporate glamour that the Whitehead has managed to cultivate for itself.
The difference between a broad spectrum approach such as Millennium's and a more focused
approach such as Variagenics' is that in the former case the primary onus is on screening a large amount of
DNA, and seeing what emerges, whereas in the latter case the focus is on specific biological impacts, and
the correlation of various genomic parameters to those impacts. Looking from the get-go for just those
polymorphisms that have biological impact is an extremely useful way of reducing costs, though as
mentioned in the body of the chapter, it might lead to an overlooking of factors that aren't expected from
biological impact hypotheses that are generated by studying parameters such as allele frequency, linkage
disequilibrium and structural modeling. Haplotype analysis is major strategy to narrow SNP information into
data sets that are more manageable, and also perhaps more informative about co-inheritance pattems of
various SNPs, and therefore their likely association with complex disease states. It therefore is a
cornerstone of Variagenics' strategy, and much of the challenge there is to come up with bioinformatic
haplotype prediction algorithms. However, as mentioned in the body of the chapter, haplotyping can be an
extremely useful diagnostic tool because haplotypes can serve as genomic markers for various diseases.
They are, however, much poorer predictors of drug response. This again hints at the relatively limited utility
that haplotyping would have for a company whose primary long-term aim really is drug development. While
every biotech company says they would like eventually like to produce drugs, Variagenics' strategy does
suggest that its longer term evolution, if it continues this way, will be primarily into a diagnostic company
rather than one that develops therapeutics as its primary focus. Ironically, as Myriad's continuing success
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with its diagnostic kit for the brca genes shows, diagnostics may well be a more profitable and less risky
business strategy than therapeutic development, given the greater ease of diagnostic development
compared to drug development, and given the larger market size: in a testing society, as I will further argue
in the next section, every individual becomes a likely candidate for a diagnostic test, whereas one needs to
have a pathology (or a significant likelihood of pathology) before one becomes a therapeutic consumer. I will
use this comparison of Millennium and Variagenics as a springboard into the next part of my chapter, which
precisely talks about the affects of genomic information operating as scientific fact on (would-be) patients-
as-consumers.
8.2: Genomic Fetishism and Polymorphic Subjects
This part of the chapter asks the question of the relationality of epistemic shifts to the
constitution of subjects, where scientific knowledge, the episteme in question, derives its
authority from its perceived objectivity, making this a question, similar to that asked by Joseph
Dumit in his analysis of what he calls "objective self-fashioning", of the relationship between
what he calls (using Merleau-Ponty) the objective and the lived body (Dumit 1998). It is a
question that demands the understanding of the functioning of facts as "facts-in-the-world" (86).
Dumit defines objective self-fashioning as follows:
The objective self is an active category of the person that is developed through references
to expert knowledge and is invoked through facts. The objective self is also an embodied
theory of human nature, both scientific and popular. Objective self-fashioning calls
attention to the equivocal site of this production of new objective knowledge of the self.
From one perspective, science produces facts that define who our selves are objectively,
which we then accept. From another perspective, our selves are fashioned by us out of the
facts available to us through the media, and these categories of persons are in turn the
cultural basis from which new theories of human nature are constructed (88-89).
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What is at stake, no less, from these factual configurations, are individual identity
formations, collective identity formations, and what (and who) gets counted - as humans, normal,
diseased, patients, consumers and so on - in various ways and multiple institutional contexts. I
am interested here in tracing some of the mechanisms by which such configurations, of identity
and subjectivity through scientific fact, take place.
The (implicit?) Foucauldian argument is that epistemic shifts directly lead to the
constitution of subjects. My argument will be that it is precisely the interstices between epistemic
shift and subject constitution that need to be examined in order to understand the constructed and
contingent relationship between knowledge and subjectivity, in this case between the subject (as
in discipline) and the subject (as in constituted person) of genetics. Paul Rabinow has used the
term biosociality to point to the phenomenon of the increased co-production of biology and
society (Rabinow 1992). My question regards the mechanisms of articulation of the "bio" and the
"social" that allow emergent manifestations of biosociality.
I ask these questions around the node of SNPs. I divide this section into three parts. In the
first two parts, I will analyze the epistemic shift that SNPs reflect, from the earlier related concept
of mutant; firstly by looking at the types of meanings embedded in the mutant subject, and then
by looking at how those meanings reconstitute themselves into a discursive framework of risk
with the emergence of SNPs. I then ask the question of how SNP information becomes accepted
as legitimate scientific fact, leading to a genetically deterministic conception of the human
subject.
Epistemic Shift: From Mutants to SNPs
SNPs have emerged as much more than informational artifacts. They have emerged as
targets of ownership that structure institutional reconfigurations, and are equally new forms of
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knowledge, representing and identifying individual human beings as particular collections of
specific genetic variations. But first, let me briefly outline the epistemic shift that SNPs mark in
the understanding of genetic subjects, by contrasting them to mutants.
I shall start by making the distinction between the study of mutants and mutagenesis.
Mutants have always been important to genetics, and before. But the ability to generate mutants
intentionally is quite a different thing, and has become more and more directed, more pinpointed,
through the past century. In a mutation, a gene gets knocked out. Prior to recombinant DNA
technology, however, there was no way of knowing where in the gene the mutation had occurred,
and how -- single base change, insertion of DNA or deletion of DNA. Gene cloning and
sequencing therefore empowered mutagenesis by allowing the knocked-out gene to be localized.
This means that recombinant DNA technology (RDT) allows the isolation and study of single
genes. Mutagenesis is not new, but the specificity and site-directedness that RDT allows brings
the gene into play as the mutated subject. While specificity is the key term here, the vel of
specificity is at the level of the individual gene.
In other words, mutants now aren't there to just be studied: they can be precisely, at the
level of genetic engineering, be created.
Conceptualizing a world of mutants: A world of normality and pathology
The first thing to make clear is that a mutant subject cannot exist without the formulation
of the corresponding concept of the wild-type. Now the wild-type is an interesting term: a term
that in its most simplistic guise is one used to denote an unmutated organism, but is often
understood, by its very construction, to denote an organism as it is found in the wild. A wild-type
organism is, however, very much an artificial construct. Nature is extremely unlikely to have
wild-types (indeed, the very concept of an "unmutated" genotype is an anachronism, since
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genotypes themselves have arisen as a consequence of both natural selection and mutation), only
a range of uncontrolled and uncharacterized mutants, some with a greater selective advantage
than others. "Wild-type" strains, therefore, like so many other constructions of the laboratory, are
analytical tools rather than replicas of nature, as their name would have us assume. Equally, and
more important for the argument here, they are essential analytical tools in a world of
mutagenesis, where the mutant needs to be in oppositional relationship to a "normal" referral
point, of which the mutant is an error. But a mutant, further, is an error of a particular type - a
type that has value attached to it. Mutants are not just different from wild-types: they are deviants
from the wild-type norm.
A wild-type, therefore, is not a "normal" entity, in the sense that it is not an entity that
one would normally find in nature. But it is a norm. A norm, according to Georges Canguilhem,
"does not exist, it plays its role which is to devalue existence by allowing its correction"
(Canguilhem 1989 [1989]: 77). A norm is also, as Derrida points out, an extremely equivocal
concept, since "it encompasses both the concept of moral, ethical, political law as well as the
concept of factuality. The norm is also sometimes imposed as a fact, in the name of which one
normalizes precisely" (Derrida 2002a: 199). A wild-type serves as the reference point compared
to which mutants are devalued.
Mutants are studied in order to understand relationships between gene structure and
function. A far-fetched, but certainly not untrue, extension of this latter function in the context of
the laboratory / clinic interface is that they can thus tell scientists of disease. A state of
"unwellness" is identified, studied and treated as a disease because there were people who fell
sick, who told doctors of their disease. A way of understanding disease without requiring people
to fall ill first is to use model organisms - so scientists create mutants (or study appropriately
existing ones) so that abnormalities can be better detected and understood when manifested as
human disease. The mutant helps advance knowledge about normal organisms - research on
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Oncomice, for example, will hopefully help researchers understand normal cell differentiation.
And that is where the distinction between the normal and the norm can be teased out: an
Oncomouse needs a wild-type, non-Oncomouse in order for it to be an Oncomouse, but the
insights into normality that it provides are not necessarily facets of "normality" that any particular
wild-type mouse actually exhibits - it is an idealized normality that is only defined itself in terms
of the pathological Oncomouse, a normality that is defined in terms not of natural occurrence but
in terms of absence of pathology. In other words, a mutant serves to tell us how a non-mutant
would not work, rather than telling us how a wild-type works.
Lab mutants, therefore, operate on a terrain of normality versus pathology and have
attached to them the (generally negative) value of deviance with respect to a referent norm.
The minute one grants that genes, and pathways, interact with one another (i.e. the minute
one looks up from the level of single genes to see what they are doing at a larger cellular level -
one doesn't even need to look as far up as the organism), one must acknowledge the existence of
feedback effects mediated by various components on the activities of others. Mutants, as
metaphorical constructions, and genes, as conceptual vantage points, offer vital perspectives on
biological systems, but these are at best partial perspectives that pose as complete.
One limitation, then, of a mutant / single gene - eye view of the world is that phenotypes
tend to get equated with the existence of single genes, rather than with their interactions with
others. The other limitation is that one needs a phenotype in the first place to get talking. In the
language of mutants, if you don't have a phenotype, you don't have a conversation.
From model organisms to human diseases: the emergence of SNPs
The shift from classical to molecular genetics accords a new place for and understanding
of mutants: from anomalous organisms that help understand evolution to specifically altered
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genes that help simulate deviance in order to understand normality. But when one goes beyond
the study of model organisms to the understanding of diseases in humans, many of the
imperfections in the mutants-eye view of the world could be damning imperfections. Even
without entering the nature - nurture debate, the well established polygenicity of most diseases
makes it impossible to evolve an understanding of human disease on the basis of human gene
information that doesn't take into account interactions and pleiotropy.
There is a discontinuity in molecular biology that allows this necessary discontinuity in
perspective, and that is the SNP. At one level the discontinuity from mutant to SNP is one that
has technological causes and consequences: SNPs become possible and feasible markers because
of the Human Genome Project, but simultaneously are landmarks that both make human genome
sequencing easier and potentially more lucrative (in terms of helping generate pegs upon which
the translation from gene sequence to therapy can be made). There is a subtle change in
perspective that SNPs bring about from mutants. An equation of one mutation with one
phenotype in the former case gets subtly altered to become an equation of a number of variations
with the probability of a particular phenotype. SNPs, therefore, bring about discursive and
conceptual shifts in the language and understanding of molecular biology. Further, SNPs bring a
different perspective to light, a perspective that has to do with risk rather than deviance. SNPs
talk about susceptibilities and predispositions, rather than abnormalities or aberrations. The key
difference between mutations and SNPs is one between deviation and difference. Obviously
SNPs, unlike mutants, do not show a strict correlation between individual phenotype and genetic
aberration. A human who is considered in every respect to be healthy could well have variations
at the nucleotide level, but these variations do not constitute deviance against a constructed
standard of normality - they do, however, constitute the possibility of risk, of future pathology. A
SNP is not a pathology, but an anomaly: something that, according to Canguilhem (1989 [1966]),
can "shade into disease but does not constitute one" (140).
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SNPs are not about the simple correlation of a mutation to its phenotype: they are about
variations in genomes, rather than differences in genes; and variations within and between whole
populations, rather than differences between a "normal" and a "mutant" individual. In terms of
level, therefore, SNPs provide a peculiar bifocality: on the one hand, the immediate level of
analysis is even smaller than the gene, it is the nucleotide; but on the other hand, it is an analysis
that can only be undertaken when the nucleotide is set in the context of whole populations. Few
SNPs are likely to be involved in disease, the way a mutation is involved in giving rise to an
aberrant phenotype: what SNPs allow is the identification of patterns of inheritance that affect
health.
This implies a contradiction at the very heart of the sorts of knowledge personalized
medicine relies upon, a contradiction that has to do with the fact that this is a knowledge gained
from an increasedly molecular understanding of life itself. The more things get molecularized,
however, the more one needs to rely on statistical, population-based data in order to
"individualize" therapy. So one can only individualize therapy on the basis of population
classifications. These are classifications that are extremely difficult to construct, as Jenny
Reardon's (2000) work on the history of the Human Genome Diversity Project shows. In fact,
what is at stake, from the get-go, is the question of what in fact "populations" are, as opposed to
"races", or other forms of ethnic categorization, in order to be subjects for genetic analysis.
These dilemmas of classifying populations, and defining what sort of categorizations
need to be assumed as "populations" in the first place before the subsequent of act of classifying
within those categories can take place, is particularly evident in India, where something like race,
as a "natural" unit within which to classify populations, doesn't have the same ready-made social-
scientific valence as it does in the United States. Classifying populations for genetic studies on
the basis of caste is equally fraught, both politically and epistemologically, and is made more
complicated by the fact that kinship patterns, that would profoundly effect the purported genetic
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"homogeneity" of the population in question, vary widely between different parts of India (North
Indian communities being traditionally more exogamous than South Indian communities). And
yet, classifying populations for genetic studies is absolutely essential for a genomic endeavor,
such as that of the Indian state as driven by the Centre for Biochemical Technology (CBT), that
has identified population genetics as the way to go to establish India's presence in global genomic
knowledge production. Research at CBT has population genetics as its cornerstone, which means
that researchers at CBT really need to be able to define what populations are in order to even
begin to tackle the scientific agenda that they have set for themselves.
Such definitions, I discovered, are usually made by taking recourse to the
Anthropological Survey of India's voluminous atlas, People of India (Singh 1992-). However,
sometimes more random and violent classificatory methods are adopted. Therefore, I encountered
one project that claimed an attempt to discover the genetic differences between Aryans and
Dravidians, categories that are not merely politically fraught (especially when expressed in those
very terms), but also, in the real world, quite difficult to establish, since it excludes a wide range
of non-Brahmin, non-Dravidian people who might well trace back to "Aryan" and "Dravidian"
(or some combination of both) roots. The DNA samples of "Aryans" and "Dravidians" that this
particular researcher was collecting, further, came from students who were identified as
belonging to one or the other category in nearby Delhi University: a particularly cosmopolitan
site for sample collection, in all probability teaming with donors containing all manners of
genetically hybrid DNA. Six months into the project, this researcher, himself a Brahmin (and
thereby, I suppose, of the population category "Aryan") abandoned it because he couldn't find
genetic differences of statistical significance between the two groups. Instead of acknowledging
this as a possible consequence of the genetic similarity between different population groups, as
Lewontin (1993), for instance, argues for, this researcher indicated his frustration that the samples
probably came from "genetically impure" people, descendants of such - to the researcher -
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unthinking foreparents who intermarried across these wonderfully convenient (and probably for
the researcher, sacrosanct) population binaries. It was hard to discern whether this researcher felt
greater contempt because his experiments couldn't provide elegant answers to the fundamental
genetic differences between Aryans and Dravidians, or at the thought that the Aryan forebears of
his experimental subjects might have been "contaminated" by Dravidian blood.
While much of this chapter focusses on genetic determinism as individualized (and that
especially plays out thus in regimes of personalized medicine), the purpose of this above
argument is to show that myths of genetic homogeneity amongst populations are an equally
powerful constituent of this determinist knowledge producing enterprise. Indeed, this tension
between the genetic myths that underlie population genomic projects that seek ultimately to be
vehicles towards the generation of personalized medicine, and the individualized risk of genetic
determinism as a consequence of regimes of personalized medicine that imply personalized DNA
diagnostic profiles, is seen equally powerfully in the controversial case of the Icelandic Health
Sector Database of DeCode Genetics. DeCode really was a company that was pitched as unique
because its DNA samples came from the "genetically homogenous" Icelandic population. On the
one hand, the myth of the value of genetic homogeneity in order to do population genetics
experiments has been questioned by such companies as the Irish population genomics company
Hibergen, which claims that it can still generate population genetic information as valuable as
DeCode's even though the Irish population is less genetically homogenous than the Icelandic is
supposed to be225 (indicating, in other words, that the purported homogeity of the Icelandic
population is not DeCode's most significant competitive advantage); and indeed has been
questioned by population genetics enterprises such as CBT's, who believe, in contradiction to
DeCode, that it is the genetic heterogeneity of the Indian population, coupled with large Indian
family sizes, and as yet very little genetic counseling, that allows CBT to do the sorts of extensive
25 Based on a conversation with one of the co-founders of Hibergen, Patrick Vaughan.
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linkage analyses across families that are just not possible to the same extent in places like Iceland,
Ireland or the US. On the other hand, the myth of genetic homogeneity itself seems to be getting
eroded from the sorts of knowledge DeCode has started producing, which suggests, rather like the
experiments of the CBT researcher I mentioned do, that more contaminating mischief was
probably happening in the Icelandic ports with sailors of non-Icelandic stock than the Icelandic
myths of genetic homogeneity are willing to admit.
Of course, the purpose of this argument is not simply to show how classificatory
categories may take recourse to mythical and ideological conceptions of pure population histories
that are debunked by the very impure stories that the DNA tells, but also to show the epistemic
violence that can get enacted when these classificatory artefacts might start operating as scientific
fact (see Bowker and Star 2000) - a violence that might very well have both been enacted, and
been more than simply epistemic, had the CBT researcher in fact claimed to find genetic
differences between Aryans and Dravidians.
But a little bit more about discontinuity - how do discontinuities, and shifts in concepts,
metaphors and perspectives occur? One way I have alluded to is technological. But another way
of looking at discursive shifts within science is by locating them in the context of discursive shifts
without, as Ludwig Fleck's studies on the course of syphilis research do (Fleck 1979 [1935]). A
similar relationship between macro-cultural anxieties and the rhetorical practices of science might
be posed for the risk discourse surrounding SNPs, by situating them in the contemporary societal
context of what Ulrich Beck calls the Risk Society.
In his book Risk Society, Beck (1986) describes how contemporary society can be
visualized not in terms of the class-based logic of wealth distribution, but in terms of a new
inverse logic of risk distribution. What he brings out that is important and relevant in the context
of this chapter is, firstly, the importance in contemporary (at least Western) society of having a
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knowledge of the risk one is at; and secondly, of the breakdown of traditional class alliances and a
concomitant individuation of society. Even though the risks of disease that SNPs foretell aren't
specifically risks of modernization, that is the theme of Beck's thesis, the importance of SNPs
highlight the pervasive influence and importance of risk discourse in late modernity. Indeed,
comparing the risk discourse around SNPs with the risk discourse that Beck traces shows how
risk discourse, that starts becoming important in the 1960s and 1970s around issues of
environmental risk, gets displaced by a risk discourse that gets intensely associated with lifestyle
and genetics. In the process, as Ilana Lowy suggests, risk operates as a moral technology, and is
very much a part of the ethical terrain of biocapitalism.
A number of facets of Beck's vision of Risk Society play interestingly with a SNP-eye
view of the world. For Beck, Risk Society is a society that always has potential catastrophe within
its calculus - the "exceptional condition", according to him, "becomes the norm" (Beck 1986:
24); as indeed is the case with SNPs, where variability, rather than a constructed "normality", is
the norm. Secondly, according to Beck, "sciences' monopoly on rationality is broken" (29). And
so with SNPs: SNPs do not tell us the truth about a human condition as much as they express
probabilities of how that human condition might evolve in the future - SNPs ultimately operate
within a framework of probability statements. For Beck, Risk Society has "no perfect system, no
perfect human being" (30); and indeed, SNPs do not have room for wild-types.
The other important perspective is the individuation of contemporary risk society, in
which there are no "natural" class-based alliances. The risks associated with possible disease are
intensely individual risks, and theoretically, each individual has her own risk / probability illness
profile, that could be calculated from her SNP profile. And indeed, that is what the ultimate aim
of SNP research is: pharmacogenomics, or individualized prophylaxis or therapy based on each
individual's unique genetic profile - a profile whose uniqueness can only be established at the
nucleotide level.
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The rationale of SNPs is ultimately to generate individualized therapy. So SNPs are not
just situatable in a discursive context of risk, but also in the social context of capitalism -
individuals, in a SNP's-eye view of the world, aren't classified as "normal" or "diseased", but
every individual is a potential target for therapy, and every individual's genetic profile is a
potential commodity.
Knowledge - Subjectivity I. Commodification
The therapeutic intervention that gets envisaged by SNPs is personalized medicine. As
the contemporary discursive terrain of knowledge production is also inevitably the capitalist
terrain of value generation, each probabilistically interpellated polymorphic subject becomes not
just a target of possible intervention but also a consumer - in - waiting. Personalized medicine,
should it ever be realized, is undoubtedly envisaged as a commodity. Further, the possibility of
personalized medicine is insurance (for the patient, against future illness), just as the always-
already existent patient-as-consurner is insurance for the pharmaceutical company. As Francois
Ewald has argued, the concept of risk is deeply tied into the concept of insurance, to the extent
that risk itself is capital (see Burchell et al 1991: 197-210). In other words, SNPs are imbricated
in two distinct types of risk discourse: the patient's risk of future disease (the individuation that
Beck speaks of) is inseparable from the pharmaceutical company's risk of high investment in
therapeutic development that must be realized in an eventual commodity.
My divergence from Beck is similar to that of other more "Foucauldian" theorists of risk
such as Robert Castel, Francois Ewald or Pat O'Malley. In Beck's Risk Society scenario, potential
catastrophes are foreseeable, but their potential governability by insurance and other statistical
calculations of risk is not explicitly theorized. I am, on the other hand, precisely interested in the
relationship of this foreseeability to governability, and to governmentality.
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Knowledge 9 Subjectivity II: Interpellation
My argument so far has been that a particular discursive - epistemic shift allows a
reconfiguration of subject categories away from normality and pathology towards variability and
risk, thereby placing every individual within a probability calculus of becoming a potential target
for therapeutic intervention. This is quite compatible with a Foucauldian analysis. There is,
however, a major denial that gets effected through the standard Foucauldian collapse of epistemic
shift with subject constitution, and that is the denial of ideology, one of the major points of
divergence between Foucault and Marxism.
I use ideology in a much broader sense here than the classical Marxist formulation
initially allowed. In my definition, I consider the ideological as the reification as "real" of
something that is not necessarily just ideational but constructed. The ideological step in such a
broadened conception is not illusion but the naturalized and apparently independent
thingification of something that is historically, contingently and relationally constructed. This is
closer indeed to the notion, central to the later Marx, of fetishism. The distinctness of capitalist
(commodity) fetishism from pre-capitalist fetishism is taken for granted in much Marxist
theorizing of fetishism. The basic difference between the two forms of fetishism that emerges is
the alienation from human association that marks the fetishized commodity, an alienation that
finds expression through expropriation, divestiture and the ideological masking of capitalist
exchange processes as natural rather than contingent and relational.
Knowledge 9 Subjectivity III: Subjective Fetishism
Let me shift analysis now from the fetishism of the commodity to the fetishism of
scientific knowledge, before moving on to analyze how the two articulate in the case of
commodified scientific knowledges such as around SNPs to in-form subjects. The fetishism of
scientific knowledge operates by mechanisms similar to commodity fetishism. Indeed the
moment of mystification through fetishism is less through the "illusory" appearance of scientific
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knowledge as true than through the appearance as natural something that is contingent and
socially constructed. I call this mystification of scientific knowledge as a natural thing-in-itself
that merely awaits ready-made discovery rather than the material-semiotic-conceptual outcome of
real historical processes of knowledge production epistemicfetishism.226
The ideological power of epistemic fetishism comes from the fact that the mystification
that elevates a statement established by rigorous scientific method into that natural and ahistorical
thing-in-itself the Scientific Fact is invisible. Genetic determinism acquires the status of scientific
"fact" at the same time that scientists hasten to tell us that SNPs are merely a set of probability
statements. The irony - and power - of epistemic fetishism is that probability statements start
operating with determinate legitimacy. Probability statements, therefore, acquire performative
force. When confronted with the question of what one does when confronted with a probability
statement, the absence of an obvious response allows the probability statement to harden into a
reified statement of prophecy. Therefore, it is a fetishism that is at once an operation of
naturalization (the denial of the history of construction of a statement) as it is an operation that,
while naturalizing the statement, shifts it from being a statement of association to one of
causality. This mode of discursive operation is nicely described by Foucault (1989: 12), as he
describes the nature of questions posed by such philosophers as Cavaill/s, Koyr,, Bachelard and
Canguilhem, or by members of the Frankfurt School:
These questionings are those which must be addressed to a rationality which makes
universal claims while developing in contingency; which asserts its unity and yet
proceeds only by means of partial modification when not by general recastings; which
authenticates itself through its own sovereignity but which in its history is perhaps not
dissociated from inertias, weights which coerce it, subjugate it.... [W]hat we are to
226 Of course the power of epistemic fetishism cannot be divorced from its functioning as truth-claim; rather
than using the apparent "truthfulness" consequent to epistemic fetishism of the scientific fact as the
explanation, however, it is precisely such a functioning as truth-claim that I wish to ultimately attempt to
explain.
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examine essentially is a reason whose autonomy of structures carries with itself the
history of dogmatisms and despotisms - a reason which, consequently, has the effect of
emancipation only on the condition that it succeeds in freeiIg itself of itself.
Yet the question still remains -- how does this reification happen?
An example of an understanding of the "facts" represented by SNPs that emerges from
the blurred boundaries of scientific-business articulation is encapsulated in the following quote
from Signals magazine, an online magazine for biotechnology executives:
Coming soon: A global genomic map of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), the
tiny differences between two people's DNA that largely determine everything from who's
the natural athlete to who's the klutz to who's likely to get lung cancer from smoking and
who's not. In the not-so-distant future, scientists will also be able to tell who's at risk for
cardiovascular disease, whatever their lifestyle, as well as who will respond, or not, to
this drug or that. But the techniques now used for discovering or mapping SNPs are
costly, tedious and Ph.D.-intensive. The real mark of a SNP-detection assay scale-up will
be its downward mobility: For characterizing huge numbers of SNPs among large
populations, cheap, fast and easy is the way to go.227
Statements like these, on the "margins" of science, occupy a liminal space, where they
can be comfortably disavowed by scientists as not "their" facts while being allowed legitimate co-
existence. It is in this liminal space that "unscientific" statements undergo factuosclerosis to
harden into legitimate fact,228 and the epistemically fetishized object gets formed.
227 From Signals magazine, an online magazine that analyses biotechnology for executives.
www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/0/DEC74B56C34589DC882567D 1 006C676E. The genetic
determinism in this quote is particularly striking: it is interesting and vital to see how it is precisely such
deterministic language that is shed in, for instance, the promotion of cloning. It is also striking to note how
SNPs simultaneously seem to represent information about individuals, populations and the "globe".
228 The inspiration for this ugly but I think rather evocative word is Helen Watson-Verran's wonderful
phrase "hardening of the categories" (Watson-Verran 1995). It is important to remember, however, that
genetic determinism does not merely occupy the "margins" of science; nor is such construction disavowed
by all scientists. Many sociobiologists, most notably Richard Dawkins, swear by it. Also see Chapter 3 for
an account of articles in journals such as Nature Genetics that subscribe to the ideological notion of single-
gene diseases.
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And yet statements alone are often necessary yet insufficient to in-form subjects. For that
the (quasi-)scientific statement of genetic determinism needs material-semiotic allies. It is the
articulation of the deterministic statement to / as an artefactual representational device, the DNA
chip, that ties the statement not just to the constitution of facts but to the constitution of subjects
(the DNA chip, as described in the Prologue, being a lcm x lcm silicon chip on which it is
possible to represent an individual's entire SNP profile).
My analysis of epistemic fetishism so far owes much to Donna Haraway's concept of
gene fetishism (Haraway 1997)229. Gene fetishism, operating as it does in a capitalist framework
that naturalizes gene-as-property, is a capitalist fetish, and yet is distinct from commodity
fetishism. For Haraway, the moment of fetishization is not just the naturalization but the
corporealization of the gene as not just a thing-in-itself, but as a thing-in-itself that stands in for
and completely represents what is essentially a relationally constituted subject (whether gene or
organism). I would like to take Haraway's notion a little further, to argue that gene fetishism is a
form of subjective fetishism, in which the fetishism of the object (which is simultaneously, in
case of SNPs, the chip, the information on the chip, and the facticity of the information on the
chip) operates not by alienation - the assumption of a transcendental thing-in-itself status - but by
interpellation. It is through the constitution of a polymorphic subject that the ideological-
scientific "fact" of genetic determinism gets constituted. However, this subject constitution
occurs in an epistemic and ideological space in which the determinants - information,
representational device, subject - are always-already over-determined as "naturally"
commodifiable. In other words, the oppositional tension between commodity fetishism as
alienating from subjective association, and non-capitalist ("pre-capitalist") fetishism as intensely
subject-associated implode through scientific-capitalist technologies of representation such as
SNPs, SNP databases and DNA chips, and constitute subjects as genetically determined sets of
229 Haraway (1998) indeed in her analysis of gene fetishism refers to it as "epistemological fetishism".
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probability statements (as statements of risk) simultaneous to their constitution as always-already
future (x%) probable targets of individual therapeutic intervention. In the latter case, they are
constituted not (just) as subjects of the state in a Foucauldian / Althusserian manner, but also as
consumers - as (future) buyers or (future) therapies. Thereby, the ideology of the inevitability,
beneficence and naturalness of the pharmaceutical market as the means to therapy gets
constituted simultaneously with the constitution of subjects and of scientific facts. Genomic
fetishes are market(able)s.
Before moving further, then, it would be worthwhile to summarize the various fetishistic
operations that I have alluded to, in this chapter and earlier in the thesis, as constitutive of
biocapitalism. There is, firstly, the fetishism of technoscientific production as simply an outcome
of private intellectual labor, which underlies regimes of intellectual property protection that I
have described in Chapters 4 and 5. Secondly, there is the fetishization of time, as having material
value. Thirdly, there is the reification of scientific fact, and fourthly, the fetishization of humans
as patients- and consumers-in-waiting, along with the fetishization of the gene as constitutive of
humans in the first place, the latter three fetishes together constitutive of what I call genomic
fetishism. In other words, understanding the fetishistic ensembles that constitute the modes of
abstraction in biocapitalism involves understanding the articulations not just of an alienating
(commodity) fetishism and an interpellating (subjective) fetishism that marks genomic fetishism,
but further understanding how these articulate with the fetishization of time, when speed itself
represents capital.
In outlining the history of the discovery and functional elucidation of tRNA, Hans-Jorg Rheinberger
argues that the material culture in which experimental biology is situated profoundly impacts both the type of
and the manner in which "knowledge' gets produced (Rheinberger 1997). It is equally clear, by looking at a
SNP lab, how agendas for the type of and manner in which experimental biology gets produced has
implications for a lab's material culture. The latter, indeed, is intuitive, but even so the material culture of
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what should more properly be called a "functional genomics" lab, is a dramatic representation of the sorts of
transformations, technological and disciplinary, that genomics marks.
An example of this is the Whitehead Institute's center for functional genomics, one of the major
basic research labs working on SNPs, and one of the early users of Affymetrix DNA chips.
The Whitehead Institute is one of the most prestigious centers for academic biology research in the
world. It is a semi-autonomous institute with links to MIT, so that Whitehead faculty members all have dual
appointments at MIT (the inverse isn't necessarily true). Much of the Whitehead's recent clout comes from
its involvement as one of the major centers in the Human Genome Project (HGP). Indeed, the Whitehead
has been responsible for generating about 30% of the public genome sequence, making it the largest of the
public sequencing centers in the US.230 There is a lot more to the Whitehead Institute than its Genome
Center, but in terms of space the Genome Center has rather "taken over' the Whitehead. So, in addition to
the original Whitehead Institute building on Main Street are two other buildings in different parts of
Cambridge that house the Genome Center. There is a building where sequencing takes place, and then
there is the building that houses the functional genomics unit. It is the latter that is responsible for making
sense, in some of the many ways that it is possible to make sense, of genome sequence information, and it
is this center that done a lot of research on gene expression using Affymetrix chip technology. Both
buildings of the Genome Center are part of what might be called the Lander lab' (or the multiple Lander
labs), Eric Lander being the head of genomics at the Whitehead in addition to being one of the superstars of
the HGP, and a co-founder of Millennium Pharmaceuticals.
The Whitehead functional genomics lab is at Kendall Square, which is what my informant there
calls a vanity address".2 31 It is a rather characterless and incongruous block of offices rising up in the
230 The Sanger Centre in the UK has also sequenced about a third of the genome, making it the other major
contributor to the public sequence.
231 Getting access to the Whitehead is about as difficult as getting access to a biotech company. Unlike the
latter, the Whitehead's fears aren't about an anthropologist having access to proprietary information, but
about the amount of time an anthropologist's presence might waste there. I was, therefore, formally refused
permission to do extended participant observation at the Whitehead by one of the lab supervisors at the
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middle of an otherwise rather characterful array of shops and restaurants around a lively red-brick square
tenanted by lots of brunch eaters and hot-dog stalls.
The inside of the center looks more like a corporate office than a lab: plush orange carpeting, a
reception-hall with a secretary: no smells or lab-coats or chemical muck here. No signs of any of that even
on the bench of the post-doc showing me around, which only had a computer as testimony of any work: this
could have been a cubicle out of Dilbert. But there were a few, perhaps three, rather sterile workbenches
behind her 'bench", and it was on one of these that I got my first glimpse of the famed Affymetrix chips.
Pretty much like I expected them to look, small and rectangular and looking like fancy microscope slides.
But the process of hybridizing and detecting on them is a complicated one, and completely automated.
There is a whole, rather large, room that just houses the machines into which the chips are locked in,
buttons turned on, and readouts obtained. There were also, on the post-doc's bench, some glass slides that
were in the process of being turned into more inexpensive, homemade DNA chips.
In the center of the floor was a bizarre spiral staircase that looked like something out of a
spaceship in a 1960s version of 'Star Trek". Downstairs is what is called the variant" group, which does a
lot of comparative genomics work. Now this looked like what a molecular biology lab pre-genomics would
look like, though much larger and more spacious - more like a factory than a lab almost. Known
appropriately as a "wet lab" (in contrast to bioinformatics labs that have just computers in them), this floor
had an area to pour gels in, and shelves stacked with measuring cylinders, and proper lab benches. Much
of the upstairs, as I said, just housed offices with computers in them, many of them very plush and
secluded. Much of my conversation with the post-doc did indeed revolve around organizational structure,
and it is a peculiarly organized place, with these two groups, that seem hardly to interact at all, constituting
the interdisciplinary space of "functional genomics".23 2
functional genomics centre. This makes me particularly grateful to the post-doc who took the time to show
me around the center on her own initiative.
232 The gendering of this space, I think, is particularly striking, with the "intellectual" computational work
taking place upstairs and the "wet" lab work taking place downstairs. Indeed, intuitively, one would think
that it would make sense to have the space arranged the other way around, since it is the wet lab that
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The big question for me then is how the biologists and the informaticists talk, and I think it is the
produces noxious chemical waste that one presumably wouldn't want to have wafting up into the
bioinformatics area. This abstract question of gendering hardened into quite an explicit division of labor at
CBT, India's flagship public sector genome lab that I write about elsewhere in this dissertation. The head of
CBT, Sameer Brahmachari, is quite clear that it is men who make good bioinformaticians, and women who
make good wet lab workers, because the former are "genetically" better equipped for mental work, the
latter so for the more tedious, manual wet lab work. This determinist (and pre-determined) division has
some consequence for his hiring practices at CBT. While there are a few women in the CBT bioinformatics
facility, there are no men at all in its sequencing and genotyping unit, and I was assured that that was a
conscious policy and not coincidence. Many thanks to Alexandru Balasescu for drawing my attention to the
gendered nature of the Whitehead's spatial organization
3 Of course, such sites also immediately complexify Lander's extremely public image as a "public"
scientist opposed to private genome companies patenting gene sequences. It must be mentioned here that
Millennium, while broadly speaking a genome company, doesn't have the generation of sequence databases
as its primary locus of value, but rather concentrates on more downstream parts of the value chain, and
ultimately is trying to become a drug development company itself. Therefore, there is no business
contradiction in Lander's opposition to gene patenting as a "public" scientist while being on the Board of a
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peculiar combination of these two sets of people that contributes to the peculiar architecture, and the
peculiar patterns of conversation - it must be weird working on what might be called the same thing, but
coming from completely different universes; and that's reflected just in the different natures of the two floors,
with the spiral (helical???) staircase in between. The meeting point, really, is 'making sense out of data",
which of course works two ways: the informaticists trying to make sense of and generate databases out of
the chip results, and the biologists helping to give biological meaning to the vast amounts of computer
information the informaticists generate.
There are then the larger institutional relationships, with the group's lab meetings often being
attended by people from Millennium Pharmaceuticals, which is housed a few floors below in the same
building. As mentioned earlier, Eric Lander is one of the co-founders of Millennium, which is one of the
leading genome companies anywhere. The Whitehead lab meetings are quite literally physical sites of
diffusion of academic research into industry, and in my opinion (as well as the opinions of many private
genome scientists that I have talked to), a major source of competitive advantage for Millennium.233 The
interaction between the Whitehead and Millennium, indeed, is not just at the level of architecture or informal
interaction. The Whitehead functional genomics group is funded by a consortium that comprises Millennium,
Affymetrix (whose DNA chips are extensively used at the Whitehead) and Bristol-Myers Squibb (with whom
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Millennium has close ties in the area of oncology pharmacogenomics and therapeutics). The Whitehead
consortium therefore brings together, in essence, the major components and actors of the drug
development marketplace, with a functional genomics company, a tool company (as two distinct types of
upstream providers), a big pharmaceutical company downstream, and an academic lab that gets funded by
all three and that feeds basic research into the development programs of its industrial partners. Such
arrangements typify the venture science worlds epitomized by genomics.
8.3: Consumptive Power
Paul Virilio ( 1977) in Speed and Politics talks about the consumption of security in
contemporary, what he calls dromocratic, society (a society run by speed). He says: "We will see
the creation of a common feeling of insecurity that will lead to a new kind of consumption, the
consumption of protection; this latter will progressively come to the fore and become the target of
the whole merchandizing system" (122; emphasis in original). High-throughput diagnostic
capabilities, such as those provided by DNA chips, fit exactly into such a dromological regime.
This is why personalized medicine, genomics and biocapital are all about governmentality in a
Foucauldian sense (see Burchell et al 1991). The consumption of diagnostic tests and drugs are a
means of ensuring security. The consumer of the diagnostic tests quite precisely fits the
description of Virilio's dromocratic consumer: "no longer the one who enriches the nation by
consuming, but the one who invests first and foremost in security, manages his cwn protection as
best as he can, and finally pays more to consume less" (123).
I begin this section by thinking of Foucault through Virilio to emphasize the importance
of generating a more elaborate theory of consumption without reducing capitalist dynamics today
to the dynamics of consumption. Specifically, we need to understand new modes of consumption
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genome company. Rather, his opposition to aggressive gene patenters like Celera and Incyte could be seen
as being not just in the interests of public researchers, but also in Millennium's interests.
of surplus, see whether and how surplus consumption is a defining dynamic of biocapitalism, and
further position risk distribution as itself a perverse form of surplus consumption.
I would like to begin such an analysis by recounting and identifying Marx's analysis of
surplus production (and I will talk later about the importance of still focusing on these dynamics
of production to "get at" a dynamics of consumption, which itself, in the process, is a term that I
will try to decenter and deconstruct at the same time as I try to uphold and explain it).
The key source of exploitation that Marx identifies in the capitalist system is its
generation of surplus value. In order to understand how surplus value leads to exploitation, one
has to firstly understand that the fundamental economic contradiction that Marx is trying to
resolve is the question of how it is that an exchange of equivalents can lead to a generation of
surplus, and secondly to understand Marx's concept of labor power.
That it is labor power rather than labor that the worker exchanges with the capitalist is
crucial, because labor power, as creative potential, is not pre-determined value - it has the
potential for generating surplus ingrained within it. Therefore the apparent act of equivalent
exchange - worker's labor for capitalist's wages - has hidden within it an element of non-
equivalence, because wages are fixed remuneration, but the labor, which is actually labor power,
is the potential for the creation of value that is over and above the money expended in wages.
Surplus value "in general, is value in excess of the equivalent" (Marx 1973 [1857] [henceforth
Grundrisse]: 324). Wages, therefore, constitute for the capitalist productive consumption: "Living
labor belongs just as much among capital's conditions of existence as do raw material and
instrument. Thus it reproduces itself doubly, in its own form, [and] in the worker's consumption,
but only to the extent that it reproduces him as living labor capacity... [Tjhe payment of wages is
an act of circulation which proceeds simultaneously with and alongside the act of production. Or,
as Sismondi says from this perspective - the worker consumes his wages unreproductively; but
the capitalist consumes them productively, since he gets labor in the exchange, which reproduces
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the wages and more than the wages" (Grundrisse: 676, emphasis in original). "If the worker
needs only half a working day in order to live a whole day, then, in order to keep alive as a
worker, he needs to work only half a day. The second half of the labor day is forced labor;
surplus-labour" (Grundrisse: 324).234 Further, as long as the worker is given enough wages to
sustain himself, labor power is constantly renewable.
This is how, therefore, the exchange of equivalents leads to the creation of surplus, which
is the fundamental mystery that Marx is seeking to unravel, and which is something that political
economy has tended always to leave in the realm of mystery. "By virtue of having acquired labor
capacity in exchange as an equivalent, capital has acquired labor time - to the extent that it
exceeds the labor time contained in labor capacity - in exchange without equivalent; it has
appropriated alien labor time without exchange by means of theform of exchange.. .[T]he use-
value of labor capacity, as value, is itself the value-creating force; the substance of value, and the
value-increasing substance. In this exchange, then, the worker receives the equivalent of the labor
time objectified in him, and gives his value-creating, value-increasing living labor time"
(Grundrisse: 674, emphases in original).
Marx therefore distinguishes between necessary and surplus labor-time, the former being
the labor-time required for the worker to reproduce his means of existence i.e. that goes into the
production of use-values. Everything over and above that is surplus labor-time, and leads to
surplus value for the capitalist. In order to generate maximal surplus value, the worker is only
remunerated with enough wages to maintain his subsistence; the attempt of the capitalist is
always to maximize surplus labor-time. It is here that the exploitation of the worker takes place,
in the creation of surplus value.
234 This formulation is central to the articulation of the politics of negation advocated by Antonio Negri
and his Autonomia movement; see Negri (1991 [1984]).
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If the first step in developing an understanding of "consumption" relevant to
biocapitalism (and I purposely hold consumption, for the time being, in quotes) is an
understanding of surplus value from the productive process as being the node of exploitation of
the worker, then the second step is to understand what is meant by subject, which, after all, does
not at all necessarily mean worker. It is this gap between political economic, mainly Marxian,
analyses of labor (as somehow having to do with class, proletariat, relations of production, and so
on), and Foucauldian analyses of subjectivity (which is a word that I have used extensively in this
chapter, and ought definitely to demand problematization by now; but which is also a word that
has becomes integral to the lexicon of what have becomes disciplines such as cultural studies and
medical anthropology, and therefore get bandied about in the unreflexive fashion that any
"canonical" term gets used, and consequently reified and abused), that needs to be bridged if one
is to attempt, as I have been doing, a theorizing that is equally attentive to a Foucauldian politics
of "life, labor and value" (as subjectivity) as it is to a Marxian politics that emphasizes relations
of production.
I ask, then, a set of questions that I ask again in my concluding reflections: If there are
three categories of beings / classes, workers, capitalists and consumers, then who are the
consumers? Both workers and capitalists? To whom then is labor / exploitation invisible?
Certainly not to the workers? To whom is it made invisible? If not to the workers, then how does
ideology operate to manufacture their consent, even enthusiastic participation, in the capitalist
economy? Is this where gendering takes place, worker and capitalist as male, consumer as
female? To whom is the "reality" hidden and how? What life does the commodity take on in this
masking? Is the life of the commodity in this process of invisibility the point at which the
distinction between ideology and fetishism becomes crucial to talk about? (I respond to some of
these questions at greater length than I do here in my concluding reflections).
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Let me, then, digress from the question of the consumer to move on to the question of the
subject, who has been posed as a consumer-in-waiting through this chapter, but who has also,
especially in Chapters 5 and 7 when I have talked about genomics enterprises in India, been
implicitly the subject-as-citizen. If one is to pose the question of the relationship between
subjectivity and consumption at all, it is equally necessary to pose the question of the relationship
between subjectivity and citizenship, and the role of the nation-state in the formation of subjects
as both citizens and consumers, and citizens by virtue of their consumptive capability, sometimes,
though not always (in Chapter 5, for instance, the mode of citizenship that gets conceived is one
of citizen as genetic resource: if genetic material is deemed unproblematically to be the
"property" of the nation-state, then surely that is both by virtue of and leads to a certain form of
citizenship conferred upon the bearers of that genetic material).
I make the claim here, then, in an apparent digression from the subject (in all senses) of
this chapter, that the problem of subjectivity cannot be reduced to the problem of the potentially
consumptive subject without, at least partly, posing the problem in terms of citizenship. If one
cannot understand biosociality without theorizing biocapitalism, one can equally not do so
without theorizing what Adriana Petryna calls biological citizenship (see Petryna 1999, 2002).
Biological citizenship can be conferred by disaster (as Petryna shows in her work on the fall-out,
radiological and political, of the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine); by a medical intervention such
as an operation (as Lawrence Cohen shows in his analysis of the ethical-political issues
surrounding organ transplantation in South India; see Cohen 1999); by genetic constitution, or by
being the experimental site of clinical trials (the former in the case of the logic of population
genetics as it gets employed by the Indian state and elsewhere; the latter as illustrated by my
vignette on Wellspring Hospital in Parel in Chapter 5). This is because biocapital is not just about
ontological emergence, it is also about political emergence. As Balibar poses the relationship
between subject and citizen (before going on to problematize the relationship as posed in this
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way): "[A]fter the subject comes the citizen. For the 'subject', which has haunted the whole
problematic of liberty and of the individual.. .for fifteen centuries, is not an ontological figure...,
but a legal, political, theological, and moral figure, that os a subjectus or subditus, i.e., a
dependent, believing, and obedient individual" (Balibar 1995: 152).
If the subject, then, transitions into the political being that is citizen, then, equally, the
citizen is always already a subject, again; she is the newly re-emerged subject. So in the transition
from subject to citizen, as Balibar continues, nothing changes, to the extent that the citizen, that
which the subject has become, is still a subject. And yet everything changes: the modes of
subjectivation, the subject categories, the normativities associated with those categorizations, and
so on. Therefore, as we move towards a diagnostic regime with the patient-in-waiting as always
already a consumer-in-waiting, the question is not what "new subjectivity" is created in the
process (as if that "subjectivity" can be defined entirely with reference to itself), but rather is
what changes in the entire system of normative structures that combine to create a citizen-subject
as consumer, subjected to corporate evaluations and (their own and others') risk calculus?
Further, what is at stake in a regime of personalized medicine, that always sees the practice of
medicine as a practice of diagnostic knowledge preceding therapeutic (which may be preventive)
action, is not just management or insurance, for undergirding such regimes are deep-rooted
questions about the relationships of identity to survival.
In other words, I am not interested in investigating subjectivity per se as much as I am,
like Balibar (1995), in exploring the modes of subjection: which further, I argue, is the dialectic
inverse of modes of production. Trying to understand the dynamics of consumption without
reducing capitalism to a process of consumption has to involve rereading the assumed binary of
production and consumption as a process of cause and effect as, instead, a dialectic ofproduction
and subjection, where, as Marx is fundamentally concerned with showing, production is always
already subjected to modes of subjection. Indeed, he says as much in the Grundrisse:
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Consumption creates the motive for production; it also creates the object which is active
in production as its determinate aim. If it is clear that production offers consumption its
external object, it is therefore equally clear that consumption ideally posits the object of
production as an internal image, as a need, as drive and as purpose. It creates the objects
of production in a still subjective form.... Production thus creates not only an object for
the subject, but also a subject for the object.23 5
The question then becomes one of how modes of subjection extend beyond simply
subjectivizing modes of production, while staying attentive to the ways in which modes of
production are themselves subject to changing modes of subjection (as I have explored in Chapter
4 while talking about labor). The task is to understand, together, modes of production and modes
of subjection, where a mode of production is always already a mode of subjection, and a mode of
subjection is always already a mode of production. Consumption, then, is a particular, produced
mode of subjection, with all the ambivalences of subjugation on the one hand, and becoming
subject (as agent, articulate) on the other, just as citizenship is a particular, produced mode of
subjection.
* ********
With this context, I move back to talk about risk, which, as I argued in section 8.2, is the
definining heuristic around which the consumptive subjectivity of personalized medicine takes
shape. As I have just posed the question above, it becomes important to explore how, as we move
towards a diagnostic regime with the patient-in-waiting as always already a consumer-in-waiting,
the question is not what "new subjectivity" is created in the process (as if that "subjectivity" can
be defined entirely with reference to itself), but rather is what changes in the entire system of
normative structures that combine to create a citizen-subject as consumer, subjected to corporate
evaluations and (their own and others') risk calculus? For this, it is important to talk about risk in
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235 Marx 1973 (1858): 91-92.
terms of some of the questions I posed in Chapters 6 and 7, regarding vision, hype, nation and
salvation.
Fundamentally, risk is imbricated in a dialectical relationship between prophecy and
contingency, where prophecy is a way of both calculating contingency (through risk:benefit
analyses, calculations of insurance premiums, investment decisions based on "due diligence" and
so on - and remember, that the patient-consumptive subject's risk of future illness can only be
situated as risk when it is acknowledged that it is a risk that is calculated in the midst of a whole
range of calculations of risk that see risk as capital), and of taming it, at least partly by conjuring
a tendential future through the prophecy. Therefore, the calculation of risk as a mode of
prophecy, which is always already a process of prophesizing as a mode of coming to terms with
risk, could be about getting investors to invest in companies through investor pitches and story
stocks (see Chapter 5), but could also, in the same way, be about getting patients-in-waiting to
undertake pre-emptive or prophylactic actions on the basis of diagnostic tests. These tests can
offset the risk to the drug developer of:
a. The patient-in-waiting never falling ill and becoming a patient (and thereby
never becoming part of the market segment that consumes drugs upon falling
ill),
b. A drug never getting developed in the first place for the diagnosis (failure to
find adequate targets, or failures in clinical trials), and
c. A particular drug in question not being the prescription of choice for a
particular patient (market competition).
In other words, a diagnostic test, which is a marker of an individual's risk of future
illness, is also a strategy to offset the drug development company's risk of limited market size
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(not enough patients with a disease), limited market share (too many other drugs for that
indication) and failures in drug development or adverse events after marketing.
Pat O'Malley's distinction between risk and uncertainty in the thought of the 1920s
economist Frank Knight is useful for thinking about the difference between prophecy and
contingency (O'Malley 2000). He refers to Knight's distinction between risk as the "statistically
calculable or predictive model that is descended from positivism" and uncertainty "the non-
statistically calculable model that is relevant to the creative activity of the entrepreneur" (462). In
other words, the binary that O'Malley sees Knight as setting up between risk and uncertainty can
map on, as a binary, to corporations versus entrepreneurs, probability versus possibility.
I purposely do not point to either biotech or pharma here, because of course the different
market niches that are likely to be at stake for different sorts of companies involved in drug
discovery and development is very much at stake. But the type of company for which this sort of
rationality - of diagnostic development offsetting the risk of being in the business of therapeutic
development - is most likely to manifest itself as central to its business strategy is a company like
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, that is not yet a well-entrenched big pharmaceutical company, that
depends on genomic technologies in large measure for its drug discovery efforts, that claims it
wants to become a drug development company, that needs to continue to generate short-term
revenue on its route to becoming one in order to survive long enough to become one, and that
also has a diagnostics business lurking quite centrally in its business model. If genomic medicine,
broadly defined, is a "revolution" or a "paradigm shift" of any sort, then it is of a sort where the
companies that hope to be the vanguards of the "revolution" like Millennium, are most likely to
exhibit its attributes.
Perhaps the most interesting corporate marker of an emergent regime of "post-genomic"
medicine, that explicitly sees itself as changing and operating upon changed institutional and
normative structures, changed grounds upon which citizens, consumers and subjects get defined,
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is Genomic Health, which is a company I have mentioned in Chapter 5 while talking about Randy
Scott and Patrick Terry. To talk more about Genomic Health, it is important to revisit Scott's
modes of prophecy, that I have talked about at some length in Chapter 6 in connection to his role
as founder and Chief Scientific Officer of Incyte. When Scott was pitching Incyte, for example at
The Institute of Genomic Research (TIGR)'s industrial conference in Miami in 1999, it was an
investor pitch where his potential consumers were pharmaceutical companies. With Genomic
Health, his potential consumers are lay people, the patients and consumers-in-waiting that I have
talked about in this chapter. This leads to a whole different understanding, different time-lines,
analogies with the computer industry, and a coincidence with Patrick Terry's line about patients
and consumers that I mentioned in Chapter 5, when Scott pitches Genomic Health.236
Scott's conception of historical phases was always, as I mentioned in Chapter 6, central
to his mode of pitching stories, even for Incyte. His pitches for Genomic Health see him periodize
the "history" of genomics into decades - the 1 980s, when the first companies bring products into
the market based on classical DNA efforts; the 1990s, an era of industrialization and high-
throughput technologies; and the 2000s, which he calls the era of consumer genomics, where
biological information merged with internet capabilities will be key. In other words, the driving
assemblages of emergent, "post-genomic" medicine, in Scott's opinion, are biological
information (such as diagnostics), communications technologies that mediate such information as
they travel to lay patients (the internet), and the consequent networking of biosocial communities
such as patient advocacy groups as a consequence. It is a vision that has as its kernel the sort of
consumptive power that is evidenced by groups such as PXE International (see Chapters 5 and 7).
Scott, therefore, has a vision of "consumer genomics" that is completely entwined with
his vision of Genomic Health as a company, and which sees patients directly buying access to
236 I draw my account of Scott's pitch for Genomic Health from a talk given at a session on "Post-Genomic
Medicine", at the 2001 Genome TriConference, an investor conference held in San Francisco, on 7 March
2001.
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information and technologies, thereby seriously decentering the role of physicians.
Pharmaceutical companies, in this vision, are still involved in therapeutic development, but Scott
realizes that the lag between the development of diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities creates an
ethnographic window, an ethnographic window that is absolutely critical to the existence of
Genomic Health as a company.
Scott, then, outlines his individuized notion of consumer genomics as follows:
Genomics is inherently personal. This is not about big industrial units that are bringing
out products for other companies.37 Everyone of us sits here with a genome, and a
genome is our own particular story. My family has its story...they were a perfectly
normal family, they thought they had no genetic disease, no genetic defects..... [But] no
matter how healthy we may think we are, ultimately we will all face the reality of our
genetic faults, and the diseases that are coming at us in the future. So we are all in this
together.2 38
In this one quote, Scott points to many of the themes that I have covered in this thesis. He
encapsulates his own visionary biography, superimposed upon the history, as he sees it, of
genomics - moving away from and beyond the vision of Incyte (which he leaves at a moment
when its own business model threatens it with obsolescence, as I've mentioned earlier), a
movement that is portrayed as a natural following of the course of the history of a science that is
always already a corporate endeavor. But it is also a personal voyage, an individuation whose
limitations are immediately evident, in that it is an individuation that cannot be made sense of
without being placed in larger population contexts. Avoiding adroitly the fundamental difficulties
of classifying populations that I have pointed to earlier in this chapter, difficulties that are an
acute scientific and business reality for those who invest in population genomics as their vision of
and route to future monetary and therapeutic salvation, Scott automatically uses the family as the
237 Which of course exactly is what Incyte is.
238 Randy Scott, talk given at the Genome TriConference, San Francisco, CA, March 7 2001.
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basis of his relevant population unit - a unit, of course, that is comfortably Christian, moral and
value-laden, for one who himself is driven considerably (as mentioned in Chapter 7) by his
Christian faith. Ultimately, everyone is enrolled as part of a Christian odyssey towards their
respective genetic days of reckoning, but in the process, as Scott managed to do for his employees
at Incyte (see Chapters 3 and 5), he conjures up the image of a community, the community of
patients-in-waiting, who are always already consumers-in-waiting. For lest we forget this voyage
is over-determined by the market, Scott immediately proceeds: "So the issue is how we bring
these products to the market, how we bring them to the consumer".2 3 9
Scott's conception of consumer genomics reflects what Pat O'Malley (2000) describes as
an emergent "enterprising prudentialism". O'Malley says: "the subjects of this technology of risk
are imagined as consumers (albeit 'sovereign consumers'), for, as elsewhere in discourses of the
freedom of choice, their liberty exists in the capacity to choose rationally among available options
and to assemble from these the risk-minimizing elements of a responsible lifestyle" (465). While
the latter part of this description is inherent to the very rationale of personalized medicine as a
practice of medicine that is, in the first instance, preventive, the key addition that Scott explicitly
makes, and which forms the basis of potential value for Genomic Health, is that risk-
minimization and prevention is not dictated by the discriminatory practices of employers or
health management organizations, or by the expert (and thereby, it is implied, forcible)
interventions of physicians, but by patients themselves, who necessarily have to be configured as
rational actors in the way that advertising conceives of them thus, and have to be given the
appearance of "free choice" amongst a highly constrained set of options that are available, in any
case, only to those who occupy the class position from which to exercise such "free" choice.
Diagnostic tests and preventive or therapeutic options, in Scott's business model, become
consumables in exactly the same way that soap or perfumes are. The DNA chip, that I introduced
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this dissertation with, is precisely such a technology that creates "free" (in the utilitarian sense of
having rational choices of self-governance) subjects of uncertainty, who get subjected to a
rationality of perpetual possible consumption, and a rationality that simultaneously demands
"rational" self-governance - a governance itself that gets effected through further consumption.
In this situation, then, one comes back to the question of governmentality that I started
this section with. For after all, "rational" consumer choice, as assumed by corporations selling to
those consumers, cannot afford to be quite as banal or simplistic in its assumptions of consumer
rationality as rational choice sociology or political science can, since the very future of the
company is at stake if consumers act "irrationally". Indeed, there are clearly many ways in which
people can respond to the results of genetic tests, as responses to Myriad's breast cancer tests for
the brca genes has shown. What a range of business models - not just Genomic Health's, but also
those of diagnostics companies', drug discovery and development companies', health
management organizations' and so on - depend upon in an era of personalized medicine is not so
much rational action as reasonable action - and it is, indeed, in a notion of reasonable rather than
rational (as propounded by rational choice theorists) governance that Foucault concerns himself
with in his exposition on governmentality (see Foucault 1990; this notion of "reasonable" rather
than "rational" governance also figures prominently in O'Malley 2000). Indeed, throughout this
dissertation I have mentioned actors - including venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, pharmaceutical
companies, biosocial agents, policy makers and patients as / and consumers - who need
constantly to calculate their futures precisely because of the difficulty of calculating them. The
question that is important to stay attentive to, and trace answers to, is how such "reasonable"
governances articulate, at and through different institutional sites, national contexts and historical
and strategic conjunctures.
My opposition of the "rational" to the "reasonable" brings to the fore the notion of
common sense. Indeed, O'Malley points to the "deep well of assumptions about common-sense
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reasoning and uncertainty as fundamental conditions of the autonomy of the rationally
calculating, free subjects of liberalism" (O'Malley 000: 479). I however also point to common-
sense in the sense that Gramsci used it, as the grounds for hegemonic praxis. Personalized
medicine, or genomics, or drug development is not the teleological outcome of technoscientific
progress, as scientists like Francis Collins and Victor McCusick portray it, but is, ultimately, a
hegemonic struggle. I have tried in this dissertation to stay attentive both to the structural
constraints that form the grounds for such struggle, and to the strategic and contingent
articulations that give it shape.
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Appendix 1: Dissertation field sites in the United States and India
Long-term participant observation (few weeks to few months)
· GeneEd, Inc. Start-up company in San Francisco, CA, January - May 2001
* Entrepreneurial Pharmaceutical Professionals of the Indian Continent (EPPIC). Organization
of Indian entrepreneurs based in the Silicon Valley, seeking to create and sustain
biotechnological transfer between the United States and India, and also to mentor young
Indian entrepreneurs in the I Tnited States. January - May 2001
· Ongoing research with PXE International, a patient advocacy group organized to advocate the
cause of sufferers of the rare genetic disorder pseudoxanthoma elasticum. PXE International
advances the case for research on PXE by biotech companies, and has further entered into
agreements with biotech companies in which intellectual property for such research using
samples from PXE patients gets shared with the patient group.
* National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources (NBPGR), New Delhi, India. A public repository
of plant germplasm. July - August 1999.
* Centre for Biochemical Technology (CBT), Delhi, India. The major public laboratory in India
that is focussing on genomics related work. December 2001 - January 2002.
* Genomed, Delhi, India. Genomics start-up seeded by CBT in collaboration with the
pharmaceutical company Nicholas Piramal, to focus to commercialization of genomic
research undertaken at CBT. Represents new model of academic - industrial partnership in
India. December 2001 - January 2002.
Short visits (I - 2 days)
· National Center for Biotechnology Information, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, IVnD.
Repository for GenBank, the major public DNA sequence repository.
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· Cold Spring Harbor Genome Sequence and Analysis Meetings, 1999 and 2000. This is the
major annual gathering of researchers of the public Human Genome Project (HGP).
· The Institute of Genomic Research (TIGR)'s Genome Sequencing and Biology Meetings,
Miami, FL, 1999 and 2000. Organized by J. Craig Venter's non-profit research organization
TIGR, this is one of the largest annual industrial genome conferences.
e Cambridge Healthtech Institute's Genome TriConference, San Francisco, CA, 2001. This is
one of the largest annual genomic investor meetings.
* Whitehead Center for Functional Genomics, Cambridge, MA. One of the major academic
centers of the HGP.
* Genomics Collaborative, Inc., Cambridge, MA. Company that hopes to become the world's
largest commercial DNA repository, which it hopes to leverage towards in-house and out-
licensed genomics based therapeutic development.
o Variagenics, Cambridge, MA. A leading functional genomics company that is developing
pharmacogenomic strategies towards the development of personalized medicine.
* Incyte Genomics, Palo Alto, CA. One of the major genome companies that sells sequencing
services and sequence databases.
· Affymetrix, Santa Clara, CA. The company that developed the DNA (SNP) Chip, a major
tool that enables high-throughput genetic variation studies (known as single nucleotide
polymorphism, or SNP, analysis).
* National Chemical Laboratories, Pune, India. The most successful business sector specific lab
of India's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).
· Centre for Biochemical Technology (CBT), Delhi, India (see above).
* Genomed, Delhi, India (see above).
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· Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology (CCMB), Hyderabad, India. One of the most
prestigious molecular biology research institutes of the CSIR.
· Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics (CDFD), Hyderabad, India. A CSIR lab that
provides DNA testing services for forensics and diagnostics.
* Dr. Reddy's Laboratories (DRL), Hyderabad, India. One of India's largest pharmaceutical
companies, and the earliest to set up its own R & D foundation.
* Orchid Pharmaceuticals, Chennai, India. A smaller and newer pharmaceutical company than
its more established competitor DRL.
* Astra-Zeneca Research Foundation, Bangalore, India. A subsidiary of the global
multinational pharmaceutical giant Astra-Zeneca.
* Biocon, Bangalore, India. One of India's oldest biotech companies.
* Strand Genomics, Bangalore, India. Start-up bioinformatics company that does contract work
for American companies as well as develops its own proprietary algorithms.
* Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Hyderabad, India. One of India's most powerful software
companies and now increasingly interested in moving into bioinformatics.
* ICICI Knowledge Park, Hyderabad, India. Set up by the government of Andhra Pradesh and
the financial service provider ICICI, this is a research park that enables companies to lease
space on subsidized land and have access to state-of-the-art research facilities in a
collaborative environment. Modeled upon similar knowledge parks in Singapore.
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Appendix 2: Texts of agreements for access at GeneEd and CBT
Reproduced below are the texts of the two modified "non-disclosure agreements" that I
signed, with GeneEd and CBT. Hopefully, they will both provide a template for other work of
this sort, and also highlight the issues that are of most concern to the actors in these two different
institutional and national environments.
Agreement relating to confidentiality issues arising from information exchange in the
course of academic research program
This agreement is made between GeneEd, Inc. ("GENEED, INC."), a California
Corporation, and Kaushik Sunder Rajan / Michael M.J. Fischer / Joseph Dumit / Sheila Jasanoff
(Recipient). GENEED, INC. and Recipient hereby agree that it may be necessary to provide the
Recipient with certain technical or business information considered to be proprietary or
confidential information of GENEED, INC.
The term "Information", as used in this agreement, shall mean any and all
GENEED,INC. technical and business information, whether written, oral or graphic, that
GENEED, INC. may disclose or reveal to the Recipient, including but not limited to financial
plans and records, marketing plans, business strategies and relationships with third parties, client
lists, present and proposed products, trade secrets, computer software programs and descriptions
of functions and features of software, source code, computer hardware designs, information
regarding customers and suppliers, founders, employees and affiliates.
NOW THEREFORE, the Recipient hereby agrees to receive such information of
GENEED, INC. subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. Recipient agrees not to use any Information for any purpose except as part of an academic
project that includes interactions between Recipient and GENEED, INC. Recipient shall not
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reverse engineer, disassemble or decompile any prototypes, software or other tangible objects
which embody GENEED, INC.'s information and which are provided to recipient hereunder.
2. The Recipient will not make more copies of the Information than is necessary. Recipient shall
reproduce GENEED, INC.'s proprietary rights notices on any such copies, in the same manner in
which such notices were set forth in or on the original. Recipient agrees that it shall take all
reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of and avoid the unauthorized use of the Information.
Without limiting the foregoing, Recipient shall take at least those measures that Recipient takes to
protect its own most highly confidential information. Recipient shall immediately notify
GENEED, INC. in the event of any unauthorized use of the Information.
3. The Recipient shall not have any obligation with respect to any Information or any portion
thereof which the Recipient can demonstrate by competent evidence:
(i) was already known to the receiving party, other than under an obligation of confidentiality, at
the time of disclosure;
(ii) was generally known to the public or was otherwise part of the public domain at the time of
disclosure to the receiving party;
(iii) became generally available to the public or otherwise part of the public domain after its
disclosure and other than any act or omission of the receiving party in breach of this Agreement;
(iv) was independently developed by the receiving party without reference to any information or
materials disclosed by the disclosing party; or
(v) was subsequently disclosed to the receiving party by a person other than a party without
breach of any legal obligation to the disclosing party.
4. No license to the Recipient for the Information for any trademark, patent or copyright, or other
rights which are now or may thereafter be owned or asserted by GENEED, INC. or any
subsidiary thereof is either granted or implied by this Agreement. This excludes any audio
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recordings (henceforth "Recordings") that the Recipient might make of the voice of employees of
GENEED, INC. as well as written or oral descriptions of GENEED, INC.'s employees and their
activities for use in the Recipient's research and educational activities. GENEED, INC.
acknowledges that the Recipient is the sole author of the Recordings, and owns the entire rig:t,
title and interest in and to all copyrights in the Recordings, including the right to create derivative
works based on the Recordings. GENEED, INC. acknowledges that it owns no copyright or any
other right in or to the Recordings. GENEED, INC. does, however, have the right to request
erasure of any part of a Recording at the time of its creation or within twenty-one days of being
provided with a transcript of the Recording; however, this right shall apply only to Recordings on
which the voice or a description of activities of GENEED, INC.'s employee is first fixed, and
shall not apply to Recordings which contain no material concerning GENEED, INC. other than
material contained in an earlier completed Recording.
5. A copy of any Recording will be made available to GENEED, INC. for viewing if requested, in
order that GENEED, INC. may address issues of proprietary technical and business information
only that may be contained in the Recording. GENEED, INC. does not have the right to dictate to
the Recipient any views that the Recipient might express that are not the views of GENEED,
INC. or its employees, as long as the Recipient makes clear that the views expressed are either
those of the Recipient itself or of third parties not party to this Agreement.
6. GENEED, INC. does not wish to receive any confidential information fiom Recipient, and
GENEED, INC. assumes no obligation, either express or implied, with respect to any information
disclosed by Recipient.
7. Nothing herein shall :obligate GENEED, INC. or Recipient to proceed with any interaction
between them, and each party reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to terminate the discussions
contemplated by this Agreement concerning the academic relationship.
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8. ALL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS". GENEED, INC. MAKES NO
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, REGARDING ITS ACCURACY,
COMPLETENESS OR PERFORMANCE.
9. The Recipient recognizes and acknowledges that the Information may have competitive value
and be of a confidential nature and that irreparable damage might result to GENEED, INC. if
Information is improperly disclosed by the Recipient to a third party. Accordingly, the Recipient
agrees that legal proceedings at law or in equity, including injunctive relief, may be appropriate in
the event of a breach thereof. THIS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PROPER USE
OF THIS INFORMATION BY THE RECIPIENT THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS FOR
ACADEMIC AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ONCE ISSUES OF
CONFIDENTIALITY RELATING TO THE RECORDINGS MADE BY THE RECIPIENT
HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED BY GENEED, INC. AS SET OUT IN SECTIONS 4 AND 5
ABOVE. Such proper use includes the textual but not audio use of the Information in modified or
unmodified form in academic journal publications, academic conference presentations, academic
theses or dissertations, newspaper articles, artistic presentations or books that the Recipient might
author or contribute to.
10. GENEED, INC. also releases the Recipient from any and all claims of any nature whatsoever
which GENEED, INC. may now or hereafter have in connection with the Recordings, including
but not limited to claims based on defamation, copyright infringement, trademark infringement,
or infringement of any rights of privacy or rights to publicity of GENEED, INC. or its employees.
At GENEED, INC.'s request, the Recipient will anonymize the name of the company and
identifying features of the company, as well as anonymize the individuals in the company who
talk to the Recipient or grant the Recipient interviews. Employees of GENEED, INC. who grant
the Recipient permission to tape interviews will always have the right to ask the Recipient to turn
off the tape recorder.
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11. The Recipient wishes to have as full access as possible to personnel, daily activities and
meetings at GENEED, INC., including taping some interviews, but will grant confidentiality to
all individuals who request it. If the Recipient quotes excerpts from taped interviews, it will only
name the interviewees with their express permission and only do so as long as it does not
compromise their anonymity as outlined in section 10.
12. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their successors
and assigns. This document contains the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the
subject matter hereof. Additional agreements relating to recordings of conversations between the
Recipient and individual employees of GENEED, INC. will be entered into in order to address
issues of confidentiality and copyright relating to the Recordings, so long as such agreements do
not violate the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The terms and conditions specified in
sections 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of this Agreement shall survive termination of this Agreement. This
Agreement may not be amended, nor any obligation waived, except by a writing signed by both
parties hereto.
13. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of California.
14. This Agreement shall survive until such time as all Information disclosed hereunder becomes
publicly known and made generally available, including through actions of the Recipient through
appropriate channels as outlined in sections 9, 10 and 1 of this Agreement.
Text of Agreement with CBT
This agreement made and entered into on this 17di day of January 2002 between Council
of Scientific and Industrial Research, a Society registered under the societies registration Act
(XXI of 1860), having its registered office at Anusandhan Bhawan, 2, Rafi Marg, New Delhi -
110001 through its laboratory Centre for Biochemical Technology located at Mall Road, Delhi -
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110007 (hereinafter called CSIR / CBT which expression shall where the context so admits
include its successors and permitted assigns) on the one part.
And
Mr. Kaushik Sunder Rajan, Research Scholar and his advisors, Michael M.J. Fischer, Joseph
Dumit, Sheila Jasanoff and Donna Haraway, from Science, Technology and Society Program at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology [sic], Cambridge, MA 02139, USA (hereinafter
collectively called "Investigators").
PREAMBLE
Investigators are involved in a research project which looks at emergent models of post genomic
research in the United States and India and leading to Ph.D. title. CBT has been identified as the
key site for this study because of its pioneering role in conducting and coordinating Genomics
research in India and also because of the lead CBT has taken in initiating development of novel
methods of academic-industrial interaction in the field of Genomics.
This agreement spells out the terms and conditions of confidentiality and anonymity under which
Investigators shall conduct the studied cited above at CBT.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1. The Investigators agree to keep confidential any proprietary information of CBT that they
might obtain in the course of their research project. Disclosure of any proprietary information of
CSIR / CBT shall be made only with the prior written consent of the Director, CBT. Meanwhi!e,
CSIR / CBT will allow the Investigators to make public any non-proprietary information for
academic purposes. These academic purposes include, but are not restricted to, conference
presentations, journal and newspaper articles and grant proposals.
2. During the course of research, the Investigators will conduct many tape-recorded interviews
with employees at CBT. The Investigators will respect any requests for anonymity by the
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interviewees and / or CSIR / CBT during these interviews. Further, the Investigators will conduct
tape recorded interviews only with the express permission of the interviewees, and will turn off
the tape recorder whenever requested by the interviewee.
3. The Investigators will make available to the interviewees' [sic] copies of tape & transcripts of
their interviews within a reasor.able period of time. The interviewees and CSIR / CBT will have
30 days after the receipt of the transcripts to address with the Investigators issues of
confidentiality arising from the interviews. Any request to erase portions of the interviews
because of sensitive, confidential or proprietary information therein will be complied by the
Investigators.
4. There will be no monetary payment by CSIR / CBT to the Investigators in their capacity as
Investigators, and CSIR / CBT will not have the right to dictate or influence the content of any
written documents (papers or articles) by the Investigators except to the extent that direct issues
of confidentiality are concerned. However the papers articles or publications arising out of this
study shall be co-authored with CBT scientists / PI Genomics program CBT, if he wishes to be,
based on the intellectual input given by CBT for the this study [sic].
5. The copyrights of any interview materials or transcripts will reside with the Investigators only.
6. In case the study / research program leads to new knowledge, and is used by investigators or
any organisation for commercial gains, then the commercial gains shall be shared between CSIR /
CBT and investigators in proportion to intellectual input of each party.
7. CSIR / CBT will not be held responsible for the content of the Investigators' research findings,
even if it pertains to CSIR / CBT or to any other individuals / groups / organisations about which
the Investigators might write.
8. Investigators shall not file any application for seeking intellectual property rights in its own
name or in the name of its associates or any other person on matters relating to the studies
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wherein information about CSIR / CBT is involved without seeking written approval of Director
- CBT.
9. Investigators shall not use the information parted by CSIR / CBT in the study for purpose other
than specified in preamble and clause 1.
10. This agreement is valid independent of any other agreements that any of the Investigators
might choose to sign with CSIR / CBT for purposes other than that of this research project.
ARBITRATION
In the event of any dispute or difference between the parties hereto, such disputes or differences
shall be resolved amicably by mutual consultation. If such resolution is not possible, the
unresolved dispute or difference shall be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one
appointed by each party and an umpire appointed by two arbitrators. The three will constitute the
Arbitral Tribunal, which shall hold its proceedings in Delhi and in accordance with Indian
arbitration act, 1996.
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